restrictive standard in Pennsylvania

2019In criticizing what it characterized as the court’s “conclusion that there are ‘no limitations’ on what the jury can consider, including the number and type of specific duties violated,” the dissent below argued that this absence of limitations suggested that, “if conduct can be considered a breach of duty under both negligence-in-fact and negligence per se, the factual cause of the injuries is somehow increased even though the underlying conduct is the same.” Id.

2019In criticizing what it characterized as the court’s “conclusion that there are ‘no limitations’ on what the jury can consider, including the number and type of specific duties violated,” the dissent below argued that this absence of limitations suggested that, “if conduct can be considered a breach of duty under both negligence-in-fact and negligence per se, the factual cause of the injuries is somehow increased even though the underlying conduct is the same.” Id.

1992For a taxpayer to be granted standing to contest a government action, Biester requires that the taxpayer "allege and prove an interest in the outcome of the suit which surpasses `the common interest of all taxpaying citizens in procuring obedience to the law.'" Id. 487 Pa. at 442 , 409 A.2d at 851 .

1992For a taxpayer to be granted standing to contest a government action, Biester requires that the taxpayer "allege and prove an interest in the outcome of the suit which surpasses `the common interest of all taxpaying citizens in procuring obedience to the law.'" Id. 487 Pa. at 442 , 409 A.2d at 851 .

1981Nevil Estate, supra, 414 Pa. at 129 , 199 A.2d at 423 ; Scott on Trusts, § 414, p. 436 (Rev’d 2d Ed. 1977).

1981Nevil Estate, supra, 414 Pa. at 129 , 199 A.2d at 423 ; Scott on Trusts, § 414, p. 436 (Rev’d 2d Ed. 1977).

1940The terms of the policy in the instant case provided for the payment of the accidental .death benefit in the event “of the death of the insured, resulting directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means.” The effect of this restrictive clause alone in a policy of insurance has been settled in this State by a series of! decisions, *124 of which the leading one is Kelley v. Pittsburgh Casualty Co., 256 Pa. 1 , 100 A. 494 , cited with approval in later cases.

1940The terms of the policy in the instant case provided for the payment of the accidental .death benefit in the event “of the death of the insured, resulting directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means.” The effect of this restrictive clause alone in a policy of insurance has been settled in this State by a series of! decisions, *124 of which the leading one is Kelley v. Pittsburgh Casualty Co., 256 Pa. 1 , 100 A. 494 , cited with approval in later cases.

2014Did the PCRA court err as a matter of law in finding that undisclosed evidence of official threats against and promises to its central witness to secure her testimony was not material where the [PCRA] court applied a more restrictive standard than the governing rule under Brady v. Maryland[, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] simply because [Appellant] raised this due process claim at the PCRA stage rather than on direct appeal? ____________________________________________ 3 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. -7- J-S75014-14 3.

2013In sum, because the trial court misconstrued the restrictive clause, it erroneously held that the choice-of-law provision was applicable to contracts performed in Pennsylvania only. 7 See Summit, 573 Pa. at 645-46 , 828 A.2d at 1000 .

2012The Redington decision also postdates Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.1966), which set forth a less restrictive framework for determining the existence of a private right of action. .

2003Commonwealth v. Haag, 570 Pa. 289 , 809 A.2d 271 , 283 n. 13 (2002) (where appellant did not argue that Article I, Section 9 provided him with greater due process protection, state and federal provisions treated as coextensive); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36 , 764 A.2d 20 , 27 n. 5 (2001) (“While Appellees have suggested that this Court has the ability to construe Article I, Section 9 more broadly than federal due process, they have offered no particular reasons to support such a departure; therefore, we continue to treat the pertinent constitutional guarantees as coterminous for purpose

2003Commonwealth v. Haag, 570 Pa. 289 , 809 A.2d 271 , 283 n. 13 (2002) (where appellant did not argue that Article I, Section 9 provided him with greater due process protection, state and federal provisions treated as coextensive); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36 , 764 A.2d 20 , 27 n. 5 (2001) (“While Appellees have suggested that this Court has the ability to construe Article I, Section 9 more broadly than federal due process, they have offered no particular reasons to support such a departure; therefore, we continue to treat the pertinent constitutional guarantees as coterminous for purpose

