clear and convincing standard in Minnesota

2025Under the newly discovered evidence exception to the statutory time bar, a petitioner must prove that the evidence: (1) is newly discovered; (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney within the 2- year time-bar for filing a petition; (3) is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial; (4) is not for impeachment purposes; and (5) establishes by the clear and convincing standard that petitioner is innocent of the offenses for which he was convicted. 8 Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2012); see Minn. Stat. § 59

2024We have explained: Essentially, this exception requires that the petitioner show that the evidence (1) is newly discovered; (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney within the 2-year time-bar for filing a petition; (3) is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial; (4) is not for impeachment purposes; and (5) establishes by the clear and convincing standard that petitioner is innocent of the offenses for which he was convicted. 7 Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2012).

2016A. Newly-discovered-evidence exception To satisfy the newly-discovered-evidence exception to the postconviction time limit, appellant’s postconviction petition must allege that: (1) newly discovered evidence exists; (2) the evidence “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition”; (3) the evidence is not cumulative; (4) the evidence is not for impeachment purposes; and (5) the evidence “establishes a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of the offense . . . for which the petitioner

2016The postconviction court concluded that neither exception applies.1 A. Newly-Discovered-Evidence Exception Under the newly-discovered-evidence exception, a postconviction petition that is filed after the two-year statute of limitations may be considered if five requirements are satisfied: (1) “the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence,” (2) the evidence “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition,” (3) “the evidence is not cumulative to e

2018"We review the district court's findings in a TPR proceeding to determine whether they address the statutory criteria for termination and are not clearly erroneous ... in light of the clear and convincing standard of proof." In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F. , 823 N.W.2d 656 , 665 (Minn. App. 2012).

2017We review the district court’s factual findings “to determine whether they address the statutory criteria for termination and are not clearly erroneous, in light of the clear-and- convincing standard of proof.” In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 665 (Minn. App. 2012) (citation omitted).

2017Scott v. State, 788 N.W.2d 497 , 501–02 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 590.01 , subd. 4(b)(2)).

2016Under this exception, “the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of innocence is on the petitioner.” Scott v. State, 788 N.W.2d 497, 502 (Minn. 2010).

2016To prove innocence under the clear and convincing standard, “a party’s evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.” Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 170 (quoting Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 583 (Minn. 2010)).

2015Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Minn. 2010). 1 Because Word did not file a direct appeal, clause (2) does not apply to her case. 4 Under the statute, a petition may be filed after the two-year limitations period if (2) the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence, including scientific evidence, that could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition, and the evidence is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial, is not for impeachment pur

2011The clear- and-convincing standard is met when “the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable.’ ” In re Moeller, 582 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn.1998) (quoting In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn.1988)).

2008“The clear and convincing standard of proof is met “where the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Moeller, 582 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn.1998)).

2016Under the clear and convincing standard, the proffered evidence must be unequivocal, intrinsically probable, and free from frailties.” Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 798 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).

2016Under the clear and convincing standard, the proffered evidence must be unequivocal, intrinsically probable, and free from frailties.” Rhodes, 875 N.W.2d at 788 (quotation and citation omitted).

2016See Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (providing that relationship evidence “is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” or other listed factors); see also State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (concluding that evidence submitted under section 634.20 need not meet the clear-and- convincing standard of proof).

2008State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn.2003) (citation omitted); see also McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (holding that evidence admitted under section 634.20 need not meet the clear-and-convincing standard required for admission of character or Spreigl evidence, but need only be more probative than prejudicial).

2015See State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (stating that Spreigl evidence meets the clear-and-convincing standard “when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable” (quotation omitted)).

2008The clear and convincing standard “requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016See id.; Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Minn.2011).

2015Instead, estab *788 lishing “actual innocence” requires the petitioner to prove it is “more likely than not that no reasonable jury would convict.” Id; see also Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Minn.2011) (holding that a petitioner must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence “on its face” would prove the petitioner’s innocence by a clear and convincing standard).

2015See Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 853 (stating that the clear and convincing standard is met when “the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable”). 14 With respect to physical presence, the record supports the panel’s findings that beginning November 27, 2013, Judge Pendleton did not have a place to live in the Tenth Judicial District.

2015See Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 853 (stating that the clear and convincing standard is met when “the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable”).

2018For the same reason, Wayne's argument that he is entitled to a new trial under the test identified in Rainer v. State , 566 N.W.2d 692 , 695 (Minn. 1997), is unavailing.

2016But an exception to this limitation occurs when five criteria are met: (1) the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence; (2) the evidence could not have been discovered by the exercise of the due diligence of the petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney within the two-year period following the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence; (3) the evidence is not cumulative to that presented at trial, (4) the evidence is not introduced for impeachment, and (5) the evidence “establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of the offense or offens

2016A finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

2012We review the district court’s findings in a TPR proceeding to determine whether they address the statutory criteria for termination and are not clearly erroneous, id. at 660 , in light of the clear- and-convincing standard of proof.

2002The clear and convincing standard “requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1978).

2002The clear and convincing standard "requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1978).

2025See Williams v. Curtis, 501 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding that bar certain claims).

2024The clear-and-convincing standard “is met when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable.” State v. Miller, 754 N.W.2d 686, 701 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

2024“The trial court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980).

2017“This standard . . . is a much lower bar than the clear and convincing standard shouldered by the County,” because “the parent needs to produce only enough evidence to support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child[].” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137 (quotations omitted).

2017And we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s conclusion that the statutory requirements for termination have been established. 3 In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 900-01 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).

2017If a parent meets this burden of production, the statutory presumption is rebutted and has “no further role” in the TPR proceeding; “[t]he burden of persuasion remains with the county to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing make [the parent] palpably unfit to be a parent.” J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 447 (quotation omitted).

2016See State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Minn. 1995) (listing procedural safeguards for admitting Spreigl evidence).

2016See Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 787-88 (Minn. 2015); Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 170 .1 More specifically, to satisfy the innocence prong under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 , subd. 4(b)(2), Rhodes must have alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if true and considered in the light most favorable to the petition, would establish by a clear and convincing standard that no reasonable jury would have found Rhodes guilty of his wife’s murder beyond a reasonable doubt, had that newly discovered evidence been presented at trial.

2016See Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 787-88 (Minn.2015); Riley,. 819 N.W.2d at 170 . 1 More specifically, to satisfy the innocence prong under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 , subd. 4(b)(2), Rhodes must have alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if-true and considered in the light most favorable to the petition, would establish by a clear and convincing standard that no reasonable jury would have found Rhodes, guilty of his wife’s murder beyond a reasonable doubt, had that newly discovered evidence been presented at trial..

2016“The clear and convincing standard of proof is met where the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Disciplinary Action Against Dedefo, 752 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

2016“We review de novo whether there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the district court’s conclusion that appellant meets the standards for commitment.” In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).

2016Kasper, 409 N.W.2d at 847 .

2016See Kasper, 409 N.W.2d at 847 .

2015To satisfy this exception, a petitioner must allege: “(1) the existence of newly discovered evidence that could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition, and (2) that the newly discovered evidence establishes the petitioner’s innocence by clear and convincing evidence.” Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn.2014).