Implied consent provision unconstitutional.

- Implied consent provision in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(a) is unconstitutional as violative of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it authorizes a search and seizure, chemical testing of a suspect's blood, without probable cause that the suspect had been driving while impaired when the suspect was involved in an accident involving serious injuries or fatalities. Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003).

Right of privacy is derived from natural law and embraced within the absolute right of personal security and liberty. The unlawful entry by an officer of the home, if it is such as to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy of the wife of the head of the family and results in fright and shock to her, is such a willful and intentional tort as to give her cause of action. Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951).

State must be able to point to facts which warrant intrusion on right of privacy.

- The mere fact that an officer feels it is unlikely that an individual has regular business where the individual is found is not sufficient alone to authorize an intrusion into an individual's right of privacy. The state must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant an intrusion. Howard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 847, 258 S.E.2d 652 (1979).

Public interest in privacy subordinated to public interest in law enforcement.

- When the police have reasonable cause to believe that public toilet stalls are being used in the commission of crime, and when they confine their activities to the times when such crimes are most likely to occur, they are entitled to institute clandestine surveillance, even though they do not have probable cause to believe that the particular persons whom they may thus catch in flagrante delicto have committed or will commit the crime. The public interest in the court's privacy must, to that extent, be subordinated to the public interest in law enforcement. Mitchell v. State, 120 Ga. App. 447, 170 S.E.2d 765 (1969).

Commercial sexual activity.

- The right of privacy conferred by the Georgia constitution, like that in the federal constitution, does not extend to commercial sexual activity. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. 129, 526 S.E.2d 336 (2000).

Police agents' listening to conversations outside apartment door in public hallway to ascertain probable cause is proper.

- Police agents' entry into a public hallway and listening to conversations inside an apartment by placing their ears to the front door was proper to ascertain if probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant. Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482 (1981).

Looking through window unreasonable.

- Police officer unreasonably invaded defendants' privacy by looking through their window before knocking on their door when executing an arrest warrant for a third party since: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the third party lived with defendants; (2) even if the police were authorized to enter defendants' home, looking through the window was unreasonable as the officer did not reach the window by traveling the route any visitor would travel to reach the front door; and (3) the officer did not have articulable facts which would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the third party was a danger. A police officer must have a reasonable belief that forewarning would jeopardize the officer's safety before actions, such as peering through a window, would be justified. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573 (2003).

Use of "narcotics" dog authorized.

- Use of a "narcotics" dog, specially trained to detect marijuana and narcotics, is an authorized investigative technique. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22 (1983).

Use of choke-hold unauthorized in obtaining evidence.

- There is nothing in the text, history, or structure of the Fourth Amendment, or for that matter in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, remotely suggesting that the right of the people to be free from unreasonable seizures also includes a concomitant privilege for state actors to use certain neck restraints or force (however reasonable) against the very people the right protects. Therefore, the police officer was properly suspended for using a choke-hold on a handcuffed suspect in an attempt to prevent the suspect from swallowing narcotics in violation of department rules. Mercure v. City of Atlanta Civil Service Board, 327 Ga. App. 840, 761 S.E.2d 393 (2014).

Standard of review.

- Because a trial court credited a police officer's testimony and decided the defendant's suppression motion on an issue of law rather than on any issue of conflicting evidence, the Court of Appeals correctly used the de novo standard of review. Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 604 S.E.2d 171 (2004).

When, in a hearing on a motion to suppress filed in a case in which a defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for the defendant to drive, when the trial court found there was no evidence that the defendant was an impaired or "less safe" driver, the court's ruling involved a mixed question of fact and law, and a de novo standard of review did not apply, and, as there was some evidence supporting the trial court's factual findings made in granting the defendant's motion to suppress, that ruling would not be disturbed. State v. Sanders, 274 Ga. App. 393, 617 S.E.2d 633 (2005).

Excessive force claim.

- Sheriff's deputies were entitled to summary judgment on a claim of excessive force when the plaintiff alleged that because the arrest was unlawful, any force used was unlawful, because the plaintiff did not present a discrete excessive force claim, and the claim failed as a matter of law. Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).

Deputy used excessive force when the deputy tased the plaintiff, in violation of the plaintiff's rights, because the plaintiff was not suspected of any crime when the deputy deployed the taser, the plaintiff did not pose any immediate threat to the deputies' safety, and the plaintiff was not trying to escape - the plaintiff had not even been told the plaintiff was under arrest. Brand v. Casal, 877 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2017).

Claim of error raised for first time on appeal not reviewed.

- Because the defendant on appeal abandoned the "second-tier" argument raised at the suppression hearing, and instead argued that the evidence should have been suppressed because the state failed to show that the officer was in the lawful discharge of any official duty during questioning, the latter argument was not addressed, as it was raised for the first time on appeal. Harper v. State, 285 Ga. App. 261, 645 S.E.2d 741 (2007).

Cited in Huff v. State, 82 Ga. App. 545, 61 S.E.2d 787 (1950); Green v. State, 250 Ga. 610, 299 S.E.2d 544 (1983); State v. Roberson, 165 Ga. App. 727, 302 S.E.2d 591 (1983); Whittington v. State, 165 Ga. App. 763, 302 S.E.2d 617 (1983); Mosley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 30, 348 S.E.2d 555 (1986); Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. 523, 359 S.E.2d 416 (1987); Ford v. State, 183 Ga. App. 566, 359 S.E.2d 435 (1987); Newsome v. State, 189 Ga. App. 329, 386 S.E.2d 887 (1989); Cole v. State, 254 Ga. App. 424, 562 S.E.2d 720 (2002).

Federal good-faith exception inapplicable.

- The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is not applicable in Georgia in light of the legislatively-mandated exclusionary rule found in O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30. Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 422 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

There is nothing inherent in "papers" which immunizes them from searches otherwise proper under the Fourth Amendment. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 975, 100 S. Ct. 472, 62 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1979).

Searches by private persons not protected against.

- Fourth Amendment, though textually not so limited, actually afforded protection only against unreasonable searches and seizures made by governmental officers, so however unreasonable a search by a private person may be, absent participation by governmental agents, the Fourth Amendment is totally uninvolved. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Upon a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts, because a warrantless search of the defendant's gym locker was conducted by private citizens, and not by law enforcement, those acts did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search. Hobbs v. State, 272 Ga. App. 148, 611 S.E.2d 775 (2005).

Consensual and voluntary encounter.

- Because the defendant's encounters with the police remained consensual and voluntary, and the defendant consented to a continued detention for further questioning, a motion to suppress the evidence seized based on an illegal detention by the police was properly denied. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. 185, 640 S.E.2d 1 (2006).

Legitimate expectation of privacy controls claims of Fourth Amendment protection.

- The capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1980); Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Right to be free from police intrusion.

- In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that a co-occupant has waived the co-occupant's right of privacy as to other co-occupants when consenting to the search of a premises; but, when police are confronted with an unequivocal assertion of that co-occupant's Fourth Amendment right, such presumption cannot stand as the right involved is the right to be free from police intrusion, not the right to invite police into one's home. Randolph v. State, 264 Ga. App. 396, 590 S.E.2d 834 (2003).

With regard to the defendant being charged with driving under the influence based on a report received from an off-duty officer, a trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the arresting officer's entry into the defendant's garage was not authorized since the threat to public safety had ended and the entry was not supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances. Corey v. State, 320 Ga. App. 350, 739 S.E.2d 790 (2013).

Omission of county name in warrant had no effect on Fourth Amendment rights.

- When a copy of a warrant which omits the name of the county which is used to be directed to the executing officers, and since "the affidavit" included the name of the county along with the other description, the "omission" of the name of the county does not affect the substantial Fourth Amendment rights. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1980).

Consideration of property concepts along with totality of circumstances.

- Although property concepts are no longer controlling in application of Fourth Amendment rights, property concepts should be considered in conjunction with the totality of all the circumstances surrounding claimed violations of Fourth Amendment rights. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Evidence seized as result of illegal police activity.

- Because the State of Georgia failed to carry the state's burden of establishing exigent circumstances existed to justify the entry of the police into defendants' trailer to arrest persons for underage drinking, the trial court properly granted defendants' motion to suppress the evidence seized from the unlawful entry. State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 643 S.E.2d 262 (2007).

While non-custodial and custodial statements were properly admitted, as not vitiating the defendant's constitutional rights once defendant invoked the right to counsel, a subsequent interview initiated by police violated this right; as a result, cocaine seized through information obtained from the interview had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

Trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to suppress statements, drugs, paraphernalia, and cash the police found after searching the defendant's home as fruit of the poisonous tree because although the police had authority to enter the house for the purpose of apprehending the defendant, the subsequent reentry by the police was illegal since an officer reentered the house without a warrant, valid consent, or exigent circumstances; both before and at the time of the defendant's arrest, the defendant told the police not to enter the house, and it could not be assumed that the victim's need for assistance justified the officer's reentry because the exigent circumstances authorizing entry for the limited purpose of effecting the defendant's arrest had expired. State v. Driggers, 306 Ga. App. 849, 702 S.E.2d 925 (2010).

No Fourth Amendment violation when evidence discovered through reasonable search and inventory.

- When police officers acting in good faith and while carrying out an inventory procedure without investigative intent, discovered and read "death note" contained in the defendant's open ended shopping bag, the search was deemed reasonable and, therefore, was not violative of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 975, 100 S. Ct. 472, 62 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1979).

Restraint reasonable.

- Neck restraint a narcotics investigator used in an effort to have the defendant spit out a baggy of suspected drugs was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the application of a neck restraint maneuver was reasonable under the circumstances; the investigator observed the defendant make a series of furtive attempts at concealing the clear plastic baggy, which the investigator believed contained drug contraband, from placing the baggy in the defendant's mouth to attempting to chew it up while the investigator sought to question the defendant. Lewis v. State, 317 Ga. App. 391, 730 S.E.2d 757 (2012).

Police custody of arrested person's property.

- Fourth Amendment is not violated when police take custody of property of persons they arrest to store that property for safekeeping. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 975, 100 S. Ct. 472, 62 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1979).

Violation of rights by seizure and recording of telephone conversations unrelated to crime investigated.

- A general and wide ranging search through all of the telephone conversations conducted on telephone lines during a period covering approximately 20 days, and seizure and recording of matters in no way related to the crime investigated, constituted a violation of the defendants' right to privacy guaranteed to them under the terms of U.S. Const., amend. 4 and by this paragraph. Cross v. State, 225 Ga. 760, 171 S.E.2d 507 (1969).

Arrest before investigation complete.

- Janitorial service owner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a police detective, a police chief, and a police department could not withstand summary judgment when the police detective properly relied upon a trustworthy source to establish probable cause to arrest the owner for a theft from a customer's spa without investigating; thus, there was no violation of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. Means v. City of Atlanta Police Dep't, 262 Ga. App. 700, 586 S.E.2d 373 (2003).

No infringement of rights of individual aggrieved by illegal search and seizure of third party's property.

- A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of that person's Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1980).

When unannounced entry authorized.

- Unannounced entry by Georgia Bureau of Investigation agents was authorized when evidence could have been otherwise easily destroyed and when agents requested of the judge who issued the search warrant to include a no-knock provision. Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482 (1981).

Probable cause for warrantless arrest.

- Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the police personally heard an individual say to the informant on the telephone that the individual had a kilogram of cocaine in the individual's hotel room that the individual intended to sell to the informant if the informant would come to that certain hotel at a certain time, where that individual would be waiting on the third-floor balcony to throw the informant a key; (2) when the informant arrived at the designated hotel at the designated time, the police observed the defendant standing on the third-floor balcony and further observed the defendant respond favorably to the informant's request not to throw down the key and instead to come to the back door to let the informant in; (3) the police did not arrest the defendant until the defendant appeared at that back door; and (4) the information received from an untested informant might have been helpful and corroborating, but the personal observations and perceptions of the police alone more than sufficed to supply the probable cause needed for a warrantless arrest. Fleming v. State, 282 Ga. App. 373, 638 S.E.2d 769 (2006).

Because the trial court could have concluded that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been given the requisite notice to not return to a train station without facing the risk of an arrest, some evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the arrest, which was based solely on the violation of an invalid criminal trespass warning, lacked probable cause; hence, the suppression order was not disturbed on appeal. State v. Morehead, 285 Ga. App. 320, 646 S.E.2d 308 (2007).

Upon a de novo review of the trial court's erroneous application of the law to the evidence presented on the defendant's motion to suppress, the appeals court found that because law enforcement had probable cause to suspect that the defendant possessed cocaine, a warrantless arrest of the defendant was lawful; thus, an order granting suppression was reversed. State v. Bryant, 284 Ga. App. 867, 644 S.E.2d 871 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 540 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, as a stop by a police officer qualified as a first level police-citizen encounter, and that upon learning of an outstanding warrant for the defendant, the officer had probable cause to make an arrest and conduct a search incident thereto; further, the state was not required to introduce the warrant into evidence in order to establish its validity. Lucas v. State, 284 Ga. App. 450, 644 S.E.2d 302 (2007).

Probable cause authorized the defendant's arrest for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, despite no illegal drugs being found on the defendant, based on the similarities between the descriptions broadcasted in a be-on-the-look-out dispatch matched the defendant's truck and passengers, the items found in the truck coincided with the manufacturing, and the opinion of one of the arresting officers, who had experience as a narcotics agent. Kohlmeier v. State, 289 Ga. App. 709, 658 S.E.2d 261 (2008).

Waiver may not be condition of probation.

- Although the trial court should not have imposed a waiver of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of defendant's probation, the trial court's action in doing so was harmless since no warrantless search took place that cited defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver and the appellate court was unwilling to presume that such a search would take place in the future. Millsap v. State, 261 Ga. App. 427, 582 S.E.2d 568 (2003).

Waiver could be condition of drug court contract.

- Under the terms of a drug court contract, the defendant waived any right to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search, and absent evidence to the contrary and bad faith on the part of law enforcement, that waiver remained enforceable. Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 213, 641 S.E.2d 189 (2006).

Search proper after Fourth Amendment waiver.

- Waiver by the defendant, while free on bond for drug offenses, of rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII as a bond condition, was constitutional under U.S. Const., amend. 8 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII; it was a reasonable exercise of the trial court's function of balancing the rights of the accused with public safety interests; thus, the investigators and officers did not violate the defendant's rights when investigating information that the defendant was still involved in drug activity. Rocco v. State, 267 Ga. App. 900, 601 S.E.2d 189 (2004).

Roadblocks.

- Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress in a case in which defendant was subsequently convicted of three offenses based on evidence that was obtained at a roadblock that a police officer working in the field had authorized; the trial court should have granted the motion because supervisory personnel, and not an officer in the field, were required to approve roadblocks given the fact that a roadblock involved a warrantless stop of a vehicle. Thomas v. State, 277 Ga. App. 88, 625 S.E.2d 455 (2005).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a police roadblock with regard to the defendant's conviction for driving under the influence as the trial court properly determined that the roadblock was conducted for a legitimate primary purpose, namely to check for valid licenses, insurance, impaired drivers, and safety concerns, which were consistent with the purposes set forth in the initiation form. Further, a variance in the location of the roadblock to an intersection of a street instead of on the actual street was insignificant and did not invalidate the roadblock. Coursey v. State, 295 Ga. App. 476, 672 S.E.2d 456 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a roadblock because the evidence was sufficient to show that the decision to implement the roadblock was made by a supervisory officer, which prevented the field officers from exercising unfettered discretion in stopping the drivers since the lieutenant and corporal who implemented the roadblock testified that they were supervisors in the traffic unit of the county sheriff's office; the trial court was authorized to find that the purposes of the roadblock, which were to serve as a traffic safety checkpoint and to check driver's licenses and to identify drivers driving under the influence, were as stated by the lieutenant and corporal, and each of the identified purposes set forth in the order for the roadblock was a legitimate primary purpose. Rappley v. State, 306 Ga. App. 531, 702 S.E.2d 763 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained at a roadblock because, given the evidence presented, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the sergeant issued the order for the roadblock properly and initiated, authorized, and supervised the roadblock and that the sergeant's decision to implement the roadblock was made at the programmatic level for a legitimate primary purpose; the evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact that the information on the roadblock approval form, which stated the reasons for the roadblock, did not conflict with any evidence presented as to when the roadblock was to be conducted or by whom the roadblock was authorized. Owens v. State, 308 Ga. App. 374, 707 S.E.2d 584 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1036, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized at a roadblock because the state met the state's burden of establishing the legitimate purpose of the roadblock by introducing a certified copy of a department of public safety roadblock approval form; the programmatic purposes set out in the roadblock form were supported by the other evidence at the suppression hearing, and the police officers' actions at the scene were in line with those purposes. Hite v. State, 315 Ga. App. 221, 726 S.E.2d 704 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1286, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1020 (Ga. 2012).

Suppression of evidence from sobriety checkpoints.

- Appellate court erred by reversing a trial court decision granting the appellant's motion to suppress evidence resulting from a traffic safety checkpoint stop of the appellant's vehicle because the checkpoint at which the appellant was stopped was unconstitutional since it did not meet the case law requirement that supervisory personnel made the decision to implement the checkpoint. The Georgia Supreme Court adheres to the holding that the decision to implement a particular sobriety checkpoint may be made by any authorized supervisor. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 750 S.E.2d 148 (2013).

Sobriety checkpoints.

- Georgia Supreme Court holds that traffic safety checkpoints can be a valid and important means of law enforcement but that police checkpoint programs must have an appropriate primary purpose other than general crime control, and each checkpoint must be implemented and operated so as to control the risks of unconstrained discretion that would be abused by some officers in the field, and of oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 750 S.E.2d 148 (2013).

Basic field sobriety test.

- Although it is a close question, the Georgia Supreme Court concludes that a basic field sobriety test is not a search implicating Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const., amend. IV, protections. Mitchell v. State, 301 Ga. 563, 802 S.E.2d 217 (2017).

DNA sample collection from convicted felons.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-60 (see now O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160) did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the search and seizure provisions of the Georgia Constitution, or a convicted felons' rights to privacy under the United States or Georgia Constitutions. Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 651 S.E.2d 32 (2007).

Statement by juvenile questioned by school official, who was state's agent.

- Juvenile court properly suppressed one incriminating statement made by a juvenile, regarding the robbery of two students in a bathroom during a basketball game, as the juvenile was questioned by an agent of the police with the involvement and participation of the school resource officer. Further, the juvenile was in custody and, thus, entitled to Miranda warnings, which had not been given. In the Interest of T.A.G., 292 Ga. App. 48, 663 S.E.2d 392 (2008).

Entry based on arrest warrant.

- Deputy was justified in entering the plaintiff's home on the basis of an arrest warrant because pursuant to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980), there was no constitutional violation; the deputy reasonably believed the residence was the dwelling for the person sought in an arrest warrant and facts also supported the reasonable belief that the person sought was in the house when the deputy entered. Because the entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the parallel state-law claim also failed. Brand v. Casal, 877 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2017).

Same protection as provided by United States Constitution.

- The protection against unreasonable searches provided in the Georgia Constitution is the same as that provided by the United States Constitution. Wells v. State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 348 S.E.2d 681 (1986).

Expression of common-law rights.

- This paragraph, being the constitutional provision under reasonable searches and seizures, is but an expression of common-law rights. Hollinshed v. Shadrick, 95 Ga. App. 88, 97 S.E.2d 165 (1957).

Constitution prohibits only searches which are unreasonable, and reasonableness is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Gugliotta v. State, 117 Ga. App. 212, 160 S.E.2d 266 (1968).

General searches are prohibited. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).

The officer cannot use a warrant as a pretext for launching a full scale investigation as to the origins of an item which is not incriminating on its face. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).

Sheriff not permitted to violate rights against unlawful search and seizure.

- The office of sheriff carries with it the duty to preserve the peace and protect the lives, persons, property, health, and morals of the people. But in the exercise of these duties, the sheriff is not permitted to violate the constitutional guaranties against unlawful search and seizure. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942).

Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers. Adams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 41, 264 S.E.2d 532 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).

Defendant has standing to challenge searches.

- When the defendant was charged with an offense, the essential element of which is possession, the defendant is endowed with automatic standing to challenge the validity of the searches of which the defendant complains. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).

Defendant lacked standing.

- Trial court erroneously granted a motion to suppress, concluding that: (1) police had no particularized objective basis for seizing the men, including the defendant; (2) the officer had no reason to pat down the first man and did so as a pretext to search for drugs; and (3) the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search; the defendant lacked standing to object to the search, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag which contained the contraband, and the stop, which led to the seizure, as a first tier encounter, was reasonable. State v. Robinson, 278 Ga. App. 511, 629 S.E.2d 509 (2006).

A defendant lacked standing to contest the seizure of cocaine that was found abandoned in a wooded area. Maldonado v. State, 284 Ga. App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316 (2007).

In a prosecution for, inter alia, felony murder, a defendant did not have standing to suppress the evidence of a gun recovered from a hotel room pursuant to a search warrant as the defendant was not the registered guest at the hotel but merely visited the guest on three occasions and, thus, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 674 S.E.2d 275 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence an officer seized from the defendant's vehicle because the evidence undisputedly showed that the defendant had abandoned the vehicle, and since the defendant abandoned the defendant's car, the defendant had no standing to assert the claim that the search was invalid as a warrantless search incident to an arrest; the defendant abandoned the defendant's vehicle when the defendant fled to escape police, leaving the vehicle parked in a stranger's driveway with the door open, and before searching the open vehicle, an officer even confirmed with the landowner that the defendant's vehicle was not parked there with the owner's permission. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 635, 700 S.E.2d 612 (2010).

Defendant's motions to suppress were properly denied because the defendant did not show that the defendant had standing to challenge the search of the apartment where the defendant was apprehended as the evidence showed that the apartment was leased to a third party; there was no evidence of how long the defendant had been in the apartment or whether the defendant was an overnight guest; there was no evidence of any of the defendant's personal belongings in the apartment; and the mere presence of miscellaneous papers in the apartment bearing the defendant's name, without any further evidence connecting the defendant to the apartment, was insufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy for the defendant to contest the search. Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 695, 763 S.E.2d 710 (2014).

Encounter with police officer not a seizure.

- Fact that officer activated blue lights when parking behind the defendant, whose car was parked in front of a closed business with its motor running and its headlights on, did not turn the encounter into a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion; given the late hour, darkness, officer's intention to offer assistance, and fact that both the officer and defendant were parked in the travel lane, it could not be said that the defendant was not free to leave. Darwicki v. State, 291 Ga. App. 239, 661 S.E.2d 859 (2008).

Officer had reasonable suspicion warranting investigation.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, as the officer who stopped the defendant possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant further investigation of the defendant, based on: the number of burglaries in the area; the early morning hour; the closed business; the posted no trespassing signs; and the defendant's attempt to drive away as the police vehicle pulled in behind the defendant. Cox v. State, 263 Ga. App. 266, 587 S.E.2d 205 (2003).

Motion to suppress was properly denied when an officer, who pulled over a van on a traffic stop for following too closely, had justification to investigate the driver and the passenger since a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity accompanied the totality of the facts on the stop: (1) the officer noticed an unusual amount of activity when the officer turned the officer's lights on to pull the car over; (2) the van did not pull over for a mile or two after the officer turned the officer's lights on, which was highly unusual; and (3) the driver and the passenger were extremely nervous when questioned and they gave conflicting reports on why they were traveling in the area. Rucker v. State, 266 Ga. App. 293, 596 S.E.2d 639 (2004).

Because police officers saw a vehicle matching a dispatcher's description shortly after receiving the dispatch, and the vehicle attempted to elude them, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a), the officers had a specific and articulable reason to stop the vehicle; consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant's motions to suppress, in limine, and for a new trial. Francis v. State, 275 Ga. App. 164, 620 S.E.2d 431 (2005).

Defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence found in a vehicle search was properly denied because the trial court was authorized to reject the testimony of an expert for the defendant that a state trooper could not have seen whether the defendant was wearing a seat belt and to believe the trooper's testimony that the trooper had a clear and unobstructed view of the defendant through the car's windshield; the expert based the opinion on a re-enactment which did not exactly match the conditions of the observation because the driver in the test was wearing a dark rather than a light shirt, the expert did not park in the median perpendicular to oncoming traffic, and the expert did not observe the test driver through the front windshield. Bailey v. State, 283 Ga. App. 365, 641 S.E.2d 548 (2006).

Defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence found in a vehicle search was properly denied because a state trooper did not impermissibly exceed the scope of an original traffic stop when, after stopping the defendant's vehicle, the trooper smelled marijuana smoke in the vehicle, asked the defendant about it, and soon thereafter requested that a K-9 unit be dispatched; the testimony of an expert for the defendant that the trooper could not have smelled the unburned marijuana found in the defendant's vehicle did not necessarily overcome the trooper's testimony because the trial court could have concluded that the trooper smelled marijuana smoke rather than unburned marijuana in the vehicle, which gave the trooper a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity warranting continued detention of the defendant. Bailey v. State, 283 Ga. App. 365, 641 S.E.2d 548 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's suppression motion, as the arresting officer was authorized to conclude that in turning off a roadway to evade a roadblock, the defendant committed a possibly illegal backing maneuver, upon which the officer was permitted to investigate; moreover, the officer's honest belief that a traffic violation was committed, even if ultimately proven incorrect, could nevertheless demonstrate the existence of at least an articulable suspicion and reasonable grounds for a traffic stop. Terry v. State, 283 Ga. App. 158, 640 S.E.2d 724 (2007).

The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress cocaine seized after a valid traffic stop had essentially concluded, as a state trooper's objective observations, when combined with the extensive experience the trooper possessed in drug interdiction and knowledge of drug smuggling patterns, supplied sufficient facts to conclude that the defendant might have been engaged in criminal activity. Giles v. State, 284 Ga. App. 1, 642 S.E.2d 921 (2007).

Because a police officer possessed sufficient information regarding both the defendants via a police dispatcher, who was relaying information from a9-1-1 caller, and after signaling for the defendants to pull the vehicle over, the officer observed both the defendants switch places, the officer observed sufficient and particular facts to investigate both men for driving under the influence; hence, the trial court erroneously ordered suppression of the evidence obtained from the resulting traffic stop. State v. Bingham, 283 Ga. App. 468, 641 S.E.2d 663 (2007).

Because a detective's suspicions were raised by the defendant's odd behavior and the detective thought that something might be hidden in the defendant's shoes, the detective was permitted to detain the defendant in order to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information concerning that suspicion; thus, when combined with the defendant's valid consent, suppression of the evidence seized was unwarranted. Lane v. State, 287 Ga. App. 503, 651 S.E.2d 798 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0187, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. 2008).

Because an officer was authorized to: (1) detain the defendant for investigatory purposes based on a9-1-1 call reporting a domestic disturbance; (2) pat the defendant down for weapons; (3) seize the cocaine from the defendant's pocket under the plain feel doctrine; (4) search the defendant's vehicle; and (5) seize the contraband found during that search, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Lester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 363, 651 S.E.2d 766 (2007).

It was error to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a defendant's truck; information from a reliable informant, much of whose information had been confirmed before officers stopped the truck, provided officers with reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop of the truck, after which the alerting of a drug dog further corroborated the source's information and provided probable cause for the search of the truck. State v. Jones, 287 Ga. App. 259, 651 S.E.2d 186 (2007).

Given that an officer, responding to a disturbance call in a remote location of the precinct involving the defendant, had a reasonable safety concern, and because the call described the defendant as loud, belligerent, and possibly intoxicated, the officer had a sufficient basis to conduct a pat-down search of the defendant; hence, the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of a concealed weapon and drugs found following a search was properly denied. Walker v. State, 289 Ga. App. 657, 658 S.E.2d 207 (2008).

Because law enforcement officers were given permission to enter a landowner's land in order to investigate the presence of possible trespassers for engaging in other illegal activity on the landowner's property, the officers gained a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the two individuals were involved in some form of criminal activity, the very least of which was criminal trespass, and therefore had the authority to detain the defendant and a cohort in a brief investigative stop; thus, suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the encounter was properly denied, after the cohort ran, and the defendant failed to comply with the officers' orders, given that those actions amounted to probable cause to support a warrantless arrest and a search thereafter. Burgess v. State, 290 Ga. App. 24, 658 S.E.2d 809 (2008).

Trial court order suppressing drug evidence seized after a Terry stop of the defendant for parking in the middle of the road was error because O.C.G.A. § 40-6-200(a) made it improper to park in the middle of a two-way roadway, and provided a sound basis for the officer's decision to stop the defendant; as a result, the stop of the defendant was proper. Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (2008).

An officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle, which matched the description of one the officer had been told to be on the lookout for, as it was connected with previous suspicious activity and with a suspect who was wanted by police, and it was described with great particularity. Furthermore, as the officer was justified in detaining the defendant long enough to determine whether an outstanding warrant was valid, the extent of the stop did not exceed the permissible scope of the investigation; having already effected a valid stop, the officer could request consent to search the vehicle. Edmond v. State, 297 Ga. App. 238, 676 S.E.2d 877 (2009).

Because a concerned citizen reported that a suspected drunk driver was driving a specific vehicle in a specific location, a police officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify an investigative traffic stop; accordingly, defendant did not show a basis for reversing the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress. Adcock v. State, 299 Ga. App. 1, 681 S.E.2d 691 (2009).

Defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were appropriate because an officer testified that the officer detected the odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside the defendant's vehicle; that the officer retrieved the dog to conduct a free-air sniff; and that after the dog alerted at the vehicle, the officer noticed tears pouring down the defendant's face. The evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the defendant had knowledge of the cocaine in the car and that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine. Perkins v. State, 300 Ga. App. 464, 685 S.E.2d 300 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to exclude evidence obtained as a result of the defendant's detention, specifically the defendants' responses to an officer's questions and the victim's identification of defendant at the scene, because the investigatory stop of the defendant was based on reasonable suspicion arising from a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the defendant of criminal activity. While the victim's description of the assailants was not very specific, the defendant matched the description in build, height, race, and clothing color; with the assistance of a tip from a concerned citizen, the defendant was found at 3:00 or 4:00 A.M. within walking distance of the crime shortly after the crime was committed, within the perimeter law enforcement officials had established; there were no other pedestrians or traffic in the area; the defendant was out of breath and sweaty despite being underdressed for the weather; and the defendant gave conflicting accounts of where the defendant was coming and going. Hall v. State, 309 Ga. App. 179, 710 S.E.2d 146 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress after finding that the excessive-window-tinting statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(b), was unconstitutional because an officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; the officer observed that the defendant's vehicle had darkly tinted windows and reasonably believed that to be in violation of § 40-8-73.1, and the fact that the statute was later found to be unconstitutional did not render the stop invalid. Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647, 727 S.E.2d 269 (2012).

Officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the defendant based on the report of a concerned citizen, who described a suspect involved in illegal drug activity the citizen witnessed and the suspect's location; the officer immediately identified the defendant as matching the description reported by the citizen. Durden v. State, 320 Ga. App. 218, 739 S.E.2d 676 (2013).

Police lacked reasonable suspicion for stop.

- Defendant's motion to suppress suspected cocaine was properly granted as: (1) police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction of justice upon the defendant's flight; (2) an initial uncoercive encounter with the police did not constitute a seizure, and defendant was free to leave at any time; and (3) the record was devoid of any evidence about the details of an anonymous tip that defendant was seen selling drugs in the area of the encounter; moreover, given the tip's lack of detail and failure to predict future behavior, observation of defendant's conduct might have warranted further investigation, but it did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion needed to briefly detain or even arrest. State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 630 S.E.2d 847 (2006).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of traffic stop made by an officer armed with only a "be on the lookout" warning, as the officer lacked a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity, but admitted to possessing only scant information about the driver, the year and make of the vehicle being driven, and the vehicle's direction of travel; moreover, the mere fact that the defendant's gold Ford truck was located in the vicinity of the alleged crime did not necessarily give rise to articulable suspicion. Murray v. State, 282 Ga. App. 741, 639 S.E.2d 631 (2006).