2003Commonwealth v. Haag, 570 Pa. 289 , 809 A.2d 271 , 283 n. 13 (2002) (where appellant did not argue that Article I, Section 9 provided him with greater due process protection, state and federal provisions treated as coextensive); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36 , 764 A.2d 20 , 27 n. 5 (2001) (“While Appellees have suggested that this Court has the ability to construe Article I, Section 9 more broadly than federal due process, they have offered no particular reasons to support such a departure; therefore, we continue to treat the pertinent constitutional guarantees as coterminous for purpose

2003Commonwealth v. Haag, 570 Pa. 289 , 809 A.2d 271 , 283 n. 13 (2002) (where appellant did not argue that Article I, Section 9 provided him with greater due process protection, state and federal provisions treated as coextensive); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36 , 764 A.2d 20 , 27 n. 5 (2001) (“While Appellees have suggested that this Court has the ability to construe Article I, Section 9 more broadly than federal due process, they have offered no particular reasons to support such a departure; therefore, we continue to treat the pertinent constitutional guarantees as coterminous for purpose

2001Declining (as unnecessary in the particular case which involved evidence inadmissable under either standard) to adopt in Pennsylva nia the less restrictive standard determined by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert to be mandated in federal jurisprudence by Fed.R.C.P. 702 and refusing to overturn the rule of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

2001Cir. 1923) adopted as this Commonwealth’s governing principle by Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223 , 369 A.2d 1277 (1977). .

2001Cir. 1923) adopted as this Commonwealth’s governing principle by Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223 , 369 A.2d 1277 (1977). .

2000As we have written before, Biester and its progeny “have developed a restrictive standard with narrow exceptions.” Falter, 614 A.2d at 331 .

1998The Superior Court noted that amendments are liberally allowed under Rule 1033 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and, “we see no reason to apply a more restrictive rule merely because the cause of action before the court has come to it upon appeal from an arbitrator’s award.” Furthermore, in Dover v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 318 Pa. Super. 460 , 465 A.2d 644 (1983), our Superior Court allowed a party in an arbitration appeal to raise an issue by a pleading which was filed well beyond the period within which a petition to modify and/or vacate would have been required.

1998The Superior Court noted that amendments are liberally allowed under Rule 1033 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and, “we see no reason to apply a more restrictive rule merely because the cause of action before the court has come to it upon appeal from an arbitrator’s award.” Furthermore, in Dover v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 318 Pa. Super. 460 , 465 A.2d 644 (1983), our Superior Court allowed a party in an arbitration appeal to raise an issue by a pleading which was filed well beyond the period within which a petition to modify and/or vacate would have been required.

1991Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (eschewing the “good faith” exception in search and seizure); Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428 , 586 A.2d 914 (1991) (imposing a more restrictive rule on the use of hearsay); and of course, Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244 , 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (where more realistic voters were forced to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to overrule this Court when it insisted that the right to lie was a precious liberty).

1991Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (eschewing the “good faith” exception in search and seizure); Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428 , 586 A.2d 914 (1991) (imposing a more restrictive rule on the use of hearsay); and of course, Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244 , 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (where more realistic voters were forced to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to overrule this Court when it insisted that the right to lie was a precious liberty).

1991Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (eschewing the “good faith” exception in search and seizure); Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428 , 586 A.2d 914 (1991) (imposing a more restrictive rule on the use of hearsay); and of course, Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244 , 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (where more realistic voters were forced to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to overrule this Court when it insisted that the right to lie was a precious liberty).

1991Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (eschewing the “good faith” exception in search and seizure); Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428 , 586 A.2d 914 (1991) (imposing a more restrictive rule on the use of hearsay); and of course, Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244 , 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (where more realistic voters were forced to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to overrule this Court when it insisted that the right to lie was a precious liberty).

1991Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (eschewing the “good faith” exception in search and seizure); Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428 , 586 A.2d 914 (1991) (imposing a more restrictive rule on the use of hearsay); and of course, Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244 , 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (where more realistic voters were forced to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to overrule this Court when it insisted that the right to lie was a precious liberty).

1991Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (eschewing the “good faith” exception in search and seizure); Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428 , 586 A.2d 914 (1991) (imposing a more restrictive rule on the use of hearsay); and of course, Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244 , 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (where more realistic voters were forced to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to overrule this Court when it insisted that the right to lie was a precious liberty).