clear and convincing standard in Massachusetts

2015See Mendonza, supra at 783 & n.5.

2015See Mendonza, supra at 783 & n.5.

2025"Under the clear and convincing standard, '[t]he evidence must be sufficient to convey a "high degree of probability" that the contested proposition is true.'" Doe No. 523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 94 , quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015).

2022Evidence meets the clear and convincing standard if it is “sufficient to convey a ‘high degree of probability’ that the contested proposition is true.’” Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 309 (citation for quotation omitted by Doe No. 380316 court).

2007In Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275-276 (1978), we rejected the application of the clear and convincing standard to the State’s burden at initial commitment under G.

1994As noted in Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass, at 681 n. 18, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights has been construed to “on occasion afford[ ] the individual’s interest in physical liberty more protection than required by the United States Constitution.” For example, although the United States Supreme Court permits involuntary commitment under a clear and convincing standard, see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979), the Supreme Judicial Court has held that “the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the release of a mentally ill person would create a substantial risk o

2025"Under the clear and convincing standard, '[t]he evidence must be sufficient to convey a "high degree of probability" that the contested proposition is true.'" Doe No. 523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 94 , quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015).

2024After careful review of the hearing examiner's decision, we discern no error and conclude that the level two classification was supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record.4 See Doe, No. 523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 94 ("Under the clear and convincing standard, [t]he evidence must be sufficient to 3 We note that SORB "may give appropriate evidentiary weight to documentary reports and risk assessment, but the ultimate risk opinion, if any, will be excluded from consideration unless the mental health professional testifies as an expert witness at the classification hearing." 803 Cod

2019Under the clear and convincing standard, "[t]he evidence must be sufficient to convey a 'high degree of probability' that the contested proposition is true." Doe No. 380316 , 473 Mass. at 309 , 41 N.E.3d 1058 , quoting Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co ., 372 Mass. 582 , 588 n.3, 363 N.E.2d 240 (1977).

2019Under the clear and convincing standard, "[t]he evidence must be sufficient to convey a 'high degree of probability' that the contested proposition is true." Doe No. 380316 , 473 Mass. at 309 , 41 N.E.3d 1058 , quoting Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co ., 372 Mass. 582 , 588 n.3, 363 N.E.2d 240 (1977).

2024And, in addition, the judge was the trier of fact for both the trial and the motion to continue. 14 As to the second, it is true that the judge did not state that she was applying a clear and convincing standard in assessing the juvenile's need for rehabilitation.9 We have accordingly considered whether the matter should be remanded, because it is ordinarily for the trial court judge to make such a determination in the first instance -- not us.10 Cf. Adoption of Eden, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 296 (2015) ("it is for the trial judge, not us, to determine in the first instance whether unfitness has

2022The “SORB’s burden is to show that [Petitioner] presents a ‘cognizable risk of re-offense, not merely a hypothetical or speculative potential risk.’” Doe No. 24341 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387-388 (2009), quoting Doe No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 762 (2006).

2022The “SORB’s burden is to show that [Petitioner] presents a ‘cognizable risk of re-offense, not merely a hypothetical or speculative potential risk.’” Doe No. 24341 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387-388 (2009), quoting Doe No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 762 (2006).

2019See Adoption of Anton , 72 Mass. App. Ct. 667 , 673, 893 N.E.2d 436 (2008).

2019See Adoption of Anton , 72 Mass. App. Ct. 667 , 673, 893 N.E.2d 436 (2008).

2017See Krasner v. Krasner , 362 Mass. 186 , 189 (1972) ("ample evidence"); Citizens Bank , 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 617 ("sufficient evidence"). "[A] preponderance standard is generally applied in civil cases [;] ... the clear and convincing standard is applied when particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake." Doe No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd ., 473 Mass. 297 , 309 (2015) (quotation omitted).

2017See Krasner v. Krasner , 362 Mass. 186 , 189 (1972) ("ample evidence"); Citizens Bank , 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 617 ("sufficient evidence"). "[A] preponderance standard is generally applied in civil cases [;] ... the clear and convincing standard is applied when particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake." Doe No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd ., 473 Mass. 297 , 309 (2015) (quotation omitted).

2015See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 , 1110-1111 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109 (1998); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

2015Although a preponderance standard is generally applied in civil cases, see, e.g., Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597 (1995), the clear and convincing standard is applied when “particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.” Craven v. State Ethics Comm’n, 390 Mass. 191, 200 (1983), quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983).

2015See MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423 Mass. 652, 657 (1996). 27 Although the consequences of Internet dissemination provide a convicted sex offender with a particularly strong interest in avoiding classification as a level two or level three offender, the clear and convincing standard should be applied to all sex offender risk classification levels, including level one.

2015Given these interests, a clear and convincing standard would better “enable police and the community to focus on those offenders who may pose an actual threat to young children and others that the statute seeks to protect.” Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting). d.

2015Proof by clear and convincing evidence is “not without teeth.” Matter of G.P., 473 Mass. 112, 120 (2015).

2015See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 , 1110-1111 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109 (1998); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

2015See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 , 1110-1111 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109 (1998); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

2015Although a preponderance standard is generally applied in civil cases, see, e.g., Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597 (1995), the clear and convincing standard is applied when “particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.” Craven v. State Ethics Comm’n, 390 Mass. 191, 200 (1983), quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983).

2015In State v. Jackson, 283 Conn. 111, 120-124 (2007), the Connecticut Supreme Court flatly rejected it, noting the growing support for Instruction 21 and the unlikelihood that jurors in a criminal case even would be aware of the clear and convincing standard.

2015Although a preponderance standard is generally applied in civil cases, see, e.g., Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597 (1995), the clear and convincing standard is applied when “particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.” Craven v. State Ethics Comm’n, 390 Mass. 191, 200 (1983), quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983).

2015Compare Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 489-490 (vacating final risk classification that violated procedural due process, and treating as preliminary SORB’s attempted classification). 9.

2005See United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 946 (2002) (rejecting Thevis standard because Fed.

2005See United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 946 (2002) (rejecting Thevis standard because Fed.

2005See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967) (circumstances surrounding lineup identification).

2005See United States v. Smith, supra at 442 (not deciding standard required); United States v. Mastrangelo, supra at 273-274 (advocating preponderance standard).

2000See Schaer v. Brandeis University, 48 Mass.App.Ct. 23, 30 (1999), review granted, 430 Mass. 1112 (1999) (court held that the record, which consisted of “she said” against “he said” evidence, did not support the defendants’ argument that the defendants had properly applied a clear and convincing standard); see also Berman v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 6 Mass.App.Ct. 438, 442 (1978) (court can review the decision of an arbitrator in order to determine that it was rendered in a “procedurally fair manner”).

2000See Schaer v. Brandeis University, 48 Mass.App.Ct. 23, 30 (1999), review granted, 430 Mass. 1112 (1999) (court held that the record, which consisted of “she said” against “he said” evidence, did not support the defendants’ argument that the defendants had properly applied a clear and convincing standard); see also Berman v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 6 Mass.App.Ct. 438, 442 (1978) (court can review the decision of an arbitrator in order to determine that it was rendered in a “procedurally fair manner”).

2000The Appeals Court decided an issue similar to the issue currently before this court in Schaer, 48 Mass.App.Ct. at 30 .