clear and convincing standard in Illinois

2025The court held that “due process does not require imposition of a clear and convincing standard of proof at a best-interests hearing, and that the preponderance standard of proof adequately ensures the level of certainty about the court’s factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process.” Id. at 366 .

2025The clear-and-convincing standard “requires proof greater than a preponderance, but not quite approaching the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 , 362 (2004). ¶ 18 The statute provides a non-exclusive list of factors “to be considered in making a determination of dangerousness” that the trial court may consider in assessing whether the -5- No. 1-25-0588B defendant poses a threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).

2007Because the trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses in an involuntary admissions proceeding, the trial court’s decision “ ‘will not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear and convincing standard, would have ruled differently’ [citation], unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Bennett, 251 Ill.

2007The trial court’s decision is given great deference and, absent a showing that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it “ ‘will not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear and convincing standard, would have ruled differently.’ ” In re Bennett, 251 Ill.

2014“The clear and convincing standard requires proof greater than a The “first case” referred to is presumably the complaint filed in Indiana state court, which was 19 voluntarily dismissed. - 53 - preponderance, but not quite approaching the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004); Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995). ¶ 207 In the case at bar, we can find no support in the record for the trial court’s conclusion that Keita was involved in a fraud, much less clear and convincing evidence.

2014“The clear and convincing standard requires proof greater than a preponderance, but not quite approaching the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004); Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995). ¶ 207 In the case at bar, we can find no support in the record for the trial court’s conclusion that Keita was involved in a fraud, much less clear and convincing evidence.

2004Respondent renews her argument, rejected by the appellate court, that the Supreme Court's decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), mandates imposition of a clear and convincing standard of proof at a best-interests hearing.

2004Ed. 2d 599 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), mandates imposition of a clear and convincing standard of proof at a best-interests hearing.

2020“Under this clear and convincing standard, ‘if the facts and circumstances relied upon are as consistent with innocence as with guilt it is the duty of the court to find that the conspiracy has not been proved.’ ” McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 140 -41 (quoting Tribune Co. v. Thompson, 342 Ill. 503, 529 (1930)). ¶ 26 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the application of a heightened standard of proof at the summary judgment stage should not be construed as undermining the function of the jury or authorizing “trial[s] on affidavits.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 .

2013Further, McClure held: “Under this clear and convincing standard, ‘if the facts and circumstances relied upon are as consistent with innocence as with guilt it is the duty of the court to find that the conspiracy has not been proved.’ ” Id. at 140-41 (quoting Tribune Co. v. Thompson, 342 Ill. 503, 529 (1930)).

2019Ct. 2003); Miller v. State, 2014 UT App 280, ¶ 6 , 340 P.3d 795 (per curiam); see also Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a clear and convincing standard and also requiring the petitioner to show that “no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty”). ¶ 58 After recognizing that a defendant who pleaded guilty could raise an actual innocence claim, the Colorado Supreme Court in Schneider explained that it had previously “only articulated the standard applicable to the determination of when a defendant who has been convicted at trial m

2018Ct. 2003); Miller v. State, 2014 UT App 280, ¶ 6 , 340 P.3d 795 (per curiam); see also Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a clear and convincing standard and also requiring the petitioner to show that “no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty”). ¶ 47 After recognizing that a defendant who pleaded guilty could raise an actual innocence claim, the Colorado Supreme Court in Schneider explained that it had previously “only articulated the standard applicable to the determination of when a defendant who has been convicted at trial m

2019Ct. 2003); Miller v. State, 2014 UT App 280, ¶ 6 , 340 P.3d 795 (per curiam); see also Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a clear and convincing standard and also requiring the petitioner to show that “no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty”). ¶ 58 After recognizing that a defendant who pleaded guilty could raise an actual innocence claim, the Colorado Supreme Court in Schneider explained that it had previously “only articulated the standard applicable to the determination of when a defendant who has been convicted at trial m

2018Ct. 2003); Miller v. State, 2014 UT App 280, ¶ 6 , 340 P.3d 795 (per curiam); see also Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a clear and convincing standard and also requiring the petitioner to show that “no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty”). ¶ 47 After recognizing that a defendant who pleaded guilty could raise an actual innocence claim, the Colorado Supreme Court in Schneider explained that it had previously “only articulated the standard applicable to the determination of when a defendant who has been convicted at trial m

2019Specifically, in People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 559-60 (Colo. 1981) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme Court had determined that a defendant claiming actual innocence after a trial conviction is required to show “ ‘ “that the evidence was discovered after the trial; that defendant and his counsel exercised diligence to discover all possible evidence favorable to the defendant prior to and during the trial; that the newly discovered evidence is material to the issues involved, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and that on retrial . . . the newly discovered evidence must be of such a cha

2019Specifically, in People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 559-60 (Colo. 1981) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme Court had determined that a defendant claiming actual innocence after a trial conviction is required to show “ ‘ “that the evidence was discovered after the trial; that defendant and his counsel exercised diligence to discover all possible evidence favorable to the defendant prior to and during the trial; that the newly discovered evidence is material to the issues involved, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and that on retrial . . . the newly discovered evidence must be of such a cha

2007The trial court's decision is given great deference and, absent a showing that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it "`will not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear and convincing standard, would have ruled differently.'" In re Bennett, 251 Ill.App.3d 887, 888 , 191 Ill.Dec. 352 , 623 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1993), quoting In re Orr, 176 Ill.App.3d *802 498, 505, 125 Ill.Dec. 885 , 531 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1988).

2007The trial court's decision is given great deference and, absent a showing that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it "`will not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear and convincing standard, would have ruled differently.'" In re Bennett, 251 Ill.App.3d 887, 888 , 191 Ill.Dec. 352 , 623 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1993), quoting In re Orr, 176 Ill.App.3d *802 498, 505, 125 Ill.Dec. 885 , 531 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1988).

2019App. 3d 1015, 1029 , 566 N.E.2d 759, 768 (1991), for the proposition that the clear and convincing standard is applied to prevent inheritance by someone who has murdered the person from whom he or she stands to inherit.

2018App. 3d 1015 , 1029, 152 Ill.Dec. 882 , 566 N.E.2d 759 , 768 (1991), for the proposition that the clear and convincing standard is applied to prevent inheritance by someone who has murdered the person from whom he or she stands to inherit.

2019In re Brandon A., 395 Ill.

2018In re Brandon A. , 395 Ill.

2014See id. at 134 . ¶6 The parties in this case dispute whether the clear and convincing standard is required in removal proceedings under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.

2014See id. at 134 . ¶6 The parties in this case dispute whether the clear and convincing standard is required in removal proceedings under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.

2007Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283 , Ill L.

2004See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283 , Ill L.

2006In re Moore, 301 Ill.App.3d 759, 764 , 235 Ill.Dec. 93 , 704 N.E.2d 442, 445 (1998).

2006In re Moore, 301 Ill.App.3d 759, 764 , 235 Ill.Dec. 93 , 704 N.E.2d 442, 445 (1998).

2005Cases requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof (see, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Grissom, 150 Ill.

2005We do likewise and so hold. *857 Cases requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof (see, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Grissom, 150 Ill.