51 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People in Interest of AMDgreen2 sentences2015A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 631 (Colo. 1982) (holding that the clear and convincing standard must apply in terminating the parent-child relationship after the children have been adjudicated dependent or neglected). 2015A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 631 (Colo.1982) (holding that the clear and convincing standard must apply 'in terminating the parent-child relationship after the children have been adjudicated dependent or neglected). | 9 | 15 |
L.L. v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2011See In re A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 641 (Colo.1982); L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d at 1276 (reasoning that the greater the deprivation, the greater the procedural protection provided to parents). 2011See In re A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 641 (Colo.1982); L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d at 1276 (reasoning that the greater the deprivation, the greater the procedural protection provided to parents). | 4 | 4 |
In Re Adoption of Cagreen2 sentences2010But because the presumption that arises in favor of a fit parent's decision concerning grandparent visitation is constitutionally mandated, see C.A., 137 P.3d at 322, 327 , as is the clear and convincing standard, id., it is nevertheless appropriate to place the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence upon grandparents. 2010But because the presumption that arises in favor of a fit parent's decision concerning grandparent visitation is constitutionally mandated, see C.A., 137 P.3d at 322, 327 , as is the clear and convincing standard, id., it is nevertheless appropriate to place the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence upon grandparents. | 3 | 4 |
In Re the Parental Responsibilities of Reesegreen2 sentences2011See In re Parental Responsibilities of B.J., 242 P.8d 1128, 1188-85 (Colo.2010) (when a nonparent seeks primary care of a child, the presumption that the parent has the first and prior right to primary care may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence); In re Parental Responsibilities of Reese, 227 P.3d 900, 908 (Colo.App.2010)(when nonparent seeks allocation of parental responsibilities against parent's wishes, parent's liberty interest in child not infringed "when the parent's determination regarding the best interests of the child is overcome by clear and convincing proof of releva 2010See In re Parental Responsibilities of Reese, 227 P.3d 900, 901 (Colo.App.2010) (concluding that the parental presumption that applied to mother as a fit parent could be rebutted only by findings based on clear and convincing evidence that the grant of decision-making responsibility and parenting time to third-party petitioners was in the child's best interests). | 3 | 3 |
Raftopoulos v. Mongergreen2 sentences1990In Gerner , an adverse possession case, the court noted that subsequent to the enactment of § 13-25-127(1), it had decided Raftopoulos v. Monger, 656 P.2d 1308 (Colo.1983), in which it followed the clear and convincing standard, and it concluded that case had been wrongly decided as to the burden of proof question and specifically overruled it on that issue. 1989See Raftopoulos v. Monger, 656 P.2d 1308 (Colo.1983). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2025E:03 (2021). ¶ 36 Griego’s contention overlooks that the court’s instruction defined the burden of proof as “more than proof that something is highly probable, but it does not require proof with absolute certainty.” (Emphasis added.) Because the instruction required more than the clear-and-convincing standard of being highly probable used in civil cases, see People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1136 (Colo. 1980), the level of certainty required by the “firmly convinced” language did not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof below that of beyond a reasonable doubt, see Schlehuber, ¶ 31 (holding t 1988Proof by “clear and convincing evidence” is proof which persuades the trier of fact that the truth of the contention is “highly probable.” It is evidence which is stronger than a “preponderance of the evidence.” People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1136 (Colo.1980). 3 “The clear and convincing standard thus minimizes the risk of error. | 2 | 2 |
Page v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2013Similarly in Page, 197 Colo. at 317 n. 3, 592 P.2d at 799 n. 3, the supreme court noted that the burden of proof in actions in equity had been cited as "clear, strong, satisfactory, and convineing" (citing and abrogating Tourtelotte v. Brown, 4 Colo.App. 377 , 36 P. 73 (1894)), and similar formulations, all of which were tantamount to a clear and convincing standard. 483 Thus, the marital presumption as it had been applied in Balanson and earlier cases implicitly relied on the above-cited resulting and constructive trust cases which set forth a standard of proof equivalent to clear and convinc 2013Similarly in Page, 197 Colo. at 317 n. 3, 592 P.2d at 799 n. 3, the supreme court noted that the burden of proof in actions in equity had been cited as "clear, strong, satisfactory, and convineing" (citing and abrogating Tourtelotte v. Brown, 4 Colo.App. 377 , 36 P. 73 (1894)), and similar formulations, all of which were tantamount to a clear and convincing standard. 483 Thus, the marital presumption as it had been applied in Balanson and earlier cases implicitly relied on the above-cited resulting and constructive trust cases which set forth a standard of proof equivalent to clear and convinc | 2 | 2 |