Because: (1) an investigating officer did not have a particularized and objective reason to suspect the defendant of any criminal activity before stopping the defendant's vehicle; (2) the act of driving at night, lawfully, on a public road, and in a high crime area, did not justify the stop in the absence of additional circumstances; and (3) the state failed to provide any evidence of any such additional circumstances, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. Young v. State, 285 Ga. App. 214, 645 S.E.2d 690 (2007).

The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress, as the investigating officer lacked any particularized basis to suspect the defendant of any criminal activity, and information contained in a "be on the lookout" alert for a certain vehicle failed to supplant the officer's belief that the defendant was involved in a reported burglary, given that: (1) the description of the vehicle being driven and the suspect were inadequate; (2) no information was provided about the lapse of time between the crime occurring and the traffic stop; (3) no information was provided about the number of persons about in the area; and (4) the defendant was not engaged in any activity which would have otherwise authorized a traffic stop. State v. Dias, 284 Ga. App. 10, 642 S.E.2d 925 (2007).

Because a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle was not based on the commission of a traffic violation or illegal act, but instead was based on the unreliable information provided by a concerned citizen to a police sergeant which amounted to hearsay gleaned from an overheard conversation, and did not provide the officer with the type of "inside information" that would not have been known to the public at large, the defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana seized as a result of the traffic stop was properly granted. State v. Holloway, 286 Ga. App. 129, 648 S.E.2d 473 (2007).

An officer who stopped the defendant's vehicle because the officer saw the defendant and a passenger "flailing their arms around pretty aggressively" and thought that the two were having a heated argument did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the stop. The officer did not testify that the officer saw any blows being struck, that the officer observed any potential traffic infraction, that either the defendant or the passenger was making threatening gestures, or that the argument was impairing the defendant's ability to drive. State v. Martin, 291 Ga. App. 548, 662 S.E.2d 316 (2008).

Denial of suppression was error since there was no valid basis for initiation of a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle, the further detention of the defendant without evidence of criminal activity was improper, and the defendant's consent to a search was invalid because the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the unreasonable stop. Adkins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 229, 679 S.E.2d 793 (2009).

Officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop because the officer did not see the defendant engage in any drug transaction at the motel, talk to anyone who was a known drug dealer, or commit a traffic offense as the defendant left the motel. Adkinson v. State, 322 Ga. App. 1, 743 S.E.2d 563 (2013).

Officer never said to stop running.

- Defendant, upon seeing a police officer, ran away. As the officer never told the defendant to stop running, there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction. State v. Fisher, 293 Ga. App. 228, 666 S.E.2d 594 (2008).

Vehicle stops.

- A traffic stop was not "pretextual" when an officer saw a traffic offense occur, even if the officer had ulterior motives in initiating the stop, and even if a reasonable officer would not have made the stop under the same circumstances. Clark v. State, 243 Ga. App. 362, 532 S.E.2d 481 (2000).

Police dispatcher who reports a crime at a specified location gives police an articulable suspicion to investigate and detain individuals at the scene. When a police officer received a dispatch on suspicion of drunk driving describing the defendant and the defendant's vehicle, and the officer saw the defendant in the defendant's vehicle matching that description immediately after receiving the dispatch, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop and it was error to grant the defendant's motion to suppress the stop even though the stop was made without the officer observing any traffic violations. State v. Harden, 267 Ga. App. 381, 599 S.E.2d 329 (2004).

When law enforcement received two anonymous tips that the defendant would be traveling from another state with cocaine in a certain model car licensed in the other state, would be taking a certain route, and would be staying in a certain hotel, the tips' range of details relating to future acts not easily predicted allowed police to conduct an investigatory stop of the defendant. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166 (2004).

Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied; the stop of the defendant was reasonable because the defendant was exceeding the speed limit and crossed the center line twice. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720, aff'd, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

After a police officer validly stopped the defendant's vehicle for speeding, and the defendant got out of the vehicle, and informed the police officer that there was a lawful gun with a permit in the vehicle, the defendant's rights were not violated by the officer's entry into the vehicle in order to seize the gun for safety purposes. Megesi v. State, 277 Ga. App. 855, 627 S.E.2d 814 (2006).

Because the trial court had ample evidence to support the court's conclusion that the reason police officers supplied as the basis to stop the defendant's vehicle, specifically, an alleged computer insurance inquiry, was "suspect and insufficient," the court did not clearly err in disbelieving the evidence; hence, the court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle as a result of the stop. State v. Starks, 281 Ga. App. 15, 635 S.E.2d 327 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress, as the search was valid under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII; the officer stopped the defendant based on a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving with an invalid drive-out tag in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-8, and the defendant's tag was suspicious because the tag did not have a strip on the bottom to prevent tampering with the expiration date. Green v. State, 282 Ga. App. 5, 637 S.E.2d 498 (2006).

Because an officer had probable cause to arrest a vehicle's occupants, including the defendant, after encountering a truck matching the description in a be-on-the-lookout bulletin, with the same number of occupants as advised therein, traveling on the road and in the direction identified, and from a location known by the officer to be the scene of an armed robbery, a search based on the lawful arrest was upheld; as a result, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a search incident to the arrest. Boone v. State, 282 Ga. App. 67, 637 S.E.2d 795 (2006).

Because the defendant committed two traffic violations, an ensuing stop of the defendant's vehicle was not unjustifiably extended, the defendant voluntarily granted the officers consent to search, and a canine free-air search was undertaken immediately and as a result of the defendant's consent, the trial court properly denied suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the stop. Noble v. State, 283 Ga. App. 81, 640 S.E.2d 666 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized as a result of a traffic stop on the vehicle the defendant was a passenger in as sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that an officer's stop of that vehicle was justified by the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime, specifically, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-20. Richardson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 89, 640 S.E.2d 676 (2006).

Trial court erred in granting the suppression motions filed by both the first and second defendant, who occupied the vehicle stopped, as a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-41 provided a sufficient reason for the traffic stop; moreover, the trial court erred in ruling that some portions of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-41 did not apply to the out-of-state license plate on the subject vehicle and by ruling that even though the word "Carolina" on the license plate was not legible, and hence, there was no violation of the statute because the police officer testified about an inability to recognize it as a South Carolina license plate. State v. Davis, 283 Ga. App. 200, 641 S.E.2d 205 (2007).

There was probable cause to stop and search a drug defendant's car based on recorded conversations between the defendant and an informant detailing plans for a drug exchange, a call from the informant's wife telling an officer that two males had arrived with drugs and would be following the informant to a prearranged destination, corroboration of this information by an agent, and the defendant's evasion of a roadblock. Maldonado v. State, 284 Ga. App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316 (2007).

Despite the defendant's claim that a sheriff's deputy lacked a specific and articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to execute a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle, and thus that the evidence seized thereafter had to be suppressed, the appeals court found otherwise, as sufficient facts were conveyed to the deputy prior to the stop for the deputy to have a reasonable belief that the defendant was involved in a domestic dispute, and might be under the influence of alcohol thereby justifying a finding that the resulting stop was valid; hence, suppression was properly denied. Lacy v. State, 285 Ga. App. 647, 647 S.E.2d 350 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1514, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 620 (Ga. 2007).

A traffic stop was justified when officers noticed that a defendant's car had a ten-inch "starburst" crack in its windshield; under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73(e), a vehicle was not to be operated with a windshield or rear window having a starburst or spider webbing effect greater than three inches by three inches. Glenn v. State, 285 Ga. App. 872, 648 S.E.2d 177 (2007).

When an officer received a call from an off-duty police captain who stated that the captain was following a white pickup truck with dual rear tires that was weaving, and the officer went on the road and in the direction indicated and found such a truck illegally parked in an intersection, the officer was warranted in stopping the truck; that the manufacturer of the truck was not the same manufacturer named by the captain did not, in light of the other circumstances, demonstrate that the intrusion was not reasonably warranted. Ingram v. State, 286 Ga. App. 436, 649 S.E.2d 576 (2007).

The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, despite a claim that an informant used to apprehend the defendant was not previously known to police and had never provided any information until helping in the prosecution of the defendant, because the informant's tip predicted some aspects of the defendant's future behavior and contained information not available to the general public that was corroborated by the observations of officers; moreover, the defendant's reckless driving and flight from a congested parking lot, which caused a short high-speed chase to ensue, and the fact that the police learned that the defendant often carried a gun, provided the officers with an additional basis to stop the defendant and make an arrest. Patton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 18, 650 S.E.2d 733 (2007).

Drugs were lawfully seized because the defendant's commission of a traffic offense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-2-6.1 allowed an officer to make a valid traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle and thus allowed the officer to ask for consent to search and use a drug-sniffing dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle. Thus, the defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. App. 161, 657 S.E.2d 247 (2008), cert. dismissed, No. S08C0959, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 491 (Ga. 2008).

Because an officer was authorized to stop vehicles for traffic violations under both the Fourth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution, it was proper for the officer to stop the defendant, whose vehicle bore the license plate of another vehicle in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-6. Thompson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 661, 658 S.E.2d 122 (2007).

Because the defendant committed a traffic violation by crossing a solid yellow line in the roadway, and was not legitimately faced with an obstruction, despite claiming that it was undoubtedly convenient to pass the slow moving van driving ahead, a police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle; thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that stop. Przyjemski v. State, 290 Ga. App. 22, 658 S.E.2d 807 (2008).

Traffic stop of defendant was justified when an officer saw defendant's car hit a large pothole, which the officer testified a car could not hit if it were entirely within its lane; even if the officer's honest belief that a traffic violation had occurred was incorrect, the officer's decision to stop defendant was made in good faith and was not unreasonable or harassing. Camacho v. State, 292 Ga. App. 120, 663 S.E.2d 364 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1769, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 872 (Ga. 2008).

In a driving under the influence case, there was no merit to the defendant's argument that an officer lacked articulable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle. Testimony that the defendant was swerving showed that the defendant was not stopped because of mere inclination, caprice, or harassment, and the trial court accepted the officer's testimony that the full extent of the defendant's actions was not reflected on a video shown to the jury. Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 665 S.E.2d 731 (2008).

An officer in an unmarked car who had been following the defendant based on a tip that the defendant was transporting methamphetamine was authorized to stop the defendant under the Fourth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution after the officer saw the defendant illegally cross the center line. Sapp v. State, 297 Ga. App. 218, 676 S.E.2d 867 (2009).

There was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle. The defendant was the only person who had been in physical contact with a drug dealer whom police were watching; the defendant took a package from the dealer; and a search of the dealer's car indicated that the dealer no longer had the drugs, giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant possessed the drugs. Garza v. State, 298 Ga. App. 332, 680 S.E.2d 175 (2009).

When the only evidence to support a traffic stop was that defendant's car was in front of a residence that had been previously raided by the police, this did not constitute an objective manifestation that defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity sufficient to warrant the intrusion of a traffic stop. Pritchard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 14, 684 S.E.2d 88 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motions to suppress drug evidence because the defendants failed to establish that the actions of the arresting officer unreasonably expanded the scope or duration of the traffic stop; because the officer's suspicions were piqued by observations of a truck's condition, the strong scent of perfume emanating from the cab, the demeanor of one the defendants, and the other defendant's responses to the officer's brief questioning, the officer was then prompted and authorized to request a K-9 unit and to run criminal histories on both defendants, and there was no evidence to suggest that the officer delayed in making either query. Young v. State, 310 Ga. App. 270, 712 S.E.2d 652 (2011).

Officer was permitted to continue initial authorized detention while the officer verified the defendant's license, insurance, and registration, completed paperwork, and checked for outstanding warrants, and the defendant's own actions, including exhibiting extreme nervousness, prevented the officer from completing the citations earlier; thus, the scope and duration of the stop were not impermissibly expanded. Moore v. State, 321 Ga. App. 813, 743 S.E.2d 486 (2013).

Roadblock stop is reasonable within requirements of Georgia Constitution when the decision to implement the roadblock is made by supervisory personnel rather than the officers in the field, all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random vehicle stops, the delay to motorists is minimal, the roadblock operation is well identified as a police checkpoint, and the screening officer's training and experience is sufficient to qualify the officer to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field tests for intoxication. Brent v. State, 270 Ga. 160, 510 S.E.2d 14 (1998); Boyce v. State, 240 Ga. App. 388, 523 S.E.2d 607 (1999).

Primary purposes for roadblock.

- A roadblock was constitutional when its primary purposes were to check for driver's licenses, insurance, and impaired drivers and when its secondary purposes were to check tags, observe seat belt use, and check the safe condition of vehicles. The fact that officers were checking for multiple violations did not make the primary purposes invalid. Kellogg v. State, 288 Ga. App. 265, 653 S.E.2d 841 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0458, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 229 (Ga. 2008).

Testimony about implementation and purposes of roadblock established by multiple agencies.

- To show the constitutionality of a roadblock set up by city police, county police, and the state highway patrol, it was not necessary that officers from all three jurisdictions testify about its implementation and primary purpose. Testimony from a city officer that the officer was the primary supervisor at the roadblock and in which the officer addressed these matters sufficed to meet the evidentiary requirements. Kellogg v. State, 288 Ga. App. 265, 653 S.E.2d 841 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0458, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 229 (Ga. 2008).

Trial court properly denied suppression motions filed by two defendants because a well-identified roadblock initiated to conduct vehicle safety checks was constitutional, stopped every vehicle, and was authorized by supervisory personnel at the programmatic level; further, when an officer detected an odor of marijuana from the inside of the defendant driver's vehicle, continued detention of the defendant and the defendant's passenger was authorized. Harwood v. State, 262 Ga. App. 818, 586 S.E.2d 722 (2003).

The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress on grounds that a roadblock was unlawful, as the state presented sufficient evidence that the checkpoint was set up for a legitimate purpose and the decision to implement the roadblock was made by law enforcement supervisory personnel. Wright v. State, 283 Ga. App. 393, 641 S.E.2d 605 (2007).

A roadblock implemented by a lieutenant in a city police department as part of a statewide safety campaign was not unconstitutional; the lieutenant testified that the lieutenant was a supervisor with the authority to order a roadblock, the fact that policy was set at a statewide level did not mitigate the lieutenant's independent authority to implement a roadblock for a permissible purpose, and the purposes of the roadblock, to check for seatbelt infractions and to check for intoxicated drivers, were permissible. Furthermore, although the lieutenant stated that implementation of the roadblock would depend upon the number of officers available to support the roadblock, this practical consideration did not transform a pre-planned checkpoint into a roving patrol. Bennett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 581, 642 S.E.2d 212 (2007).

Stop based on be-on-the-lookout bulletin.

- Motion to suppress was properly denied in a defendant's trial for driving under the influence of alcohol and violating the open container law, as an officer's be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) bulletin provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to authorize the stop of defendant's vehicle; the BOLO provided particularized information describing the color, manufacturer, and model of the vehicle, the number and race of its occupants, and its location and direction of travel. Faulkner v. State, 277 Ga. App. 702, 627 S.E.2d 423 (2006).

Continued detention after traffic stop.

- A deputy who asked to search the defendant's vehicle had a reasonable suspicion to warrant the defendant's continued detention after a warning citation was issued pursuant to a traffic stop; the deputy testified that both the defendant and the defendant's sibling were extremely nervous, especially the sibling while reaching into the glove compartment to get the vehicle's registration, and the two gave conflicting stories as to their destination. Medvar v. State, 286 Ga. App. 177, 648 S.E.2d 406 (2007).

On appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the court held that despite the fact that the police were authorized to conduct a brief investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle, the resulting detention beyond that authorized as a Terry stop evolved into an illegal arrest. Hence, the evidence seized thereafter became the fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed. Grandberry v. State, 289 Ga. App. 534, 658 S.E.2d 161 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained at a roadblock after finding that the defendant's detention by the officers was not excessive because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the brief detention of the defendant was neither unreasonable nor illegal; the trial court's findings that the arresting officer detained the defendant for 20 minutes after the initial portable breath test to conduct an additional test and that the 20 minute delay was for the defendant's benefit to insure that the portable alcohol test was not affected by residual alcohol due to the defendant's recent consumption of alcoholic beverages were supported by the evidence. Owens v. State, 308 Ga. App. 374, 707 S.E.2d 584 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1036, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2011).

Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence deputies seized from the defendant's car because the deputies did not have reasonable grounds upon which to continue to detain the defendant after the deputies called for a drug dog; the state offered no evidence that the deputies still were investigating the defendant's failure to properly signal a right turn when the deputies called for a canine unit to come to the scene and detained the defendant until the dog arrived or that the deputies had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in some criminal activity besides the traffic violation when the deputies called for the drug dog and continued to detain the defendant until the dog arrived and sniffed the car. Dominguez v. State, 310 Ga. App. 370, 714 S.E.2d 25 (2011).

Police officer impermissibly extended a traffic stop without specific and articulable facts to warrant the detention; while the officer observed nervousness in the defendant, that was not sufficient to extend the stop and there was no other evidence from which the officer could have formed reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity. Weems v. State, 318 Ga. App. 749, 734 S.E.2d 749 (2012), overruled on other grounds, State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 779 S.E.2d 248 (2015).

Stop of vehicle not unreasonably prolonged.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer recovered from the defendant's vehicle because the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the officer did not unreasonably prolong the stop of the vehicle, and once the drug dog alerted to the vehicle, the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle; a brief detention was authorized because it was reasonable for the officer to be suspicious in light of the defendant's furtive movement at the initial point of the stop, and that suspicion was heightened when the defendant attempted to explain that the defendant was looking for the defendant's wallet but then retrieved the defendant's license from a different part of the car, and when the defendant revoked the defendant's consent to search. Hardaway v. State, 309 Ga. App. 432, 710 S.E.2d 634 (2011).

Passenger in car owned by another has no interest in car and no standing to object to search. Autry v. State, 150 Ga. App. 584, 258 S.E.2d 268, overruled on other grounds, Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).

Objection to search not available to one who makes no claim to ownership.

- Objection that an automobile was illegally searched without a warrant is not available to one who makes no claim to the ownership or possession of the automobile or its contents and who was not present at the time of the search. Gugliotta v. State, 117 Ga. App. 212, 160 S.E.2d 266 (1968).

There is nothing unlawful in government's appropriation of abandoned property, which does not constitute a search or seizure in the legal sense. Marshall v. State, 153 Ga. App. 198, 264 S.E.2d 718 (1980).

Stolen items in plain view but not mentioned in warrant.

- Seizure of items in plain view suspected to have been derived from recent area burglaries while executing a search warrant for documents proving theft of services was valid when the incriminating character of the items was immediately apparent and the officer had a lawful right to visual and physical access of the objects themselves. Nichols v. State, 210 Ga. App. 134, 435 S.E.2d 502 (1993).

Invalid arrest warrant.

- Because a search yielding evidence used against the defendant was incident to the execution of an arrest warrant which was later invalidated, and no good faith exception existed, the evidence seized against the defendant should have been suppressed, as the arresting officer had no other basis to search the car in which the defendant was a passenger. Register v. State, 281 Ga. App. 822, 637 S.E.2d 761 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2007).

Nature of offense has bearing on objects seized as incidental to arrest.

- The nature of the offense for which the accused is arrested has an important bearing upon what objects may be seized as incidental to the arrest. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967).

Inapplicability of constitutional inhibition to confiscation of illegally kept devices.

- The constitutional inhibition against unlawful searches and seizures has no application to a confiscation of illegally kept devices for the hazarding of money in a place of business open to the general public. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942).

The protection afforded by this paragraph will not prevent a seizure and confiscation by a proper legal officer of "slot machines" for evidence or destruction when such machines are found unlawfully kept by a person, and when their seizure does not involve a search of private premises. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942).

No aid from court to owner seeking to retain implements of crime.

- Regardless of the nature of the place where a portion of illegal instrumentalities was seized, the court did not err in granting the interlocutory injunction and in continuing in force the writ of prohibition, sought by the sheriff and the solicitor general (now district attorney) against the owner who was suing to regain possession of the seized devices, since the courts will not lend their aid to assist or protect an owner seeking to retain implements of crime such as gaming or lottery paraphernalia. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942).

"Mere presence" rule not applicable to accused's residence.

- Rule that "mere presence" of individual in area where contraband is seized will not support conviction has no application when the area involved is the accused's permanent residence. McDade v. State, 175 Ga. App. 204, 332 S.E.2d 672 (1985).

"Equal access" rule application to permanent residence of accused.

- "Equal access" rule, precluding conviction where contraband is found in a common area to which many people have access, had no application if the contraband was discovered in the permanent residence of the three accuseds (father, mother, and son), all three were alleged to be in joint constructive possession of the contraband, and the three had had no visitors during the period after the search warrant was issued and before it was executed. McDade v. State, 175 Ga. App. 204, 332 S.E.2d 672 (1985).

Voluntary consent of head of household.

- The voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by such head of the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant, and such search does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Crawford v. State, 181 Ga. App. 454, 352 S.E.2d 635 (1987).

Because the defendant's grandfather, as the head of household, possessed the authority over the entire house, including the defendant's bedroom where the defendant lived rent-free, the trial court properly found that the consent given by the grandfather was properly granted, and hence served as the proper basis to deny the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized in the bedroom; as a result, the defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal. Rhone v. State, 283 Ga. App. 553, 642 S.E.2d 185 (2007).

Defendant's appearance and a cut in defendant's jacket shoulder, defendant's proximity to the burglary site, the observation of a running person believed by the officer to be the same one stopped pursuant to the description by the other officer a few minutes later, the short time between the report of the burglar alarm and the apprehension of defendant, the absence of anyone else in the area matching the suspect's description, defendant's nervousness, and the deputy's knowledge of defendant's prior record of burglary and escape, added up to probable cause to arrest the defendant. State v. Wilson, 179 Ga. App. 334, 346 S.E.2d 111 (1986).

Coercion not established by mere fact of arrest.

- The mere fact that an accused is under legal arrest when the consent to a search is given does not establish the consent was made involuntarily or by coercion. Wright v. State, 189 Ga. App. 441, 375 S.E.2d 895 (1988).

Recent possession justified search.

- Upon the defendant's arrest for simple battery, and after the arresting officer had been told that the defendant was known to carry a gun, a search of a bag within the defendant's immediate possession was lawful as a search incident to the defendant's arrest; it did not matter that the defendant was in handcuffs at the time the police searched the bag; the decisive factor was whether the defendant was, at the time of arrest, in recent possession of the item being searched. Hill v. State, 263 Ga. App. 365, 587 S.E.2d 843 (2003).

Detention reasonable after officer noticed sawed off shotgun in defendant's vehicle.

- Because a police officer noticed that a shotgun in defendant's vehicle had been sawed off, the officer acted reasonably in further detaining defendant to determine whether defendant had, in fact, violated O.C.G.A. § 16-11-122. Castleberry v. State, 275 Ga. App. 37, 619 S.E.2d 747 (2005).

Guilty plea waives suppression issue on appeal.

- Because the defendant pled guilty to the charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant waived any claim that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of said firearm found in the defendant's residence. Stuart v. State, 267 Ga. App. 463, 600 S.E.2d 629 (2004).

Pretrial detainees.

- When the search of a pretrial detainee's cell is instigated or conducted by the prosecution solely for the purpose of uncovering incriminating evidence which could be used against the detainee at trial, rather than out of concern for any legitimate prison objectives, the detainee retains a limited but legitimate expectation of privacy that the detainee would be protected in such circumstances from an unreasonable search. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S. Ct. 807, 145 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2000).

Prisoners.

- The ruling in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984), making the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution inapplicable to searches of convicted prisoners' cells, reflects the proper interpretation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S. Ct. 807, 145 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2000).

Equal access rule inapplicable.

- Because the defendant was not charged with possessing cocaine and no presumption of ownership of the premises arose, the equal access rule was not applicable. Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 278, 609 S.E.2d 207 (2005).

Tipster.

- Trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence seized in the wake of an invalid stop of the defendant's car; although a police officer was able to corroborate a tipster's description of the vehicle, the vehicle's location, and the fact that there was a black male driver and female passenger, the tip did not provide any information concerning the defendant's future behavior. Rucker v. State, 276 Ga. App. 683, 624 S.E.2d 259 (2005).

Because the trial court found that officers acting on an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown at the defendant's residence were within their rights when they saw marijuana from the adjoining property, when they smelled marijuana from the driveway, and when they went to both the front and the back doors of the house in an attempt to make contact with someone, and the grounds given in the affidavit supporting a search warrant application were wholly unconnected with the defendant's arrest and the two protective sweeps, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. Padgett v. State, 287 Ga. App. 789, 653 S.E.2d 102 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0415, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 209 (Ga. 2008).

Because the information provided by a confidential informant was reliable and substantially corroborated by police officers, probable cause to search the defendant existed; accordingly, because the warrantless search was authorized with or without defendant's consent, there was no basis to suppress the drug evidence found on the defendant's person. Hall v. State, 310 Ga. App. 397, 714 S.E.2d 7 (2011).

Exigent circumstances found.

- Because evidence of sufficient exigent circumstances were presented to law enforcement officers to justify a warrantless search of the defendant's home, and if a warrant would have been obtained, many of those individuals, if left to their own devices, could have attempted to drive home, placing both themselves and the general public at risk, the warrantless search of the defendant's residence was justified; moreover, if a warrant would been obtained, evidence of the crime of furnishing alcohol to minors could have easily been destroyed when the minors left the scene of the crime. Burk v. State, 284 Ga. App. 843, 644 S.E.2d 914 (2007).

Because sufficient exigent circumstances existed to authorize a sheriff's deputy to enter the defendant's backyard and seize a number of animals the officer observed were malnourished and mistreated, and given the harsh weather conditions and impending holiday, obtaining a warrant would have been unreasonable, the defendant's motions to suppress and in limine seeking to preclude admission of the evidence seized were properly denied. Moreover, the evidence seized after the defendant's lawful arrest, and observed in plain view by the officer upon being allowed to enter the defendant's residence, was also properly admitted. Morgan v. State, 289 Ga. App. 209, 656 S.E.2d 857 (2008).

Contrary to the defendant's argument, the trial court did not err in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in the defendant's trial for obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), based on the defendant's claim that the defendant was entitled to resist an unlawful search of the defendant's premises; among other things, exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers' warrantless entry onto the defendant's property because officers observed that the defendant's dogs did not have their required rabies tags, and further investigation, including the capturing of the animals, was necessary to protect the public against a risk of rabies. Jarvis v. State, 294 Ga. App. 482, 669 S.E.2d 477 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress photographs obtained subsequent to police officers' entry into the defendant's home because the officers' entry was authorized by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment; the trial court was authorized to find that the age of the defendant's children, the children's undisputed inability to care for themselves, and the lack of adult supervision due to the defendant's absence and their father's arrest constituted an exigent circumstance that authorized the officers' entry into the residence for the purpose of temporarily supervising the children until a responsible adult arrived to relieve the officers, and once the officers were legally in the house pursuant to the exigent circumstances, the officers were authorized to photograph items of potential evidentiary significance that were in plain view, specifically, the family's living conditions. Staib v. State, 309 Ga. App. 785, 711 S.E.2d 362 (2011).

Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the murder weapon and photographs of the crime scene because the search of the defendant's residence was authorized due to the exigent circumstances; officers arrived at the residence to conduct a welfare check and knocked on the door, which caused the door to open slightly, allowing the officers to see the victim lying motionless on the couch, and after the victim failed to respond to the officers' calls, the officers were authorized to proceed into the residence immediately to come to the victim's aid. Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 717 S.E.2d 447 (2011).

Warrant supported by probable cause.

- Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied as to an arrest warrant as the warrant was supported by probable cause since a witness identified the defendant and stated that the defendant was present at the murder scene and another witness confirmed the identification through a photo lineup and testified to observing the defendant carry out the actual crime; even if the affidavit contained allegedly misleading information that one witness was the victim's cousin and that the defendant was identified by witnesses via a six-photo lineup was redacted, the remaining information was still sufficient to support the probable cause finding. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

There was probable cause supporting a warrant to arrest the defendant for a homicide; although the defendant claimed that the victim had committed suicide, evidence pointed to a homicide, and the defendant had been found kneeling over the victim in an apparent attempt to stage a suicide. Hulsey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 461, 643 S.E.2d 888 (2007).

Probable cause shown.

- There was probable cause for a murder defendant's arrest since police officers had been informed by other residents in the home where the defendant was living that the defendant had admitted killing the victims and that the defendant had shown the residents a tooth from one of the victims. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007).

The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized by a state trooper who was lawfully investigating a serious injury accident the defendant was involved in, as evidence the trooper found, specifically, some steel wool and prescription drugs, when coupled with other information the trooper possessed concerning the nature and cause of the crash, provided sufficient probable cause for the trooper to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence; further, the appeals court agreed that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga. App. 739, 644 S.E.2d 878 (2007).

Given the evidence that the defendant was unable to offer a credible explanation for being on the grounds of a housing project, and failed to provide a law enforcement officer with a clear answer when asked about the ownership of a car the defendant had been leaning on, the officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of the defendant for loitering; thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that arrest. Boyd v. State, 290 Ga. App. 34, 658 S.E.2d 782 (2008).

There was no merit to a defendant's argument that the trial court should have suppressed evidence because police lacked probable cause for the defendant's arrest. Officers knew that within minutes of a carjacking, three people matching an eyewitness's description were seen in the vicinity of the crime driving vehicles also matching the eyewitness's description; the suspects were followed by police until the suspects abandoned their vehicles and fled across a highway and through a muddy, overgrown area; almost immediately, the officers found the defendant on the other side of the highway, at a closed business, with muddy shoes and debris on the defendant's clothes, sweating profusely; the defendant generally matched the description given of one of the fleeing suspects; and the defendant could not give a logical explanation for the defendant's presence at that location. Daugherty v. State, 291 Ga. App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 792 (Ga. 2008).

Plain view.

- No abuse of discretion resulted from the admission of similar transaction evidence because the state established a sufficient similarity between the crimes charged and the similar transaction; and the defendant failed to show that the evidence in the similar transaction was obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure, as the officer involved in the seizure did so through a lawful non-search plain view situation. Sherrer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 391 (Ga. 2008).

Photographs of items in plain view.

- Juvenile court did not err by admitting photographs of a parent's home during deprivation proceedings because pretermitting whether a purported violation of the Fourth Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para XIII would preclude the admission of photographs in a child deprivation action, police officers were authorized to take photographs of items observed in plain view as long as the officer was in a place where the officer was entitled to be; even assuming that the admission of the photographs was erroneous, the parent failed to show that the parent was harmed thereby in light of the remaining evidence supporting the juvenile court's determination that the children were deprived. In the Interest of R. C. H., 307 Ga. App. 774, 706 S.E.2d 686 (2011).

Warrant required to search curtilage.

- It is the general rule that a warrant is required to search the curtilage, and the yard immediately surrounding one's dwelling is well within the curtilage. Black v. State, 119 Ga. App. 855, 168 S.E.2d 916 (1969).

Public safety exception.

- When the "public safety" exception allowed a police officer to ask the defendant about the location of a knife prior to giving the Miranda warnings, the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's statements and the knife into evidence. Martin v. State, 277 Ga. 227, 587 S.E.2d 650 (2003).

Prima facie search made within curtilage of owner without warrant is unconstitutional and void. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

"Curtilage" defined.

- "Curtilage" includes the yards and grounds of a particular address, its gardens, barns, buildings, etc. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Enclosure is unnecessary to mark boundary of curtilage. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Search of curtilage.

- Defendant's consent to search the defendant's house impliedly included consent to search the curtilage, in which a "hobo," or garbage can, was located. Woods v. State, 258 Ga. 540, 371 S.E.2d 865 (1988).

It is confusing to combine the concepts of "common area" and "curtilage" in deciding whether a particular area adjoining an apartment building is entitled to protection. The test should be the reasonableness of the resident's expectation of privacy and the officer's reasons for being in the yard. Espinoza v. State, 265 Ga. 171, 454 S.E.2d 765 (1995).

Evidence was not within the curtilage shared by two units in a duplex since the evidence was not found in the hallway leading to both units or in the front yard between two driveways leading to the dwelling. Evidence located in the yard outside the driveway leading to the defendant's unit, an area where the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, i.e., a part of the curtilage of the defendant's unit, for which police did not have a search warrant, should have been suppressed. Espinoza v. State, 265 Ga. 171, 454 S.E.2d 765 (1995).

