restrictive requirement in Florida

2004"The theory underlying the more restrictive rule is that appellate review of nonfinal judgments serves to waste court resources and needlessly delays final judgment." Id.

1996The theory underlying the more restrictive rule is that appellate review of nonfinal judgments serves to waste court resources and needlessly delays final judgment." Bruns, 443 So.2d at 961 (emphasis added).

2022The second prong is constitutional, thus, “controlled by United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause and imposes a more restrictive requirement.” Id.

2010Issues of due process and fairness are properly considered in the second prong, which “imposes a more restrictive requirement.” Id. (quoting Exe-cur-Tech Bus.

2024A court can exercise personal jurisdiction only if the foreign [defendant] maintains “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1257 (quoting Execu–Tech Bus.

2024A court can exercise personal jurisdiction only if the foreign corporation maintains “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1257 (quoting Execu–Tech Bus.

2022To satisfy due 7 process, “[a] court can exercise personal jurisdiction only if the foreign corporation maintains ‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

2021Under the second step, assuming the complaint is legally sufficient, the trial court must consider whether a defendant has satisfied “minimum contacts” with Florida such that the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant complies with due process requirements and does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Venetian Salami, 554 So. 2d at 502 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also Astro Aluminum, 296 So. 3d at 466; Johnny’s Pool Super Ctr., Inc. v. Foreverpools Caribbean, LLC, 307 So. 3d 832 , 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (recognizing

2021Ass’n, 181 So. 3d 531, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“Linguistically, ‘a’ refers to ‘any or each’ of a type when used with a subsequent restrictive modifier.”); United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926, 932 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In common terms, when ‘a’ or ‘an’ is followed by a restrictive clause or modifier, this typically signals that the article is being used as a synonym for either ‘any’ or ‘one.’”); Golf Scoring Sys.

2015Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1 (2d ed. 1986); see also United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926, 932 (11th Cir.2015) (“In common terms, when ‘a’ or ‘an’ is followed by a restrictive clause or modifier, this typically .signals that the article is being used as a synonym for either ‘any or ‘one.’”).

2018Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that Florida’s long-arm statute “bestows broad jurisdiction” whereas “United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause . . . imposes a more restrictive requirement.”); cf Modern Principles of Personal Jurisdiction, 4A Fed.

2018Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1215 (Fla. 2010) (“[The Florida Supreme Court has] never construed the first prong of the jurisdiction analysis with a constitutional overlay . . . [i]ssues of due process and fairness are properly considered in the second prong, which imposes a more restrictive requirement.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2017This is the only explanation that reconciles the Lake line of cases with the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous decision in De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1957) discussed later in this opinion. 18 In subsequent decisions, the Florida Supreme Court made clear that this use of common law certiorari was not subject to the restrictive standard often associated with common law certiorari in other contexts: “[a]lthough termed ‘certiorari’ review, review at this level is not discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal.” Fla. Power & Lig

2017In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court made clear that this use of common law certiorari was not subject to the restrictive standard often associated with common law certiorari in other contexts: “[a]lthough termed ‘certiorari’ review, review at this level is not discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 2000).

2021Ass’n, 181 So. 3d 531, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“Linguistically, ‘a’ refers to ‘any or each’ of a type when used with a subsequent restrictive modifier.”); United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926, 932 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In common terms, when ‘a’ or ‘an’ is followed by a restrictive clause or modifier, this typically signals that the article is being used as a synonym for either ‘any’ or ‘one.’”); Golf Scoring Sys.

2021Unlimited, Inc. v. Remedio, 877 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“‘The’ is a definite article ‘used as a function word with a noun modified by an adjective or by an attributive noun to limit the application of the modified noun to that specified by the adjective or the attributive 8 noun’ . . . .

2017Here, the contractual term “medical services” is modified by the restrictive clause “that include performing Mohs surgery.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) (“[A] limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”).

2017Here, the contractual term “medical services” is modified by the restrictive clause “that include performing Mohs surgery.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) (“[A] limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”).

2017This is the only explanation that reconciles the Lake line of cases with the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous decision in De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1957) discussed later in this opinion. 18 In subsequent decisions, the Florida Supreme Court made clear that this use of common law certiorari was not subject to the restrictive standard often associated with common law certiorari in other contexts: “[a]lthough termed ‘certiorari’ review, review at this level is not discretionary but rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal.” Fla. Power & Lig

2014Marina Dodge, Inc. v. Quinn, 134 So.3d 1103, 1105-06 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citations and footnote omitted).

2005The rationale for the less restrictive standard is acknowledgement of the government's misconduct in withholding evidence and the effect that misconduct has on a defendant's right to due process and a fair trial. [7] See, e.g., Thomas v. Kuhlman, 255 F.Supp.2d 99, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2003); Cox v. State, 555 So.2d 352, 352 (Fla.1989). [8] See Roderick Seeman, Japanese Violate U.S. Antitrust Law, The Japan Lawletter (Jan. 1987), available at http://www. japanlaw.info/ lawletter/jan87 /fab.htm. [9] Of course, there are also potential weaknesses in Glenn's story.

2005The rationale for the less restrictive standard is acknowledgement of the government's misconduct in withholding evidence and the effect that misconduct has on a defendant's right to due process and a fair trial. [7] See, e.g., Thomas v. Kuhlman, 255 F.Supp.2d 99, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2003); Cox v. State, 555 So.2d 352, 352 (Fla.1989). [8] See Roderick Seeman, Japanese Violate U.S. Antitrust Law, The Japan Lawletter (Jan. 1987), available at http://www. japanlaw.info/ lawletter/jan87 /fab.htm. [9] Of course, there are also potential weaknesses in Glenn's story.

2005Under this test, a tax exemption is constitutionally permitted only if the use by the private entity "could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds." Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238, 246-48 (Fla.2001) (quoting Roberts, supra, at 1092).

1984See State v. Bastardo, 347 So.2d 463 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).