clear and convincing standard in Florida

2012The Second District held that “[t]he banking statute ... creates a presumption which shifts the burden of proof to the estate under section 90.304, Florida Statutes (1987), and increases the burden to the clear and convincing standard.” Combee, 583 So.2d at 711 (citing Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)).

2010Acevedo v. State, 787 So.2d 127, 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (quoting Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797, 800 (Fla.4th DCA 1983)); see also Hernandez v. State, 16 So.3d 336, 340 (Fla.4th DCA 2009) ("To meet the clear and convincing standard, `[t]he evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.'" (quoting J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So.2d 434, 439 (Fla.4th DCA 2004))).

2021Analysis “While a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence, our review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” M.D. v. State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[W]e look at the evidence presented, not in the light most favorable to the parents, but in a neutral manner in which we must assess whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion .

2021Analysis “While a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence, our review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” M.D. v. State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[W]e look at the evidence presented, not in the light most favorable to the parents, but in a neutral manner in which we must assess whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion .

2021Analysis “While a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence, our review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” M.D. v. State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[W]e look at the evidence presented, not in the light most favorable to the parents, but in a neutral manner in which we must assess whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion .

2021Analysis “While a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence, our review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” M.D. v. State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[W]e look at the evidence presented, not in the light most favorable to the parents, but in a neutral manner in which we must assess whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion .

2021Analysis “While a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence, our review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” M.D. v. State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[W]e look at the evidence presented, not in the light most favorable to the parents, but in a neutral manner in which we must assess whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion .

2021Analysis “While a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence, our review is limited to whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.” M.D. v. State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[W]e look at the evidence presented, not in the light most favorable to the parents, but in a neutral manner in which we must assess whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion .

2012See Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145. .

2010See Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145 ("We need not address this claim because the circuit court held that Nixon could not establish his mental retardation under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.") (citing Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329-30 (Fla. 2007)).

2011See McKesson Drug Co. v. Williams, 706 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“the appellate court’s function is not to conduct a de novo proceeding or reweigh the evidence by determining independently whether the evidence as a whole satisfies the clear and convincing standard, but to determine whether the record contains competent substantial evidence to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.”).

2011See McKesson Drug Co. v. Williams, 706 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ("the appellate court's function is not to conduct a de novo proceeding or reweigh the evidence by determining independently whether the evidence as a whole satisfies the clear and convincing standard, but to determine whether the record contains competent substantial evidence to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.").

2010The clear and convincing standard is "more than a `preponderance of the evidence,' but the proof need not be `beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 85 (Fla.2003)).

2010The clear and convincing standard is “more than a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but the proof need not be ‘beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 85 (Fla.2003)).

2010Acevedo v. State, 787 So.2d 127, 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (quoting Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797, 800 (Fla.4th DCA 1983)); see also Hernandez v. State, 16 So.3d 336, 340 (Fla.4th DCA 2009) ("To meet the clear and convincing standard, `[t]he evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.'" (quoting J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So.2d 434, 439 (Fla.4th DCA 2004))).

2010Acevedo v. State, 787 So.2d 127, 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (quoting Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)); see also Hernandez v. State, 16 So.3d 336, 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“To meet the clear and convincing standard, ‘[t]he evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.’ ” (quoting J.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 890 So.2d 434, 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004))).

2005This Court has noted that "even when the evidence is in conflict, the proof may be more than sufficient to meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence." In re Bryan, 550 So.2d 447 , 448 n. * (Fla.1989); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("The clear and convincing standard of proof, while very high, permits a decision in the face of inconsistent or conflicting evidence.").

2005This Court has noted that “even when the evidence is in conflict, the proof may be more than sufficient to meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence.” In re Bryan, 550 So.2d 447 , 448 n. * (Fla.1989); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“The clear and convincing standard of proof, while very high, permits a decision in the face of inconsistent or conflicting evidence.”).