Trial court properly granted defendants' motions to suppress evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia found at the residence owned by one defendant as officers had already learned that the person they were looking for stayed at a trailer next door, and thus officers engaged in impermissible search of the curtilage when officers found a bag of drugs 45 feet from the defendants' house; as a result, all evidence seized in course of subsequent searches of the property was obtained as a direct result of the impermissible intrusion into the curtilage and had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. State v. Gravitt, 289 Ga. App. 868, 658 S.E.2d 424 (2008).

Vehicles parked within the curtilage of a dwelling to be searched pursuant to a warrant may also be searched pursuant to that warrant. Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. 523, 359 S.E.2d 416 (1987).

Continued detention when driver unable to produce driver's license.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress when a police officer was authorized to stop the vehicle the defendant was driving because of a perceived traffic violation and to continue the officer's investigation because the defendant did not have a driver's license; the particularized and objective basis for the initial stop was the information from the Georgia Crime Information Center that the male owner of the registered vehicle defendant was operating had a suspended driver's license, and once the stop was made, and it was ascertained that the defendant was not the owner of the car, the officer had a duty to further investigate only because defendant could not produce a driver's license. Humphreys v. State, 304 Ga. App. 365, 696 S.E.2d 400 (2010).

Search of passengers on commercial bus.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs found in a bag that the defendant acknowledged belonged to the defendant during a bus search conducted by the Motor Carrier Compliance Division of the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety as the defendant was not in custody when the defendant answered an officer's questions that the bag belonged to the defendant and that the officer could search the bag. As a result, no seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurred, and it was not necessary for the officer to advise the defendant of the defendant's Miranda rights since no arrest or seizure took place. Solano-Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. App. 896, 673 S.E.2d 351 (2009).

Marijuana field not in curtilage.

- Marijuana patch was not within the curtilage of the defendant's home since the patch was between 30 feet and 30 yards from the house, no fences or enclosures surrounded the patch and the home, and officers had legally viewed the patch from the air and knew before entering the area that it was used to grow marijuana and not for an intimate domestic activity; the marijuana plants were not growing inside a structure of any kind or shielded by any covering, but were located in a 30 to 40 acre kudzu field and surrounded by a mesh hog-wire fence. Gordon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 247, 626 S.E.2d 214 (2006).

Apartment renter or owner in Georgia has reasonable expectation of privacy in curtilage surrounding the apartment. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Seizure invalid when intrusion into curtilage without probable cause.

- An intrusion by police officers into curtilage, without probable cause to search or arrest, without a warrant, and without exigent circumstances, renders the subsequent seizure invalid. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Because the seizure of cash found on the defendant's person was conducted based on a lawful arrest for a domestic violence act of assault, given information by the defendant's girlfriend, the girlfriend's obvious injuries, and the defendant's attempt to flee, the trial court properly denied suppression of the evidence; however, because the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage surrounding the defendant's residence, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, suppression of cocaine found in that area was erroneously denied. Rivers v. State, 287 Ga. App. 632, 653 S.E.2d 78 (2007).

Evidence connecting vehicle with premises required before authorized search pursuant to warrant.

- In order to authorize a search of a vehicle parked within the curtilage of the premises which are to be searched pursuant to a warrant, there must be some evidence to connect the vehicle with the premises. Albert v. State, 155 Ga. App. 99, 270 S.E.2d 220 (1980).

Probable cause for belief that certain articles subject to seizure are in dwelling cannot of itself justify search without warrant. Black v. State, 119 Ga. App. 855, 168 S.E.2d 916 (1969).

Person's presence at suspect place.

- A citizen does not, by mere presence at a suspect place, lose the constitutional right from unreasonable search of the citizen's person and the citizen's property to which the citizen otherwise would be entitled. Collins v. State, 187 Ga. App. 430, 370 S.E.2d 648 (1988).

Warrant usually required before search of luggage seized from automobile.

- In the absence of exigent circumstances or some exception to the warrant requirement other than that applicable to automobiles, a warrant must be obtained before searching personal luggage seized from a lawfully stopped automobile. Buday v. State, 150 Ga. App. 686, 258 S.E.2d 318 (1979).

Consent to search invalid.

- Trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found during a search incident to a traffic stop because defendant's consent to search was not valid since the defendant was under arrest for loud music; the fact that defendant was nervous after being stopped by a state trooper was not in and of itself sufficient articulable suspicion which would result in probable cause to search defendant's vehicle. State v. McCloud, 261 Ga. App. 37, 581 S.E.2d 679 (2003).

Trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement which showed that the first officer on the scene lacked a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in criminal activity, and after a back-up officer arrived, neither officer was placed in fear of their safety by the defendant's actions; thus, the first officer's acts of detaining the defendant and asking for consent to search were unlawful. State v. Lanes, 287 Ga. App. 311, 651 S.E.2d 456 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 85 (Ga. 2008).

Search of visitor's bag.

- Trial court properly suppressed evidence gathered in connection with a warrantless search of a bag owned by the defendant after the defendant's arrest at a friend's house. The search was not incident to the defendant's arrest under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1, as the defendant was already secured in a patrol car and there was no contention that the bag was related to the outstanding warrant on which the defendant had been arrested; the consent given by the defendant's friend to the search of the friend's home did not override the privacy interest that the defendant, a visitor, had in the bag; and there was no testimony that the bag was searched as part of an inventory of the defendant's personal effects. State v. McCarthy, 288 Ga. App. 426, 654 S.E.2d 239 (2007).

Search of lost wallet.

- A trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the drug evidence found in defendant's wallet, which defendant lost at a concert, and the shell of a plastic pen in defendant's pocket after being searched, since by losing the wallet and not abandoning the wallet, the defendant never lost the expectation of privacy regarding the wallet. Wolf v. State, 291 Ga. App. 876, 663 S.E.2d 292 (2008).

Search of purse during booking process.

- Upon the defendant's arrest based on a warrant for failure to appear, the defendant was subject to being transported to jail for booking and the trial court did not err in concluding that the contents of the defendant's purse would have been inevitably discovered as part of the booking process associated with the defendant's lawful arrest. Schweitzer v. State, 319 Ga. App. 837, 738 S.E.2d 669 (2013).

Search of desk at work.

- A trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence seized by the police from defendant's desk at work and concluding that no warrant was required for the search of the desk because it was unlocked and was in a workspace shared by numerous coworkers. A warrant was required for the search of the desk and, since the warrant authorizing the search was issued without a showing of probable cause based on the tip of an unidentified caller, and there was no exception to the warrant requirement shown, the fruits of the search of the desk had to be suppressed. Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 657 S.E.2d 213 (2008).

Search of vehicle of corrections officer in prison parking lot.

- Trial court properly denied a motion to suppress filed by the defendant, a corrections officer, whose car was searched after a drug-detecting dog alerted in the parking lot of the prison where the defendant worked. Signs posted outside the prison informed those entering that they would be subject to search once inside the guard line; by driving onto the premises, the defendant consented to such a search. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 737, 665 S.E.2d 428 (2008).

Breath test admissible in DUI.

- Defendant's breath test was admissible because the defendant consented after being read an implied consent warning as required by O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b)(2), and there was no evidence that the officers used fear, intimidation, threat, or lengthy detention to obtain the defendant's consent, although the defendant was arrested and in handcuffs when the notice was read. Kendrick v. State, 335 Ga. App. 766, 782 S.E.2d 842 (2016).

Defendant's motion in limine excluding the results of the defendant's breath test was improperly granted because the evidence, including the videotape of the stop, did not show that the officers used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the defendant's consent to the test; the defendant's intoxication, youth, lack of education, or low intelligence did not somehow negate the voluntariness of the defendant's consent; the implied consent notice read to the defendant informed the defendant of the choice of either agreeing or refusing to submit to chemical testing, and the possible consequences for each choice; and the defendant immediately agreed to submit to the breath test. State v. Young, 339 Ga. App. 306, 793 S.E.2d 186 (2016).

Breath test as search incident to arrest.

- Implied consent statute was not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII because, even if the statute were coercive, police could obtain a breath test without a warrant as a search incident to arrest. Fazio v. State, 302 Ga. 295, 806 S.E.2d 544 (2017).

Roadblocks.

- Police roadblock for driving under the influence (DUI) was proper, and defendant's motion to suppress evidence collected at the roadblock was properly denied, since: the decision to set up the roadblock was made by a supervisory officer who also approved the time and the place of the roadblock; the roadblock served a legitimate purpose; all vehicles were stopped at the roadblock; the screening officer had prior training and experience with respect to field sobriety testing, police checkpoint implementation, and DUI detection; the delay to motorists was minimal; and the roadblock was well-identified by several signs, an emergency vehicle, a police car with flashing lights, and officers at the scene. Carson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 501, 629 S.E.2d 487 (2006).

Despite the defendant's claim on appeal that evidence was obtained by police conducting an illegal roadblock and that an arbitrary desire to keep officers busy was not a sufficient purpose to justify the roadblock, the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence seized from the roadblock, as its primary purpose was to check for drivers' licenses, seat belts, and vehicle registrations, and not general law enforcement. Cater v. State, 280 Ga. App. 891, 635 S.E.2d 246 (2006).

Roadblock, implemented by a lieutenant in the police department with 19 years of experience in order to check for drunk drivers and drivers without a license or insurance, was valid under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII; the lieutenant was a supervisor authorized to plan a roadblock, and the roadblock had a valid purpose. Giacini v. State, 281 Ga. App. 426, 636 S.E.2d 145 (2006).

Because a form document, entitled the "Henry County Police Department Roadblock & Safety Checkpoint Record," introduced at a motion to suppress hearing by the state was properly admitted as a business record under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803), and the testimonial evidence regarding the primary purpose of the roadblock passed constitutional muster, in that it was legitimately conducted as part of a statewide "zero tolerance" campaign, the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result was properly denied. Yingst v. State, 287 Ga. App. 43, 650 S.E.2d 746 (2007).

Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop because there was some evidence that the defendant attempted to avoid a roadblock; the defendant made an immediate, sudden turn into a driveway, reversed course, and drove away from the checkpoint at the same time that the police officer noticed the defendant's headlights. Blakely v. State, 316 Ga. App. 213, 729 S.E.2d 434 (2012).

Motion to suppress evidence obtained at a highway roadblock was properly denied because the supervisory officer did not lose supervisory status while assisting subordinates when traffic was backed up, and the officer's uncontradicted testimony that the officer was expressly authorized to plan and implement roadblocks was sufficient to establish supervisory authority. Williams v. State, 317 Ga. App. 658, 732 S.E.2d 531 (2012).

Articulable suspicion insufficient to validate warrantless search.

- An articulable suspicion is not sufficient in and of itself to validate an otherwise invalid warrantless search of a stopped or detained automobile. McKinney v. State, 155 Ga. App. 930, 273 S.E.2d 888 (1980).

Absence of articulable suspicion.

- When an officer had the defendant put the defendant's hands on the truck during a traffic stop and began to frisk the defendant, a seizure occurred, and since there was no articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the detention and search were illegal; the evidence belied any supposed threat, so the officer's frisk of the defendant was not a justified Terry stop and frisk. Debord v. State, 276 Ga. App. 110, 622 S.E.2d 460 (2005).

Failure of the police to knock and give verbal notice may be excused if the police have reasonable grounds to believe that forewarning would either greatly increase their peril or lead to the immediate destruction of the evidence. Martin v. State, 165 Ga. App. 760, 302 S.E.2d 614 (1983).

Van parked in adjoining lot not subject to search authorized of house.

- Since the defendant's van was parked in the driveway of a vacant lot adjoining the residence mentioned in the search warrant, the search of the van was not conducted within the dwelling described in the warrant or the dwelling's curtilage and was therefore unauthorized. Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 808, 301 S.E.2d 633 (1983).

Search held contemporaneous to arrest.

- When the defendant's arrest was lawful, the fact that the arresting officer took the time to write out two traffic tickets before searching the defendant's vehicle did not render the search noncontemporaneous to the arrest. Oswell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 35, 351 S.E.2d 221 (1986).

Search of the defendant's clothes, during which crack cocaine was found in the defendant's pocket, was proper as it was incident to a lawful arrest. Finney v. State, 270 Ga. App. 422, 606 S.E.2d 637 (2004).

Since an officer had probable cause to arrest a juvenile from the time that a cellophane bag, still warm to the touch and filled with marijuana, was found near where the juvenile had been standing, a search of the juvenile's pocket, which yielded a bag of methamphetamine powder, was permissible as a search incident to lawful arrest, even though arrest formalities had not yet occurred. In the Interest of J.D.G., 278 Ga. App. 672, 629 S.E.2d 397 (2006).

Warrantless arrest of the defendant was authorized on the ground that a sale of cocaine was committed in the officers' presence, and after the defendant retreated into a motel room, the exigencies of the situation demanded and excused an immediate entry into the room for the officer to arrest the defendant without a warrant; hence, suppression of the evidence seized thereafter would not have been granted. Fortson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 120, 640 S.E.2d 693 (2006).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress evidence found on the defendant's person because any motion to suppress would have been without merit; when the officers lawfully approached and questioned the defendant, the smell of alcohol on the defendant's person and emanating from a cup, and the officers' earlier observations of the defendant staggering and stumbling in the middle of the roadway, gave the officers probable cause to arrest the defendant for unlawfully walking upon the roadway while under the influence of alcohol, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-95, and the cocaine and digital scales subsequently found in the defendant's pockets were discovered pursuant to a lawful search incident to an arrest. White v. State, 310 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011).

Search of vehicle following arrest not improper.

- Although there may have been technical violations of former O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121(b)(1) in an officer's arrest of a driver for driving with a suspended license, the driver's statement that the driver's license was suspended provided the officer with probable cause to arrest, and any violation of § 40-5-121(b)(1) did not render the subsequent search of the van improper. Agnew v. State, 298 Ga. App. 290, 680 S.E.2d 141 (2009).

Use of a trained drug detection dog, in a location where the dog is entitled to be, to sniff the exterior of a container, is not an unreasonable search. O'Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406 (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406 (1989); State v. Montford, 217 Ga. App. 339, 457 S.E.2d 229 (1995).

"Free air search" by a drug sniffing dog around the exterior of a vehicle stopped during a purportedly valid traffic stop in which the police did not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion of any illegal drug activity was valid under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. Bowens v. State, 276 Ga. App. 520, 623 S.E.2d 677 (2005).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's suppression motion, as the evidence showed that once an officer obtained the defendant's consent to conduct a free air search around the vehicle the defendant was driving, a drug dog alerted to contraband that would be contained therein, and once this occurred, the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was transporting drugs. Garvin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 242, 641 S.E.2d 176 (2006).

A urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure. Smith v. City of E. Point, 183 Ga. App. 659, 359 S.E.2d 692 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 258 Ga. 111, 365 S.E.2d 432 (1988).

City's urinalysis testing of employees with police powers was constitutionally reasonable since a compelling need for the use of urinalysis was demonstrated by reports of marijuana use, the interest the city had in preventing that use, and the fact that the city first attempted to solve the problem by conventional means. City of E. Point v. Smith, 258 Ga. 111, 365 S.E.2d 432 (1988).

Taking saliva samples for DNA testing not unconstitutional.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-60 (see now O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160) did not violate the Fourth Amendment or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, as Georgia's legitimate interest in creating a permanent identification record of convicted felons for law enforcement purposes outweighs the minor intrusion involved in taking prisoners' saliva samples and storing DNA profiles, given their reduced expectation of privacy in their identities. Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 820, 126 S. Ct. 352, 163 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2005).

Terry search of auto passenger.

- A Terry pat-down search is authorized when the officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to protect the officer from attack, including the search of passengers in vehicles omitted from the original police notifications. Dowdy v. State, 209 Ga. App. 311, 433 S.E.2d 293 (1993).

Passenger had standing to contest seizure and detention.

- Because the passenger had standing to contest the passenger's own allegedly illegal seizure and detention in connection with a traffic stop, and because evidence or contraband discovered in a search of the car during the traffic stop could be considered the fruits of the passenger's illegal detention, the passenger could move to suppress the evidence or contraband and could thus indirectly challenge the search of the car. State v. Menezes, 286 Ga. App. 280, 648 S.E.2d 741 (2007).

Pat-down search held proper.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized by law enforcement, given the totality of the circumstances presented, including: (1) an anonymous tip; (2) the two responding officers' personal observations of the defendant's actions at the scene; and (3) their brief investigative detention of the defendant; thus, a pat-down of the defendant's outer clothing was reasonable. Carter v. State, 287 Ga. App. 597, 651 S.E.2d 759 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 172 (Ga. 2008).

An officer was justified in being concerned for the officer's safety and in conducting a pat-down search of the defendant based upon the officer's observations of the defendant's earlier behavior of repeatedly tugging at the defendant's waistband to pull up the defendant's sagging pants, the bulge in the defendant's waistband that appeared to be a pistol grip, and the defendant's actions of raising the defendant's left hand and reaching toward that bulge when the officer approached the defendant. Davis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 1, 658 S.E.2d 788 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the search of the defendant's pockets was valid; the officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in criminal activity, and because the pat-down was brief, yielded no evidence, and was not a basis for the further investigative detention, it did not taint the defendant's subsequent consent to the search of the pockets. Mwangi v. State, 316 Ga. App. 52, 728 S.E.2d 729 (2012).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the initial encounter was a first-tier encounter requiring no suspicion since the defendant was already stopped and the officer did not block the defendant's vehicle, activate the blue lights, or otherwise indicate that the defendant was unable to leave; the subsequent pat-down was proper because the pat-down was performed pursuant to the defendant's consent, which the defendant freely gave when requested by the officer. Kirkland v. State, 316 Ga. App. 310, 728 S.E.2d 907 (2012).

Pat-down search held improper.

- Trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking to suppress evidence; before conducting a pat-down, officers had not obtained any information that would support a reasonable belief that the defendant was armed or dangerous, and there was prejudice in that the evidence supporting the convictions all resulted, directly or indirectly, from the search. Perez v. State, 284 Ga. App. 212, 643 S.E.2d 792 (2007).

When a defendant was asked to leave a car and was patted down while a warrant was being served on the driver, the Terry pat-down was unconstitutional when the officer who conducted the pat down acknowledged that the officer had no reason to believe that the defendant was armed but that it was the officer's general practice to pat down anyone the officer asked to leave a car. Accordingly, drugs discovered as a result of the pat-down should have been suppressed. Teal v. State, 291 Ga. App. 488, 662 S.E.2d 268 (2008).

Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress a gun police officers found on the defendant's person because although the officers had a sufficient basis for a brief initial Terry stop since the defendant partially fit the description given by the victim of the person who attacked the victim, the officers had no authority to conduct the pat-down that discovered the weapon on the defendant's person; the fact that the officers suspected that the defendant could have been the one that assaulted the victim did not reasonably give rise to a belief that the defendant was armed and a threat to the officers, and because the record revealed no proof of other circumstances known to the officers when the officers commenced the frisk that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the defendant had a weapon or instrument capable of being used as a weapon on the defendant's person, the state did not carry the state's burden of proving the propriety of the search. Daniels v. State, 307 Ga. App. 216, 704 S.E.2d 466 (2010).

Pat-down search exceeded permissible scope.

- Because the state introduced no evidence that the defendant consented to an officer's opening of a matchbox retrieved from the defendant's pants, the officer was not concerned that a weapon was hidden in the box, and the box was not readily identifiable as contraband, the search of the defendant's person exceeded the permissible scope of a pat-down for weapons, requiring suppression of the cocaine found inside the matchbox. Mason v. State, 285 Ga. App. 596, 647 S.E.2d 308 (2007).

Third-tier detention.

- Trial court erred in finding that a narcotics investigator only escalated an encounter to a second-tier detention by using a neck restraint maneuver and ordering the defendant to spit out what was in the defendant's mouth because by placing the defendant in a neck restraint and ordering the defendant to spit out the baggy, the investigator escalated the encounter to a third-tier detention requiring a showing of probable cause; thus, the trial court erred in treating the encounter as a second-tier detention requiring only a showing of reasonable suspicion. Lewis v. State, 317 Ga. App. 391, 730 S.E.2d 757 (2012).

Pat-down of pocket of coat found hanging in hotel.

- Marijuana was properly seized from the pocket of a coat hanging outside the bathroom door in the defendant's hotel room; the officer who needed to enter the closed bathroom was justifiably concerned for safety and was worried if a bulge in the coat was a gun. A pat-down of the coat pocket was a reasonable step, and the officer was authorized to seize a baggie found in the pocket. Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340 (2009).

Search incident to arrest.

- Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when drug agents searched the bag defendant was carrying after defendant got off a train in a Georgia city and defendant fit the profile of a drug courier who a confidential informant told one drug agent would be on the train; defendant's actions in attempting to flee after defendant consented to speak with another drug agent and the totality of the circumstances in general showed that the drug agents had probable cause to search the bag and, thus, the search was part of a valid arrest. Higdon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 729, 583 S.E.2d 556 (2003).

When evidence showed that the first defendant's cell phone was an instrumentality of the crime of cocaine trafficking and that the details of the drug transaction were arranged by telephone, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the search of the defendant's cell phone because the defendant's cell phone was confiscated during a lawful search incident to the defendant's arrest and because it was an instrumentality of the crime that was probative of criminal conduct. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 601 S.E.2d 116 (2004).

Officer's search of the defendant's vehicle incident to the defendant's arrest was lawful because the crime of arrest was the possession of bagged marijuana in the defendant's pocket, and it was reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the offense could be found in the vehicle from which the defendant exited. Kirkland v. State, 316 Ga. App. 310, 728 S.E.2d 907 (2012).

Probable cause existed to search passenger.

- It was error to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search of the car in which the defendant had been a passenger on the ground that the driver had not voluntarily consented to the search; an officer was authorized to make a traffic stop because of a traffic violation, and after the stop, the occupants' behavior and visible drug paraphernalia gave the officer probable cause to search the car. State v. Menezes, 286 Ga. App. 280, 648 S.E.2d 741 (2007).

Search after stop for seat belt violation authorized.

- Because sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that the arresting officer had a clear and unobstructed view of the defendant not wearing a seat belt as required by O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(f), the officer's subsequent stop of the defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause, making suppression of the evidence thereafter seized unwarranted. Schramm v. State, 286 Ga. App. 156, 648 S.E.2d 392 (2007).

Motion to suppress properly denied.

- Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress items that were found in the trunk of defendant's car after defendant was apprehended on suspicion of shoplifting despite defendant's claim that defendant did not consent to the search of the car, as the trial court weighed the credibility of the testimony and the record supported the trial court's finding that defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search; moreover, even if defendant did not consent to the search, the search was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which allows a warrantless search of a vehicle when there is probable cause, because the police had probable cause to search the vehicle in light of information from a store manager who saw the defendant place store items in the defendant's trunk without paying for them and in light of defendant's subsequent conduct of shoplifting at another store down the road 30 minutes later. Horne v. State, 260 Ga. App. 640, 580 S.E.2d 644 (2003).

Driving under the influence of alcohol conviction was upheld as the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress breath test results taken from an officer posted at a secondary roadblock since the evidence supported the fact that the officer was part of the primary roadblock, and thus had legitimate authority to stop the defendant; the fact that the officer may have served as the chase car was irrelevant as the chase car was also part of the primary roadblock. Fischer v. State, 261 Ga. App. 44, 581 S.E.2d 680 (2003).

Appellate court's finding that O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1 was unconstitutional as no rational connection existed between the residence of the driver of a vehicle and the goal of improving law enforcement officer safety during traffic stops, did not warrant suppression of evidence seized during a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle, because the investigating officer had reason to believe that the vehicle's windows were tinted darker than that permitted by the statute. Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 597 S.E.2d 392 (2004).

When a police officer learned that defendant's license was suspended and the officer had just seen defendant driving a car, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving without a license; because the officer could thereafter search defendant incident to arrest, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. Edge v. State, 269 Ga. App. 88, 603 S.E.2d 502 (2004).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as an officer did not exceed the scope of the officer's initial traffic stop since officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion when the officer smelled the "very" strong odor of marijuana coming from the truck; the conflict between defendant's answers to the officer's questions and the strong odor of burnt marijuana detected by the officer constituted probable cause to search defendant's truck for marijuana; the search was not based upon the traffic violation that caused the initial stop and defendant's attempt to distinguish between the odor of "burnt" marijuana and "burning" marijuana was also rejected. Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 637, 615 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied as the totality of the circumstances gave rise to an articulable suspicion, justifying the police officers' detention of the defendant. O'Neal v. State, 273 Ga. App. 688, 616 S.E.2d 479 (2005).

Defendant was not in custody simply from being pulled over and temporarily detained; since the defendant was not in custody at the time that the officer pulled the defendant over, there was no need for the officer to give a Miranda warning prior to asking the defendant about drugs found in the defendant's car, and the defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied. Connell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 413, 631 S.E.2d 456 (2006).

Because officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, based on the officers' awareness of the defendant's prior arrest following an explosion at a methamphetamine lab and that the defendant was subject to bond requirements related to such arrest, and, at the time of the search, the defendant was in the company of an individual who was driving on a suspended license and carrying methamphetamine, which was in violation of the defendant's bond conditions, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search incident to a valid arrest. Collins v. State, 281 Ga. App. 240, 636 S.E.2d 32 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress marijuana seized as a result of a pat-down search conducted by an investigating officer as: (1) the officer observed sufficient, articulable facts to believe that an aggravated assault suspect might be leaving town; and (2) upon smelling burnt marijuana, and the possibility that weapons might be present, a pat-down of those individuals present, including the defendant, was supported by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time. Brown v. State, 283 Ga. App. 250, 641 S.E.2d 551 (2006).

Because the totality of the circumstances known to the law enforcement officers participating in the drug investigation and the undercover purchase of narcotics supplied sufficient probable cause that contraband would be found inside the vehicle the defendant was driving, suppression of the drug evidence seized during the search of this vehicle was properly denied. Stroud v. State, 286 Ga. App. 124, 648 S.E.2d 476 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress as officers could lawfully search the interior of the defendant's car. A sergeant who had received a report of a speeding car had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity having occurred, and after the defendant fled and disobeyed an order to stop, a second officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction following which the car interior could be lawfully searched under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1. Spence v. State, 295 Ga. App. 583, 672 S.E.2d 538 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress cocaine a detective found in the defendant's pocket because the defendant's presence on the premises being searched and defendant's apparent attempt to flee from the premises provided probable cause for the detective to believe that the defendant possessed or was, at least, a party to the crime of possessing, the unlawful contraband specified in the warrant, which authorized the detective to detain defendant and to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant's person. Sheats v. State, 305 Ga. App. 475, 699 S.E.2d 798 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress marijuana a police officer found in a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger because the defendant was legally detained when the officer sought the driver's consent to search, and the officer made the officer's request shortly after completing the officer's check of the occupants' identification, which was within six minutes of initiating the stop; having found that the defendant was not subject to an illegal detention, the trial court did not err in further concluding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search on other grounds. Baker v. State, 306 Ga. App. 99, 701 S.E.2d 572 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motion to suppress evidence police officers seized pursuant to search warrants for a residence and vehicles and a traffic stop because all of the facts, taken together, justified the stop based on a reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicles were involved in an active marijuana growing operation; a search warrant for the residence was pending based on probable cause to believe that an active marijuana growing operation was being conducted inside, the officers had information from multiple sources that the residence was a marijuana grow house, the house exhibited the physical characteristics of other grow houses that had been recently discovered, and the officers observed the defendants driving away from the residence in tandem with a truck and large recreational trailer, which had been obscured in the backyard behind a privacy fence. Prado v. State, 306 Ga. App. 240, 701 S.E.2d 871 (2010).

Because an inventory search of a codefendant's vehicle after impoundment was reasonable, and because the search was performed incident to the codefendant's lawful arrest, there was no basis to suppress the evidence seized from the search. Williams v. State, 308 Ga. App. 464, 708 S.E.2d 32 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer obtained through a traffic stop of a driver's vehicle because the stop of the defendant and the driver was valid since the officer's observation that the vehicle was traveling 40 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone authorized the officer to initiate the traffic stop, and the officer was on the lookout for the vehicle based on information relayed by the county drug squad; the stop was not illegally extended because it did not matter whether the request to search came during the traffic stop or immediately thereafter, and there was no illegal detention since the questioning was almost instantaneous, all indications were that the search of the vehicle was by consent of the driver. Hammont v. State, 309 Ga. App. 395, 710 S.E.2d 598 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because an officer did not extend the duration of a traffic stop; the officer's testimony supported the conclusion that the officer asked for consent to search during the time that the officer was issuing citations, and the officer's questioning did not extend the duration of the defendant's detention. Arroyo v. State, 309 Ga. App. 494, 711 S.E.2d 60 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the evidence provided sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to support a brief detention of the defendant; an officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in criminal activity when the officer told the defendant to leave a residence because the officer was aware that the owner of the residence was known for dealing narcotics from a number of prior cases the officer had personally worked on, and the officer believed that the defendant was at the residence to buy marijuana. Hilbun v. State, 313 Ga. App. 457, 721 S.E.2d 656 (2011).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress, as the officer was authorized to initiate the traffic stop after observing the defendant's seat belt violation and was thereafter authorized to make a reasonable inquiry and investigation. After learning that the defendant did not have a valid driver's license, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant and after observing the defendant reach into a pocket, retrieve a plastic bag, and attempt to conceal the bag, the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (2012).

Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied when the officer's stop of the defendant was based on the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant was operating a bicycle in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-296(a), and marijuana was discovered in a bag on the handlebars of the bicycle during the stop, which was not unreasonably prolonged. Bolen v. State, 320 Ga. App. 3, 739 S.E.2d 11 (2013).

Harmless error.

- When the defendant was subjected to a pat-down search and the defendant's wallet was removed from the defendant's pocket, after which the defendant fled, leaving the wallet behind, any error in failing to suppress the wallet was harmless because its contents only showed the defendant's identity, which was not an issue. Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217, 126 S. Ct. 1435, 164 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2006).

Probable cause for arrest.

- When the defendants were convicted of trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in finding that there was probable cause to arrest the two defendants because after the codefendant met the two defendants in a nearby apartment complex, the defendant returned with the package of cocaine to sell to the undercover agent, and the second defendant parked that defendant's truck facing the area of the anticipated exchange, apparently so that the second defendant and the first defendant could watch the drug deal; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the first defendant's motion to suppress. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 601 S.E.2d 116 (2004).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied, even though an officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support a first investigatory stop, as the defendant's flight after the officer's general questions, the defendant's suspicious claim that the defendant was biking home from a job 10 miles away, and the defendant's proximity to a car with flashing lights consistent with a triggered car alarm, supported a second investigatory stop; the evidence the defendant sought to suppress was obtained after the second investigatory stop. Crowley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 718, 601 S.E.2d 154 (2004).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as the arresting officer radioed in and was told that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant; whether the information later proved incorrect or invalid was immaterial. Howard v. State, 273 Ga. App. 667, 615 S.E.2d 806 (2005).

Trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress, as the defendant's presence at the scene of an ongoing robbery, coupled with the defendant's flight from police, supplied sufficient probable cause justifying an arrest, and police thereafter conducted a lawful Terry pat-down. Vega v. State, 285 Ga. App. 405, 646 S.E.2d 501 (2007).

Trial court did not err in failing to suppress all the evidence discovered as a result of the defendant's arrest because the arresting officer had probable cause to make an arrest for DUI. Caraway v. State, 286 Ga. App. 592, 649 S.E.2d 758 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1736, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 686 (Ga. 2007).

A deputy had probable cause to arrest a defendant for DUI independent of field sobriety tests; when the deputy arrived on the scene and before the deputy conducted the tests, the deputy was told by another officer that the defendant had been driving on the wrong side of the road and had been drinking, the deputy noticed that the defendant was unsteady and nervous and smelled strongly of alcohol, and the defendant admitted to having been drinking two or three hours before. Tune v. State, 286 Ga. App. 32, 648 S.E.2d 423 (2007).

