clear and convincing standard in Utah

2023“Courts that assess these comparative degrees of certainty have characterized the clear and convincing standard as the existence of facts that make a conclusion very highly probable.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶8 Here, Cordova does not contest that substantial evidence supports his felony charge in this case, but does contend that the district court’s conclusions—that an individual distributing drugs is a danger to the community and that his failure to appear in a prior misdemeanor case suggests he is a flight risk—are clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 2 More specifically, in regard

2022“Courts that assess these comparative degrees of certainty have characterized the clear and convincing standard as the existence of facts that make a conclusion very highly probable.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶20 Silveira’s contention that “no facts” supported the district court’s ruling is incorrect.

2024“We generally disturb a trial court’s grant or denial of a rule 59 motion only if it constitutes an abuse 20220803-CA 20220820-CA 34 2024 UT App 25 In re H.H. of discretion.” Bergmann v. Bergmann, 2018 UT App 130, ¶ 12 , 428 P.3d 89 (quotation simplified).

2024“We generally disturb a trial court’s grant or denial of a rule 59 motion only if it constitutes an abuse 20220803-CA 20220820-CA 34 2024 UT App 25 In re H.H. of discretion.” Bergmann v. Bergmann, 2018 UT App 130, ¶ 12 , 428 P.3d 89 (quotation simplified).

2024“A lower court’s best-interest ruling is reviewed deferentially,” but we do not limit our review to considering whether any relevant facts have been left out; we also “assess whether the court’s determination that the clear and convincing standard had been met goes against the clear weight of the evidence.” In re L.L.B., 2023 UT App 66, ¶ 16 , 532 P.3d 592 (cleaned up).

2023A lower court’s best-interest ruling is reviewed deferentially 20210942-CA 6 2023 UT App 66 In re L.L.B. but “we will not only consider whether any relevant facts have been left out but assess whether the . . . court’s determination that the clear and convincing standard had been met goes against the clear weight of the evidence.” In re G.D., 2021 UT 19, ¶ 73 , 491 P.3d 867 (cleaned up).

2024“We generally disturb a trial court’s grant or denial of a rule 59 motion only if it constitutes an abuse 20220803-CA 20220820-CA 34 2024 UT App 25 In re H.H. of discretion.” Bergmann v. Bergmann, 2018 UT App 130, ¶ 12 , 428 P.3d 89 (quotation simplified).

2024“We generally disturb a trial court’s grant or denial of a rule 59 motion only if it constitutes an abuse 20220803-CA 20220820-CA 34 2024 UT App 25 In re H.H. of discretion.” Bergmann v. Bergmann, 2018 UT App 130, ¶ 12 , 428 P.3d 89 (quotation simplified).

2023And “[t]hreatened harm” is defined as “actions, inactions, or credible verbal threats, indicating that the child is at an unreasonable risk of harm or neglect.” Id. § 80-1-102(92). ¶24 As applied to this case, to satisfy the clear and convincing standard, the State “needed to present evidence that would allow the [juvenile] court to conclude that it was very highly probable that the [C]hildren had been harmed.” See In re K.T., 2017 UT 44 , ¶ 9 n.3 (quotation simplified).

2020As our supreme court stated in In re K.T., 2017 UT 44 , 424 P.3d 91 , The clear and convincing standard demands the introduction of evidence that makes “the existence of the disputed facts . . . very highly probable.” [Applying this principle] to the case before the juvenile court, the State needed to present evidence that would allow the court to conclude that it was very highly probable that the children had been harmed.

2020Relying on Santosky, we held that “[b]ecause the parental presumption deals with parental liberty interests, and accordingly should be afforded great deference by the courts, we conclude that a clear and convincing standard of proof should apply to satisfy due process requirements.” Id. 18 Cite as: 2020 UT 36 Opinion of the Court strictly necessary.

2013The court further addressed the "standard of proof by which the parental presumption must be rebutted," concluding that "a clear and convincing standard of proof should apply to satisfy due process requirements." - Id. 128 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ("We hold that such a standard adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process.")). 1 16 But the clear and convincing standard is a standard of evidentiary proof, not a level of constitutional serutiny.

2013If the doubt afforded under the clear and convincing standard allows an alibi as weak as Ms. Brown’s to stand as proof of factual innocence, we have created a very low hurdle indeed. 52 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 JUSTICE LEE, dissenting II ¶119 We should accordingly reach the merits of the State’s challenge to the district court’s determination that Ms. Brown met her burden of proving her factual innocence.

