14 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aaron Lontinegreen2 sentences2020She also points to our holding in State v. Lontine for the proposition that to establish a potential threat to others under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a, the State must meet a clear-and-convincing standard of proof, and argues that the clear-and-convincing standard cannot be met in this case. 2016 VT 26, ¶¶ 45-46 , 201 Vt. 637 , 142 A.3d 1058 (mem.). ¶ 23. 2020She also points to our holding in State v. Lontine for the proposition that to establish a potential threat to others under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a, the State must meet a clear-and-convincing standard of proof, and argues that the clear-and-convincing standard cannot be met in this case. 2016 VT 26, ¶¶ 45-46 , 201 Vt. 637 , 142 A.3d 1058 (mem.). ¶ 23. | 2 | 4 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (conc 2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (co | 2 | 3 |
State v. David Downinggreen2 sentences2024Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 2020 VT 84, ¶ 18 , 213 Vt. 322 (quotations omitted); see State v. Lontine, 2016 VT 26, ¶¶ 46-47 , 201 Vt. 637 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Downing, 2020 VT 101, ¶ 22 , 213 Vt. 468 . 2023Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 2020 VT 84, ¶ 18 , 213 Vt. 322 ; see State v. Lontine, 2016 VT 26, ¶¶ 46-47 , 201 Vt. 637 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Downing, 2020 VT 101, ¶ 22 , 213 Vt. 468 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re ADgreen2 sentences1986Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982); In re A. D., 143 Vt. 432, 435 , 467 A.2d 121, 123 (1983). 1986Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re A.D., 143 Vt. 432, 435 , 467 A.2d 121, 123 (1983). | 2 | 2 |
In re Assistant Judge Paul Kanegreen2 sentences2023The clear and convincing standard “does not require that evidence in support of a fact be uncontradicted, but does require that the fact’s existence be highly probable.” In re Kane, 2017 VT 48 , 204 Vt. 635 , 637, 169 A.3d 180, 183 (mem.) (quotation omitted). 2023The clear and convincing standard “does not require that evidence in support of a fact be uncontradicted, but does require that the fact’s existence be highly probable.” In re Kane, 2017 VT 48 , 204 Vt. 635 , 637, 169 A.3d 180, 183 (mem.) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Baldwin v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Id.; see, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 126 Vt. 70, 77 , 223 A.2d 556, 561 (1966) (concluding admission of photographs, even if in error, was harmless because they were cumulative of other evidence). 10 ¶ 20. 2024Id.; see, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 126 Vt. 70, 77 , 223 A.2d 556, 561 (1966) (concluding admission of photographs, even if in error, was harmless because they were cumulative of other evidence). 10 ¶ 20. | 1 | 1 |
In re the Estate of Manvillegreen1 sentence2019See Application of Last Will & Testament of Manville, 447 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
In re C.L. & H.L.green2 sentences2015While the trial court must certainly apply a clear-and-convincing standard in deciding these cases, this Court has not required “an explicit statement by the trial courts as to the standard employed in parental termination cases.” In re C.L., 151 Vt. 480, 488 (1989). 2015To determine if the proper standard was met, we examine “the language used by the trial court.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Stanley D. v. Deborah D.green1 sentence2014See Tailor v. Becker, 708 A.2d 626, 628-29 (Del. 1998) (rejecting constitutional challenge to statute permitting custody to be given to custodial stepparent over noncustodial parent after custodial natural parent’s death, based on conclusion that statute did not irrevocably terminate natural parent’s rights but rather permitted parent-child contact and requests for modification of custody order); cf. Stanley D., 467 A.2d at 251 (stating that order awarding joint custody to stepparent and natural parent was not equivalent to termination of parental rights and therefore did not require proof of | 1 | 1 |
Tailor v. Beckergreen1 sentence2014See Tailor v. Becker, 708 A.2d 626, 628-29 (Del. 1998) (rejecting constitutional challenge to statute permitting custody to be given to custodial stepparent over noncustodial parent after custodial natural parent’s death, based on conclusion that statute did not irrevocably terminate natural parent’s rights but rather permitted parent-child contact and requests for modification of custody order); cf. Stanley D., 467 A.2d at 251 (stating that order awarding joint custody to stepparent and natural parent was not equivalent to termination of parental rights and therefore did not require proof of | 1 | 1 |
Hoversten v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (conc 2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (co | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Manzogreen2 sentences2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (conc 2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (co | 1 | 1 |
McAlister v. Shavergreen2 sentences2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (conc 2011As discussed at length in Mullin , however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. 162 Vt. at 265-67 , 647 A.2d at 723-24 ; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (co | 1 | 1 |
Bardill Land & Lumber, Inc. v. Davisgreen2 sentences1986See Bardill Land & Lumber, Inc. v. Davis, 135 Vt. 81 , 370 A.2d 212 (1977). *206 The defendants do not contest any of the court’s stated findings, and therefore they are binding. 1986See Bardill Land & Lumber, Inc. v. Davis, 135 Vt. 81 , 370 A.2d 212 (1977). *206 The defendants do not contest any of the court’s stated findings, and therefore they are binding. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Megan Lanfear v. Jamie Ruggerio and Lisa Diane Fennimore
green
2 sentences2024Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 2020 VT 84, ¶ 18 , 213 Vt. 322 (quotations omitted); see State v. Lontine, 2016 VT 26, ¶¶ 46-47 , 201 Vt. 637 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Downing, 2020 VT 101, ¶ 22 , 213 Vt. 468 . 2023Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 2020 VT 84, ¶ 18 , 213 Vt. 322 ; see State v. Lontine, 2016 VT 26, ¶¶ 46-47 , 201 Vt. 637 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Downing, 2020 VT 101, ¶ 22 , 213 Vt. 468 . | 2 | 2023–2024 |
In re A. D.
green
2 sentences1986Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982); In re A. D., 143 Vt. 432, 435 , 467 A.2d 121, 123 (1983). 1986Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re A.D., 143 Vt. 432, 435 , 467 A.2d 121, 123 (1983). | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Mullin v. Phelps
green
2 sentences2011The court also specifically held that there was not sufficient evidence of abuse to meet the clear and convincing standard required to terminate all parent-child contact, citing to Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250 , 647 A.2d 714 (1994). 2011The court also specifically held that there was not sufficient evidence of abuse to meet the clear and convincing standard required to terminate all parent-child contact, citing to Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250 , 647 A.2d 714 (1994). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Witt v. Moran
green
2 sentences1993Id. 1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.