Officer had probable cause to believe that, by lying about whether weapons were in a vehicle, the defendant had violated O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 because, at the time the defendant produced the rental agreement for the vehicle, the officer saw a firearm in the center console of the rental car, which the defendant apparently tried to conceal by quickly closing the console; when the officer asked the defendant whether any weapons were in the car, the defendant denied it, and that was a reason for the officer to detain the defendant and to secure the firearm for the officer's own safety. Culpepper v. State, 312 Ga. App. 115, 717 S.E.2d 698 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer recovered from a rental car because the officer had reasonable grounds for detaining the defendant since the officer found the defendant and a friend in the parking lot of a closed business late at night, knew that several burglaries and thefts had occurred in the area recently, and observed that the defendant and the friend appeared to be nervous when the officer spoke with them; in the course of securing a firearm the officer saw a firearm in the center console of the rental car, the officer saw in plain view a digital scale with white residue, affording the officer probable cause to effect a custodial arrest of the defendant. Culpepper v. State, 312 Ga. App. 115, 717 S.E.2d 698 (2011).

Motion to suppress improperly denied.

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence, as the evidence that the police officer either observed or seized as a result of entry into the defendant's apartment without consent and without the existence of exigent circumstances violated the defendant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga. App. 760, 605 S.E.2d 400 (2004).

Motion to suppress improperly granted.

- Trial court erroneously granted suppression of the evidence seized in a traffic stop involving two defendants in which an officer, after arresting the first defendant for obstruction, searched the car and found a substance which a field test showed to be cocaine, as the stopping officer was authorized to make the stop based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202 and because the officer could search the passenger compartment of the car incident to the arrest of the first defendant. State v. Stafford, 288 Ga. App. 309, 653 S.E.2d 750 (2007), aff'd, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, the defendant failed to establish that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a motion to suppress the evidence found in the defendant's room as the evidence showed that a preliminary motion to suppress was filed and that trial counsel concluded that, based on the Fourth Amendment waivers of the defendant and others involved, pursuit of the motion would have been fruitless. Corn v. State, 290 Ga. App. 792, 660 S.E.2d 782 (2008).

Trial court erred in granting a defendant's motion to suppress crack cocaine police officers found in the defendant's pants' pocket during a pat-down search because the officers made a valid Terry stop, and the defendant was not free to leave; the undisputed testimony from the officers was that based on the officers' experience, outside window tinting was often performed on stolen cars, defendant and other men were working on a car in a vacant lot, the car had no tag, and the men were gathered around the car in a way that could be construed as trying to conceal a stolen automobile. State v. Miller, 300 Ga. App. 55, 684 S.E.2d 80 (2009).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence resulting from a police officer's search and seizure because, although the defendant was subjected to a tier-two Terry-type investigative detention, the defendant was not in custody, and the defendant was detained for a reasonable time to investigate in conjunction with the valid stop, and the officer's question regarding whether the defendant was in possession of contraband occurred within a few seconds of the stop, such that no reasonable person could believe that they were under arrest and that they were not free to leave after the officer had been afforded a reasonable time to finish conducting a traffic investigation. State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 723 S.E.2d 89 (2012).

Reentry not justified by earlier arrest.

- On review, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the sheriff's deputies violated the Fourth Amendment when they unlawfully entered the house and arrested the plaintiff; a reasonable police officer in the deputies' positions could not show that their presence in the home was justified, either by exigent circumstances or consent or that the reentry was a lawful extension of the initial entry 20 minutes earlier to arrest the plaintiff's wife. Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).

Probable cause for stop.

- Trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion to suppress the drug evidence seized following a traffic stop for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1, as an officer's observations of a vehicle's dark tinted windows, and belief that such violated the statute were sufficient to justify the stop; moreover, a free air search by a drug-sniffing dog did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Simmons, 283 Ga. App. 141, 640 S.E.2d 709 (2006).

Proper basis existed for an investigative stop as a police officer was given a description of the vehicle used by the perpetrators of an armed robbery, which matched that of the defendant's vehicle; a protective sweep of the vehicle, which revealed, inter alia, a handgun, was justified as the crime was committed at gunpoint. Billingsley v. State, 294 Ga. App. 661, 669 S.E.2d 699 (2008).

No justification for stop.

- Trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a deputy sheriff obtained in the course of a traffic stop because the court found that the deputy did not really believe at the time of the stop that the absence of side view mirrors supplied proper grounds for a stop and that the deputy did not, in fact, see anyone toss anything from the car were not clearly erroneous; the factual findings were based not only upon a video that was absent from the record on appeal but also upon an assessment of the credibility of the deputy. State v. Reid, 313 Ga. App. 633, 722 S.E.2d 364 (2012).

No probable cause when defendant could not identify owner of vehicle.

- An officer improperly arrested a defendant for sitting in a car, the owner of which the defendant could not identify. As the officer had no report of a stolen vehicle, nor was there any evidence that the vehicle had been broken into, the officer had no probable cause to remove the defendant from the vehicle and arrest the defendant; therefore, evidence consequently discovered in the vehicle was illegally obtained and properly suppressed. State v. Fisher, 293 Ga. App. 228, 666 S.E.2d 594 (2008).

Entry into car upheld after officer saw object in plain view.

- Based on an unusual metal pipe an officer saw through a defendant's window after the officer made a traffic stop, its resemblance to other pipes the officer knew to be used to smoke marijuana, the officer's experience in a drug interdiction unit, and the defendant's nervous behavior, the officer was authorized to enter the defendant's vehicle based on the officer's viewing of the metal pipe; the officer was then lawfully in a position to observe in plain view a glass pipe containing methamphetamine. Glenn v. State, 285 Ga. App. 872, 648 S.E.2d 177 (2007).

Consent given by outbuilding owners and property deemed abandoned.

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for sexual abuse of a child, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress various items found in an outbuilding that the defendant, the victim, and the victim's parent had been living in as the owners of the outbuilding consented to the entry by the police as well as had brought certain items to the police themselves. The defendant's failure to retrieve the items for over three months, despite repeated requests on the part of the owners to get the items, as well as the defendant moving out of state sufficiently established that the defendant had abandoned the property, thus, no illegal search and seizure was possible. Driggers v. State, 295 Ga. App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95 (2009).

Officers had no knowledge of bond order when conducting search.

- Defendant's drug-related convictions were reversed on appeal as the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a bond order against the defendant to justify the search of the defendant's person by two officers on patrol in a high crime area when the officers had no knowledge of the bond order at the time the search was conducted. The trial court should have conducted a hearing to determine the validity of the defendant's waiver of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and the reasonableness of imposing such a waiver as a condition of the defendant's pretrial release on the bond. Cantrell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 634, 673 S.E.2d 32 (2009).

Search of vehicle after illegal detention not justified despite probable cause for initial stop.

- Trial court erred by denying two defendants' motion to suppress the drug evidence found in the vehicle in which one defendant was driving, and the other defendant was a passenger, because the search of the vehicle was conducted after the defendants were illegally detained after a traffic stop. The officers were justified in stopping the vehicle upon observing the vehicle speeding but by only observing nervousness and an expandable baton, the officers exceeded the scope of a permissible search by continuing to detain the defendants without any cause to believe the defendants were dangerous; thus, the search was not justified. Bell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 607, 672 S.E.2d 675 (2009).

Search of vehicle in parking lot of closed gas station proper.

- Officers were authorized to search the defendants' vehicle for weapons to ensure the officers' safety under circumstances in which an officer investigating a burglary call found the defendants parked in the dark lot of a closed gas station, the defendants claimed that the defendants had mechanical difficulty but there were other open gas stations nearby, the defendants were unduly nervous and appeared to have been hiding the interior of the vehicle while the defendants kept moving in and out of the vehicle, and the officer saw bags in the vehicle; additionally, the officer's concern increased when the men separated and one of them "got around behind" the officer's patrol car. The fact that the defendants were outside the vehicle when the search was conducted did not change the result because a suspect re-entering a suspect's car after an investigative detention would have had access to any weapon therein. Kennedy v. State, 298 Ga. App. 372, 680 S.E.2d 478 (2009).

Unlawful search of vehicle in apartment complex.

- Trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to suppress all evidence seized after the vehicle the defendant was driving was stopped because the defendant did not abandon the car or lose any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the car; when the defendant ran away after the traffic stop, the police officer had just observed the defendant park the car within a parking space of an apartment complex, where the person to whom the car's registered owner had entrusted the vehicle lived, and because the evidence from which the officer ascertained the defendant's identify derived from documents found during the unlawful search of the car, the trial court did not err in rejecting the state's argument that the items retrieved from the sidewalk were admissible in a trial against the defendant. State v. Nesbitt, 305 Ga. App. 28, 699 S.E.2d 368 (2010).

Search of hotel room.

- Contraband found by police officers in the defendant's hotel room was properly seized under the Fourth Amendment because the hotel manager had the authority to terminate the defendant's rental agreement without prior notice on the ground the defendant was selling drugs from the room and creating a disturbance at the hotel, and did so before the officers went to the room; thus, the defendant no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. The officers had to determine if anyone was in the room before the clerk could lock the door and effectuate the eviction, and thus properly entered the room to search in places where someone could be hiding and properly seized marijuana found on a table in plain view, as well as marijuana located under the bed. Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340 (2009).

Trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion to suppress evidence found in a hotel room and by assuming that the defendants had a continuing expectation of privacy in a hotel room because a guest services agent had the authority to evict the defendants from the room once the agent learned that the defendants had checked into the hotel using a fraudulent credit card, and because the defendants had obtained the room through a fraudulent credit card that would not be honored by the credit card company, the defendants were not paying a fee for the room and were not guests within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 43-21-1(1); therefore, the defendants could be evicted from the room for cause, and if the defendants were being evicted from the hotel for cause, under O.C.G.A. § 43-21-3.1(b), the defendants were not entitled to notice of the eviction. State v. Delvechio, 301 Ga. App. 560, 687 S.E.2d 845 (2009).

Search of commercial establishment.

- Night club and owner's U.S. Const., amends. IV and XIV and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII claims against two police officers survived summary judgment after the club and the owners alleged that the officers entered the club without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, ordered the lights turned on and the music stopped, frisked the club's patrons and handcuffed some of the patrons without making any arrests, and acted in an intimidating manner. Illusions of the South, Inc. v. City of Valdosta, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2009).

Items in plain view seen through open door to residence.

- In a cocaine trafficking prosecution, though the defendant testified that an officer kicked in the door to the defendant's residence, as the defendant's landlord testified that there was no damage to the front door, and the trial court was entitled to believe the officer's testimony that the door was open, the officer was entitled to seize drugs seen in plain view through the open door. Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress the drugs was properly denied. Reid v. State, 298 Ga. App. 889, 681 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

Impact of alcohol on consent to search.

- Based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. McNeely, in which the court rejected a per se rule that the natural metabolization of alcohol in a person's bloodstream constitutes an exigency justifying an exception to the U.S. Const., amend. 4's search warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all driving under the influence cases, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514 (1973) to the extent that decision holds otherwise. Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (2015).

Defendant's driving under the influence case was remanded to the trial court because in considering the defendant's motion to suppress, the court failed to address whether the defendant gave actual consent to the procuring and testing of blood, which would require a determination of the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances. Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (2015).

State must carry burden on issue of consent to search.

- Whether or not consent to search was freely given is an issue on which the state must carry the burden of proof. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Consent to search must be product of essentially free and unrestrained choice by its maker. Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 833, 261 S.E.2d 720 (1979).

Consent to search properly imposed as probation condition.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, as a consent to search was properly imposed as a condition of the defendant's probation and did not amount to a waiver of rights; thus, the defendant's tacit acceptance of this special condition provided the police with the authority to search. Peardon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 158, 651 S.E.2d 121 (2007).

Probable cause and warrant not required for search and seizure conducted pursuant to consent. Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 833, 261 S.E.2d 720 (1979).

Probationer waives rights when probationer consents to periodic searches.

- When a person voluntarily agrees, as a condition of probation, to the possibility that periodic "shake down" searches would be conducted, the probationer consents to a search of the probationer's person, the probationer's property, and the probationer's room and waives the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights. Dean v. State, 151 Ga. App. 847, 261 S.E.2d 759 (1979).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a search of the defendant's person and home because the defendant validly waived the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, when the defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana; the transcripts of the defendant's guilty plea revealed that the defendant was informed by the assistant district attorney that a Fourth Amendment waiver was part of the negotiation, neither the defendant nor the attorney objected to the Fourth Amendment waiver during the plea, the trial court explained the Fourth Amendment waiver to the defendant on the record, and the defendant signed a waiver as a special condition of probation. Morrow v. State, 311 Ga. App. 323, 715 S.E.2d 744 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1872, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 993 (Ga. 2011).

Requiring consent to periodic search as condition of parole is not unreasonable. Dean v. State, 151 Ga. App. 847, 261 S.E.2d 759 (1979).

Absent target of search assumes risk of third party permitting search.

- When the absent target of search and consenting third party do not have common authority over and mutual use of premises, third party has the right to permit inspection in the third party's own right and the absent target has assumed the risk that the third party may grant this permission to others. Fears v. State, 152 Ga. App. 817, 264 S.E.2d 284 (1979).

State may show that permission to search was obtained from third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Park v. State, 154 Ga. App. 348, 268 S.E.2d 401 (1980).

Videotape demonstrated consent to search given.

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motions to suppress because the court properly determined that the search was consensual as the videotape of the traffic stop showed that the defendant was not in handcuffs prior to the search, there was no evidence that the defendant was being threatened in any way, misled, or subject to a lengthy detention before giving consent, and the defendant never withdrew the consent given. Batten v. State, 341 Ga. App. 332, 801 S.E.2d 57 (2017).

Scope of consent to search pockets.

- Given that a police officer was granted consent to search the defendant's hotel room to search for the victim's stolen truck keys, upon the officer's receipt of an inconclusive response that a set of keys found could belong to the victim, a continued search, which yielded methamphetamine, was reasonable, and did not exceed the original scope of consent granted; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the drug evidence that officers found as a result of a continued search. Shuler v. State, 282 Ga. App. 706, 639 S.E.2d 623 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a pat-down search, because the defendant consented to the search and, under the plain-feel doctrine, the officer conducting the search was authorized to retrieve a plastic bag suspected to be illegal contraband from the defendant's watch pocket. Dunn v. State, 289 Ga. App. 585, 657 S.E.2d 649 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1021, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 496 (Ga. 2008).

An officer exceeded the permissible scope of a consent frisk for weapons as nothing indicated that a cigar box that the officer removed from the defendant's pocket felt like a gun or other weapon, and the officer pointed to no particularized facts that reasonably led the officer to believe that the defendant might have a weapon. Thus, crack cocaine found in the box was inadmissible. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (2008).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's suppression motion as drug evidence was properly seized during a pat-down search of defendant's person for weapons, which was justified under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-28 because police were in the process of executing a search warrant to search for drugs; a deputy's removal of a package from the defendant's pants pocket was within the scope of defendant's consent. Brint v. State, 306 Ga. App. 10, 701 S.E.2d 507 (2010).

Scope of consent did not extend to looking down defendant's pants.

- Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer found while conducting a search of defendant's person because the purportedly consensual search of defendant's person was unlawful when the consent was the product of an illegal detention; even if defendant's consent was not the product of an illegal detention, the search exceeded the scope of defendant's consent because defendant's indication that the defendant did not "have a problem" with the officer searching the defendant's pockets could not be interpreted as having extended so far as to have authorized the officer to, after searching all of defendant's pockets and finding nothing, push defendant's abdomen, pull defendant's waistband forward, and look down inside defendant's pants for narcotics. Walker v. State, 299 Ga. App. 788, 683 S.E.2d 867 (2009).

Removal of contents of pockets.

- Because the consent received by an officer to search the defendant's pockets for weapons did not extend to allowing the officer to remove the contents of those pockets, when the officer testified that the contents did not feel like a weapon or an object immediately identifiable as contraband, the defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted. Foster v. State, 285 Ga. App. 441, 646 S.E.2d 302 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 625 (Ga. 2007).

Sufficient evidence to support nonverbal consent to patdown.

- See Borda v. State, 187 Ga. App. 49, 369 S.E.2d 327 (1988).

Implied consent statute.

- Order denying suppression of chemical test results admitted against a defendant was proper under the implied consent statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55, and was based on sufficient probable cause and valid consent, given evidence that a formal arrest of defendant prior to reading the implied consent rights was not warranted, and defendant was being administered medical care. Hannah v. State, 280 Ga. App. 230, 633 S.E.2d 800 (2006).

Trial court properly suppressed the alco-sensor tests taken by the defendant because the officer incorrectly informed defendant that defendant did not have the right to refuse the test; O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 gave the defendant the right to withdraw implied consent, as, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have thought the defendant, who was ordered to turn around and place the defendant's hands behind the defendant's back after refusing the test, was being placed under arrest. State v. Norris, 281 Ga. App. 193, 635 S.E.2d 810 (2006).

Under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, defendant could not suppress the evidence of the blood test taken while the defendant was under suspicion for driving under the influence under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391; because the state complied with the statutory implied consent requirements, the defendant was deemed under the implied consent provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 to have given the defendant's consent to a test of the defendant's blood. Meiklejohn v. State, 281 Ga. App. 712, 637 S.E.2d 117 (2006).

Suppression of breath tests.

- Trial court erroneously suppressed the breath-test evidence obtained when the defendant was arrested for, inter alia, driving under the influence of alcohol because there was no evidence that the officer used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or a lengthy detention to obtain the defendant's consent to the breath test; there was no evidence that the defendant's age, intelligence, or level of education hindered the defendant's ability to understand the implied-consent notice; the notice, as read to the defendant, made it clear that the defendant had the right to refuse testing; and the defendant was advised of the various consequences of the defendant's refusal to consent to any testing. State v. Jacobs, 342 Ga. App. 476, 804 S.E.2d 132 (2017).

Blood test results.

- Test results of a sample taken from a suspect may not be used for purposes for which the suspect was not advised and to which the suspect did not consent, and while it is not always essential for a person to be told that he or she may refuse to consent to a warrantless search, informing an individual of the right to refuse consent is a factor a trial court may consider in determining whether such consent was voluntary; a trial court's suppression of blood test results obtained from the defendant without a warrant was affirmed when any consent given by the defendant before the blood draw did not include testing and when the defendant was not informed of the defendant's right to refuse consent and did not give a free and voluntary consent after the blood was drawn. State v. Poppell, 277 Ga. 595, 592 S.E.2d 838 (2004).

In a case charging the defendant with driving under the influence (DUI) to the extent it was less safe for the defendant to drive and DUI per se, the motion to suppress the results of the state-administered test of the defendant's breath was properly granted as the defendant lacked the capacity to consent to the breath test based upon the defendant's confusion and high level of intoxication; the state was only able to show that the defendant acquiesced to the officer's request that the defendant submit to a breath test but was unable to show actual consent; and the trial court was not expressly required to address in its order each relevant factor in determining if the defendant's consent was voluntary. State v. Jung, 337 Ga. App. 799, 788 S.E.2d 884 (2016).

Blood test results inadmissible when actual consent not obtained.

- On remand from the Supreme Court, the defendant's motion to suppress the state-administered blood test, taken without a search warrant, was properly granted as the state was able to show that the defendant acquiesced to the officer's request that the defendant submit to the state-administered blood and urine tests but was unable to show actual consent because the trial court found that the defendant's communications with the officer during the field sobriety evaluations indicated that the defendant was confused, and that evidence brought the defendant's mental capacity into question and showed that the defendant appeared highly intoxicated; and, at the hospital, the defendant had to lean on the officer for support. State v. Williams, 337 Ga. App. 791, 788 S.E.2d 860 (2016).

Consent to search of body.

- Trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence of contraband, namely, defendant's possession of marijuana, as the police officer's discovery of the marijuana was not pursuant to an impermissible pat-down search that two other officers conducted on a group of students, including defendant, but was pursuant to defendant's invitation for the officer to search defendant after the officer asked defendant why defendant's license had been suspended; however, a remand was necessary to determine whether defendant's consent to search was voluntarily given. State v. Baker, 261 Ga. App. 258, 582 S.E.2d 133 (2003).

Upon questioning from outside of a parked car in which defendant was a passenger, defendant's act of voluntarily and immediately pulling a plastic bag from defendant's pants' crotch area and giving it to police, constituted a voluntary encounter, and not a search, implicating any constitutional protections; thus, defendant's suppression motion was properly denied. Carrera v. State, 261 Ga. App. 832, 584 S.E.2d 2 (2003).

Because the defendant was not detained or subjected to prolonged questioning or physical punishment, the police officers were lawfully on the premises, explained the basis for their suspicion, and asked for permission to search the defendant's pants, the defendant's consent to the search was voluntary; consequently, the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Kinsey, 272 Ga. App. 723, 613 S.E.2d 232 (2005).

When the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to an officer's pat-down search, and, upon the officer encountering a hard object in the defendant's pocket, jumped back from the officer, the defendant's act did not constitute a revocation of the defendant's consent to the search, under an objective standard of reasonableness. Whiting v. State, 275 Ga. App. 251, 620 S.E.2d 480 (2005).

Trial court erred in finding that the defendant's continued detention after a license check was illegal and without legal justification, as a police sergeant, after detecting an odor of alcohol from the defendant's vehicle, was legally justified to determine whether the defendant was driving while under the influence, and could not do so without conducting field sobriety tests; moreover, a search of the defendant occurred only after the defendant granted the officer consent to do so, and consent was voluntarily given. State v. Johnson, 282 Ga. App. 102, 637 S.E.2d 825 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 58 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer found in the defendant's wallet during a traffic stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger because the defendant voluntarily consented to the officer's search of the wallet; although the officer did not have a proper basis to frisk the defendant after asking the defendant to exit the automobile, the contraband was not uncovered during the unlawful pat-down, and the prior unlawful pat-down did not operate to invalidate the defendant's later consent to the search of the wallet. Rogue v. State, 311 Ga. App. 421, 715 S.E.2d 814 (2011).

Trial court did not err in failing to grant the defendant's motion to suppress a pistol because the search of a residence was properly conducted when the police obtained the consent of the homeowner; the defendant, who was a visitor at the residence, was physically present but failed to express any refusal of consent or any objection to a police search. Rockholt v. State, 291 Ga. 85, 727 S.E.2d 492 (2012).

Search of vehicle passenger not product of illegally expanded traffic stop and not expansion of consent given.

- Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of pills found on the defendant's person during a traffic stop and convicted the defendant of possession of dihydrocodeinone, since the pat down search of the defendant did not exceed the scope of the consent search and was authorized to ensure the officer's safety, and the safety of others, based on the vehicle driver identifying various weapons in the car. Further, the traffic stop was not illegally expanded since the defendant's arrest occurred nine minutes into the stop and the driver's radar check remained outstanding at the time. Stagg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 640, 678 S.E.2d 108 (2009).

Pointing of stun gun at defendant waives consent.

- Trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress both the evidence seized upon being stopped and detained by sheriff's officers and all statements made to any law enforcement officer following such detention given that: (1) law enforcement exceeded the authority to search the defendant; and (2) the evidence showed that any consent given by the defendant was coerced, as such was obtained when one of the officers pointed a stun gun at the defendant. State v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 187, 635 S.E.2d 807 (2006).

Consent to pat down not valid when defendant was not free to go.

- Since an officer was still in possession of the defendant's driver's license, the defendant did not feel free to leave when the officer asked the defendant to exit the parked vehicle; the officer had no reason to suspect criminal activity, the defendant's license was valid, and there were no warrants, so, despite the defendant's initial lie about the reason for being where the defendant was, the continued detention was wrongful, and the defendant's consent to the officer's pat down did not validate the search. Ward v. State, 277 Ga. App. 790, 627 S.E.2d 862 (2006).

Mere acquiescence to authority of officer did not substitute for free and voluntary consent.

- Despite the fact that the trial court concluded that the second of two defendant's warrantless arrest was unauthorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) because mere acquiescence to the authority asserted by a police lieutenant by both the defendants could not substitute for a free and voluntary consent to search, the trial court erred in finding that the acquiescence granted valid consent to the officer. Thus, the trial court's grant of the motions to suppress filed, in part, was reversed. Hollenback v. State, 289 Ga. App. 516, 657 S.E.2d 884 (2008).

Lack of authority to consent to search of residence.

- After accessing a defendant's residence from a person that was not authorized to allow access and making no attempt to question anyone's authority to allow access by use of an automatic door opener, the subsequent warrantless search of the defendant's residence was unjustified and, likewise, the subsequent search by warrant was illegal. State v. Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007).

Seizure of evidence from locked gun cabinet.

- Evidence seized from defendant's locked gun cabinet during a warrantless search of defendant's residence was properly suppressed because defendant's spouse lacked authority to consent to search of the locked cabinet since the spouse informed an officer that the cabinet belonged to defendant and that the defendant was the only one who possessed a key to the cabinet. State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 691 S.E.2d 888 (2010).

Authority to consent to search of home.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the defendant's stepparent had authority to consent to a warrantless entry and search of the stepparent's home; it was undisputed that the stepparent owned the home, and the state was not required to produce a deed. Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. App. 10, 658 S.E.2d 796 (2008).

Parent's consent to search of home.

- Suppression of dark clothing found in a crawl space in the home of the defendant's parent was not required because the evidence supported the finding that, when a police officer stopped and questioned the defendant's parent at a grocery store soon after the defendant was identified as a suspect in the robbery of the store, the officer's actions were perfectly reasonable given the totality of the circumstances, and there was nothing presented to rebut the evidence that the parent's consent to search the parent's home was voluntary. Jupiter v. State, 308 Ga. App. 386, 707 S.E.2d 592 (2011).

Person who consents cannot complain of illegal search and seizure.

- When undisputed evidence shows that a person freely and voluntarily authorized a search of the person's automobile, the person cannot complain of an illegal search and seizure. Hightower v. State, 228 Ga. 301, 185 S.E.2d 82 (1971).

Defendant's claim that the statements defendant made to an officer as to defendant's intent to buy drugs and ownership of the jacket defendant was wearing, which contained a digital scale, should have been excluded as defendant had not been advised of defendant's Miranda rights was rejected as defendant made the statements after a consensual search revealed that defendant was carrying the scale, which gave the officer a reasonable suspicion to momentarily detain defendant to inquire about the scale. Lewis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 547, 602 S.E.2d 278 (2004).

When defendant, after being properly stopped for a traffic violation, was asked for consent to search defendant's vehicle and replied, "I don't care," none of the circumstances surrounding the consent showed it was involuntary, as a videotape of the encounter showed no hint of fear, intimidation, coercion or deceit, there was no evidence of a lengthy detention, and defendant suffered no physical punishment; therefore, an officer's failure to advise defendant of defendant's constitutional rights did not invalidate the consent, as questioning was limited to defendant's lack of a valid driver's license, whether defendant had drugs in the car, and whether defendant consented to a search. Goodman v. State, 272 Ga. App. 639, 613 S.E.2d 190 (2005).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress two videotapes seized from the defendant's residence that displayed the defendant engaging in sexual acts with two minors because the defendant had consented to the deputies playing the first videotape, thereby obviating the need for a search warrant, and a third party had spontaneously and voluntarily handed the videotape to the deputies. Mitchell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 55, 656 S.E.2d 145 (2007), cert. dismissed, No. S08C0770, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 499 (Ga. 2008).

Consent to limited search.

- Given defendant's consent to the limited search of the premises, the officers were lawfully in a position to plainly view the items associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine; as a result, the officers developed the probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant and search for additional evidence, supporting denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. Wesson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 428, 631 S.E.2d 451 (2006).

Scope of consent extended to trunk.

- Defendant was not entitled to suppression of, inter alia, marijuana seized from the trunk of a car in which the defendant was a passenger because a police officer did not exceed the scope of the driver's consent to search, which allegedly was limited to looking in the car, by opening the trunk as the officer had discussed the problems with contraband being transported on the state highways prior to requesting the driver's consent; thus, the driver was on notice that the officer was looking for contraband. Davis v. State, 297 Ga. App. 319, 677 S.E.2d 372 (2009).

Consent to search included bed of truck.

- Search of the defendant's truck did not exceed the scope of the defendant's consent as a reasonable person would have understood the defendant's consent, given after the officer asked if there was anything in the vehicle the defendant should be concerned with, to include a search of the passenger compartment of the truck and the bed of the truck. Berry v. State, 318 Ga. App. 806, 734 S.E.2d 768 (2012).

Search of glove box.

- Deputy who searched the defendant's car had probable cause to believe that contraband was behind the dashboard near the glove compartment and did not exceed the scope of the defendant's consent by prying open the glove compartment; the deputy observed before the search that both the defendant and the defendant's sibling were extremely nervous, after the search began, the deputy noticed that screws securing the glove compartment were scratched or missing, the deputy smelled marijuana while using a screwdriver to lift the glove compartment to allow the deputy to see behind the dashboard, and the defendant consented to a "complete" search of the vehicle. Medvar v. State, 286 Ga. App. 177, 648 S.E.2d 406 (2007).

Evidence sufficiently attenuated from illegality in search of residence.

- Because: (1) evidence seized from the defendant's residence as a result of an interrogation was sufficiently attenuated from any illegality to be admissible; (2) the duration of the search had no bearing on the subsequent consent given by the defendant's roommate; (3) the consent was not a product of any illegal conduct; and (4) there was no evidence of any flagrant misconduct and coercion on the part of the investigating law enforcement officers involved, the evidence was properly admitted. Spence v. State, 281 Ga. 697, 642 S.E.2d 856 (2007).

Handcuffed defendant gave free and voluntary consent to search property.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence police officers seized from the defendant's apartment because the state satisfied the state's burden of showing that the defendant's consent to the search was not the product of coercion, express or implied, and although the defendant was handcuffed at the time the defendant consented to the search, voluntary consent could be given while a suspect was handcuffed; the evidence supported a finding that one of the officers requested and received the defendant's consent to search under permissible circumstances, and the officer testified that the officer's gun was not drawn and that the defendant was compliant. Silverio v. State, 306 Ga. App. 438, 702 S.E.2d 717 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute was upheld on appeal as the defendant failed to establish that the motion to suppress would have been granted had counsel not waived the issue because, even in handcuffs, the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle and the defendant failed to show that the consent was invalid. Blitch v. State, 323 Ga. App. 677, 747 S.E.2d 863 (2013).

Sufficient evidence of free and voluntary consent to search of property.

- Since the defendant gave free and voluntary consent for the police to search both the defendant's apartment and vehicle, as evidenced by the defendant's handwritten waiver, and police did not coerce the defendant into doing so, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. Watson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 95, 587 S.E.2d 243 (2003).

Defendant's consent to warrantless searches of the defendant's car and apartment were consensual as the defendant was a well-educated college senior, able to read, write, and understand the English language, and had driven personally to the police station for questioning; after defendant signed the consent forms giving permission to the searches, defendant followed the police to defendant's apartment in defendant's own car. Ray v. State, 273 Ga. App. 656, 615 S.E.2d 812 (2005).

Fact that police requested permission to enter the defendant's home several times and pointed out that neighbors could see them on the porch did not make the defendant's consent involuntary when there was no coercion involved; once inside, the police were entitled to inquire about apparent drug paraphernalia that was sitting in plain sight, even though they had originally been inquiring about the reported presence of an assault weapon. Saadatdar v. State, 277 Ga. App. 339, 626 S.E.2d 552 (2006).

Search of the defendant's motel room did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII or U.S. Const., amend. 4; comparing the officers' testimony, that the defendant gave them permission to enter the motel room and to search the pants that were lying on the floor, with the defendant's companion's uncertain testimony, the trial court did not err in crediting the officers' testimony, and since the officers searched defendant's wallet after they arrested defendant for possession of methamphetamine, the search of the wallet was authorized as a search incident to an arrest. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 7, 635 S.E.2d 278 (2006).