People Ex Rel. Smamagreen2 sentences2012See People in Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d 958, 962 (Colo.App.2007). " 49 Based on this record, we conclude that the GAL and the Department, which supported the termination motion, met the clear and convincing standard and proved that mother did not substantially or successfully comply with most aspects of the treatment plan. 2012See People in Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d 958, 962 (Colo.App. 2007). ¶ 49 Based on this record, we conclude that the GAL and the Department, which supported the termination motion, met the clear and convincing standard and proved that mother did not substantially or successfully comply with most aspects of the treatment plan. | 2 | 2 |
Cruzan Ex Rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Healthgreen2 sentences2004In re A.W., 637 *597 P.2d 366 (Colo.1981); see Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 , 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990)(upholding state requirement of clear and convincing evidence to discontinue life sustaining procedures for person in persistent vegetative state). 2004In re A.W., 637 *597 P.2d 366 (Colo.1981); see Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 , 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990)(upholding state requirement of clear and convincing evidence to discontinue life sustaining procedures for person in persistent vegetative state). | 2 | 2 |
Petition of RHNgreen2 sentences2019See A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶¶ 28-29 ; D.P.H., 260 P.3d at 323 ; E.R.S. v. O.D.A., 779 P.2d 844, 847-48 (Colo. 1989); In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 486 (Colo. 1985). 16 V. 2011See In re Parental Responsibilities of B.J., 242 P.8d 1128, 1188-85 (Colo.2010) (when a nonparent seeks primary care of a child, the presumption that the parent has the first and prior right to primary care may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence); In re Parental Responsibilities of Reese, 227 P.3d 900, 908 (Colo.App.2010)(when nonparent seeks allocation of parental responsibilities against parent's wishes, parent's liberty interest in child not infringed "when the parent's determination regarding the best interests of the child is overcome by clear and convincing proof of releva | 1 | 2 |
In Re Roosegreen2 sentences2003Id. 2003See id. | 1 | 2 |
People ex rel. C.Z.green1 sentence2025See People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 7 ; L.S., ¶¶ 34-35 (noting that the clear and convincing standard applies only at the termination hearing, not the dispositional hearing). ¶ 10 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves the application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. | 1 | 1 |
Frazier v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2023Such a high bar indicates that an expedited hearing absent any discovery procedures and with a preponderance of the evidence standard is not the appropriate means for adjudicating a matter of this magnitude.5 See Frazier, ¶¶ 17–18, 401 P.3d at 545 (holding that “inconsistencies” between the procedures of section 1-1-113 and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “reinforce” the conclusion that not all federal law claims can be raised in section 1-1-113 proceedings). 5 Although the district court made its findings using the clear and convincing standard, the election code calls for a preponderance stan | 1 | 1 |
ion Maternity v. Burrengreen1 sentence2022McCormick, The Law of Evidence § 339 (2nd ed. 1972)) — the clear and convincing standard requires proof that a fact is “highly probable and free from serious or substantial doubt.” Destination Maternity v. Burren, 2020 CO 41, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). ¶ 37 A communication is made with actual malice if it is published with “actual knowledge that it was false” or “with reckless disregard for whether it was true.” L.S.S., ¶ 40. | 1 | 1 |
A.M. v. A.C.green1 sentence2019See A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶¶ 28-29 ; D.P.H., 260 P.3d at 323 ; E.R.S. v. O.D.A., 779 P.2d 844, 847-48 (Colo. 1989); In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 486 (Colo. 1985). 16 V. | 1 | 1 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsongreen2 sentences2019See Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 , 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (noting that because the Court had "never squarely addressed" a certain issue and had at most assumed the applicability of the pertinent standard, it was "free to address the issue on the merits"); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651 , 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (noting that the Court's "summary affirmances" of lower court decisions "are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits"); see also People v. Delage , 2018 CO 45 , ¶ 10, 41 2019See Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 , 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (noting that because the Court had "never squarely addressed" a certain issue and had at most assumed the applicability of the pertinent standard, it was "free to address the issue on the merits"); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651 , 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (noting that the Court's "summary affirmances" of lower court decisions "are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits"); see also People v. Delage , 2018 CO 45 , ¶ 10, 41 | 1 | 1 |
