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10 Alabama opinions name it 1 courts 1915–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Luv N' Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc.green2 sentences2007Recently, in Luv n' care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir.2006), Judge DeMoss, concurring specially in a holding that the defendant was subject to suit in Louisiana, noted that while he was bound by Fifth Circuit precedent to apply the less restrictive view urged by Justice Brennan in Asahi, he preferred the "stream-of-commerce-plus" approach advocated by Justice O'Connor. 2007Recently, in Luv n’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir.2006), Judge DeMoss, concurring specially in a holding that the defendant was subject to suit in Louisiana, noted that while he was bound by Fifth Circuit precedent to apply the less restrictive view urged by Justice Brennan in Asahi, he preferred the “stream-of-commerce-plus” approach advocated by Justice O’Connor. | 2 | 2 |
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Nielsengreen2 sentences2005If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature must be given effect.'" Blue Cross Blue Shield v. Nielsen , 714 So.2d 293 , 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. 2005If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature must be given effect.'" Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998)(quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden
green
2 sentences1994The trial court based its ruling on Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden , 350 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1977), wherein this Court held that, absent a restrictive clause, "the lessee generally has the right, without consent of the lessor, to assign his interest under the lease, or to sublet the premises, because the law looks with disfavor on restraints on alienation." 350 So.2d at 1037 . 1994The trial court based its ruling on Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden , 350 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1977), wherein this Court held that, absent a restrictive clause, "the lessee generally has the right, without consent of the lessor, to assign his interest under the lease, or to sublet the premises, because the law looks with disfavor on restraints on alienation." 350 So.2d at 1037 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Henry v. White
green
2 sentences1976They also contend that under the rule of construction of Henry v. White, 257 Ala. 549 , 60 So.2d 149 (1952), the first clause in the deed, i. e., the grant of an absolute fee simple, prevails. 1976They also contend that under the rule of construction of Henry v. White, 257 Ala. 549 , 60 So.2d 149 (1952), the first clause in the deed, i. e., the grant of an absolute fee simple, prevails. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Ex parte Miller
neutral
2 sentences1970The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Ex parte Ashton, 231 Ala. 497 , 165 So. 773 , and this court said that: “It was no doubt the intent of the statute to liberalize the restrictive test of the common law, * * But in Ex parte Miller, 273 Ala. 453 , 142 So.2d 910 , and Ex parte Brownlee, 273 Ala. 456 , 142 So.2d 913 , we held that the trial court erred in consolidating trials of two landowners appealing from the same municipal sewer assessment and were represented by the same attorney. 1970The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Ex parte Ashton, 231 Ala. 497 , 165 So. 773 , and this court said that: “It was no doubt the intent of the statute to liberalize the restrictive test of the common law, * * But in Ex parte Miller, 273 Ala. 453 , 142 So.2d 910 , and Ex parte Brownlee, 273 Ala. 456 , 142 So.2d 913 , we held that the trial court erred in consolidating trials of two landowners appealing from the same municipal sewer assessment and were represented by the same attorney. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Ex parte Brownlee
green
2 sentences1970The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Ex parte Ashton, 231 Ala. 497 , 165 So. 773 , and this court said that: “It was no doubt the intent of the statute to liberalize the restrictive test of the common law, * * But in Ex parte Miller, 273 Ala. 453 , 142 So.2d 910 , and Ex parte Brownlee, 273 Ala. 456 , 142 So.2d 913 , we held that the trial court erred in consolidating trials of two landowners appealing from the same municipal sewer assessment and were represented by the same attorney. 1970The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Ex parte Ashton, 231 Ala. 497 , 165 So. 773 , and this court said that: “It was no doubt the intent of the statute to liberalize the restrictive test of the common law, * * But in Ex parte Miller, 273 Ala. 453 , 142 So.2d 910 , and Ex parte Brownlee, 273 Ala. 456 , 142 So.2d 913 , we held that the trial court erred in consolidating trials of two landowners appealing from the same municipal sewer assessment and were represented by the same attorney. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Ex Parte Ashton
green