Consensual search upon a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation supported the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, as the search conducted pursuant to the defendant's consent was not a search based solely on the defendant's failure to wear a seatbelt; thus, the trial court did not err by ruling that law enforcement did not violate the Fourth Amendment during an officer's traffic stop for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1. Blitch v. State, 281 Ga. 125, 636 S.E.2d 545 (2006).

Because the defendant's consent to search was not obtained by deceit, the defendant voluntarily accompanied officers to the motel room searched, and the consent was not the product of an illegal detention, suppression of the contraband seized was unwarranted. Miller v. State, 287 Ga. App. 179, 651 S.E.2d 103 (2007).

A trial court did not err in denying either defendant's motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized during the consensual search of defendant's vehicle or a motion to suppress defendant's voluntary custodial statement, as the testimony of the arresting and investigating officers established that defendant did not display any problems with the understanding of the English language as did videotapes of the vehicle search and the in custody interview, which likewise showed defendant having no problems with the English language. Therefore, defendant's consent to the search of the vehicle nor defendant's waiver of defendant's Miranda rights were invalidated. Serrano v. State, 291 Ga. App. 500, 662 S.E.2d 280 (2008).

Because the defendant waived the defendant's Miranda rights and because the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to a search of the defendant's premises, to a drug test, and to an interview, the defendant's consent was not the product of coercion; accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Handy v. State, 298 Ga. App. 633, 680 S.E.2d 646 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search of the defendant's residence because the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the defendant and the defendant's roommate freely and voluntarily consented to the search of their residence, and the officers testified that the officers did not coerce, threaten, or offer any hope of benefit to obtain the consents; the roommate gave the officers consent to search the common areas of the residence, and after the defendant arrived at the residence, the defendant likewise consented to the searches of the defendant's bedroom and of the defendant's person. Park v. State, 308 Ga. App. 648, 708 S.E.2d 614 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence a police officer seized in a hotel room because the trial court was authorized to find that the state satisfied the state's burden of showing that the defendant's consent to enter the hotel room was voluntary and not the product of coercion, express or implied; the officer's testimony and the defendant's statement supported a finding that the officer requested and received the defendant's consent to enter the hotel room under circumstances that did not suggest either coercion or threat, and the trial court was authorized to infer that the defendant's consent to search was freely given in the calculated hope that the officer would not find the hidden contraband. Liles v. State, 311 Ga. App. 355, 716 S.E.2d 228 (2011).

Consent to auto search.

- Trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress since the police had probable cause to search the driver's vehicle because a police officer smelled the odor of burning marijuana coming from the car following a valid traffic stop and the driver gave consent to search the car, the police did not need to establish that probable cause existed to search individual containers in the car which might contain contraband since the probable cause that existed to search the car gave them the right to also search each of the car's containers, and, thus, the trial court should not have suppressed evidence of contraband found in the book bag of the passenger, the defendant. State v. Selph, 261 Ga. App. 541, 583 S.E.2d 212 (2003).

Because the defendant's consent to search was validly obtained during a traffic stop rather than afterward, and the trial court could conclude that the defendant consented to the car's search despite an alleged limited understanding of English, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Salmeron v. State, 273 Ga. App. 55, 614 S.E.2d 177 (2005), aff'd, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645 (2006).

Suppression motion was properly denied as defendant was properly stopped for running a stop sign, an outstanding arrest warrant was found during a license check, and defendant consented to the search of defendant's truck after defendant's arrest. Brooks v. State, 273 Ga. App. 691, 615 S.E.2d 829 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence was proper because the evidence at the suppression hearing showed that an officer's suspicions were aroused during a traffic stop due to the defendant's erratic behavior and the fact that, on the floorboard behind the driver's seat of the defendant's car, the officer observed a bag similar to others the officer had seen used to transport illegal drugs; after the officer filled out the citation and returned it to the defendant to sign, the officer asked the defendant for consent to search the car which the defendant gave. Dowd v. State, 280 Ga. App. 563, 634 S.E.2d 509 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana seized as the search of the defendant's truck was conducted after a valid traffic stop after the defendant gave the officer consent to conduct the search, and nothing supported the defendant's claim that this consent was coerced because it was obtained during a custodial interrogation and without the benefit of Miranda warnings as the officer's questioning did not unduly prolong the traffic stop and did not result in an unauthorized seizure or an equivalent custodial detention for which Miranda warnings were required. Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (2007).

A trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence gathered in the search of the defendant's vehicle, which resulted in the seizure of a plastic bag containing additional baggies that tested positive as to containing methamphetamine, in light of the state's evidence indicating that the defendant had been driving under the influence; while the state introduced evidence indicating that the defendant had been driving under the influence, the state's evidence also showed that the arresting officer asked for and got the defendant's consent only after the defendant convinced the officer that the defendant was in full possession of the defendant's faculties. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 478, 651 S.E.2d 750 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0176, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 179 (Ga. 2008).

Because a police officer was authorized to stop defendant's vehicle based on a suspicion that defendant had illegally dumped trash, and because defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, the items seized from the vehicle would not have been suppressed; accordingly, defendant's ineffective assistance claim failed, and the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw defendant's Alford plea. Bishop v. State, 299 Ga. App. 241, 682 S.E.2d 201 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a police officer found in the defendant's vehicle because the defendant's consent to search the vehicle was not the product of an illegal detention since after returning the defendant's driver's license and issuing a warning ticket, the officer told the defendant that the defendant was free to leave, but the defendant remained on the scene and engaged in casual conversation about the high level of drug activity in the area and the fact that the defendant worked nearby; the defendant's conduct showed that the defendant did not feel intimidated by the officer's presence, and under the circumstances, the initial traffic stop had de-escalated into a consensual encounter when the officer requested consent to search, which the defendant readily provided, and there was no evidence that the officer coerced the defendant's consent, tricked the defendant, or conveyed a message that the defendant's consent to search was required. Davis v. State, 306 Ga. App. 185, 702 S.E.2d 14 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress marijuana a police officer found during the search of the defendant's car because the evidence showed that the defendant was legally detained when the officer requested consent to search; the officer's testimony reflected that the officer sought consent to search immediately after issuing a verbal warning. Nix v. State, 312 Ga. App. 43, 717 S.E.2d 550 (2011).

Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to move to suppress evidence an officer obtained during a traffic stop because there was no illegal detention that would have supported a motion to suppress since the officer's uncontradicted testimony that the officer observed the defendant's car failing to maintain the car's lane provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to support the traffic stop; immediately after checking the defendant's license and insurance, the officer asked for and obtained the defendant's consent to search the vehicle, after which the defendant fled from the scene. Ross v. State, 313 Ga. App. 695, 722 S.E.2d 411 (2012).

A trial court erred by denying a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendant's vehicle, despite the defendant consenting to the search of the vehicle, as the police's detention of the defendant was unlawful in as much as no warrant existed since the seizure of the defendant arose from the defendant arriving at a location under surveillance for drug manufacturing based on an anonymous tip regarding a codefendant, and the tip had nothing to do with the defendant. By an officer, who knew the defendant, forcibly opening the defendant's vehicle door, the defendant's movement was physically restrained and the fact that the defendant consented to the search did not validate the search since the consent was the product of a wrongful detention. Smith v. State, 288 Ga. App. 87, 653 S.E.2d 510 (2007).

Consent to search vehicle coerced.

- Trial court erred by denying defendants' motion to suppress drug and weapon evidence found in defendants' vehicle during a search after a routine traffic stop as the driver's consent to search was coerced in violation of defendants' Fourth Amendment rights by an officer's intimidating, harassing, and threatening words of arrest used to convince the driver to consent. A videotape of the stop showed that the officer threatened the driver with obstruction of justice and that the officer would bring a dog to the scene if the driver did not consent to the search. Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 663 S.E.2d 396 (2008).

Withdrawal of consent not shown.

- An investigator's testimony that the defendant "got kind of upset a little bit" upon being questioned regarding the things which had been found at the defendant's trailer did not demonstrate that the defendant withdrew consent to a search. Boone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (2008).

Inventory is permissible intrusion when scope of search is reasonable.

- Only so long as the scope of the search is reasonable, taking into consideration the three interests to be protected by the inventory: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody; the protection of police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from potential danger, will it be held to be a constitutionally permissible intrusion. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

When the police take custody of any sort of container such as an automobile, it is reasonable to search the container to itemize the property to be held by the police. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Police permitted broad circumstances for valid seizure and inventory of property.

- A police seizure and inventory is not dependent for its validity upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve it. They are permitted to take charge of property under broader circumstances than that. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Inventory and impoundment may be invalid and unreasonable.

- Even though the decision to seize and inventory need not be based upon the "absolute necessity" to do so, unless the rationale for an inventory search inheres in the decision to seize and inventory, the impoundment itself may be "unreasonable" and the resulting inventory search invalid. State v. Thomason, 153 Ga. App. 345, 265 S.E.2d 312 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Stilley, 261 Ga. App. 868, 584 S.E.2d 9 (2003); Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Inventory rationale is one which may be abused and stretched to cover unnecessary searches; but even some suspicion that contraband will be found will not avoid an otherwise valid inventory search. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337 (1979).

Discovery and disclosure of "death note" were pursuant to valid inventory.

- When one officer pursuant to a valid and proper inventory had read and called attention to a "death note" found in the defendant's possessions and since the discovery and disclosure of the note were appropriate police actions, the subsequent acts of other officers, in rereading and perusing the documents in question were plainly justified under the "second glance doctrine." Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337 (1979).

Inventory search authorized both as search of properly impounded vehicle and as search incident to lawful arrest. State v. Gilchrist, 174 Ga. App. 499, 330 S.E.2d 430 (1985).

A police officer's decision to impound a car and to conduct an inventory search was upheld after the car was involved in a parking lot collision; the defendant was arrested after driving with a suspended driver's license and a license tag issued to another vehicle and driving without insurance; the officer was unable to reach anyone locally who could take custody of the car; and other alternatives to impoundment would have incurred the risk of theft or damage to the car or its contents. State v. Gilchrist, 174 Ga. App. 499, 330 S.E.2d 430 (1985).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the inventory of defendant's car, which was parked on private property as: (1) defendant was arrested, at night, for carrying a concealed weapon while walking away from a motel after a clerk had reported defendant to the police as a suspicious person; (2) the motel clerk testified that the motel's policy was to tow unclaimed cars parked in their lot; (3) a detective testified that it was the police department's policy to impound a suspect's car so that it would not be stolen or towed by the motel; (4) it was the police department's policy to inventory the contents of the car before impounding it to protect the department from a suspect later claiming that valuable items were missing from the suspect's car; and (5) the detective's decision to impound the car was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Johnson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 443, 587 S.E.2d 775 (2003).

Impound search of defendant's car was reasonably necessary to protect the car and its contents where defendant, who was arrested for driving under the influence, was the lone occupant of defendant's car, the car was parked at the side of the road at 4 A.M., defendant did not ask for an alternative disposition to impoundment, and absent a reasonable request, officers were not obligated to offer impound alternatives to those individuals placed under arrest. Evans v. State, 267 Ga. App. 706, 600 S.E.2d 671 (2004).

Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied as a search of defendant's wallet was conducted during an inventory of defendant's personal items after defendant was arrested and the search was not investigatory. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720, aff'd, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as the police stopped a rental truck, late at night, and discovered that defendant, the only authorized driver, had a suspended license; the truck was properly impounded and an inventory search conducted as the officer could not allow defendant to continue driving the truck, nor could defendant leave the truck at the scene, creating a potential hazard. Wiley v. State, 274 Ga. App. 60, 616 S.E.2d 832 (2005).

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine and crack pipes found during an inventory search of the car was properly denied, as: (1) the police impound was not unlawful; (2) waiting a reasonable time, usually 20 minutes, prior to having the car towed, was not unreasonable as a matter of law; and (3) the officers were not required to call defendant's relatives first. Carlisle v. State, 278 Ga. App. 528, 629 S.E.2d 512 (2006).

Because an officer was authorized to arrest the defendant for weaving, a decision to impound the vehicle the defendant was driving was not unreasonable, and an inventory search of the vehicle was authorized; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. Lopez v. State, 286 Ga. App. 873, 650 S.E.2d 430 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because there was evidence to support the trial court's finding that the officers' search of a zippered, red bag found during the inventory search of the defendant's motorcycle was conducted pursuant to State Patrol procedures, which required that all items of value be listed and, thus, did not exceed the permissible scope of the inventory search; there was no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Grizzle v. State, 310 Ga. App. 577, 713 S.E.2d 701 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the trial court's finding that the impoundment of the defendant's motorcycle was reasonably necessary under the circumstances was supported by the evidence because the defendant was arrested for attempting to elude police and for several traffic offenses, including driving with an expired license, and the defendant was not going to be allowed to drive the motorcycle under any circumstances. Grizzle v. State, 310 Ga. App. 577, 713 S.E.2d 701 (2011).

Inventory search of vehicle pursuant to impoundment.

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the inventory search of a van was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment due to a lack of evidence of police policy; the record contained no evidence about the police department's policy or procedures on inventory searches, but rather, the officers simply testified that the officers' searches of a flatbed wrecker, the van, and the van's contents were inventory searches pursuant to the impoundment. Capellan v. State, 316 Ga. App. 467, 729 S.E.2d 602 (2012).

Order to apprehend for a mental health evaluation does not authorize full inventory search.

- Search of a civil detainee under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-41, before being placed in a patrol car, absent some valid reason for the officer conducting the search to take custody of the clothing, container, or bag searched, does not come within the ambit of allowable inventory searches because such an inventory presupposes some valid reason for taking custody of the object being searched; an inventory search which is not necessary to achieve the recognized custodial goals of such a search is not permissible, and no controlling precedent authorizes a full inventory search on the basis that a detainee will be transported to another location in a patrol car for a mental health evaluation. Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. App. 644, 639 S.E.2d 584 (2006).

Drug evidence found in a defendant's pocket by a police officer who was executing a civil order to apprehend the defendant for a mental health evaluation under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-41 should have been suppressed because the search in which the officer found the evidence did not come within the ambit of allowable inventory searches; no full inventory search was authorized on the basis that the defendant was to be transported in a patrol car to the location of the evaluation. Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. App. 644, 639 S.E.2d 584 (2006).

Compelled testing after defendant's invocation of right to refuse under implied consent law.

- Police do not have the authority to seek a search warrant to compel a defendant to submit blood and urine samples for drug testing after a defendant has invoked the defendant's right under the implied consent law to refuse the testing. State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316, 612 S.E.2d 281 (2005).

General exploratory warrants are void.

- By definition, a general warrant is one which does not sufficiently specify the person, place, or thing to be searched. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22 (1983).

Search warrants unavailable to individual for maintenance of private right.

- Search warrants are criminal in nature, having no relation to civil process and are unavailable to an individual for the maintenance of a mere private right. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965), commented on in 17 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1966).

No prohibition against legislature designating other persons power to issue search warrants.

- At common law, justices of the peace had general power to issue search warrants for stolen goods. So long as a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause is made, there is no constitutional inhibition against designation by the General Assembly of persons other than a justice of the peace for doing it. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965), commented on in 17 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1966).

Sufficiency of description contained in warrant.

- It is enough if the description of the place to be searched is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. Steele v. State, 118 Ga. App. 433, 164 S.E.2d 255 (1968).

When a search warrant fails to name an individual and describes incorrectly the street number, county, and city, naming only the street name correctly, it is defective. State v. Hatch, 160 Ga. App. 384, 287 S.E.2d 98 (1981).

Warrant references adjacent buildings.

- Even though a search warrant may have been issued for premises which were described in commercial terms, the express scope of the warrant nevertheless also extended to "adjacent buildings". Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to grant the motion to suppress the evidence that was discovered in the search of the residence pursuant to the warrant. Hamil v. State, 198 Ga. App. 869, 403 S.E.2d 828, cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 403 S.E.2d 828 (1991).

A description in a search warrant used to seize pornographic tapes was so open-ended that the warrant violated both the United States and Georgia Constitutions. As a result, the search warrant was invalid and the tapes should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search. Dobbins v. State, 262 Ga. 161, 415 S.E.2d 168 (1992).

Trial court properly suppressed videotapes that were seized from the defendant's home during the execution of a search warrant as the description in the warrant that the items sought were videotapes that were instruments used in the crimes of molesting and sexually exploiting children did not meet the particularity requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, especially in light of the fact that the videotapes involved activity protected by U.S. Const., amend. 1, since there was no evidence of any videotape activity involving the victim, and the warrant did not elaborate on what types of videotapes were to be seized, leaving that determination solely to the discretion of the officers, which amounted to an impermissible general warrant. Circumstances may make an exact search warrant description of instrumentalities a virtual impossibility and, in those circumstances, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of items sought, but a warrant authorizing the seizure of "videotapes" with nothing more does not pass constitutional muster. State v. Kramer, 260 Ga. App. 546, 580 S.E.2d 314 (2003).

When a search warrant affidavit incorrectly described the house to be searched as the second house on the right, when it was actually the third house on the right, and a warrant containing the incorrect description had been issued, when a magistrate who did not issue the warrant corrected the errors in the affidavit and warrant, the change was clearly typographical and not so material as to destroy the integrity of the affidavit or the validity of the warrant, and the change did not affect any substantive rights. Marshall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 17, 614 S.E.2d 169 (2005).

Evidence seized from defendant at place of work was properly suppressed since the search warrant did not authorize the search of the defendant at the defendant's place of employment and only covered searches at the defendant's residence. State v. Dills, 237 Ga. App. 165, 514 S.E.2d 917 (1999).

A search warrant is not invalid for want of description of the premises to be searched if the description sufficiently permits a prudent officer executing the warrant to locate the place definitely and with reasonable certainty, and without depending upon the officer's discretion. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201 (1983).

Effect of incorrect street number in warrant.

- Even though a street number is incorrect, where there are other elements of description sufficiently particular, the search warrant may be valid. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201 (1983).

Incorrect street address invalidated warrant.

- A search warrant containing the wrong street address was defective under both the federal and Georgia constitutions as the defect was not a mere technical irregularity under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-31 because it did not incorporate the affidavit and application and thus could not be construed with reference to them; furthermore, the warrant did not contain other descriptive elements that would allow an officer to locate the place with reasonable certainty. Thomas v. State, 287 Ga. App. 262, 651 S.E.2d 183 (2007).

Sufficient particularity.

- Search warrant which defined the person, premises, and vehicle to be searched with sufficient particularity was not subject to attack as a general warrant because it authorized the search and seizure of "the person, premises or property" - the use of the word "or" did not give the officers unbridled discretion in what to search. Minter v. State, 206 Ga. App. 692, 426 S.E.2d 169 (1992).

When law enforcement received two anonymous tips that the defendant would be traveling from another state with cocaine in a certain model car licensed in the other state, would be taking a certain route, and would be staying in a certain hotel, the tips' range of details relating to future acts not easily predicted, combined with information obtained while defendant was lawfully detained that $150,000.00 was seized from a concealed compartment in defendant's vehicle and defendant was deceptive during a conversation with a police officer, allowed the issuance of a search warrant for the defendant's house. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166 (2004).

Trial court properly denied suppression of the defendant's blood sample for a DNA comparison pursuant to a particularized search warrant seeking the sample as the warrant and the attached affidavit when read together particularly described the evidence to be seized and gave the executing officers adequate notice of the search warrant's scope and command. Holloway v. State, 287 Ga. App. 655, 653 S.E.2d 95 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence police officers found at a residence because the fact that the investigator who submitted the affidavit for the search warrant did not leave a copy of the affidavit with the warrant at the premises did not render the warrant invalid; the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII on the warrant's face because the warrant listed the address of the place to be searched and contained a description of the home, and the warrant also listed items to be seized, including marijuana, weighing devices, and other paraphernalia used in the distribution of drugs. Pass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 440, 710 S.E.2d 641 (2011).

Effect of incorrect date in warrant.

- Because affidavit accompanying a search warrant contained sufficient probable cause and resulting search was not rendered illegal merely because the date on the warrant post-dated the search by one day, trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 767, 658 S.E.2d 386 (2008).

"Curtilage" does not include neighboring or nearby property which is beyond the property lines of the dwelling specified in the warrant. Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 808, 301 S.E.2d 633 (1983).

A driveway is properly considered within the curtilage of the dwelling it services, at least when the driveway is located on the dwelling owner's property. Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 808, 301 S.E.2d 633 (1983).

When a search warrant was issued allowing a search of defendant's house, this extended by implication to areas within the curtilage of the dwelling, and to a vehicle parked within that curtilage. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166 (2004).

Warrant valid which requires officer to make determination of fact.

- If the warrant calls for the search and seizure of intoxicating liquors at a described location, the executing officer may be required to determine as a matter of fact which of several different containers found on the premises searched contained intoxicating liquors or which contained other beverages of a nonintoxicating character. In the very nature of things, the officer cannot be relieved of making this determination, and so long as the determination which the officer is required to make is a determination of a matter of fact as distinguished from a determination of a matter of opinion the warrant is valid. Strauss v. Stynchombe, 224 Ga. 859, 165 S.E.2d 302 (1968).

Warrant valid when sufficient description and limited scope permits prudent officer to locate person and place.

- Even though the execution of a warrant is directed to all peace officers, a search pursuant to the warrant meets the requirements of the United States and Georgia Constitutions if the warrant was limited in the warrant's scope to physically described persons in a specific vicinity, and the description sufficiently permitted a prudent officer with a search warrant to be able to locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty. Fomby v. State, 120 Ga. App. 387, 170 S.E.2d 585 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008, 90 S. Ct. 1236, 25 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1970).

To be valid, search warrant must contain description of person and premises to be searched with such particularity as would enable a prudent person executing the warrant to locate the person and premises definitely and with reasonable certainty. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263 (1980).

Searches of persons on premises but not named in search warrant are illegal absent independent justification for a personal search. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Search of person not named in warrant outside home was permissible.

- Officer who saw the defendant asleep in a car parked at a house as the officer was headed to the house to execute an arrest warrant for the defendant's brother was entitled to initiate a "first-tier" encounter by approaching the car and asking the defendant to step out; marijuana seen in plain view in the car gave probable cause to arrest the defendant for drug possession, and to search the car, and, incident to the arrest, the officers were also authorized to search the entire passenger compartment of the automobile and any closed containers therein. Mauge v. State, 279 Ga. App. 36, 630 S.E.2d 174 (2006).

Searches treated as searches of person.

- Searches of a paper bag carried under a person's arm and of a plastic bag in a person's pocket have been treated as searches of the person. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Constitutional protection of visitor's personal belonging.

- Personal belongings brought by their owner on a visit to a friend's house retain their constitutional protection until their owner meaningfully abdicates control or responsibility. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Whether police had notice of searching visitor's effects requires factual determination.

- Whether the police had notice that the police were searching the personal effects of a visitor to searched premises must be determined on the facts of each case. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Without notice of ownership, police can assume objects subject to search.

- Without notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, the police are entitled to assume that all objects within premises lawfully subject to search under a warrant are part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Failure to record information in affidavit will not invalidate search warrant.

- If information sufficient to uphold a determination of probable cause is presented under oath to a state magistrate, the failure to record the information in the form of an affidavit will not invalidate the search warrant. Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143, 147 S.E.2d 666 (1966).

Failure to include affidavit or warrant in record on appeal.

- Although a defendant challenged the validity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant, neither the warrant nor the affidavit was in the record; thus, the court had to assume that the trial court's decision as to the exclusion of the search results was correct. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 361, 651 S.E.2d 768 (2007).

When automobile inventory search was not illegal, later search warrant based upon this information is not invalid. Anglin v. State, 244 Ga. 1, 257 S.E.2d 513 (1979).

Search warrant held not overbroad and general.

- A search warrant is not impermissibly overbroad and general when the warrant authorizes the agents to search "any other person found on said premises who reasonably might be involved in the commission of the aforesaid violation of the laws" as well as "any motor vehicle found on said premises" and both clauses appear in the preprinted portion of the search warrant form, since a warrant which identifies the premises and its owners or occupants is not void as a general warrant because it authorizes the search of other persons found there who may reasonably be involved in the commission of the crime for which the warrant is issued, and the scope of the search is sufficiently limited by the specific language typed in the blank spaces on the form, describing two vehicles by color, make, type, and license plate number and stating they are at the premises described. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629 (1983).

Warrant which authorized the seizure of "all items contained within a specified room and motel at the time of the fire on February 17, 2001, and which remain therein which is evidence of the crime of Insurance Fraud" was not impermissibly vague because the warrant included detailed information about the removal of cats and a dog from defendant's home and taken to the motel room prior to a fire at the home allegedly started by defendant's son with the knowledge and consent of defendant; in the warrant application, an investigator testified that CD's, tapes, stereo equipment, and other electronics were witnessed being taken to the specified motel and room number and were noticeably absent from the fire scene, and an insurance investigator further testified that in a recorded statement, defendant said that there were no items removed from the house prior to the fire. Maddox v. State, 272 Ga. App. 440, 612 S.E.2d 484 (2005).

Facts in an affidavit supporting a request for a search warrant, which stated, among other things, that the defendant had bought video tapes known to have child pornography, that the defendant admitted to investigators that the defendant had received and partially viewed the tapes, and that, based on law enforcement experience, it was likely that the defendant would store these items on a computer, the magistrate was authorized to make a pragmatic, common-sense judgment that there was a fair probability that computer equipment in the defendant's residence contained illegal images; the trial court erred in later ruling that the officers only demonstrated probable cause to search for the original tapes and that the warrant should not have included the general items listed, including the defendant's computer. State v. Henley, 279 Ga. App. 326, 630 S.E.2d 911 (2006).

Search may not exceed scope of warrant.

- A search in execution of a warrant may not exceed in scope the particular article or things to be seized. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22 (1983).

When a warrant authorized seizure of "Cruelly treated animals who are sick and are not being treated medically, animals in overcrowded and diseased environment, business records which document condition of animals; euthanizing drugs," there was no judicial authorization for seizure of drugs other than euthanizing drugs, business records which did not document the condition of animals, and any animal which was not in perfect health. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc. v. State, 181 Ga. App. 657, 353 S.E.2d 555, rev'd on other grounds, 257 Ga. 388, 360 S.E.2d 248, vacated on other grounds, 184 Ga. App. 805, 363 S.E.2d 360 (1987).

No knock requirement inappropriately applied.

- Because a search warrant affidavit did not contain specific facts indicating a risk of peril to police officers or of destruction of the evidence, there was no probable cause for issuance of a no-knock warrant; consequently, the trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Williams, 275 Ga. App. 612, 621 S.E.2d 581 (2005).

Knock and talk procedures.

- Officers' knock-and-talk procedure at a house was permissible, even though an officer used a plastic cup to hit the door of the house because the officer was not standing directly in front of the door for safety reasons and for the preservation of contraband inside the house; once the door was opened, the officer saw drugs in plain view inside the house, permitting the officer's entry. Herring v. State, 279 Ga. App. 162, 630 S.E.2d 776 (2006).

Items seized under warrant were properly related to the crime.

- Evidence seized pursuant to a valid warrant following the commission of an armed robbery, murder, and related offenses was properly admitted as the items found were of the type which might be employed in the commission of those crimes. Grimes v. State, 280 Ga. 363, 628 S.E.2d 580 (2006).

Effect of magistrate's prior issuance of blank warrants.

- When the defendant contended the search warrant was invalid because the executing magistrate was not neutral and detached, because the magistrate admitted, after first having denied, that at sometime in the past in an unrelated incident or incidents, the magistrate had signed blank warrants to accommodate an officer when the magistrate was to be at a family dinner, it was held that the incident suggested by the defendant was an isolated incident or incidents in the past and that there was no evidence except remote speculation that the magistrate's posture in issuing the search warrant in this case was not neutral and detached. Lang v. State, 165 Ga. App. 576, 302 S.E.2d 683, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1983).

Non-issuing magistrate's corrections of errors in warrant.

- When a search warrant affidavit incorrectly described the house to be searched as the second house on the right, when it was actually the third house on the right, and a warrant containing the incorrect description had been issued, a magistrate who did not issue the warrant was authorized to correct the errors in the affidavit and warrant, and was not required to take evidence under oath to do so. Marshall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 17, 614 S.E.2d 169 (2005).

Not invalid when signed by de facto magistrate.

- In a defendant's prosecution on charges of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a search warrant issued by an assistant magistrate at the magistrate's direction was invalid because the assistant magistrate could not be considered a de factor officer as no such office had been created by the county commissioners or by the superior court judges under O.C.G.A. § 15-10-20(a). Beck v. State, 283 Ga. 352, 658 S.E.2d 577 (2008).

"Staleness" of warrant.

- Time alone is inadequate to resolve questions of staleness of information in warrants because the ultimate question is whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, information about evidence is so fresh that there is probable cause to believe the evidence still exists in the same place or is so stale that such a conclusion of probable cause is unreasonable. McDade v. State, 175 Ga. App. 204, 332 S.E.2d 672 (1985).

An informant's tip was not stale because the officer waited 72 hours after receiving the tip to seek a search warrant. Regardless of whether the methamphetamine seen by the informant was still in the house, the information provided a substantial basis for believing that when the magistrate issued the warrant, methamphetamine was being manufactured there. Zorn v. State, 291 Ga. App. 613, 662 S.E.2d 370 (2008).

Sufficient facts to issue warrant for defendant's medical records.

- Search warrant for the defendant's medical records was proper because the affidavit listed the crimes that were believed to have been committed, including DUI, and averred that the defendant caused an accident and had open and empty beer cans inside the defendant's vehicle; the affidavit included sufficient facts to support a finding that evidence of the crime was in the medical records, and the evidence supported the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Therefore, the defendant's argument that the warrant was invalid because the warrant omitted relevant information and contained false and misleading information was rejected. Brogdon v. State, 299 Ga. App. 547, 683 S.E.2d 99 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 528, 697 S.E.2d 211 (2010).

Search warrant authorizing a search of defendant's hospital records relating to the defendant's treatment on the night of a shooting was constitutional under U.S. Const., amend. IV and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII because the defendant could not claim an expectation of privacy in the medical records to the extent that the records contained information the defendant disclosed to medical personnel or medical personnel disclosed to the defendant in the presence of two police officers. Bowling v. State, 289 Ga. 881, 717 S.E.2d 190 (2011).

Determination of "sufficient detail" test based solely on information coming from informant.

- In determining the reliability of the manner in which an informant obtained information, determination of whether the tip meets the "sufficient detail" test is based exclusively on what information came from the informant without reference, at this point, to independent verification of the informant's information. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Suppression motion properly denied.

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, as: (1) there was a presumption of reliability as to the report of a police officer or undercover agent in the line of duty to a fellow officer in support of the warrant; (2) the affidavit attached to the warrant set forth sufficient facts to establish the reliability of the informant; and (3) a search warrant for the defendant's home was not even necessary because at the time of the search the defendant was on probation. McTaggart v. State, 285 Ga. App. 178, 645 S.E.2d 658 (2007).

Trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to a search warrant. An informant's predictions that a third person would go to a house near a certain highway and buy drugs from a person with the defendant's first name was confirmed by police; incorrect statements in an officer's affidavit that a vehicle did not stop on the way to and from the defendant's house did not change the determination that probable cause existed to issue the warrant; and the failure of the officer to state that the informant had pending criminal charges did not require a different result. Spaeth v. State, 293 Ga. App. 608, 667 S.E.2d 449 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in a hotel suite because the affidavit supporting the search warrant for a hotel suite recited probable cause to believe that drugs would be found on the premises under the defendant's possession, custody, and control, namely the two-room suite that the hotel designated and rented to the defendant. Glass v. State, 304 Ga. App. 414, 696 S.E.2d 140 (2010).

Reliability of informants justifies issuance of search warrant.

- When an officer's investigation of the information received from the informants corroborates their allegations against the defendant, the reliability of the informants is sufficiently established to justify the issuance of a search warrant. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).

With regard to a defendant's convictions on drug-related offenses, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendant's apartment upon execution of a search warrant since the affidavit of a deputy, which was based on an informant's tip, sufficiently established probable cause as the informant had been in the defendant's apartment and had personally viewed the drugs. Rocha v. State, 284 Ga. App. 852, 644 S.E.2d 921 (2007).

Lack of reliability outweighed by detail.