v. Delage — Searches and Seizures —Consent —Voluntarinessgreen2 sentences2019See Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 , 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (noting that because the Court had "never squarely addressed" a certain issue and had at most assumed the applicability of the pertinent standard, it was "free to address the issue on the merits"); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651 , 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (noting that the Court's "summary affirmances" of lower court decisions "are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits"); see also People v. Delage , 2018 CO 45 , ¶ 10, 41 2019See Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 , 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (noting that because the Court had "never squarely addressed" a certain issue and had at most assumed the applicability of the pertinent standard, it was "free to address the issue on the merits"); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651 , 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (noting that the Court's "summary affirmances" of lower court decisions "are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits"); see also People v. Delage , 2018 CO 45 , ¶ 10, 41 | 1 | 1 |
ERS v. Odagreen1 sentence2019See A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶¶ 28-29 ; D.P.H., 260 P.3d at 323 ; E.R.S. v. O.D.A., 779 P.2d 844, 847-48 (Colo. 1989); In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 486 (Colo. 1985). 16 V. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Moncriefgreen1 sentence2013However, neither the Balanson nor the Bartolo court explained the derivation of the clear and convincing standard applied to overcome the marital presumption. 139 The Balanson court also discussed In re Marriage of Stumpf, 932 P.2d 845, 848 (Colo.App.1996), and In re Marriage of Moncrief, 36 Colo.App. 140 , 141, 535 P.2d 1137, 1138 (1975), regarding the marital presumption. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Altmangreen2 sentences2013However, neither the Stumpf nor the Moncrief division discussed the clear and convincing standard to overcome the marital presumption. {40 The Moncrief division cited In re Marriage of Altman, 35 Colo.App. 183, 185 , 530 P.2d 1012, 1013 (1974), for the proposition that under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, when one spouse causes title to be placed jointly with the other spouse, a gift is presumed and the burden to show otherwise is upon the donor. 2013However, neither the Stumpf nor the Moncrief division discussed the clear and convincing standard to overcome the marital presumption. {40 The Moncrief division cited In re Marriage of Altman, 35 Colo.App. 183, 185 , 530 P.2d 1012, 1013 (1974), for the proposition that under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, when one spouse causes title to be placed jointly with the other spouse, a gift is presumed and the burden to show otherwise is upon the donor. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Stumpfgreen1 sentence2013However, neither the Balanson nor the Bartolo court explained the derivation of the clear and convincing standard applied to overcome the marital presumption. 139 The Balanson court also discussed In re Marriage of Stumpf, 932 P.2d 845, 848 (Colo.App.1996), and In re Marriage of Moncrief, 36 Colo.App. 140 , 141, 535 P.2d 1137, 1138 (1975), regarding the marital presumption. | 1 | 1 |
| Norman v. Industrial Claim Appeals Officegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Young v. Colorado National Bank of Denvergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colorado v. Connellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grogan v. Garnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Distelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Huddleston v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Auslaender v. MacMillangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Botkin v. Pylegreen2 sentences2013In Altman, the division relied on Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 232 , 14 P.2d 187, 191 (1932), abrogated by Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 317-20 , 592 P.2d 792, 799-801 (1979), a case involving, among other things, the criteria for establishing a resulting trust, which is a trust that the court presumes to arise out of the transactions of parties, "as if one man pays the purchase[ Imoney for an estate, and the deed is taken in the name of another." Id. (quoting 1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees 17 (Tth ed.)). {41 The Botkin court held that "[where ... the husband acquires and pays for real proper 2013In Altman, the division relied on Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 232 , 14 P.2d 187, 191 (1932), abrogated by Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 317-20 , 592 P.2d 792, 799-801 (1979), a case involving, among other things, the criteria for establishing a resulting trust, which is a trust that the court presumes to arise out of the transactions of parties, "as if one man pays the purchase[ Imoney for an estate, and the deed is taken in the name of another." Id. (quoting 1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees 17 (Tth ed.)). {41 The Botkin court held that "[where ... the husband acquires and pays for real proper | 1 | 1 |
| In Re DISgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences1982This claim is disposed of by our decision in People in the Interest of C.A.K., supra, in which we held that the clear and convincing standard of proof is constitutionally required in parental termination proceedings, but that the new rule would apply only to termination hearings commenced after March 24, 1982, the date of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). 1982This claim is disposed of by our decision in People in the Interest of C.A.K., supra, in which we held that the clear and convincing standard of proof is constitutionally required in parental termination proceedings, but that the new rule would apply only to termination hearings commenced after March 24, 1982, the date of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). | 5 | 1982–1982 |
In Re MJK
