clear and convincing standard in Texas

2022The party petitioning for termination “has the burden to prove the elements necessary to support termination of the parent-child relationship,” id. at 113, and “[i]n parental termination cases, due process requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof,” id. at 112 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 ; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002)). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam.

2022In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 ). 4 We must determine 4 C.M. presents his factual insufficiency argument relying on a traditional factual sufficiency standard which the Supreme Court determined was inadequate to afford the protections inherent in the clear and convincing standard of proof.

2022In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 ). 4 We must determine 4 C.M. presents his factual insufficiency argument relying on a traditional factual sufficiency standard which the Supreme Court determined was inadequate to afford the protections inherent in the clear and convincing standard of proof.

2022The clear and convincing standard is “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)); see also Tex. Fam.

2025Relating to whether evidence “is capable of producing a firm belief or conviction,” the court has referred to two cases: first, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the clear and convincing standard should “convey[] to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process;” then, to its own opinion in State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979), wherein it held the clear and convincing standard is “that measure or degree of proof which will produce -2- in the mind of the

2022A clear and convincing standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence requires that “we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. (citing State v. K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. 2010)).

2025See also In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980) (extending the clear and convincing standard to termination proceedings because of the constitutional interests at stake); TEX.

2019Due process in these cases “requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof.” Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002)).

2000See Spurlock , 904 S.W.2d at 155-56; D.O. , 851 S.W.2d at 353 (the clear and convincing standard of proof does not alter the appropriate standard of review). oseph challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding regarding the best interest of the children in his fifth issue.

1999"The clear and convincing standard of proof required to terminate parental rights does not alter the appropriate standard of appellate review." D.O. , 851 S.W.2d at 353 .

2018Factual Sufficiency Under a clear and convincing standard, evidence is factually sufficient if “a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 ; accord In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).

2018Under a clear and convincing standard, evidence is factually sufficient if “a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 ; accord In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).

2018Factual Sufficiency Under a clear and convincing standard, evidence is factually sufficient if “a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002); accord In re K.R.M., 147 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.).

2018Factual Sufficiency Under a clear and convincing standard, evidence is factually sufficient if “a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” In re C.H., -4- 04-17-00681-CV 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002); accord In re K.R.M., 147 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.).

2006In Interest of R.D.S., 902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1995, no writ).

2004In Interest of R.D.S., 902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).

2013In the Interest of J.F.C., A.B.C., and M.B.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002).

2009In the Interest of J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002).

2024In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014).

2021See In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 502-03 (discussing review of evidence under the clear and convincing standard of review).

2025See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Tex. 2015) (“The applicable evidentiary standard is generally determined by the nature of the case or 15 fundamental right is at risk, however, “the social cost of even occasional error is sizable.” 46 The clear and convincing standard allocates the risk of error away from complete deprivation of parental contact with her child by requiring the firm conviction that a parent has engaged in family violence that is felonious, repeated, or has resulted in serious bodily harm. 47 It also instructs the factfinder—here, a trial court with considerable discretion

2025Relating to whether evidence “is capable of producing a firm belief or conviction,” the court has referred to two cases: first, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the clear and convincing standard should “convey[] to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process;” then, to its own opinion in State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979), wherein it held the clear and convincing standard is “that measure or degree of proof which will produce -2- in the mind of the

2025“In evaluating evidence for legal sufficiency under a clear and convincing standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” State v. K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. 2010).

2022A clear and convincing standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence requires that “we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. (citing State v. K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tex. 2010)).

2007Harris v. Herbers, 838 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (only the heightened standard of review for the clear and convincing standard set forth in Harris was overruled by In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ)).

2007Harris v. Herbers, 838 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (only the heightened standard of review for the clear and convincing standard set forth in Harris was overruled by In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ)).

2019Here, in contrast, other than Matthews’s drug use, the record contains no evidence that Matthews endangered his children.3 “[W]hile ‘one slender bit of evidence’ may be all a reviewing court needs to affirm a verdict based on the preponderance of the evidence, a higher burden of proof,” like the clear-and- convincing standard applicable here, “requires a higher standard of review.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 320 n.14 (1979)).

2015"We resolve disputed fact questions in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not have done so." City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005); In re i.F.C., supra, 96 S.W.3d at 266 .