- Search warrant was properly issued under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII based on the information provided in the affidavit, as the affidavit's strong showing as to the basis of the informant's knowledge compensated for any deficiency in detail as to the informant's reliability; the informant provided the defendant's first name, the location, quantity, and packaging of the cocaine, and details of the sale of cocaine that the informant had witnessed. State v. Donaldson, 281 Ga. App. 51, 635 S.E.2d 345 (2006).

Local law enforcement officers participating in common investigation are reliable informants. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981).

Magistrate may rely on law enforcement officer's knowledge of suspect's reputation in issuing search warrant. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981).

Affidavit defective when nothing recited therein shows reliability of informant.

- An affidavit based on an informer's tip is fatally defective as the basis for a search warrant when the affidavit recites absolutely nothing which would show the informer's reliability nor states how the informer obtained the information, and under Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) evidence obtained must be suppressed. Grebe v. State, 125 Ga. App. 873, 189 S.E.2d 698 (1972).

Determination of whether individual supplying information is truthful person.

- Reliable manner of the acquisition of the information having been demonstrated, it must now be determined whether the individual supplying this "reliable" information is a truthful person. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Informant's lack of previous contact with authorities is not fatal to the informant's veracity. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Requirement that magistrate be informed of underlying circumstances.

- Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the articles were where the informant claimed they were. Maddox v. State, 133 Ga. App. 709, 213 S.E.2d 1 (1975).

Underlying circumstances requirement is designed to locate original source of incriminating information and to examine the validity or reliability of that information, but is not concerned with the overall reliability of the informant personally. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

In marginal cases, preference is for validation of warrant.

- Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit for a search warrant is essential if the magistrate is to perform the magistrate's detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police; however, if these circumstances are detailed, if reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner. Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

Hearsay and even hearsay upon hearsay may be sufficient to furnish basis for issuance of valid warrant if the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant's underlying conclusions and the affiant's belief that the informant was credible or the affiant's information reliable. Smith v. State, 136 Ga. App. 17, 220 S.E.2d 11 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 938, 96 S. Ct. 1671, 48 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1976); Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979); State v. Griffin, 154 Ga. App. 361, 268 S.E.2d 412 (1980).

An affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information so long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

That there is "hearsay upon hearsay" for information upon which affidavit is based does not preclude finding of probable cause. Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664 (1979).

Mere existence of "hearsay upon hearsay" was not fatal to a search warrant because, under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate was informed of the underlying circumstances involving an undercover buy from the defendant, independent of the double hearsay, which did not depend upon the reliability of the hearsay declarations; further, a known informant's statements to police against a penal interest elevated the statements' reliability. Cochran v. State, 281 Ga. 4, 635 S.E.2d 701 (2006).

Showing required in affidavit as to noninformant hearsay declarant.

- As to a noninformant hearsay declarant, the affidavit for a search warrant must contain a showing: (1) that the hearsay information is based on personal observations of the hearsay declarant, and not rumor and speculation, or conclusory allegations of the affiant; and (2) that the hearsay declarant is reliable - as by stating that he or she is a police officer, the victim of the crime, a law-abiding and trustworthy citizen, or even a declarant against penal interest. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

When hearsay declarant is interested citizen.

- On the defendant's contention that the affidavit on which the search warrant was based was defective because the hearsay declarants were not shown to be reliable, since the hearsay declarants are identified interested citizens, the mere averments of those who provided the information are enough to support a presumption of reliability, credibility, and accuracy, and the hearsay statements therefore may serve as the foundation for probable cause. Cash v. State, 166 Ga. App. 835, 305 S.E.2d 618 (1983).

Oath covers only truthfulness of statements contained in written affidavit and not the oral statements given to show probable cause when the magistrate does not administer any oath until after the affidavit is signed. Riggins v. State, 136 Ga. App. 279, 220 S.E.2d 775 (1975).

Void search warrant cannot be validated and property illegally seized introduced in evidence merely because the officers were in fact reliably informed and did in fact recover contraband, nor can a deficiency be supplied by facts discovered in making the search, for the sufficiency of the affidavit must be determined as of the time the warrant issued. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263 (1980).

Effect of false statements in affidavit.

- When the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request; in the event at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to that extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1980).

Magistrate had probable cause to issue a search warrant for the defendant's vehicle because a crime victim identified the vehicle as the location of defendant's rape of another victim, and the fact that the victim who provided the information on which the affidavit used to obtain this warrant had previously given false information to obtain another warrant did not change the fact that the magistrate had probable cause to issue the second warrant. Cole v. State, 279 Ga. App. 219, 630 S.E.2d 817 (2006).

Information substantiating informant was sufficiently detailed to show that it was more than a mere casual rumor or accusation made on reputation when it stated that the informant had been on the property "in the very recent past" and that defendant "is presently storing marijuana in the described building." The information was, on its face and by its own terms, not stale. Lang v. State, 165 Ga. App. 576, 302 S.E.2d 683, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1983).

Stop of the appellant's vehicle was lawful because it was based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity from a tip of an informant of some past indica of reliability. Knight v. State, 242 Ga. App. 363, 528 S.E.2d 855 (2000).

Affiant's erroneous substitution of the name of the victim of a burglary for the name of the burglar in the portion of the affidavit showing the reliability of a confidential informant, from a change in filing systems, did not make the warrant void under either the federal or state Constitution. Wells v. State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 348 S.E.2d 681 (1986).

Obscenity cases.

- Warrants authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution may not issue based solely on the conclusory allegations of a police officer that the sought-after materials are obscene, but instead must be supported by affidavits setting forth specific facts in order that the issuing magistrate may focus searchingly on the question of obscenity. State v. Kramer, 260 Ga. App. 546, 580 S.E.2d 314 (2003).

Absence of informant's personal information.

- Totality of the circumstances test for reviewing search warrants involves a practical, common-sense approach to the requirement of probable cause relative to the issuance of search warrants and, with respect to information obtained from an informant, three types of information are needed to support an application for a search warrant: (1) the type of information previously supplied by the informant; (2) the use to which that information has been put; and (3) the length of time since the previous information was furnished. A search warrant was properly based on probable cause since the warrant was supported by an affidavit from a sheriff's investigator who disclosed all information, including why the informant's information was reliable, details of a controlled buy of drugs from the defendant, and the investigator's previous dealings with the defendant; the only information left off the affidavit was personal information regarding the informant. Burke v. State, 265 Ga. App. 38, 592 S.E.2d 862 (2004).

Omission of material information in affidavit for search warrant.

- Trial court properly suppressed contraband found in the defendant's home pursuant to a search warrant which indicated that the defendant's baby had been taken to a hospital by a sitter and had cocaine in the baby's system; the affidavit omitted material information, including the fact that the sitter had the baby for nine hours before taking the baby to the hospital and was seeking custody, the fact that an officer had gone to the defendant's home the day before without seeing any evidence of contraband, and the fact that the defendant's parents and the sitter had not indicated seeing drugs at the defendant's home. State v. Owens, 285 Ga. App. 370, 646 S.E.2d 340 (2007).

Failure of affiant to sign affidavit.

- Since the officers' warrant to search a safe deposit box was based upon a previous warrant that was issued upon an affidavit in which the Georgia officer was the affiant, but the Tennessee officer signed the affidavit, the jewelry should have been suppressed under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, as the affiant did not sign the affidavit. Henry v. State, 277 Ga. App. 302, 626 S.E.2d 511 (2006).

Sufficient address shown.

- When a defendant said that an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for the defendant's apartment did not state the defendant's correct address, the address stated in the affidavit was sufficient because there was no probability that it identified another apartment, particularly since law enforcement agents observing the defendant's apartment were able to establish that the informant had gone to and come from the defendant's apartment immediately before the informant was arrested and was found in possession of a quantity of drugs. Evans v. State, 263 Ga. App. 572, 588 S.E.2d 764 (2003).

Tip from confidential informant (CI) provided sufficient probable cause for a search warrant for defendant's home because the CI, in jail on pending drug charges, gave a statement against penal interest by admitting to buying drugs from the defendant at the defendant's home, and the officer confirmed the location and the ownership of the home, and the officer identified the CI to the magistrate. Elliott v. State, 275 Ga. App. 359, 620 S.E.2d 584 (2005).

Tip from known reliable informant.

- Police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified stopping the defendant's truck based on a tip from a known, reliable informant and there was no requirement to provide a basis for predicting specific future behavior of the suspect. Steed v. State, 273 Ga. App. 845, 616 S.E.2d 185 (2005).

Informant observed in controlled buy of drugs.

- Search warrant was properly issued after an informant returned from a controlled buy to the prearranged meeting place, handed officers the crack, and said that it was purchased from an unknown black male in the presence of the defendant and two others; even if the informant had no known credibility, the controlled buy conducted under the observation of the officer, alone, established probable cause. Richardson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 429, 626 S.E.2d 518 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant although the agent's affidavit in support of the search warrant did not indicate that the confidential informant whose information provided the basis for the affidavit was hoping to receive a sentence reduction for cooperating with police; the warrant was valid under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, as the omission was offset by independent corroboration of the defendant's criminal activity based upon surveillance of events leading up to a controlled buy. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence police officers found at a residence because, under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability contraband would be found at the residence; the affidavit for the search warrant revealed that an informant participated in a drug buy using law enforcement funds, and an officer transported the informant to the premises, where the informant made the purchase, and the informant provided the purchased contraband to the officer. Pass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 440, 710 S.E.2d 641 (2011).

Informant's reliability not established and information was not correct.

- Trial court erred by denying two separate defendants' motions to suppress after the male defendant's vehicle was stopped based on an informant's tip and the defendant was not committing a crime when stopped, the tip was too vague as to the time of the alleged future drug transaction and the vehicle description, and drugs other than those that the informant had said would be there were found. Baker v. State, 277 Ga. App. 520, 627 S.E.2d 145 (2006).

Information in affidavit sufficient.

- An affidavit in support of a search warrant was not insufficient because an officer had not told the magistrate about an informant's criminal history and that the informant would be paid $20 if the tip led to an arrest. Nothing indicated that the affidavit contained deliberate falsehoods, that the officer made it with reckless disregard for the truth, or that the officer consciously omitted material information which, if it had been included in the affidavit, would have been indicative of the absence of probable cause; furthermore, the informant's previous work with police, which was set forth in the affidavit, provided a substantial basis for deeming the informant reliable. Zorn v. State, 291 Ga. App. 613, 662 S.E.2d 370 (2008).

Affidavit filed in support of a search warrant of the defendant's home established probable cause because, inter alia, information received from one confidential informant (CI) was corroborated, and an admission against penal interest made by a second CI supported a finding of reliability; further, the affidavit established that a third informant was truly a concerned citizen, and the information provided by the concerned citizen corroborated the information provided by the CIs. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the facts that the concerned citizen had training in recognition and effects of various illegal drugs and had seen, within 72 hours at the premises to be searched, a powder substance said to be drugs that belonged to the defendant, the state established probable cause for the warrant. Price v. State, 297 Ga. App. 501, 677 S.E.2d 683 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence a detective found in the defendant's home because given the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate who issued the search warrant was authorized to conclude that there was a fair probability that contraband would be found at defendant's home; the detective's affidavit in support of the warrant contained ample facts by which the magistrate could independently evaluate the veracity and reliability of anonymous informants and their information, and a confidential informant's controlled buy of marijuana from the defendant at the defendant's residence on the day the detective applied for the warrant independently confirmed that illegal drug activities were taking place at the home. Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. App. 175, 702 S.E.2d 28 (2010).

Even assuming that material evidence was omitted from the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the magistrate nevertheless had probable cause for issuance of the search warrant because the affidavit stated that the defendant had possibly fathered the victim's child, the defendant had a sexual relationship with the victim from the time the victim was 10 years old until the victim was 15 years old, the victim's son was conceived during that time period, and the son's father had not been scientifically identified. Rhodes v. State, 319 Ga. App. 684, 738 S.E.2d 135 (2013).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the appellant's cell phone because although the search warrant affidavit did not specify to whom each of the cell phones belonged, it provided the issuing magistrate with sufficient information to make a practical, common sense decision that there was a fair probability that evidence of the crime would be found on the items to be searched. Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 770 S.E.2d 610 (2015).

Probable cause defined.

- Probable cause means reasonable grounds and is that apparent state of facts which seems to exist after reasonable and proper inquiry. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).

Requirements for probable cause.

- The provisions of U.S. Const., amend. 4 and this paragraph, requiring "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause . . . particularly describing the place, or places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized" are met "if the description sufficiently permits a prudent officer with a search warrant to be able to locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty." Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1980).

Finding of probable cause may rest upon evidence not competent in criminal trial.

- While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of probable cause, the term "probable cause" means less than evidence which would justify condemnation, a finding of probable cause may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965).

Test of probable cause is whether it would justify a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed, and this requires merely a probability - less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility. Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664 (1979).

Two-pronged tests for determination of probable cause.

- When hearsay, such as an informer's tip, is relied upon for probable cause, the sworn information placed before the justice of the peace must adequately set forth: (1) the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge the validity of the information; and (2) the informant's credibility or reliability. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980); Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983).

When the hearsay of an informer is relied upon, an affidavit as to probable cause must meet two tests: (1) the reasons for the informer's reliability must be furnished; and (2) it must either state how the informer obtained the information or the tip must describe the criminal activity in such detail that the magistrate may know it is more than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on the individual's general reputation. Maddox v. State, 133 Ga. App. 709, 213 S.E.2d 1 (1975).

Two-pronged test satisfied.

- When the affidavit provided the justice of the peace (now magistrate) with the knowledge that the informant had personally observed the defendants in possession of the cocaine and the informant's reliability was demonstrated within the affidavit by statements that the informant had furnished information in the previous six months leading to the issuance of three felony warrants for possession of illegal drugs and that all information provided by the informant had proven to be true, both prongs of the test for a showing of probable cause based upon an unidentified informant's tip were met in the affidavit. Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983).

Controlled buy observed by officer.

- Controlled buy conducted under the observation of the officer alone was sufficient to establish probable cause, and there was no evidence that the officer knew, or should have known, that more than one person resided at the residence. Ibekilo v. State, 277 Ga. App. 384, 626 S.E.2d 592 (2006).

Probable cause set forth in affidavit.

- Trial court did not err in denying defendant's suppression motion as the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant under the totality of the circumstances test since: (1) a controlled buy from the defendant was described; (2) the defendant's willingness to turn over the cocaine at the defendant's residence was set forth; and (3) a statement from an individual who was with the defendant at the time of the defendant's arrest that the defendant had taken the individual to the residence to pick up cocaine was set forth. Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 549, 600 S.E.2d 667 (2004).

Search warrant was based on probable cause because Clayton County investigators had purchased an illegal video poker machine from a subject in Clayton County, who said the machine was obtained from a particular address in DeKalb County, and both DeKalb and Clayton investigators observed "several other illegal video poker machines" at that address; while the investigators could not tell from looking at the machines whether they were legal or not, the test was only whether the evidence established a fair probability that contraband would be found. Jones v. State, 276 Ga. App. 810, 625 S.E.2d 4 (2005).

In a murder prosecution, an affidavit in support of a search warrant stated that the victim and defendant left a ballpark where they worked in close temporal proximity; that the victim's car was found abandoned at a gas station next to the park; that a man fitting defendant's voice characteristics made two telephone calls claiming to have the victim; that the victim's ring was found near the pay phone from which the second call was made; and that defendant had a history of assaults on females, having abducted a victim and secreted the victim to the defendant's home, gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause that evidence pertaining to the victim's disappearance would be found in defendant's home. Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the search warrant affidavit outlined the information provided by a New Hampshire detective's investigation, including the fact that the defendant had electronically sent the detective sexually explicit photographs of young boys; (2) the officer's affidavit also included information regarding the New Hampshire detective's extensive background and vast experience in the investigation of child sexual exploitation cases; (3) the New Hampshire detective's investigation provided probable cause to search the defendant's residence wherever that was; (4) the warrant sought sexually explicit photographs and other sexually explicit visual depictions of children, as well as the computer hardware and software used to create, store, and distribute those depictions; and (5) the affidavit contained information based on the New Hampshire detective's contact and electronic correspondence with the defendant indicating the likelihood that defendant's computer files would contain evidence of child sexual exploitation, given that the affidavit stated that those who sexually exploited children often kept sexually explicit photographs and other images in their possession and often stored those images in computer files. Walthall v. State, 281 Ga. App. 434, 636 S.E.2d 126 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the execution of a search warrant as the appellate court found that, after reviewing all of the information in the affidavit as a whole, the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause for the magistrate to issue the search warrant and that the information provided was not stale. The warrant was executed the same day that it was issued and was supported by a law enforcement affidavit reciting a stop made of the defendant's vehicle for a failure to have tags and various drugs and drug-related items found in the vehicle that served as the basis for obtaining the search warrant for the defendant's home. Cleveland v. State, 290 Ga. App. 835, 660 S.E.2d 777 (2008).

Because the information in an affidavit provided the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for issuing the search warrant, a motion to suppress the search warrant would have been futile; accordingly, the defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective. Jarrett v. State, 299 Ga. App. 525, 683 S.E.2d 116 (2009).

Trial court properly found that under the totality of the circumstances the affidavit in support of a search warrant for a residence suspected of being a marijuana "grow house" gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed because the affidavit set forth the fact that similar investigations and seizures had taken place in several grow houses in the area, the house under surveillance had characteristics similar to those houses, and two men fled from the residence and were apprehended with large amounts of cash; the information from the stop was not excludable as "stale" because there was a substantial basis for believing that the electrical ballasts and light fixtures identified in the search warrant could still be found at the residence and the items were not perishable. Prado v. State, 306 Ga. App. 240, 701 S.E.2d 871 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrants because the applications for search warrants to search the defendant's apartment and the car for which registration information was given in the detective's affidavit contained sufficient information from which a judicial officer could determine there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found at those sites as the sites were likely methods of transporting the victim and the likely destination of appellant and the victim; in the detective's affidavit, the detective related the discovery of the victim's body and the statements of the victim's friend and roommate concerning the victim's relationship with the defendant, and the victim's pregnancy and identification of the defendant as the father, who was not pleased about the pregnancy. Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 704 S.E.2d 794 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from a search warrant authorizing entry into the defendant's home because the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate to make a practical, commonsense decision that there was a fair probability that evidence of sexual exploitation of children would be found at the defendant's residence; the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children forwarded the information it received from a security specialist employed by the host of the website to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), and the affidavit of a special agent with the GBI set forth facts that showed both the reliability and basis of knowledge of the specialist. James v. State, 312 Ga. App. 130, 717 S.E.2d 713 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0347, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 227 (Ga. 2012).

Evaluation of evidence by magistrate.

- Task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision, whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Farmer, 177 Ga. App. 18, 338 S.E.2d 489 (1985).

Because the magistrate was presented with a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of child molestation would be found in the cameras and film located in the defendant's car, and such enabled the magistrate to form a sufficient finding of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the warrant. Manders v. State, 281 Ga. App. 786, 637 S.E.2d 460 (2006).

Because a search warrant affidavit provided the issuing magistrate with sufficient probable cause connecting the defendant to the residence of a female friend for the magistrate to logically conclude that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found therein, despite the omission of additional evidence by the affiant, an order granting suppression of the evidence seized therein was reversed. State v. Hunter, 282 Ga. 278, 646 S.E.2d 465 (2007).

Showing to be made to magistrate when affidavit is based on information from confidential informant.

- When an affidavit for a search warrant is based on information received from a confidential informant, there must be a showing made to the magistrate of: (1) the reliability of the informant; and (2) the underlying facts and circumstances corroborative of the informant's tip. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

Quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause does not require proof of guilt when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing an offense has been committed. Hood v. State, 122 Ga. App. 547, 178 S.E.2d 44 (1970).

When dealing with probable cause - as the name implies, we deal with probabilities - not certainty, and the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is not that level which is necessary for proof of guilt in a trial. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979).

Difference between requirements for proving guilt and showing probable cause.

- There is a great difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search. Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 165 S.E.2d 302 (1968).

Probable cause cannot be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory. Veasey v. State, 113 Ga. App. 187, 147 S.E.2d 515 (1966).

Speculation, conjecture, or opinion insufficient for warrant.

- Whether by recitals in the affidavit or by an independent showing before the magistrate, the facts must be such as to lead a man of prudence and caution to believe that the offense has been committed. Mere speculation, conjecture, or opinion is not enough, nor is mere rumor. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965).

Information supporting finding of probable cause may be presented to magistrate by means of affidavit or by oral testimony. Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143, 147 S.E.2d 666 (1966).

Information provided by police, arising out of official investigation, may be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981).

Warrant may be based on police officer's knowledge of suspect's reputation.

- Officer's knowledge of a suspect's reputation is a practical consideration of everyday life upon which a magistrate may properly rely in issuing a search warrant. Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983).

National Crime Information Center printouts as basis of reasonable belief to establish probable cause.

- While National Crime Information Center printouts are not alone sufficient evidence to permit convictions, the cases uniformly recognize that NCIC printouts are reliable enough to form the basis of the reasonable belief which is needed to establish probable cause for arrest. Paxton v. State, 160 Ga. App. 19, 285 S.E.2d 741 (1981).

Determination of probable cause by magistrate.

- Determination as to whether there is probable cause is not to be made by one who applies for issuance of the warrant; it must be made by the magistrate from a consideration of the facts submitted under oath. It must exist before the search is made, and cannot be supplied by after-discovered facts. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965), commented on in 17 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1966).

Affidavit ineffective to provide basis for magistrate's finding of probable cause.

- See Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374, 333 S.E.2d 207 (1985).

Reviewing court will give substantial deference to magistrate's finding of probable cause.

- When an application for a search warrant has been made by the police to a neutral and detached magistrate, and the magistrate has issued the warrant based on a finding of probable cause, a reviewing court will pay substantial deference to the magistrate's finding. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

Facts showing probable cause should be incorporated in affidavit.

- While probable cause may be made to appear by a showing under oath before the magistrate when issuance of the warrant is sought, it is the better, even necessary, practice that the facts then made to appear as showing probable cause be incorporated in the affidavit. Johnson v. State, 111 Ga. App. 298, 141 S.E.2d 574 (1965), commented on in 17 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (1966).

Magistrate may consider both affidavit and oral testimony as to probable cause.

- Magistrate in considering whether to issue a search warrant may consider both the affidavit and oral testimony as to probable cause. However, in considering a matter other than that contained in the affidavit, such proof must be under oath or affirmation. Maddox v. State, 133 Ga. App. 709, 213 S.E.2d 1 (1975).

Legislative intent that probable cause relate to current information.

- Requirement for timely execution of a search warrant under Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-5-25) indicates the legislative intent, as well as constitutional demand, that probable cause relate to current and not stale information. Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 172 S.E.2d 447 (1970).

"Staleness" as it relates to probable cause is measured by the probability that the thing to be seized is located at the place to be searched and it involves the interval between (i) the time when the thing to be seized is indicated by the evidence or information to be at the place to be searched and (ii) the time when the search warrant is issued. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981); Shrader v. State, 159 Ga. App. 522, 284 S.E.2d 37 (1981).

Information provided in the search warrant affidavit by a confidential informant was not stale and did not render the issuance of the warrant unconstitutional under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII; the informant contacted the federal agent a short time after leaving the defendant's home where the informant had witnessed a sale of drugs by the defendant, and the federal agent had contacted the affiant within 24 hours of the presentation of the affidavit. State v. Donaldson, 281 Ga. App. 51, 635 S.E.2d 345 (2006).

Sufficient probable cause found.

- Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant for the defendant's home was supported by probable cause for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 when: (1) witnesses reported seeing the defendant at the victim's home near the time that the victim disappeared; (2) the farm manager who located the victim's body told police that the defendant commonly used the farm for hunting; (3) the defendant had a tumultuous relationship with the victim; and (4) the defendant's mailbox was painted in a similar camouflage as the cattle trough in which the victim was found; as the warrant for the house was proper, the warrant for the defendant's truck was not fruit of the poisonous tree. Fortson v. State, 277 Ga. 164, 587 S.E.2d 39 (2003).

Trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence seized upon execution of a search warrant of a residence, whereupon various sexual materials and a computer, containing pornographic photographs of the defendant with a child victim, were obtained and admitted in trial on multiple sexual offenses, as the warrant was based on probable cause and described with sufficient particularity the location of the premises and the items to be seized. Daniels v. State, 278 Ga. App. 332, 629 S.E.2d 36 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, in a prosecution filed against the defendant for various sex crimes, when despite alleging specific ages, given the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit sought information of sexual activity involving minor children and was predicated on information provided by a parent involving sexual activity between defendant and the parent's daughter, the victim. Phillips v. State, 283 Ga. App. 319, 641 S.E.2d 294 (2007).

A magistrate had probable cause to issue a search warrant for a defendant's car the day after the victim was kidnapped and murdered; there was a fair probability that evidence of the crimes would be found in the car, which the defendant had parked in the victim's driveway. Dalton v. State, 282 Ga. 300, 647 S.E.2d 580 (2007).

A trial court did not err by limiting the admissibility of admissible items in a defendant's felony murder trial to those items seized incident to the defendant's arrest in the early morning hours and in plain view during the processing of the crime scene as an approximately 15-minute video recording of the premises, which was viewed by the trial court, supported the officers' testimony that guns, shell casings, significant amounts of cash, and items appearing to be crack cocaine were all in plain view and, under the circumstances, presented probable cause as being contraband or evidence of the crime of the felony murder of an officer. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008).

Because the application for a search warrant established that the victim lived in a residence at a specific address, that defendant lived in the basement apartment located in the residence, that defendant had severely beaten the victim, and that there was a fair probability that evidence of the crime could be found either in defendant's apartment or in the victim's part of the residence, probable cause existed to search defendant's basement apartment and the victim's part of the residence; accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in the apartment. Fletcher v. State, 284 Ga. 653, 670 S.E.2d 411 (2008).

Search warrant was properly issued based on information from a caller to social services that methamphetamine was being made in the defendant's home in the presence of a six-year-old and on information from an officer that the defendant had been investigated for the drug, that the defendant had a reputation of dealing, using, and making methamphetamine, and that numerous tips about the defendant's manufacturing methamphetamine had been received. Moreover, the information was not stale as the information received from multiple sources indicated a long-term involvement in the manufacture of the drug and therefore a likelihood that the equipment for the drug's production would remain in place over time. Chambliss v. State, 298 Ga. App. 293, 679 S.E.2d 831 (2009).

Insufficient probable cause found.

- Because: (1) the state conceded that its informant was not reliable, as the informant never previously provided information to its investigator; and (2) the police failed to independently investigate and corroborate the information provided to them by that informant in support of a search warrant affidavit, the magistrate lacked a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to search the defendant's home; thus, the evidence seized as a result should have been suppressed. St. Fleur v. State, 286 Ga. App. 564, 649 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, as the warrant, given the totality of the circumstances, was based upon sufficient fingerprint evidence which provided an accurate foundation for identifying the defendant as a suspect in all four crimes. Carruth v. State, 286 Ga. App. 431, 649 S.E.2d 557 (2007).

Because the evidence gathered while the defendant's residence was under surveillance, including the contents of the defendant's garbage as well as an officer's specific testimony regarding marijuana residue found on a piece of plastic wrap, supported a finding of probable cause necessary to justify the issuance of a search warrant for the defendant's residence, suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the execution of the search warrant was improper. State v. Davis, 288 Ga. App. 164, 653 S.E.2d 311 (2007).

Improper use of fact that contraband was found to justify search.

- Since a trial court found probable cause for a vehicle search based, in part, on the discovery of contraband in the vehicle, and it was unclear whether the trial court would have reached the same result absent this factor, the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion to suppress in this regard was improper. Quick v. State, 279 Ga. App. 835, 632 S.E.2d 742 (2006).

Victim's identification.

- Victim's identification of the defendant as the robber, corroborated by other witnesses, was sufficient to provide probable cause for a search warrant; because it was proper for the witnesses to identify the defendant from a videotape, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motions to suppress and in limine. Bradford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 659, 618 S.E.2d 709 (2005).

Compelled testing after defendant's invocation of right to refuse under implied consent law.

- Defendant's conviction was properly reversed as the police improperly threatened to obtain blood and urine for testing through a catheter, after defendant invoked defendant's right under the implied consent law to refuse to the testing. State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316, 612 S.E.2d 281 (2005).

"Probable cause" same for warrantless search as for issuance of warrant.

- "Probable cause" requirements for a search without a warrant are the same requirements necessary for the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and the court must look to the parameters of police knowledge at the time the search occurred to determine if that knowledge was such as would justify a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed. Bogan v. State, 165 Ga. App. 851, 303 S.E.2d 48 (1983).

Search without warrant but incident to lawful arrest may be lawful. Black v. State, 119 Ga. App. 855, 168 S.E.2d 916 (1969).

Search incident to arrest.

- Search of a vehicle was authorized as a search incident to a lawful arrest as it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the vehicle possibly contained evidence of the crime under investigation, in that the officers saw the defendant and another individual, for whom the officers had an arrest warrant, driving in a vehicle similar to the one seen leaving a crime scene, and the officers saw clothing on the backseat matching the description of the clothing worn by the two gunmen at the time of the crime. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

When defendant was handcuffed to ensure the officers' safety after a pistol-like device was found and the handcuffs were removed before the agent spoke with defendant, defendant's statement to the agent that defendant had used drugs that evening gave the agent probable cause for defendant's arrest; defendant was then searched incident to a lawful arrest. Bond v. State, 271 Ga. App. 849, 610 S.E.2d 609 (2005).

Scope of permissible warrantless searches.

- An officer at the time of a lawful custodial arrest may, without a warrant, make a full search of the person of the accused, a limited area within the control of the person arrested, and of an automobile in the person's possession at the scene of the arrest for the discovery and preservation of criminal evidence. Williams v. State, 150 Ga. App. 852, 258 S.E.2d 659 (1979); Stoker v. State, 153 Ga. App. 871, 267 S.E.2d 295 (1980).

It is reasonable for officer to search area surrounding arrest area into which suspect might reach to obtain weapon. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450 (1980).

"Plain view" doctrine permits warrantless search and seizure.

- The "plain view" doctrine will support a warrantless search and seizure if the agents are lawfully in position to obtain the view, the discovery is inadvertent, and the object viewed is immediately seen to be incriminating. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 975, 100 S. Ct. 472, 62 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1979).

When the initial intrusion that brings the police within "plain view" of an article is supported not by a warrant but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 975, 100 S. Ct. 472, 62 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1979).

For the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement to be invoked, the sighting of things not specified in the warrant must have been "inadvertent." Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22 (1983).

"Plain view" exception to the requirement for a search warrant applied since no one answered the officer's knock at the front door and the officer discovered marijuana plants and other items when the officer walked around toward the back to make certain no one was home. Galbreath v. State, 213 Ga. App. 80, 443 S.E.2d 664 (1994).

"Plain view" doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer only if the officer's access to the object itself has some prior Fourth Amendment justification. State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 501 S.E.2d 494 (1998).

After receiving a report from the victim of a property damage incident describing the defendant's truck as involved in that incident, police had a right to approach the defendant's house to investigate; police were also authorized to walk around to the back of the defendant's house where they saw a truck fitting the victim's description in plain view in a partially open shelter; no warrant was needed for the officers to take photos of the defendant's truck. Phillips v. State, 279 Ga. App. 243, 630 S.E.2d 844 (2006).

Because the police were authorized to seize marijuana found in plain view, seen through the window of an apartment where they were executing an arrest warrant on another individual, once the defendant answered a knock on the apartment door, police also had the right to search incident to the defendant's arrest for possession of marijuana and based on the exigency of the circumstances; hence, the trial court erred in granting a motion to suppress the marijuana without explaining its interpretation of the evidence or ruling on the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Venzen, 286 Ga. App. 597, 649 S.E.2d 851 (2007).

When a deputy serving an arrest warrant on a probationer had reason to believe from the warrant that the probationer resided at the address given, the officer had the limited authority to enter the home to search for the probationer after the defendant, who answered the door, said that the probationer had moved. Once inside, the officer had the authority to seize marijuana that was in plain view. Wall v. State, 291 Ga. App. 278, 661 S.E.2d 656 (2008).