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 1112 . 2010Id. at 1112 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Gerner v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2004For example, in Gerner v. Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701 (Colo.1989), we found that the statutory burden of proof was applicable in an adverse possession case, rather than the clear and convincing standard previously established throughout our case law. 2004For example, in Gerner v. Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701 (Colo.1989), we found that the statutory burden of proof was applicable in an adverse possession case, rather than the clear and convincing standard previously established throughout our case law. | 2 | 1990–2004 |
in Interest of A.M
green
1 sentence2025People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14 , ¶ 15. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Edelman v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2019See Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 , 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (noting that because the Court had "never squarely addressed" a certain issue and had at most assumed the applicability of the pertinent standard, it was "free to address the issue on the merits"); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651 , 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (noting that the Court's "summary affirmances" of lower court decisions "are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits"); see also People v. Delage , 2018 CO 45 , ¶ 10, 41 2019See Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 , 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (noting that because the Court had "never squarely addressed" a certain issue and had at most assumed the applicability of the pertinent standard, it was "free to address the issue on the merits"); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651 , 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (noting that the Court's "summary affirmances" of lower court decisions "are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits"); see also People v. Delage , 2018 CO 45 , ¶ 10, 41 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dph v. Jlb
green
1 sentence2019See A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶¶ 28-29 ; D.P.H., 260 P.3d at 323 ; E.R.S. v. O.D.A., 779 P.2d 844, 847-48 (Colo. 1989); In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 486 (Colo. 1985). 16 V. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tourtelotte v. Brown
green
1 sentence2013Similarly in Page, 197 Colo. at 317 n. 3, 592 P.2d at 799 n. 3, the supreme court noted that the burden of proof in actions in equity had been cited as "clear, strong, satisfactory, and convineing" (citing and abrogating Tourtelotte v. Brown, 4 Colo.App. 377 , 36 P. 73 (1894)), and similar formulations, all of which were tantamount to a clear and convincing standard. 483 Thus, the marital presumption as it had been applied in Balanson and earlier cases implicitly relied on the above-cited resulting and constructive trust cases which set forth a standard of proof equivalent to clear and convinc | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Nah v. Sls
green
2 sentences2011Applying this authority, we conclude that employing the clear and convincing standard at this point of the decision-making process would make it harder to promote the child's best interests and reduce the prospect of a viable solution because this elevated standard of proof would (a) put greater weight on the rights of the presumed fathers than those of the child, when "it is the child who has the most at stake in a paternity proceeding," N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 364 ; (b) change the focus of the analysis to the interests of the presumed fathers, even though "[in] some cases, the child's best interes 2011Applying this authority, we conclude that employing the clear and convincing standard at this point of the decision-making process would make it harder to promote the child's best interests and reduce the prospect of a viable solution because this elevated standard of proof would (a) put greater weight on the rights of the presumed fathers than those of the child, when "it is the child who has the most at stake in a paternity proceeding," N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 364 ; (b) change the focus of the analysis to the interests of the presumed fathers, even though "[in] some cases, the child's best interes | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Rissberger v. Gorton green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Sumner v. Mata green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Matter of CM green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Adoption of Frederick green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Boyer green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Metro Moving & Storage Co. v. Gussert green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| In Interest of SVG green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| ATB v. Department of Public Assistance & Social Services green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Stull v. People red | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Honey red | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Botham red | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Craig v. Rider green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Buckmiller v. Safeway Stores, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Hurd green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Board of County Commissioners v. Masden neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF COUNTY OF OURAY v. Masden neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People in Interest of CAK green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| New York Times Co. v. Sullivan green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Addington v. Texas green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.