2013If the doubt afforded under the clear and convincing standard allows an alibi as weak as Ms. Brown’s to stand as proof of factual innocence, we have created a very low hurdle indeed. 52 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 JUSTICE LEE, dissenting such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place”—they are reviewed for clear error.

2006"The United States Constitution guarantees that th[e] parental liberty interest cannot be disturbed without due process of law." In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39, ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 ; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

2006“The United States Constitution guarantees that th[e] parental liberty interest cannot be disturbed without due process of law.” In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39, ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 ; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

2006"We review the juvenile court's judicial notice of prior adjudicated facts under [r]ule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence for abuse of discretion." In re J.B., 2002 UT App 267,¶14 , 53 P.3d 958 . ¶12 Second, Stepfather contends that there was insufficient evidence to show by a clear and convincing standard that Stepfather had sexually abused O.D.

2006"We review the juvenile court's judicial notice of prior adjudicated facts under [r]ule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence for abuse of discretion." In re J.B., 2002 UT App 267,¶14 , 53 P.3d 958 . ¶12 Second, Stepfather contends that there was insufficient evidence to show by a clear and convincing standard that Stepfather had sexually abused O.D.

2006"The United States Constitution guarantees that th[e] parental liberty interest cannot be disturbed without due process of law." In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39, ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 ; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

2006“The United States Constitution guarantees that th[e] parental liberty interest cannot be disturbed without due process of law.” In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39, ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 ; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

2025And again, in light of our analysis regarding the admissibility of Marri’s first wife’s testimony, see infra ¶¶ 101‒05, we do not include her testimony in our analysis here. 20230034-CA 19 2025 UT App 137 Marri v. Rizwan ¶54 Finally, there was sufficient evidence that Marri also misrepresented his level of education prior to the marriage.

2024ANALYSIS ¶10 “The right of parents to raise their children is one of the most important rights any person enjoys.” In re D.S., 2023 UT App 98, ¶ 16 , 535 P.3d 843 (cleaned up), cert. granted, Jan. 25, 2024 (No. 20230162-CA 4 2024 UT App 34 In re J.E. 20230877).

2024The 20220798-CA 17 2024 UT App 91 In re R.D. juvenile court recognized that modifications to custodial orders are generally “treated as disposition hearings and subject to the preponderance of the evidence standard.” However, because DCFS was no longer a party to this case at this point, the juvenile court determined that it was “more similar to a custody dispute between a parent and non-parent.” And given this circumstance, the court concluded that the dispute “should proceed at the clear and convincing standard of proof for all parties.” ¶44 It appears that the juvenile court applied the wro

2024ANALYSIS ¶10 “The right of parents to raise their children is one of the most important rights any person enjoys.” In re D.S., 2023 UT App 98, ¶ 16 , 535 P.3d 843 (cleaned up), cert. granted, Jan. 25, 2024 (No. 20230162-CA 4 2024 UT App 34 In re J.E. 20230877).

2023ANALYSIS ¶16 “The right of parents to raise their children is one of the most important rights any person enjoys.” In re A.H., 2022 UT App 114, ¶ 31 .

2023In reaching this conclusion the 20220050-CA 8 2023 UT App 13 In re K.K. court may properly “infer harm” based on the evidence presented.

2023The court noted that it 8 Cite as: 2023 UT 19 Opinion of the Court would be difficult for Ashby to prove her innocence by clear and convincing evidence with recantation testimony because Kevin “testified that he has been a prevaricator.” Under these circumstances, the court thought it would be difficult to meet the clear and convincing standard even if Kevin’s “testimony [was] reconcilable with the undisputed surrounding facts.” But the court concluded that Kevin’s “testimony is irreconcilable.” ¶42 Specifically, the court identified three ways in which it deemed Kevin’s recantation “inconsist

2022For this reason, “it is . . . not possible [and] not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how [the clear and convincing standard] is to be applied to each new set of facts.” Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 22 .

2020Relying on Santosky, we held that “[b]ecause the parental presumption deals with parental liberty interests, and accordingly should be afforded great deference by the courts, we conclude that a clear and convincing standard of proof should apply to satisfy due process requirements.” Id. 18 Cite as: 2020 UT 36 Opinion of the Court strictly necessary.