Marijuana contained in operating, closed refrigerator was not in "plain view" of a police officer. State v. Gallup, 236 Ga. App. 321, 512 S.E.2d 66 (1999).

Fear evidence will be destroyed sufficient for warrantless search.

- When testimony presented at the motion to suppress hearing supported the conclusion that the officers feared that evidence would be destroyed if their actions were delayed in order to obtain a warrant, such evidence supported the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress premised on the assertion that the police conducted an illegal warrantless search of the defendant's house. Bogan v. State, 165 Ga. App. 851, 303 S.E.2d 48 (1983).

After an officer observed contraband in an apartment from the outside, and saw one of the occupants attempt to conceal it, the officer's warrantless intrusion into the apartment was justified by the exigent circumstance that the contraband was in danger of immediate destruction. State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 501 S.E.2d 494 (1998).

Exigent circumstances justified the officers' warrantless entry of a residence to prevent the destruction of evidence since the police initially came to the home to execute an arrest warrant for a third party, the defendant answered the door, and told the officers that the third party did not live there, and, when the officers asked for consent to search for the third party, defendant did not answer and walked away from the officers, went to the mantle, picked up a plastic bag that appeared to contain crack cocaine, and threw it into a fire burning in the fireplace, and the officers then entered the home and removed the plastic bag from the fire to prevent the destruction of evidence. Simmons v. State, 278 Ga. App. 7, 627 S.E.2d 928 (2006).

Denial of a defendant's suppression motion was proper as the police officers were authorized to immediately enter a residence, without announcing their presence as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-5-27, as the occupants fled upon seeing the police, into a residence where the police had recently conducted controlled drug buys and the officers had a reasonable belief that the fleeing occupants might retrieve weapons or destroy evidence; once legally inside the residence, the police were authorized to execute a search warrant that led to the discovery of the defendant's involvement in the drug sales. Further, suppression of evidence was not a constitutionally-required remedy for an improper entry pursuant to an otherwise valid search warrant. Jackson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 716, 634 S.E.2d 846 (2006).

No amount of probable cause can justify warrantless search or seizure absent exigent circumstances. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980); Bogan v. State, 165 Ga. App. 851, 303 S.E.2d 48 (1983).

Because no exigency existed to justify a search after the defendant was handcuffed and placed under the watchful eye of a police officer, and even assuming that the defendant was under arrest while being detained in the kitchen, a search of the defendant's bedroom which yielded a shotgun, found under the bed in the bedroom, a box of unspent shotgun shells, and some loose unspent shotgun shells, was not one incident to the arrest; thus, the defendant's possession of a firearm while a convicted felon conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial in which the illegally-obtained evidence could not be introduced. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. 105, 650 S.E.2d 767 (2007).

Warrantless search of refrigerator not justified.

- When a police officer opened the door of an operating, closed refrigerator in a storage unit, after having been called to investigate vandalism and possible burglary, these circumstances did not rise to the level of emergency involving immediate threats to life or limb, and the warrantless search of the refrigerator was not justified. State v. Gallup, 236 Ga. App. 321, 512 S.E.2d 66 (1999).

Circumstances under which detentions made without probable cause have been approved.

- When investigatory detentions made without probable cause have been approved, the police have had some reason to suspect that criminal activity had either taken place, was in progress, or was about to take place at the time of the detention. Brooks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977).

Officers had sufficient articulable suspicion to authorize an investigatory detention of a drug suspect after a known, reliable informant had arrived in person at the police station with the suspect's name, a description of the suspect's operative locale, and recent observation of activities within the previous 24 hours. Burse v. State, 209 Ga. App. 276, 433 S.E.2d 386 (1993).

Since a police officer believed in good faith that the defendant had committed the crime of disorderly conduct, the stop of the defendant's vehicle was justified, in that it was based on a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, even though it was later determined that the defendant had not, in fact, committed the crime of disorderly conduct. Turner v. State, 274 Ga. App. 731, 618 S.E.2d 607 (2005).

Tip by unknown informant justified investigatory stop.

- Defendant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence seized by a police officer making an investigatory stop, as the information provided to the officer by a reliable and anonymous tip contained explicit details of the defendant's travel itinerary, which was not known by the general public. Daniels v. State, 278 Ga. App. 263, 628 S.E.2d 684 (2006).

Distinction made between warrantless search of car and house.

- A distinction has long been drawn between a warrantless search of an automobile as opposed to a house or other structure due to the mobility of the car. Whitlock v. State, 124 Ga. App. 599, 185 S.E.2d 90 (1971).

Wherein an individual commits an offense in his or her home and that offense is committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer, the officer is authorized to arrest the individual in the home without a warrant only if the officer's entry into the home is by consent or if there are exigent circumstances. Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996).

Warrantless search inside apartment improper.

- Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized by a police officer who entered an apartment without a warrant was properly granted because a residential alarm call did not create exigent circumstances justifying the entry since the officer had no reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed given the officer's delay in reaching the apartment, the officer's decision to allow a parent and two children to enter the apartment, and the lack of any signs of distress once the officer reached the residence. State v. Merit, 262 Ga. App. 687, 586 S.E.2d 393 (2003).

Circumstances under which probable cause would exist for warrantless search of residence.

- Trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of the defendant's residence was proper as the defendant was a supplier in a drug deal that was observed by drug enforcement agents, the defendant was being followed to defendant's residence when the drug dealer and another were stopped and one of them escaped, and a man on the defendant's driveway was seen talking on a cell phone; the officers properly secured the residence in order to avoid possible destruction of evidence or the arming or fleeing of occupants, as the cell phone call could have been a warning that the investigators were aware of the drug transaction. Alvarado v. State, 271 Ga. App. 714, 610 S.E.2d 675 (2005).

Search warrants not required in noncriminal inventory searches.

- In circumstances involving noncriminal inventory searches, when probable cause to search is irrelevant, search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable cause concept. Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839, 269 S.E.2d 912 (1980).

Warrant not required to conduct search of prisoner's room.

- No one can rationally doubt that search of prisoner's rooms represent an appropriate security measure and neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals prohibited such searches, and even the most zealous advocate of prisoner's rights would not suggest that a warrant is required to conduct such a search. Riden v. State, 151 Ga. App. 654, 261 S.E.2d 409 (1979).

Hotel personnel authorized to open items found on their premises.

- It is not an unauthorized search for hotel management personnel, including security personnel, to open unlocked items found on their premises in an attempt to determine ownership so that the lost or misplaced property can be returned to its proper owner. Berger v. State, 150 Ga. App. 166, 257 S.E.2d 8 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S. Ct. 1312, 63 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1980).

Open fields.

- Special protection against unlawful search and seizure in one's home, pursuant to U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, extended to the curtilage of defendant's home but not into the open fields; accordingly, where police officers were in an unoccupied, undeveloped densely wooded/swamp area on defendant's property, it was part of the open fields and they had a right to be there and evidence observed thereon was not subject to suppression for constitutional violations. State v. Clark, 263 Ga. App. 480, 588 S.E.2d 254 (2003).

Defendant had no expectation of privacy in an area behind the defendant's house where marijuana plants grew because the area was separated by trails leading away from the defendant's mowed lawn, the plants were not growing inside any structure nor were they protected from view, and many of the plants were protected by mesh wire; the warrantless seizure of the plants did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Smithson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 421, 634 S.E.2d 184 (2006).

Serving of arrest warrant and looking into open door of shed.

- Defendant's drug convictions were appropriate because the brother lived with the defendant and would be present in the home when the officers returned to serve the arrest warrant. Thus, the trial court did not err when the court concluded that the police were authorized to enter the back yard of the premises and look into the open door of the shed. Carter v. State, 308 Ga. App. 686, 708 S.E.2d 595 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1141, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 573 (Ga. 2011).

Exigent circumstances found.

- Given the existence of exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers were justified in searching the defendant's home without a warrant in order to determine if a child was present and in need of medical attention or in danger of imminent harm; as a result, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of that search. Richards v. State, 286 Ga. App. 580, 649 S.E.2d 747 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 702 (Ga. 2007).

A warrantless entry of the house owned by the defendant's stepparent was justified by exigent circumstances, given that a violent felony, from which the suspect fled on an orange bicycle, had occurred nearby just minutes before and that a person matching the suspect's description and riding an orange bicycle had just entered the stepparent's house. Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. App. 10, 658 S.E.2d 796 (2008).

Exigent circumstances issue not addressed.

- Defendant's suppression motion was properly granted since: (1) an officer executing an arrest warrant for a third person had unreasonably looked through the defendants' window, discovering the defendants using marijuana; (2) the officers did not identify themselves as police officers when the officers knocked at the defendants' door; (3) defendants hid the marijuana before opening the door; (4) the police confronted the defendants about the marijuana after the police determined that the third person was not in the house; and (5) the appellate court could not conclude, as a matter of law, that there were exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless seizure of the drugs, in that the drugs were in danger of being destroyed, simply because the defendants hid the drugs before opening the door. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573 (2003).

In a criminal case wherein the defendant was convicted on eight counts of cruelty to animals, an officer's initial plain view observations from a driveway and road of uncared for and sickly animals did not authorize the officer to make a warrantless entry into the defendant's backyard; since consent was not given by the defendant, the case required remand as the trial court never addressed whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search, which the trial court should have addressed when it denied the defendant's motion to suppress and motion in limine. Morgan v. State, 285 Ga. App. 254, 645 S.E.2d 745 (2007).

Improper Terry stop.

- Defendant was subjected to an improper Terry stop when defendant was stopped and ordered to exit the vehicle as the police did not have specific articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct since the defendant was not a subject of a search warrant the officers were executing, the defendant had not committed any traffic violations, and the defendant's vehicle was not within the curtilage of the home subject to the search warrant. Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 712, 634 S.E.2d 842 (2006).

Hot pursuit.

- Since the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest the codefendant, that police were in hot pursuit of the codefendant who fled upon seeing the officers, and that the officers reasonably believed that the codefendant fled to the apartment shared by the defendant and the codefendant to escape the officers and avoid arrest, exigent circumstances supported the officers' warrantless entry of the apartment, where contraband was in plain view, and no taint attached to the search warrant for the complete search of the apartment and the seizure of the additional evidence which followed. Ahmed v. State, 322 Ga. App. 154, 744 S.E.2d 345 (2013).

Seizure of farm animals was justified when officials, entering the property to investigate a report that deprived animals were observed from the highway, immediately observed additional, clearly deprived animals in need of immediate care in plain view. Sirmans v. State, 244 Ga. App. 252, 534 S.E.2d 862 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 831, 122 S. Ct. 76, 151 L. Ed. 2d 40 (2001).

Reasonable suspicion not established.

- Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress as the officer simply did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in or about to be engaged in a violation of the law. When the officer found the defendant sleeping in a car in the parking lot of a funeral home, with the permission of the funeral home's owner, the officer did not see or smell any illegal substances; the officer did not question the defendant regarding the defendant's appearance or demeanor; the officer did not determine if the defendant had consumed alcohol; and the officer did not perform any field tests to determine if the defendant was under the influence of anything. Martin v. State, 316 Ga. App. 220, 729 S.E.2d 437 (2012).

Search of passenger compartment.

- Once passenger was placed under arrest, the officer could lawfully search the entire passenger compartment of the defendant's vehicle as a search incident to arrest. Tutu v. State, 252 Ga. App. 12, 555 S.E.2d 241 (2001).

Reasonable suspicion to stop car.

- As a reliable confidential informant (CI) told police that the defendant would be driving one of three vehicles to a subdivision to deliver cocaine, and an officer saw the defendant and a car, both of which matched CI's description, in that subdivision, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the car. After a drug dog alerted to the car's passenger door, and the officer saw a digital scale of the type used to weigh drugs in plain view on the car's seat, the officer had probable cause to search the car; thus, cocaine found during the search was admissible. Alford v. State, 293 Ga. App. 512, 667 S.E.2d 680 (2008).

Plain view of drugs inside car.

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence an officer seized from the defendant's vehicle because the suspected contraband was in plain view from outside the vehicle, and once the officer smelled the odor of marijuana on the recovered item, the officer had even stronger grounds to search the vehicle; because the officer saw the item before returning the defendant's license or issuing the ticket, the officer was not exceeding the scope of the initial traffic stop by seizing the object. Arnold v. State, 315 Ga. App. 798, 728 S.E.2d 317 (2012).

Smell of marijuana.

- A trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of drugs and a handgun found during the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle as the arrest of the defendant's passenger on an outstanding warrant authorized the stop of the defendant's vehicle and the mobility of the car, coupled with the existence of probable cause to believe the car contained marijuana, based on the officer smelling the marijuana upon approaching the vehicle, authorized the search. Somesso v. State, 288 Ga. App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 281 (Ga. 2008).

Circumstances under which probable cause would exist for warrantless search of vehicle.

- Probable cause would exist for the warrantless search of a vehicle only if the facts and circumstances would cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that contraband was present in the vehicle. Barlow v. State, 148 Ga. App. 717, 252 S.E.2d 214 (1979).

Officer's continued detention of a driver and defendant after issuing the driver a speeding ticket was lawful as the driver's nervousness, claimed ignorance of a destination and the passenger's identity, furtive conduct, and the absence of an authorized driver under an auto rental agreement, taken together, gave the officer a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on more than a mere hunch. State v. Whitt, 277 Ga. App. 49, 625 S.E.2d 418 (2005).

Evidence in the record supported the denial of a motion to suppress as officers testified regarding their observations, surveillance techniques, experience with drug sales, and the general modes of operation of persons involved in drug sales, the officers were authorized to stop defendant's vehicle as one involved in a drug sale, acting in concert with another vehicle as counter-surveillance and showing an obvious interest in the endeavor; further, because the detention lasted at most, fifteen minutes, such was not unreasonable and did not amount to an impermissible seizure. Hickman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 558, 631 S.E.2d 778 (2006).

Despite the defendant's claim that an officer's detention was illegal and, thus, any statement uttered while detained should have been suppressed, suppression of the defendant's statement was properly denied, given that: (1) the officer encountered the defendant after responding to a9-1-1 call reporting a crime at a specific location; and (2) the officer's personal observations, when coupled with the defendant's admission as to being drunk and driving a car onto the curb, as the9-1-1 dispatcher had stated, supplied the officer with probable cause to arrest the defendant. Moore v. State, 281 Ga. App. 141, 635 S.E.2d 408 (2006).

Because law enforcement had the authority to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant' automobile based upon information supplied to them from a reliable, honest, and law-abiding informant, which was independently confirmed by officers investigating the tip, the trial court did not err when the court denied a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the defendant's car. Fleming v. State, 281 Ga. App. 207, 635 S.E.2d 823 (2006).

Circumstances short of probable cause for arrest may justify stopping of pedestrian or motorist for limited questioning. State v. Thomason, 153 Ga. App. 345, 265 S.E.2d 312 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Stilley, 261 Ga. App. 868, 584 S.E.2d 9 (2003).

When an officer saw the defendant traveling at 30 miles per hour below the posted speed limit, and saw the defendant weaving within the defendant's own lane, while this conduct was not illegal, it provided the officer with a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was violating the laws prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol, so the officer properly initiated an investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle. Veal v. State, 273 Ga. App. 47, 614 S.E.2d 143 (2005).

It is well established that weaving, both out of one's lane and within one's own lane, particularly when combined with other factors, may give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion on the part of a trained law enforcement officer that the driver is violating the driving under the influence laws, and the conduct forming the basis of the reasonable suspicion need not be a violation of the law. Veal v. State, 273 Ga. App. 47, 614 S.E.2d 143 (2005).

Officer had a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of a car stopped at 3:40 A.M. were, or were about to be, engaged in criminal activity at a closed store, and that the oddly circuitous route to a motel taken by the car was an attempt by the driver to evade the officer. Rolfe v. State, 278 Ga. App. 605, 630 S.E.2d 438 (2006).

Officers' initial approach of defendant's vehicle and request for consent to search were warranted, even without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the time of their approach; moreover, even if a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity had been required to briefly detain the defendant, the officers had such suspicion upon seeing: (1) individuals approach the defendant's car in an area known for drug activity; (2) the individuals turn and walk away upon seeing the police; and (3) the defendant's passenger swallowing what appeared to be a crack rock as the police approached. Sego v. State, 279 Ga. App. 484, 631 S.E.2d 505 (2006).

Because the defendant was witnessed crossing the white traffic line on two occasions, the stop of the defendant's vehicle was valid under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII; the defendant's weaving without reason into nearby lanes violated O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1) and justified the stop, and the officer's actual motive in stopping the defendant was inconsequential. Rayo-Leon v. State, 281 Ga. App. 74, 635 S.E.2d 368 (2006).

Traffic stop by a sheriff's deputy was not unreasonably prolonged without a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on evidence that: (1) a rental agreement in the defendant's possession had, in fact, expired; (2) the officer was justified in calling for the drug dog because the officer did not know whether the car was stolen and because the defendant was nervous, backed toward the car when the defendant declined consent to search, and had confessed to an open container violation; and (3) the trial court properly credited testimony from the dog's handler that the dog alerted when the dog showed interest in the passenger door, although the dog's response was not an active alert; thus, the trial court properly rejected the defendant's argument that a motion to suppress should have been granted due to an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop which was not based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Tanner v. State, 281 Ga. App. 101, 635 S.E.2d 388 (2006).

Constitutional protection against search and seizure of car lost by fleeing defendant.

- When a fleeing defendant, pursued by the police, abandoned the defendant's car on a public street and started running, the defendant lost the defendant's constitutional protection against the search and seizure of the defendant's car. Whitlock v. State, 124 Ga. App. 599, 185 S.E.2d 90 (1971).

Search of vehicle is proper for purpose of obtaining evidence of the basis of a suspect's intoxication. Stoker v. State, 153 Ga. App. 871, 267 S.E.2d 295 (1980).

When a person is lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of any substance, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle for the purpose of obtaining evidence of intoxication as an incident to that lawful arrest. Knox v. State, 216 Ga. App. 90, 453 S.E.2d 120 (1995).

Stop of vehicle justified by officer's observations.

- A trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence because the stop of defendant's vehicle was justified based on the police having observed defendant at a residence under surveillance for suspected drug activity: (1) defendant went in and out of the residence under surveillance in under five minutes; (2) defendant had a drug seller as a passenger in defendant's vehicle; and (3) defendant drove to the passenger's residence. The stop was a second-tier encounter that required reasonable suspicion, and the collective knowledge of the officers involved, based on the officers' observations, justified defendant's stop. Satterfield v. State, 289 Ga. App. 886, 658 S.E.2d 379 (2008).

Trial court did not err by denying a motion to suppress because the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that a police officer, who responded to a report of a fight in a parking lot, had an articulable suspicion to stop the defendant when the officer saw the defendant driving fast from the parking lot, and investigate further the defendant's connection to the reported fight. Hines v. State, 308 Ga. App. 299, 707 S.E.2d 534 (2011).

Search of vehicle justified by officer's observations.

- Search of a van was lawful under the independent basis of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement since the objective facts known to the deputy after the deputy lawfully stopped the van, including needle marks on the occupants' arms, drug paraphernalia, and evidence of drug usage on the floor of the front seat, gave the deputy probable cause to believe that the van contained contraband. Autry v. State, 277 Ga. App. 305, 626 S.E.2d 528 (2006).

Officers' initial approach to a car occupied by the defendant as a passenger was a first-tier encounter which did not invoke the Fourth Amendment; after that approach, an officer saw, in plain view in the car, bags, a scale, and a pill bottle, known as items used for drug sales, which authorized a pat-down of the defendant, uncovering a drug pipe, and which validated the driver's consent to search the car, yielding drugs. Chapman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 200, 630 S.E.2d 810 (2006).

When an officer stopped the defendant's car in the belief that the defendant was violating a noise ordinance, saw in plain view what appeared to be illegally recorded material, and placed the defendant under arrest for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-8-60, the subsequent search of the car was legal, based on the justified traffic stop and the plain view doctrine, which gave the officer probable cause to arrest the defendant for illegally reproducing recorded materials, to seize the viewed contraband, and to search the vehicle for contraband. Hayward-El v. State, 284 Ga. App. 125, 643 S.E.2d 242 (2007).

When an officer arrested the defendant for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-8-60 and later obtained permission from the defendant's spouse to search the couple's house and saw what appeared to be illegal recordings in plain view in the defendant's parked car, the subsequent search of the car, to which the spouse consented, was legal. Hayward-El v. State, 284 Ga. App. 125, 643 S.E.2d 242 (2007).

Trial court properly denied suppression of drug evidence obtained from a search of the defendant's person after a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle and noted a strong odor of marijuana as the officer stopped the vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-14(a) by the loud music emanating from the defendant's vehicle while parked in a convenience store parking lot pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(2). Jackson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 615, 677 S.E.2d 782 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1461, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. 2009).

Defendant failed to establish that trial counsel's failure to timely file a motion to suppress evidence a police officer seized from the defendant's vehicle prejudiced the case because the warrantless search of the vehicle was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; the objective facts known to the officer after the car was lawfully stopped gave the officer probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband, and those facts included the smell of marijuana in the car, flakes of what the officer suspected to be marijuana on the floorboards of the car, and the defendant's visible agitation during the traffic stop. Brown v. State, 311 Ga. App. 405, 715 S.E.2d 802 (2011).

Drug-sniffing dog.

- During an investigative detention, the bringing of a drug dog to the scene was proper, and when the drug dog alerted to the vehicle as containing drugs, the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was justified. Bowden v. State, 279 Ga. App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (2006).

Counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to file a motion to suppress marijuana and identification found in an idling car, as the search did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII; it was proper for a drug sniffing dog to walk around the outside of defendant's vehicle, a location in which police and the dog were permitted to be, and to alert to the presence of drugs. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 83, 635 S.E.2d 372 (2006).

Search of vehicle not justified.

- Suppression motion was properly granted after the vehicle that the defendant and others were riding in was stopped on school property on suspicion of truancy and the search based on the finding that one occupant possessed marijuana and that the defendant had lied about the location of another vehicle; the stop of the vehicle was tenuous at best, the search of the occupants was even more tenuous, and any consent given by the defendant to search the other vehicle was a direct product of the illegality of the stop and the taint thereof was not sufficiently attenuated. State v. Scott, 279 Ga. App. 52, 630 S.E.2d 563 (2006).

Officer approaching stopped vehicle.

- Motion to suppress evidence seized from the defendant's car was properly denied because a uniformed officer's initial approach to the car, which had been driven to the scene of a controlled drug buy by a codefendant, was a first-tier police-citizen encounter, the car was already stopped when the uniformed officer approached and asked the codefendant for identification, the codefendant admitted that the codefendant had no driver's license or other identification, and thus the officer had reasonable suspicion that the codefendant was violating the law by driving without a license and was justified in detaining the codefendant from driving off in the vehicle. Bowden v. State, 279 Ga. App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (2006).

Search of vehicle not justified by generalized suspicion.

- Police officer's stop of the defendant's vehicle based on the officer's generalized suspicion that any vehicle on that particular road late at night was involved in illicit activity did not meet the standard for an investigative stop. Lyttle v. State, 279 Ga. App. 659, 632 S.E.2d 394 (2006).

Pat-down permitted.

- Officer's pat-down of defendant, during which the officer seized credit cards from defendant's person, was lawful as defendant had been seen in a stolen car, had previously fled police, knew the officer was investigating a crime, put defendant's hands in defendant's pockets, the officer knew defendant had lied about two items in defendant's pockets that could be used as weapons, and the objects the officer felt in defendant's pocket were ones that, in the officer's experience, had been known to have been fashioned into weapons by attaching razor blades to them. Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 583 S.E.2d 9 (2003).

During the execution of a search warrant at a residence where defendant was visiting, the sheriff's deputy felt what appeared to be marijuana in a plastic bag while searching defendant for weapons which search was permissible under the "plain feel" doctrine; thus, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Kinder v. State, 269 Ga. App. 99, 603 S.E.2d 496 (2004).

Brief investigative stop and pat-down search of defendant was justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was attempting to commit a crime when, while on patrol because of a rash of vehicle break-ins in the area of certain parking lots, an officer observed defendant looking into a parked car and defendant gave conflicting stories about where defendant was coming from. Woods v. State, 275 Ga. App. 340, 620 S.E.2d 609 (2005).

Since officers knew that the defendant was armed and considered dangerous, since the officers learned that the defendant had a machete and knives on the defendant's person, and since the defendant was nervous and moving around during an officer's pat down search, the officers did not exceed the permissible scope of the pat down search by opening a box found on defendant's person during the pat down search. Vaughan v. State, 279 Ga. App. 485, 631 S.E.2d 497 (2006).

Pat-down for safety reasons was proper after the defendant arrived at the scene of a stop of a reported carjacked vehicle since the defendant was identified as having previously been in possession of the carjacked vehicle, and incriminating documents found during the pat-down were properly seized from the defendant; the defendant's later statement admitting to having been in possession of the vehicle was not rendered inadmissible by the proper pat-down. Montgomery v. State, 279 Ga. App. 419, 631 S.E.2d 717 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine found by an officer after a precautionary pat-down, as the officer's actions in responding to a suspicious-person complaint and immediately encountering the defendant were reasonable and neither arbitrary nor harassing; hence, the seizure was authorized as incident to a lawful arrest. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 654, 637 S.E.2d 70 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 77 (Ga. 2007).

Statement by a defendant who had been stopped for speeding that the defendant had a knife, and the defendant's overly-nervous demeanor, authorized a trooper to pat the defendant down for the trooper's safety. A "plain feel" of an apparent methamphetamine pipe in the defendant's pocket authorized the trooper to remove the pipe; therefore, the pipe and methamphetamine found pursuant to a search of the defendant's pockets were admissible. Hicks v. State, 293 Ga. App. 745, 667 S.E.2d 715 (2008).

Flight from improper Terry stop.

- Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress was affirmed as the defendant's flight from an improper Terry stop gave the police officers an independent basis to arrest the defendant; thus, the methamphetamine found in close proximity was admissible. Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 712, 634 S.E.2d 842 (2006).

Instrumentalities used in commission of crime may be seized at time of arrest without search warrant. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967).

Police may search person under custodial arrest for weapons or contraband.

- Once a defendant has been placed under custodial arrest, police may search the defendant's person, incident to that arrest, for weapons or contraband. Buday v. State, 150 Ga. App. 686, 258 S.E.2d 318 (1979).

Reasonable for officer to remove weapons during lawful arrest.

- It is reasonable that when a lawful arrest is made the arresting officer may remove any weapons that the suspect might seek to use to try to resist arrest or to escape. Banks v. State, 246 Ga. 178, 269 S.E.2d 450 (1980).

Search of juvenile not proper.

- Law enforcement officer, who was acting as an agent for a school principal in searching a juvenile, upon reports that the juvenile had been overheard making arrangements to sell drugs on school grounds, was not authorized to search the juvenile absent probable cause to do so; thus, when the juvenile was searched and drugs were found, the court properly granted the juvenile's motion to suppress. State v. K.L.M., 278 Ga. App. 219, 628 S.E.2d 651 (2006).

Level-one, non-coercive encounter and resultant search of person.

- Since an officer made no show of force, and did not threaten, coerce, or restrain the defendant, the officer's initial approach to the defendant and two others and the officer's questioning of the defendant was a level-one, non-coercive encounter, and the officer did not need articulable suspicion to justify the conduct, to question the defendant, or to ask for consent to search the defendant's person; the defendant's consent to a search thus was not tainted by an illegal stop and met constitutional muster. Postell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 275, 630 S.E.2d 867 (2006).

Officer's observation of the defendant's unusual, evasive behavior, coupled with the defendant's ensuing confrontation of the officer near a place where a burglar alarm had recently sounded, followed by defendant's unresponsive replies to the officer's questions provided the officer a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was engaged in wrongdoing, thereby justifying, under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, a Terry-style investigative detention; once the defendant was subdued after attempting to flee the scene, probable cause to arrest existed. Franklin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 409, 636 S.E.2d 114 (2006).

Search of defendant's pocket after traffic stop.

- Because an officer stopped the defendant for suspected drunk driving, but did not smell alcohol on the defendant's breath and did not administer sobriety tests, and because the officer soon realized during the stop that the license tag was valid, the officer never testified that the officer was in fear for the officer's safety, and did not conduct a Terry pat-down search, the trial court was authorized to find that the officer failed to articulate the reasonable suspicion necessary to sustain a second tier search. during which the officer found marijuana in the defendant's pocket. State v. Brown, 278 Ga. App. 457, 629 S.E.2d 123 (2006).

Consent nor warrant required for taking of blood sample.

- A blood sample is not taken from a defendant unconstitutionally because a defendant does not freely consent to the taking of the sample and because it is taken without a search warrant. Corn v. Hopper, 244 Ga. 28, 257 S.E.2d 533 (1979).

Breath test was search incident to arrest.

- In the defendant's DUI trial, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), because a breath test was permitted as a search incident to the defendant's DUI arrest, the defendant's refusal to take the breath test was not the exercise of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and evidence of the defendant's refusal was properly admitted under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b). Cherry v. State, 345 Ga. App. 409, 813 S.E.2d 408 (2018).

Breath test authorized as search incident to arrest.

- Warrantless test of the defendant's breath was authorized by the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement under both the Fourth Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, irrespective of whether the defendant's consent was freely and voluntarily obtained for the breath test. MacMaster v. State, 344 Ga. App. 222, 809 S.E.2d 478 (2018).

Search of probationer's residence.

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress because the court did not err in determining that the law-enforcement officers who searched the defendant's home had reasonable suspicion to suspect criminal activity or violations of probation based on the probation officer's concerns that the defendant was using drugs and attempting to avoid detection; thus, the search was conducted for probationary purposes, rather than for law-enforcement purposes. Whitfield v. State, 337 Ga. App. 167, 786 S.E.2d 547 (2016).

Change in admissibility of evidence rules.

- Law as to admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure as stated in Winston v. State, 79 Ga. App. 711(2a), 54 S.E.2d 354 (1949) and similar cases is determined to be no longer valid. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169 (1964).

All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of Constitution is inadmissible in state court. Carson v. State ex rel. Price, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965).

Evidence of guilt which the defendant, either directly or indirectly, is compelled to disclose by an unlawful search and seizure of the defendant's person under illegal arrest, is not admissible in a criminal prosecution of the person illegally arrested. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169 (1964).

Evidence of DUI investigation admissible.

- Because a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed any freedom of action had been more than temporarily curtailed by an officer's investigation for a possible DUI, and the defendant was not in custody or arrested until after the field sobriety tests were performed, at which point the officer had probable cause for the arrest and read the implied consent rights, the trial court did not err in denying suppression of the defendant's statement made to the officer and the field sobriety evaluations conducted. Amin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 830, 643 S.E.2d 4 (2007).

Because a defendant was arrested for driving under the influence under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 based on probable cause and the state had complied with the implied consent requirements of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55, the defendant could not complain that drug and alcohol testing violated the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment or the Georgia Constitution because the implied consent statute allowed for the warrantless compelled testing of bodily fluids based on the existence of probable cause, but without proof of the existence of exigent circumstances. Cornwell v. State, 283 Ga. 247, 657 S.E.2d 195 (2008).

Evidence obtained from aerial search is admissible and not product of illegal search.

- Since the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their "persons, houses, papers and effects" is not extended to open fields, evidence obtained from an aerial search of an open field is not inadmissible as the product of an illegal search. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).

Test for fruit of the poisonous tree.

- Evidence is not "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which an objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. McKinney v. State, 261 Ga. App. 218, 582 S.E.2d 463 (2003).

Though evidence would not have been admissible if discovered as the result of police officers' unconstitutional roadblock and illegal Terry stop of defendant's car before defendant reached the roadblock, defendant's gratuitous shoving of police was an aggravated battery, and the discovery of drugs defendant threw while fleeing from that battery meant the discovery of the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop to justify its admission into evidence and denial of defendant's motion to suppress. Strickland v. State, 265 Ga. App. 533, 594 S.E.2d 711 (2004).