2 sentences1970The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Ex parte Ashton, 231 Ala. 497 , 165 So. 773 , and this court said that: “It was no doubt the intent of the statute to liberalize the restrictive test of the common law, * * But in Ex parte Miller, 273 Ala. 453 , 142 So.2d 910 , and Ex parte Brownlee, 273 Ala. 456 , 142 So.2d 913 , we held that the trial court erred in consolidating trials of two landowners appealing from the same municipal sewer assessment and were represented by the same attorney. 1970The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Ex parte Ashton, 231 Ala. 497 , 165 So. 773 , and this court said that: “It was no doubt the intent of the statute to liberalize the restrictive test of the common law, * * But in Ex parte Miller, 273 Ala. 453 , 142 So.2d 910 , and Ex parte Brownlee, 273 Ala. 456 , 142 So.2d 913 , we held that the trial court erred in consolidating trials of two landowners appealing from the same municipal sewer assessment and were represented by the same attorney. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Bell v. Jones
green
2 sentences1936In the recent case of Bell v. Jones, Judge, 223 Ala. 497 , 136 So. 826, 829 , there were pending suits in Montgomery and Jefferson counties, founded on a collision on the public highway between the two cities, not within the instant statute, and motion to stay the suits was instituted in Montgomery. 1936In the recent case of Bell v. Jones, Judge, 223 Ala. 497 , 136 So. 826, 829 , there were pending suits in Montgomery and Jefferson counties, founded on a collision on the public highway between the two cities, not within the instant statute, and motion to stay the suits was instituted in Montgomery. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. White
green
2 sentences1927Co. v. White, 175 Ala. 60 , 56 So. 574 ), we are nevertheless persuaded the verdict is so excessive and out of proportion to the damages suffered as to call for the remedial action of this court. 1927Co. v. White, 175 Ala. 60 , 56 So. 574 ), we are nevertheless persuaded the verdict is so excessive and out of proportion to the damages suffered as to call for the remedial action of this court. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Bethea-Starr Packing & Shipping Co. v. Mayben
green
2 sentences1921Section 4298 of the Code of 1907: “Misrepresentation of a material fact, made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and innocently, and acted on by the opposite party, constitutes legal fraud.” See Bethea Co. v. Mayben, 192 Ala. 542 , 68 South. 814 ; Dean v. Brown, 201 Ala. 468 , 78 South. 966 . 1921Section 4298 of the Code of 1907: “Misrepresentation of a material fact, made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and innocently, and acted on by the opposite party, constitutes legal fraud.” See Bethea Co. v. Mayben, 192 Ala. 542 , 68 South. 814 ; Dean v. Brown, 201 Ala. 468 , 78 South. 966 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Dean v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence1921Section 4298 of the Code of 1907: “Misrepresentation of a material fact, made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and innocently, and acted on by the opposite party, constitutes legal fraud.” See Bethea Co. v. Mayben, 192 Ala. 542 , 68 South. 814 ; Dean v. Brown, 201 Ala. 468 , 78 South. 966 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
McCombs v. Stephenson
neutral
1 sentence1915In view of the considerations stated above it is hardly necessary to say that the rule quoted in McOomibs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 116 , 44 South. 867 , from section 837 of Devlin on Deeds, is not applicable in this instance. (6) Our opinion is that, since the subject of the restrictive clause was of an estate in land less than the fee, and was incorporated in the granting clause, it was, in nature, an “exception,” not a “reservation,” as those terms are defined in Frank v. Myers, 97 Ala. 437, 440 , 11 South. 832 ; 13 Cyc. pp. 672-674. (7) So, the application of the exceptioiv, if valid, to the | 1 | 1915–1915 |
James Greenleaf's Lessee v. Birth
green
1 sentence1915In view of the considerations stated above it is hardly necessary to say that the rule quoted in McOomibs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 116 , 44 South. 867 , from section 837 of Devlin on Deeds, is not applicable in this instance. (6) Our opinion is that, since the subject of the restrictive clause was of an estate in land less than the fee, and was incorporated in the granting clause, it was, in nature, an “exception,” not a “reservation,” as those terms are defined in Frank v. Myers, 97 Ala. 437, 440 , 11 South. 832 ; 13 Cyc. pp. 672-674. (7) So, the application of the exceptioiv, if valid, to the | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Frank v. Myers
green
1 sentence1915In view of the considerations stated above it is hardly necessary to say that the rule quoted in McOomibs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 116 , 44 South. 867 , from section 837 of Devlin on Deeds, is not applicable in this instance. (6) Our opinion is that, since the subject of the restrictive clause was of an estate in land less than the fee, and was incorporated in the granting clause, it was, in nature, an “exception,” not a “reservation,” as those terms are defined in Frank v. Myers, 97 Ala. 437, 440 , 11 South. 832 ; 13 Cyc. pp. 672-674. (7) So, the application of the exceptioiv, if valid, to the | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.