2005This Court has noted that "even when the evidence is in conflict, the proof may be more than sufficient to meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence." In re Bryan, 550 So.2d 447 , 448 n. * (Fla.1989); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("The clear and convincing standard of proof, while very high, permits a decision in the face of inconsistent or conflicting evidence.").

2005This Court has noted that “even when the evidence is in conflict, the proof may be more than sufficient to meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence.” In re Bryan, 550 So.2d 447 , 448 n. * (Fla.1989); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“The clear and convincing standard of proof, while very high, permits a decision in the face of inconsistent or conflicting evidence.”).

2004In Boller v. State, 775 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the court stated that “the need for treatment and medication and the refusal to take psychotropic medication despite a deteriorating mental condition, standing alone, do not justify involuntary commitment under the Baker Act.” In addition, “[c]onclusory testimony, unsubstantiated by facts in evidence, that a patient has ... the possibility of substantial harm to herself, is insufficient to satisfy. the statutory criteria by the clear and convincing evidence standard.” Id. at 410 .

2004In Boller v. State, 775 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the court stated that “the need for treatment and medication and the refusal to take psychotropic medication despite a deteriorating mental condition, standing alone, do not justify involuntary commitment under the Baker Act.” In addition, “[c]onclusory testimony, unsubstantiated by facts in evidence, that a patient has ... the possibility of substantial harm to herself, is insufficient to satisfy. the statutory criteria by the clear and convincing evidence standard.” Id. at 410 .

1990See also, In the Interest of T.S., 511 So.2d 435 (Fla. 5th [2nd] DCA 1987).

1990See also, In the Interest of T.S., 511 So.2d 435 (Fla. 5th [2nd] DCA 1987).

1989Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975)." *846 Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984).

1987In Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), this Court held that the facts and circumstances of the crime were such that the facts suggesting that the death sentence be imposed over the jury's recommendation of life ... meets the clear and convincing test to allow override of the jury's recommendation in accordance with previous decisions of this Court.

1989See Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1980); Castillo v. State, 536 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); *548 Tennyson v. State, 469 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

1989Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 647 (Fla. 1980); Bailey v. State, 319 So.2d 22, 27 (Fla. 1975).

1985Cf. Knowlton v. State, 466 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). .

1985Cf. Knowlton v. State, 466 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). [5] It is only with the greatest temerity that we attempt to follow Judge Letts in undertaking this task, Mischler, 458 So.2d at 39-40 , particularly since our route and our conclusion appear to differ from his. [6] It may be helpful, in resolving the question of whether or not a particular factor is inherent in a particular crime, to refer to the now-accepted lesser included offense — Blockburger double jeopardy analysis.

2010The clear and convincing standard is "more than a `preponderance of the evidence,' but the proof need not be `beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 85 (Fla.2003)).

2010The clear and convincing standard is “more than a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but the proof need not be ‘beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 85 (Fla.2003)).

2004Second, it is too speculative to conclude, because the proposed amendment requires the revocation of some medical doctors' licenses on the basis of findings reached under the preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof required under Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla.1987), that the judiciary will be forced to either overrule Ferris or change the standard of proof in malpractice cases.

1997As the unanimous court observed through Justice Barkett, "In a case where the proceedings implicate the loss of livelihood, an elevated standard is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the accused." 510 So.2d at 295 ; see also Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Nair v. Department of Bus. & Prof.

2026C.A.J., 709 P.2d 604, 606 (Colo. App. 1985)). 4 In sum, the trial court correctly applied the clear and convincing standard to the findings required under Florida law and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the finding required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f).

2025In denying the requested relief, the circuit court found that Hutchinson could not prevail under the clear-and-convincing standard or the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. -7- illness makes him unable to ‘reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.’ ” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 274 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007)).

2025In denying the requested relief, the circuit court found that Hutchinson could not prevail under the clear-and-convincing standard or the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. -7- illness makes him unable to ‘reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.’ ” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 274 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007)).