Taint of illegal procurement of evidence under void warrant forbids its use.

- Evidence obtained under a void warrant is evidence illegally obtained and it has been settled once and for all that the taint of illegal procurement forbids its use as evidence. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263 (1980).

Suppression of evidence when impermissible intrusion on rights.

- When no circumstances at all appear which might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of following and detaining a vehicle and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen. When this occurs, the penalty exacted by the law is that evidence turned up as a result of such intrusion may not be introduced against the defendant on the trial of the defendant's case. Brooks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977).

Trial court properly granted a defendant's motion to suppress a firearm - a hunting rifle that was in the cab of the defendant's pick-up truck - that was seized from the vehicle after a traffic stop, because no evidence was presented of any danger to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle for weapons, and the officer acknowledged the search was conducted merely to see if the firearm was stolen, with no basis shown that criminal activity existed. State v. Jones, 289 Ga. App. 176, 657 S.E.2d 253 (2008).

Suppression motion properly denied when probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence existed after: (1) the defendant was stopped for speeding; (2) an officer noticed that the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, that the defendant's speech was slow, and that the defendant smelled of alcohol; and (3) field sobriety tests indicated that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Moody v. State, 273 Ga. App. 670, 615 S.E.2d 803 (2005).

Because: (1) it was reasonable for the arresting officers to act upon an investigating deputy's observations; (2) law enforcement had reasonably trustworthy information to warrant their belief that the defendant had committed or had participated in committing a burglary; and (3) a determination of probable cause to arrest the defendant could rest on the collective knowledge of the police, given the communication between them, probable cause supported the defendant's warrantless arrest and supported the admission of the seized evidence. Murphy v. State, 286 Ga. App. 447, 649 S.E.2d 565 (2007).

"Plain feel" exception.

- Since the record was devoid of any testimony or evidence that the seizing officer articulated a suspicion that would have reasonably led the officer to believe that the object seized from a coin pocket of defendant's jeans was contraband, never observed any portion of the plastic bag protruding from the pocket, and never testified that it was immediately apparent that the object was contraband, the plain feel exception did not apply and the trial court properly granted suppression of the item seized. State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. App. 880, 589 S.E.2d 647 (2003).

Pat down conducted as a matter of routine during a traffic stop did not provide a reasonable basis for concluding that defendant was a threat to the officer's safety, and because nothing indicated that defendant was involved in the drug trade or was otherwise threatening, the pat down was not justified and defendant's subsequent incriminating statement and drugs seized from defendant's vehicle should have been suppressed. Wilson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 291, 612 S.E.2d 311 (2005).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress rings a police officer seized from the defendant's pocket during a pat-down search because the seizure was authorized under the plain feel doctrine; the officer's knowledge that a man matching the defendant's description was suspected of stealing numerous rings shortly beforehand and nearby gave the officer probable cause to believe that the items the officer felt in the defendant's pocket were the stolen rings, and had the rings been in the officer's plain view when the officer detained the defendant, the officer could have seized the rings under the plain view doctrine. State v. Cosby, 302 Ga. App. 204, 690 S.E.2d 519 (2010).

Seizure of contraband during justified safety frisk was proper.

- A trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the contraband found on the defendant's person as a result of a traffic stop that came to fruition after an officer observed the defendant making a U-turn in front of a recently robbed bank because the defendant admitted to having a knife in the defendant's pocket but refused to remove the defendant's hand therefrom. As a result, the police were justified in frisking the defendant for safety reasons and the contraband was, therefore, legally obtained from the defendant. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 27, 656 S.E.2d 161 (2007).

Statement overheard by officers not illegally procured evidence.

- Evidence of statements made by the defendant in a conversation overheard by the arresting officers who had concealed themselves, as planned between them and the person with whom the defendant talked, does not amount to evidence given by the defendant involuntarily and without the advice of counsel, and is not coerced from the defendant in violation of the defendant's rights not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. Blackwell v. State, 113 Ga. App. 536, 148 S.E.2d 912 (1966).

Evidence is lawfully obtained if observed by sheriff when the sheriff is lawfully on premises on another matter. Hudson v. State, 127 Ga. App. 452, 193 S.E.2d 919 (1972).

Plain view.

- When the defendant was already stopped at the side of a road and a police chief, lawfully wanting to question the defendant about the incorrect vehicle tag number that the defendant had given earlier, walked passed an open car door and saw a gun in plain sight, there was no stop and the chief had a right to retrieve the gun; consequently, the trial court did not err by refusing to suppress the evidence of the gun. Eldridge v. State, 270 Ga. App. 84, 606 S.E.2d 95 (2004).

Evidence voluntarily given or seized while in plain view should not be suppressed.

- When evidence establishes that a warrantless arrest and seizure were unrelated as when a sheriff who seized the items in question was permitted inside defendant's home by a person identified as defendant's spouse, and the items seized were either in plain view or voluntarily given to the sheriff, the evidence did not show a seizure pursuant to an illegal warrantless arrest that should be suppressed. Dickerson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 429, 260 S.E.2d 535 (1979).

Suppression not required when insufficient evidence of unreasonable search and seizure.

- When a sheriff goes into the house of a relative and takes possession of a gun offered to the sheriff, the evidence is insufficient to show an unreasonable search and seizure, and suppression of the gun was not required. Marsh v. State, 223 Ga. 590, 157 S.E.2d 273 (1967).

Untimely motion to suppress.

- In a prosecution on four counts of child molestation, the defendant's failure to file a timely motion to suppress waived the right to claim that the seized items were inadmissible as fruits of the poisonous tree. Walker v. State, 277 Ga. App. 485, 627 S.E.2d 54 (2006).

Motion to suppress properly denied because approaching individual and asking questions not "seizure."

- Trial court properly refused to suppress evidence based on the defendant's initial seizure as a deputy initiated a first-level police-citizen encounter when the deputy approached the defendant's stopped car and asked the defendant to get out; it was only after the deputy smelled alcohol on the defendant and noticed the defendant's bloodshot eyes that the defendant acted upon a reasonable suspicion that the defendant might be intoxicated. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 426, 602 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

Seizure from pretrial detainee's cell.

- Because the state properly sought and obtained a search warrant before the state seized written materials from a pretrial detainee's cell, it was error to grant the detainee's motion to suppress. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S. Ct. 807, 145 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2000).

Circumstances surrounding seeking of warrant.

- When any conflict between testimony of magistrate and law enforcement officer seeking warrant as to circumstances surrounding seeking of warrant was resolved by the court and supported by the record, the motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. Daitch v. State, 168 Ga. App. 830, 310 S.E.2d 703 (1983).

There is no constitutional right to suppress evidence solely on ground that others have access to it. Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981).

Seizure of marijuana when police officer investigates complaint is proper.

- Seizure of marijuana plant growing in yard of home where police officer was investigating complaint of illegal activity was proper. State v. Brooks, 160 Ga. App. 381, 287 S.E.2d 95 (1981).

Warrant as pathway to evidence.

- Police did not exceed the scope of a search warrant when the warrant specified "receipts" and a furniture receipt was found in the defendant's car leading to the defendant's paramour's home and police, in a consented-to search, found incriminating evidence; the police were not required to overlook relevant evidence when the police knew the defendant's paramour's name and the receipt was a pathway to evidence. Brown v. State, 260 Ga. App. 627, 580 S.E.2d 348 (2003).

Use of similar transaction evidence.

- Given the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting evidence showing the commission of similar transactions, in the nature of two out-of-state traffic stops which led to searches and discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia on defendant, because there was no reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different had the evidence been excluded. Goldsby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 523, 615 S.E.2d 592 (2005).

Blood test results inadmissible.

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the results of the defendant's intoximeter test after the arresting officer failed to provide an independent blood test under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a)(3), failed to use reasonable efforts to ensure that the defendant's blood was both drawn and tested, and since the officer did not suggest any other testing alternatives, such as calling the defendant's personal physician or a lawyer, or submitting the sample to the state's crime lab; once the defendant invoked the right to an independent test, the officer had a duty to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the request. Cole v. State, 263 Ga. App. 222, 587 S.E.2d 314 (2003).

Blood and urine test results, obtained without sufficient voluntary consent, properly suppressed.

- Because the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant's mental condition was clearly vulnerable, and that the defendant: (1) could not read; (2) had to be forcibly restrained while the consent form was initially being read; (3) was weeping while the remainder of the form was read; and (4) never actually signed the consent form, the trial court properly found that any consent to submit to blood and urine tests was not freely and voluntarily given. Moreover, the proper standard of review on appeal, based on the fact that credibility was an issue, was not a de novo standard, but a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Stephens, 289 Ga. App. 167, 657 S.E.2d 18 (2008).

Second blood sample was not fruit of poisonous tree.

- Although a first search warrant for defendant's blood was defective, a second blood sample that was later drawn from defendant was not "fruit of the poisonous tree" because there was no evidence that the second search warrant for the blood was defective or that the second blood sample was obtained by exploitation of the original defective warrant; the second sample was separate and distinguishable from the first sample so as to be purged of the primary taint and, therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the second sample. McKinney v. State, 261 Ga. App. 218, 582 S.E.2d 463 (2003).

Blood test results admissible.

- Denial of a defendant's suppression motion was affirmed as a victim with a broken kneecap was seriously injured under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(c) and the officers had probable cause based on the defendant's statements, the defendant's glossy eyes, and the odor of alcohol on the defendant's person, to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol; the officer was not required to arrest the defendant before the implied consent reading. Jenkins v. State, 282 Ga. App. 106, 637 S.E.2d 818 (2006).

In a DUI per se case, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a chemical testing of the defendant's blood because the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the test as the defendant gave an affirmative response to the officer's question pursuant to the implied consent notice; the officer did not employ shows of force; and, at the fire station, the defendant reaffirmed the defendant's assent before the medic drew the defendant's blood. Jacobs v. State, 338 Ga. App. 743, 791 S.E.2d 844 (2016).

Evidence of refusal to submit to breath test admissible.

- Trial court erred in suppressing the defendant's refusal to submit to a state-administered chemical breath test, as the implied consent notice given by a sheriff's deputy was substantially accurate and timely given, and irrespective of whether the refusal resulted from the defendant's confusion, it nevertheless remained a refusal. State v. Brookbank, 283 Ga. App. 814, 642 S.E.2d 885 (2007).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress results from a blood test performed prior to any arrest, as: (1) the evidence showed that the defendant was involved in a car wreck resulting in serious injury before blood was drawn; and (2) a sheriff's deputy had probable cause to suspect that the defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol; moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the fact that a loss of consciousness was temporary did not cause the blood test to fall outside the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55(c). State v. Umbach, 284 Ga. App. 240, 643 S.E.2d 758 (2007).

Tate standard justified suppression of breath tests.

- Under the Tate standard, defendant's breath test results, obtained while defendant was in custody, were properly suppressed as the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence since: (1) defendant had a single-car accident; (2) defendant had two clues for intoxication in the HGN test, while the other four clues were inconclusive or indicated no intoxication; (3) defendant's alco-sensor test results were positive for alcohol; (4) the trial court found that all of the alleged indicia of impairment were caused by the accident or lacked credibility; and (5) defendant adequately explained the accident to the officer. State v. Gray, 267 Ga. App. 753, 600 S.E.2d 626 (2004), disapproved, Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015).

Photographic lineup was not impermissibly suggestive.

- While a defendant pointed out differences in the various pictures, such as background, clothing, and facial hair, defendant failed to show how such differences made defendant stand out from the other lineup participants in an arbitrary or apparent way so as to "suggest" to the victim that defendant was the perpetrator; the lineup administrator's comment that the victim "did good" was not proof the administrator set up a suggestive lineup. Weeks v. State, 268 Ga. App. 886, 602 S.E.2d 882 (2004).

Statement by defendant during police investigation held admissible.

- Based on an officer's unequivocal testimony that the defendant was not under arrest when a challenged statement was made, but the officer was merely investigating the victim's stolen vehicle claim, and hence Miranda warnings were not required, suppression of the statement was not required. Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. App. 86, 648 S.E.2d 674 (2007).

With regard to defendant's felony murder conviction, the trial court properly determined that defendant was not in custody when defendant told a police officer that defendant was the shooter as, although defendant was transported to the police station in a car which had a security screen between the front and back passenger seats, and a pat-down search for officer safety was performed before defendant entered the car, those actions did not mandate a finding that defendant was in custody. At no time was defendant handcuffed, defendant's relatives were present during the interview, and the door to the detectives' work area in the police station was not locked in any way that impeded exit. Sewell v. State, 283 Ga. 558, 662 S.E.2d 537 (2008).

Evidence taken after arrest based on probable cause.

- Because the record showed that every police officer on duty the day of the defendant's arrest had actual knowledge of facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause for the arrest, the seizure of the defendant's bloody clothes after the arrest was proper. Simpson v. State, 289 Ga. 685, 715 S.E.2d 142 (2011).

Department's search regulation is valid.

- A regulation established by the Department of Human Resources which makes vehicles entering on the grounds of Central State Hospital subject to search is a valid exercise of the department's power, and does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-15.

Search warrant permits search and seizure by official.

- Any law enforcement official who has obtained a search warrant may lawfully search and seize prescriptions retained for inspection by a pharmacy as required by Georgia law. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-112.

Inspector has authority to search and seize and make arrests.

- Chief drug inspector of the Board of Pharmacy and the inspector's assistants have the authority to make arrests for certain violations and to search and seize evidence necessary for the presentation before courts of this state or before the Board of Pharmacy; the chief drug inspector and the inspector's assistants do not have the authority to seize prescriptions from a pharmacy without properly acquiring a valid search warrant. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-112.

Authority of department's officers to board and search vessels.

- Enforcement officers of the State Game and Fish Commission (now Department of Natural Resources) may board and search vessels: (a) when acting under a warrant; (b) when they have probable cause to believe a violation exists; or (c) in arresting an offender detected in the commission of a violation. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 342.

Prisoner's consent required for inspection of personal documents.

- Board of Corrections may not authorize the inspection of personal documents and papers of a prisoner, in the custody of the warden, without the consent of the prisoner. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 437.

Unauthorized dormitory searches.

- A college may not rely absolutely on a contractual provision in a dormitory contract to conduct a search of a student's dormitory room in the absence of a valid warrant or consent. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-13.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures, § 1 et seq.

Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force in Making Arrest, 9 POF2d 363.

Lack of Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrest, 44 POF2d 229.

Excessive Force by Police Officer, 21 POF3d 685.

C.J.S.

- 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Constitutional guaranties against unreasonable searches and seizures as applied to a search for or seizure of intoxicating liquor, 13 A.L.R. 1316; 27 A.L.R. 709; 39 A.L.R. 811; 41 A.L.R. 1539; 74 A.L.R. 1418.

Right to arrest without a warrant for unlawful possession or transportation of intoxicating liquor, 44 A.L.R. 132.

Admissibility of evidence obtained by government or other public officer by intercepting letter or telegraph or telephone message, 53 A.L.R. 1485; 66 A.L.R. 397; 134 A.L.R. 614.

Search of automobile without a warrant by officers relying on description of persons suspected of a crime, 60 A.L.R. 299.

Right of search and seizure incident to lawful arrest without a search warrant, 74 A.L.R. 1387; 82 A.L.R. 782.

Use as evidence against officers, employees, or stockholders of corporation of illegally seized documents or other articles belonging to corporation, 78 A.L.R. 343.

Constitutionality of statutory provisions for examination of records, books, or documents for taxation purposes, 103 A.L.R. 522.

Right of privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22; 57 A.L.R.2d 634; 57 A.L.R.3d 16.

Order upon application for suppression in criminal case of evidence wrongly seized by government as appealable, 156 A.L.R. 1207.

Requiring submission to physical examination or test as violation of constitutional rights, 164 A.L.R. 967; 25 A.L.R.2d 1407.

Search incident to one offense as justifying seizure of instruments of or articles connected with another offense, 169 A.L.R. 1419.

Requiring submission to physical examination or test as violation of constitutional rights, 25 A.L.R.2d 1407.

Opening, search, and seizure of mail, 61 A.L.R.2d 1282.

Nature of interest in, or connection with, premises searched as affecting standing to attack legality of search, 78 A.L.R.2d 246.

Transiently occupied room in hotel, motel, or roominghouse as within provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, 86 A.L.R.2d 984.

Lawfulness of nonconsensual search and seizure without warrant, prior to arrest, 89 A.L.R.2d 715.

Admissibility, in civil case, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 5 A.L.R.3d 670.

Validity of procedures designed to protect the public against obscenity, 5 A.L.R.3d 1214; 93 A.L.R.3d 297.

Lawfulness of seizure of property used in violation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473.

Validity of consent to search given by one in custody of officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858.

Lawfulness of search of motor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation, 10 A.L.R.3d 314.

Propriety of considering hearsay or other incompetent evidence in establishing probable cause for issuance of search warrant, 10 A.L.R.3d 359.

Search warrant: sufficiency of description of apartment or room to be searched in multiple-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330.

Investigations and surveillance, shadowing and trailing, as violation of right of privacy, 13 A.L.R.3d 1025.

Modern status of rule as to validity of nonconsensual search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by lapse of time between, or difference in places of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727.

Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful search and seizure, 20 A.L.R.3d 724.

Admissibility, in criminal case, of evidence obtained by search by private individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553.

Privilege against self-incrimination as ground for refusal to produce noncorporate documents in possession of person asserting privilege, but owned by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 1373.

"Fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine excluding evidence derived from information gained in illegal search, 43 A.L.R.3d 385.

Right of exonerated arrestee to have fingerprints, photographs, or other criminal identification or arrest records expunged or restricted, 46 A.L.R.3d 900; 58 A.L.R.4th 902.

Censorship of convicted prisoners' "legal" mail, 47 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Lawfulness of "inventory search" of motor vehicle impounded by police, 48 A.L.R.3d 537.

Observation through binoculars as constituting unreasonable search, 48 A.L.R.3d 1178, 59 A.L.R.5th 615.

Censorship and evidentiary use of unconvicted prisoners' mail, 52 A.L.R.3d 548.

Uninvited entry into another's living quarters as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 434.

Liability of creditor for excessive attachment or garnishment, 56 A.L.R.3d 493.

Waiver or loss of right of privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d 16.

Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance of prisoner, 57 A.L.R.3d 172.

Admissibility of videotape film in evidence in criminal trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333; 41 A.L.R.4th 812; 41 A.L.R.4th 877.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, 77 A.L.R.3d 636.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches, 79 A.L.R.3d 1083.

State or municipal liability for invasion of privacy, 87 A.L.R.3d 145.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by domestic employee or servant, 99 A.L.R.3d 1232.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's spouse (resident or nonresident) - state cases, 1 A.L.R.4th 673, 65 A.L.R.5th 407.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in warrantless search of rental property authorized by lessor of such property - state cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 1173, 61 A.L.R.5th 1.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues, 12 A.L.R.4th 318.

Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search warrant - modern cases, 24 A.L.R.4th 1266.

Admissibility in criminal case of evidence that accused refused to take test of intoxication, 26 A.L.R.4th 1112.

Employment of photographic equipment to record presence and nature of items as constituting unreasonable search, 27 A.L.R.4th 532.

Search and seizure: suppression of evidence found in automobile during routine check of vehicle identification number (VIN), 27 A.L.R.4th 549.

Validity of, and admissibility of evidence discovered in, search authorized by judge over telephone, 38 A.L.R.4th 1145.

Search and seizure: what constitutes abandonment of personal property within rule that search and seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable - modern cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381.

Admissibility, in criminal case, of physical evidence obtained without consent by surgical removal from person's body, 41 A.L.R.4th 60.

Officer's ruse to gain entry as affecting admissibility of plain-view evidence - modern cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425.

Search and seizure: necessity that police obtain warrant before taking possession of, examining, or testing evidence discovered in search by private person, 47 A.L.R.4th 501.

Propriety of state or local government health officer's warrantless search - post-Camara cases, 53 A.L.R.4th 1168.

Seizure of books, documents, or other papers under search warrant not describing such items, 54 A.L.R.4th 391.

Search and seizure of telephone company records pertaining to subscriber as violation of subscriber's constitutional rights, 76 A.L.R.4th 536.

"Caller ID" system, allowing telephone call recipient to ascertain number of telephone from which call originated, as violation of right to privacy, wiretapping statute, or similar protections, 9 A.L.R.5th 553.

Lawfulness of search of person or personal effects under medical emergency exception to warrant requirement, 11 A.L.R.5th 52.

State constitutional requirements as to exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized - post-Leon cases, 19 A.L.R.5th 470.

Search and seizure of bank records pertaining to customer as violation of customer's rights under state law, 33 A.L.R.5th 453.

Propriety of execution of search warrant at nighttime, 41 A.L.R.5th 171.

Sufficiency of description in warrant of person to be searched, 43 A.L.R.5th 1.

Application of "plain-feel" exception to warrant requirements - state cases, 50 A.L.R.5th 467.

Propriety of search of nonoccupant visitor's belongings pursuant to warrant issued for another's premises, 51 A.L.R.5th 375.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's minor child - state cases, 51 A.L.R.5th 425.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's adult relative other than spouse - state cases, 55 A.L.R.5th 125.

Searches and seizures: Reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of garbage or trash receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th 1.

Belief that burglary is in progress or has recently been committed as exigent circumstance justifying warrantless search of premises, 64 A.L.R.5th 637.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in tent or campsite, 66 A.L.R.5th 373.

Validity of anticipatory search warrants - state cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by one, other than relative, who is cotenant or common resident with defendant - state cases, 68 A.L.R.5th 343.

Civilian participation in execution of search warrant as affecting legality of search, 68 A.L.R.5th 549.

Effect of retroactive consent on legality of otherwise unlawful search and seizure, 76 A.L.R.5th 563.

Permissibility and sufficiency of warrantless use of thermal imager or Forward Looking Infra-Red Radar (F.L.I.R.), 78 A.L.R.5th 309.

Validity of search or seizure of computer, computer disk, or computer peripheral equipment, 84 A.L.R.5th 1.

What constitutes compliance with knock-and-announce rule in search of private premises - state cases, 85 A.L.R.5th 1.

Federal and state constitutions as protecting prison visitor against unreasonable searches and seizures, 85 A.L.R.5th 261.

Constitutionality of secret video surveillance, 91 A.L.R.5th 585.

Expectation of privacy in internet communications, 92 A.L.R.5th 15.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches, 99 A.L.R.5th 557.

Error, in either search warrant or application for warrant, as to address of place to be searched as rendering warrant invalid, 103 A.L.R.5th 463.

Search warrant as authorizing search of structures on property other than main house or other building, or location other than designated portion of building, 104 A.L.R.5th 165.

Admissibility, in civil proceeding, of evidence obtained through unlawful search and seizure, 105 A.L.R.5th 1.

Odor detectable by unaided person as furnishing probable cause for search warrant, 106 A.L.R.5th 397.

When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of cocaine so untimely as to be stale - state cases, 109 A.L.R.5th 99.

When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sexual offense so untimely as to be stale - state cases, 111 A.L.R.5th 239.

When are facts relating to marijuana, provided by one other than police or other law enforcement officer, so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of a controlled substance - state cases, 112 A.L.R.5th 429.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana - state cases, 114 A.L.R.5th 173.

When are facts relating to marijuana, provided by police or other law enforcement officer, so untimely as to be stale when offered in support of search warrant for evidence of sale or possession of controlled substance - state cases, 114 A.L.R.5th 235.

Validity of warrantless search based in whole or in part on odor of narcotics other than marijuana, or chemical related to manufacture of such narcotics, 115 A.L.R.5th 477.

Validity of routine roadblocks by state or local police for purpose of discovery of driver's license, registration, and safety violations, 116 A.L.R.5th 479.

Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or drugs as unreasonable search in violation of state constitutions, 117 A.L.R.5th 407.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues - Motions and objections during trial and matters other than pretrial motions, 117 A.L.R.5th 513.

Validity of warrantless search of other than motor vehicle or occupant of vehicle based on odor of marijuana - state cases, 122 A.L.R.5th 439.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle driver based on odor of marijuana - state cases, 123 A.L.R.5th 179.

Validity of search conducted pursuant to parole warrant, 123 A.L.R.5th 221.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle passenger based on odor of marijuana, 1 A.L.R.6th 371.

Application of Leon good faith exception to exclusionary rule where police fail to comply with knock and announce requirement during execution of search warrant, 2 A.L.R.6th 169.

Application in state narcotics cases of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers' rule under Fourth Amendment - Cocaine cases, 4 A.L.R.6th 599.

Application in state narcotics cases of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers' rule under Fourth Amendment-Drugs other than marijuana and cocaine and unidentified drugs, 12 A.L.R.6th 553.

Construction and application of rule permitting knock and talk visits under Fourth Amendment and state constitutions, 15 A.L.R.6th 515.

When is warrantless entry of house or other building justified under "hot pursuit" doctrine, 17 A.L.R.6th 327.

Employee's expectation of privacy in workplace, 18 A.L.R.6th 1.

Expectation of privacy in text transmissions to or from pager, cellular telephone, or other wireless personal communications device, 25 A.L.R.6th 201.

Timeliness of execution of search warrant, 27 A.L.R.6th 491.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in outbuildings, 67 A.L.R.6th 531.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in side yards, 69 A.L.R.6th 275.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues - Pretrial motions - Suppression motions where no warrant involved, 71 A.L.R.6th 1.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues - Pretrial motions - Suppression motions where warrant was involved, 72 A.L.R.6th 1.

Reverse-Franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth - Underlying homicide and assault offenses, 72 A.L.R.6th 437.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues - Pretrial motions - Motions other than for suppression, 73 A.L.R.6th 1.

Reverse-Franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for truth - Underlying drug offenses, 73 A.L.R.6th 49.

Reverse-Franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth - Underlying sexual offenses, 74 A.L.R.6th 69.

Validity of warrantless search under extended border doctrine, 102 A.L.R. Fed. 269.

When is consent voluntarily given so as to justify a search conducted on basis of that consent - Supreme Court cases, 148 A.L.R. Fed. 271.

Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or drugs as unreasonable search in violation of Fourth Amendment, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 399.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's minor relative, 152 A.L.R. Fed. 475.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's spouse, 154 A.L.R. Fed. 579.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant's property or residence authorized by defendant's adult relative other than spouse, 160 A.L.R. Fed. 165.

Validity of warrantless administrative inspection of business that is allegedly closely or pervasively regulated; cases decided since Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U.S., 397 U.S. 72, 90 S. Ct. 774, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1970), 182 A.L.R. Fed. 467.

When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of federal nondrug offense so untimely as to be stale, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 415.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana - federal cases, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 487.

Validity of warrantless search of other than motor vehicle or occupant of motor vehicle based on odor of marijuana - federal cases, 191 A.L.R. Fed. 303.

Validity of warrantless search of motor vehicle occupant based on odor of marijuana - federal cases, 192 A.L.R. Fed. 391.

Sufficiency of information provided by confidential informant, whose identity is known to police, to provide probable cause for federal search warrant where there was indication that informant provided reliable information to police in past - Cases decided after Ilinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), 196 A.L.R. Fed. 1

Sufficiency of information provided by confidential informant, whose identity is known to police, to provide probable cause for federal search warrant where there was no indication that informant provided reliable information to police in past - Cases decided after Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), 9 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

When are facts offered in support of search warrant for evidence of federal drug offense so untimely as to be stale, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Allowable use of federal pen register and trap and trace device to trace cell phones and internet use, 15 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 537.

Validity and application of anticipatory search warrant - federal cases, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 123.

Unconstitutional search or seizure as warranting suppression of evidence in removal proceeding, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 489.

Border search or seizure of traveler's laptop computer, or other personal electronic or digital storage device, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Construction and application of Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, 47 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 657 (2009), that police may search vehicle incident to recent occupant's arrest only if arrestee is within reaching distance of passenger compartment at time of search or it is reasonable to believe vehicle contains evidence of offense - pretextual traffic offenses and other criminal investigations, 56 A.L.R.6th 1.

Necessity of rendering medical assistance as circumstance permitting warrantless entry or search of building or premises, 58 A.L.R.6th 499.

Propriety of execution of no-knock search warrant, 59 A.L.R.6th 311.

Validity of search of wireless communication devices, 62 A.L.R.6th 161.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in backyards, 62 A.L.R.6th 413.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in outbuildings, 67 A.L.R.6th 531.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in side yards, 69 A.L.R.6th 275.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues - pretrial motions - suppression motions where no warrant involved, 71 A.L.R.6th 1.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues - pretrial motions - suppression motions where warrant was involved, 72 A.L.R.6th 1.

Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth - underlying homicide and assault offenses, 72 A.L.R.6th 437.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding search and seizure issues - pretrial motions - motions other than for suppression, 73 A.L.R.6th 1.

Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for truth - underlying drug offenses, 73 A.L.R.6th 49.

Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth - underlying sexual offenses, 74 A.L.R.6th 69.

Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for truth - underlying weapons offenses, 75 A.L.R.6th 443.

Construction and application of Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004), governing validity of police roadblock, checkpoint, or other detention of vehicle for gathering of information, 78 A.L.R.6th 213.

Construction and application by state courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) - warrantless search of house for dangerous persons, 78 A.L.R.6th 297.

Permissibility under Fourth Amendment of Terry stop to investigate completed misdemeanor, 78 A.L.R.6th 599.

Construction and application by state courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) - warrantless search of apartment or other non-house dwelling for dangerous persons, 79 A.L.R.6th 1.

Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for truth - underlying vehicular offenses, 79 A.L.R.6th 325.

Validity of "reach-in" searches, 79 A.L.R.6th 631.

Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant theft and burglary offenses, 80 A.L.R.6th 239.

Reverse-franks claims, where police arguably omit facts from search or arrest warrant affidavit material to finding of probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth - underlying miscellaneous offenses, 81 A.L.R.6th 257.

Permissibility under Fourth Amendment of investigatory traffic stop based solely on anonymous tip reporting drunk driving, 84 A.L.R.6th 293.

Expectation of privacy in and discovery of social networking web site postings and communications, 88 A.L.R.6th 319.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, 92 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and application by state courts of federal and state constitutional standards governing police orders to passengers in car lawfully pulled over for traffic stop, 92 A.L.R.6th 171.

Sufficiency of search warrant for DNA sample, 93 A.L.R.6th 275.

Validity of search of digital camera and associated memory cards, 94 A.L.R.6th 525.

Search and seizure: what constitutes abandonment of real property within rule that search and seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable, 99 A.L.R.6th 397.

Application of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers' rule under Fourth Amendment in prosecution for prostitution, pornography, or other sexually based offense - state cases, 101 A.L.R.6th 299.

Application of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers' rule under Fourth Amendment in murder, homicide or manslaughter prosecution - state cases, 101 A.L.R.6th 331.

Application of collective knowledge doctrine or fellow officers' rule under Fourth Amendment in prosecution for robbery, burglary, larceny, or other theft offense - state cases, 103 A.L.R.6th 347.

Whether police scan of magnetic strip on credit or debit card violates reasonable expectation of privacy under fourth amendment, 5 A.L.R.7th 1.

Construction and application of supreme court's holding in Florida v. Jardines, that canine sniff on front porch of home constitutes "search" for purposes of Fourth Amendment in subsequent similar factual circumstances, 15 A.L.R.7th 3.

Validity of search and seizure warrant, and execution thereof, to disclose records and electronic communications relating to specific e-mail address, 15 A.L.R.7th 5.

Construction and application by federal courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) - warrantless search of house for dangerous persons, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 159.

Construction and application of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule - Supreme Court cases, 68 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 303.

Construction and application by federal courts of protective sweep doctrine recognized in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) - warrantless search of apartment or other nonhouse dwelling for dangerous persons, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 241.

Racial profiling by law enforcement officers in connection with traffic stops as infringement of federal constitutional rights or federal civil rights statutes, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Validity of use of cellular telephone or tower to track prospective, real time, or historical position of possessor of phone under Fourth Amendment, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Application of Fourth Amendment to evidence seized in foreign jurisdiction, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 4.