2015Faram v. Gervitz-Faram, 895 Page 440 S.W.2d 839 , 842 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1995, no writ); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App.--Austin 1993, no writ); see also State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.1977); Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex.1975) (clear and convincing standard of appellate review disapproved); contra Harris v. Herbers, 838 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Wetzel v. Wetzel, 715 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, no writ) (appropriate standard of review is whether the trier of fact could reasonably fi

1999See State v. Turner , 556 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. 1977); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. , 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, no writ). (4) In deciding whether the evidence is factually sufficient, this Court considers and weighs all the evidence and should set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.

2007Harris v. Herbers, 838 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (only the heightened standard of review for the clear and convincing standard set forth in Harris was overruled by In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ)).

2007Harris v. Herbers, 838 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (only the heightened standard of review for the clear and convincing standard set forth in Harris was overruled by In re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ)).

2004Ellis County State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.1994); Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex.1975) (per curiam); accord, Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367 , 341 S.W.2d 401, 411 (1960) (“The clear and convincing test is but another method of measuring the weight of the credible evidence, and thus is also a fact question.”); cf. Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593 , 227 S.W.2d 206, 209 (1950) ("In practical effect [the requirement of clear and convincing evidence] is but an admonition to the judge to exercise great caution in weighing the evidence.”); see generally Bill Vance, The

2001I am aware that this court has refused to follow the clear and convincing standard of review in a number of prior cases, that the Texas Supreme Court refused to follow that standard to determine whether a party was actuated by malice in Meadows v. Green, 524 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.1975), and I realize that a majority of courts of appeals have also refused to follow that standard of review.

2019Code Ann. § 107.013 (a); In re B.G., 317 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. 2010). 44 Id. 45 In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544-45 (Tex. 2003). 46 Id. at 545 . 47 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. 2005). 19 highly deferential and presumes counsel’s conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance.49 To establish that a parent received ineffective assistance of counsel, the record needs to show that the conduct engaged in by trial counsel is the type of conduct that no competent attorney would have chosen to use given the responsi

2015See In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573 .

2002In re Caballero , 53 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2001, pet. denied).

2002In re Caballero, 53 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet. denied).

2007See Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 19 S.W.3d 413, 423 (Tex.2000) (holding that “we decline to adopt the clear-and-convincing standard at the summary judgment stage of a public-figure defamation case”).

2007See Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm't Co. , 19 S.W.3d 413, 423 (Tex. 2000) (holding that "we decline to adopt the clear-and-convincing standard at the summary judgment stage of a public-figure defamation case").

2026See Warriner, 394 S.W.3d at 248 (explaining that party’s testimony about characterization of property “must be supported by other evidence”); see also Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“As a general rule, the clear and convincing standard is not satisfied by testimony that property . . . is separate property when that testimony is contradicted or unsupported by documentary evidence tracing the asserted separate nature of the property.”); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“Mer

2021Nevertheless, “[a]s a general rule, the clear and convincing standard is not satisfied by testimony that property possessed at the time the marriage is dissolved is separate property when that testimony is contradicted or unsupported 16 by documentary evidence tracing the asserted separate nature of the property.” Graves, 329 S.W.3d at 139 .

2015In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84 ; Robinson v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 89 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2015In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84 ; Robinson v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 89 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2022See In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d at 697; Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d 195, 208 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); Bush, 336 S.W.3d at 743; Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 615 ; Ganesan v. Vallabhaneni, 96 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509, 512 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); but see Pace v. Pace, 160 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (“The testimony of a spouse seeking to overcome the community property presumption need not be corroborated to meet the clear and convincing standard. . . .

2022See In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d at 697; Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d 195, 208 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); Bush, 336 S.W.3d at 743 ; Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 615 ; Ganesan v. Vallabhaneni, 96 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509, 512 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); but see Pace v. Pace, 160 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (“The testimony of a spouse seeking to overcome the community property presumption need not be corroborated to meet the clear and convincing standard. . . .

2012Under the clear and convincing standard, an appellate "'court [reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case] should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable [factfinder] could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.'" In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ).

2008Under the clear and convincing standard, an appellate "court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable [factfinder] could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." In re J.L. , 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005) (quoting In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266 ).

2002Spurlock v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 904 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied); Harris, 838 S.W.2d at 941 .

2000See Spurlock , 904 S.W.2d at 155-56; D.O. , 851 S.W.2d at 353 (the clear and convincing standard of proof does not alter the appropriate standard of review). oseph challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding regarding the best interest of the children in his fifth issue.

2015In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625 , 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (citing State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)).

2007In re D.T. , 34 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

2025But when “particularly important” rights are at risk, such as the fundamental rights of parents, “a heightened clear and convincing standard applies . . . .” Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).

1985Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), on remand, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979), mandated that the standard for involuntary commitment in mental health cases must be the clear and convincing standard of proof.