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6 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rathke v. MacFarlanegreen1 sentence2004See Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 651-652 (Colo.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Byford v. Town of Ashergreen2 sentences1997In short, the common law has never seen fit to extend its principles of general negligence (as they came to be fashioned in the last century) to govern harm occasioned on the premises of others_ Although questioned in some literature and even repudiated by isolated case-law pronouncements in at least two states, the common-law approach has continued to command our unswerving commitment.” Byford v. Town of Asher, 1994 OK 46 ¶ 5 , 874 P.2d 45, 51 (Opala, J., concurring) (referring to the general negligence approach in premises liability cases as the "California madness”.) 6 . 1997In short, the common law has never seen fit to extend its principles of general negligence (as they came to be fashioned in the last century) to govern harm occasioned on the premises of others_ Although questioned in some literature and even repudiated by isolated case-law pronouncements in at least two states, the common-law approach has continued to command our unswerving commitment.” Byford v. Town of Asher, 1994 OK 46 ¶ 5 , 874 P.2d 45, 51 (Opala, J., concurring) (referring to the general negligence approach in premises liability cases as the "California madness”.) 6 . | 1 | 1 |
Dargusch v. Columbus Bar Ass'ngreen1 sentence1973It also said hostility, vindictiveness or other bad motives alone are not actionable; the subjective state of mind of the publisher though generally a jury issue should not always be, “especially where the issue is recklessness, which is ordinarily inferred from objective facts.”; the court also quoted from Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at p. 92, 86 S.Ct. at p. 679, 15 L.Ed.2d at p. 609, [concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart], “No matter how gross the untruth, the New York Times rule deprives a defamed public official of any hope for legal redress without proof that the lie was a knowing o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Edmondson v. Pearce
green
2 sentences2009(Emphasis added.) "One of the main reasons for the restrictive rule as to when it is appropriate for equity to enjoin pending or threatened prosecution under a criminal statute is based on the separation of powers doctrine, i.e., the judiciary should be relue-tant to unnecessarily interfere in the workings of the other two branches of government, the executive and legislative, in the exercise of their authority/power." Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶ 15 , 91 P.3d 605, 613-614 . 2009(Emphasis added.) "One of the main reasons for the restrictive rule as to when it is appropriate for equity to enjoin pending or threatened prosecution under a criminal statute is based on the separation of powers doctrine, i.e., the judiciary should be relue-tant to unnecessarily interfere in the workings of the other two branches of government, the executive and legislative, in the exercise of their authority/power." Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶ 15 , 91 P.3d 605, 613-614 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State Ex Rel. Hensley v. Eubanks
neutral
2 sentences2004Hensley v. Eubanks, 1962 OK CR 2 , 368 P.2d 253, 255 . ¶ 15 One of the main reasons for the restrictive rule as to when it is appropriate for equity to enjoin pending or threatened prosecution under a criminal statute is based on the separation of powers doctrine, i.e., the judiciary should be reluctant to unnecessarily interfere in the workings of the other two branches of government, the executive and legislative, in the exercise of their authority/power. 2004Hensley v. Eubanks, 1962 OK CR 2 , 368 P.2d 253, 255 . ¶ 15 One of the main reasons for the restrictive rule as to when it is appropriate for equity to enjoin pending or threatened prosecution under a criminal statute is based on the separation of powers doctrine, i.e., the judiciary should be reluctant to unnecessarily interfere in the workings of the other two branches of government, the executive and legislative, in the exercise of their authority/power. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Wright v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1957Wright v. Morgan, 191 U.S. 55 , 24 S.Ct. 6 , 48 L.Ed. 89 ; Sharp v. City of Guthrie, 49 Okl. 213 , 152 P. 403 . 1957Wright v. Morgan, 191 U.S. 55 , 24 S.Ct. 6 , 48 L.Ed. 89 ; Sharp v. City of Guthrie, 49 Okl. 213 , 152 P. 403 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Reichelderfer v. Quinn
green
2 sentences1957Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 60 App. D.C. 325 , 53 F.2d 1079 ; 287 U.S. 315 , 53 S.Ct. 177 , 77 L.Ed. 331 , 83 A.L.R. 1429 . 1957Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 60 App. D.C. 325 , 53 F.2d 1079 ; 287 U.S. 315 , 53 S.Ct. 177 , 77 L.Ed. 331 , 83 A.L.R. 1429 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Bourett v. Herman
neutral
1 sentence1957Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 60 App. D.C. 325 , 53 F.2d 1079 ; 287 U.S. 315 , 53 S.Ct. 177 , 77 L.Ed. 331 , 83 A.L.R. 1429 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Reichelderfer v. Quinn
neutral
1 sentence1957Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 60 App. D.C. 325 , 53 F.2d 1079 ; 287 U.S. 315 , 53 S.Ct. 177 , 77 L.Ed. 331 , 83 A.L.R. 1429 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Harris v. State
green
1 sentence1957Wright v. Morgan, 191 U.S. 55 , 24 S.Ct. 6 , 48 L.Ed. 89 ; Sharp v. City of Guthrie, 49 Okl. 213 , 152 P. 403 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Sharp v. City of Guthrie
green
1 sentence1957Wright v. Morgan, 191 U.S. 55 , 24 S.Ct. 6 , 48 L.Ed. 89 ; Sharp v. City of Guthrie, 49 Okl. 213 , 152 P. 403 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Tidal Oil Co. v. Roelfs
green
2 sentences1930It will be noticed. that the restrictive clause is set off by a comma; that is, a comma appears after the word “property” in the clause, “and resulting from injury to or death of persons and loss or destruction of or damage to property,” and immediately preceding the clause, “* * * caused in any manner by any acts or omissions,” etc. In paragraph 3 of the syllabus in the case of Tidal Oil Co. v. Roelfs, 77 Okla. 183 , 187 Pac. 486 , the following rule is announced: “The rule is that no comma must be placed between restrictive adjuncts or clauses and that which they restrict. 1930It will be noticed. that the restrictive clause is set off by a comma; that is, a comma appears after the word “property” in the clause, “and resulting from injury to or death of persons and loss or destruction of or damage to property,” and immediately preceding the clause, “* * * caused in any manner by any acts or omissions,” etc. In paragraph 3 of the syllabus in the case of Tidal Oil Co. v. Roelfs, 77 Okla. 183 , 187 Pac. 486 , the following rule is announced: “The rule is that no comma must be placed between restrictive adjuncts or clauses and that which they restrict. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.