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12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wilkerson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Scholarship on the issue of adequate provocation reveals that, although the common law largely restricted provocation to four categories (mutual combat, sudden injury, false arrest, and adultery), by the time the Model Penal Code was enacted, this restrictive rule 13 A trial court must “grant the defendant’s request for a charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter if there is any evidence, however slight, to support such a charge.” Wilkerson v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 247 (2) (892 SE2d 737) (2023) (cleaned up). 2024Scholarship on the issue of adequate provocation reveals that, although the common law largely restricted provocation to four categories (mutual combat, sudden injury, false arrest, and adultery), by the time the Model Penal Code was enacted, this restrictive rule 13 A trial court must “grant the defendant’s request for a charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter if there is any evidence, however slight, to support such a charge.” Wilkerson v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 247 (2) (892 SE2d 737) (2023) (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Under our former Evidence Code, “there [was] no requirement that the independent acts be identical to the crime charged; the proper focus is on the similarity, not the differences, between the separate [acts] and the crime in question.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 316 Ga. App. 442, 446 (2) (a) ( 729 SE2d 578 ) (2012). 2015Under our former Evidence Code, “there [was] no requirement that the independent acts be identical to the crime charged; the proper focus is on the similarity, not the differences, between the separate [acts] and the crime in question.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 316 Ga. App. 442, 446 (2) (a) ( 729 SE2d 578 ) (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Keramidas v. Department of Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences2015Nevertheless, in Fowler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,11 this Court overruled a line of cases holding that a superior court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over appeals from workers’ compensation awards that are filed in the wrong venue,12 noting that the restrictive rule expressed in those cases would thwart the compensatory purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.13 Thus, we held in Fowler that a superior court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a workers’ compensation award even if it was filed in the wrong county.14 Based on the foregoing, to the extent that Chandl 2015Nevertheless, in Fowler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,11 this Court overruled a line of cases holding that a superior court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over appeals from workers’ compensation awards that are filed in the wrong venue,12 noting that the restrictive rule expressed in those cases would thwart the compensatory purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.13 Thus, we held in Fowler that a superior court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a workers’ compensation award even if it was filed in the wrong county.14 Based on the foregoing, to the extent that Chandl | 1 | 1 |
Fowler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green2 sentences2015Nevertheless, in Fowler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,11 this Court overruled a line of cases holding that a superior court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over appeals from workers’ compensation awards that are filed in the wrong venue,12 noting that the restrictive rule expressed in those cases would thwart the compensatory purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.13 Thus, we held in Fowler that a superior court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a workers’ compensation award even if it was filed in the wrong county.14 Based on the foregoing, to the extent that Chandl 2015Nevertheless, in Fowler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,11 this Court overruled a line of cases holding that a superior court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over appeals from workers’ compensation awards that are filed in the wrong venue,12 noting that the restrictive rule expressed in those cases would thwart the compensatory purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.13 Thus, we held in Fowler that a superior court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a workers’ compensation award even if it was filed in the wrong county.14 Based on the foregoing, to the extent that Chandl | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Wolfgreen2 sentences2011See Jones, 443 U.S. at 611 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 . [13] In the majority's response to this dissent, no mention was made as to how evidence of the local church's "affiliation" with the national church fits into the tight construct of the neutral principles of law doctrine and how they can rely on it as a matter of law when it is a fact that is in dispute in this case. [14] The local church denied receiving such benefits and, ironically, when the local church argued that as a result the "trust was breached," the Kemp Court stated: "We know of no neutral principle of law that embodies appellants' posit 2011See Jones, 443 U.S. at 611 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 . [13] In the majority's response to this dissent, no mention was made as to how evidence of the local church's "affiliation" with the national church fits into the tight construct of the neutral principles of law doctrine and how they can rely on it as a matter of law when it is a fact that is in dispute in this case. [14] The local church denied receiving such benefits and, ironically, when the local church argued that as a result the "trust was breached," the Kemp Court stated: "We know of no neutral principle of law that embodies appellants' posit | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Furthermore, while the general rule permits admission of evidence establishing the commission of other crimes when such are within the circumstances connected with an accused’s arrest (Wright v. State, 210 Ga. App. 616, 617 ( 436 SE2d 783 )), the trial court imposed a more restrictive standard and did not allow the State to show that police went to Bowen Homes in response to a robbery call or that defendant was arrested because he was a robbery suspect. 1999Furthermore, while the general rule permits admission of evidence establishing the commission of other crimes when such are within the circumstances connected with an accused’s arrest (Wright v. State, 210 Ga. App. 616, 617 ( 436 SE2d 783 )), the trial court imposed a more restrictive standard and did not allow the State to show that police went to Bowen Homes in response to a robbery call or that defendant was arrested because he was a robbery suspect. | 1 | 1 |
Stuckey v. Kahngreen2 sentences1997See generally Stuckey v. Kahn, 140 Ga.App. 602, 606 (1), 231 S.E.2d 565 ). 1997See generally Stuckey v. Kahn, 140 Ga.App. 602, 606 (1), 231 S.E.2d 565 ). | 1 | 1 |
Moss v. Central State Hospitalgreen2 sentences1994Appellee argues that appellant seeks an overly broad construction of the statute which will permit judicial review any time an administrative ruling risks duplication of effort or expense by the licensee and suggests a more restrictive standard from Thomas v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry, 197 Ga. App. 589 ( 398 SE2d 730 ) and predicated upon Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404 ( 339 SE2d 226 ). 1994Appellee argues that appellant seeks an overly broad construction of the statute which will permit judicial review any time an administrative ruling risks duplication of effort or expense by the licensee and suggests a more restrictive standard from Thomas v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry, 197 Ga. App. 589 ( 398 SE2d 730 ) and predicated upon Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404 ( 339 SE2d 226 ). | 1 | 1 |
Nalle v. Quality Inn, Inc.green2 sentences1994See Nalle v. Quality Inn, 183 Ga. App. 119, 120 ( 358 SE2d 281 ); Washington Rd. 1994See Nalle v. Quality Inn, 183 Ga. App. 119, 120 ( 358 SE2d 281 ); Washington Rd. | 1 | 1 |
Leonard v. Benjamingreen2 sentences1989Since statutes are presumed to be enacted with the Legislature’s full knowledge of existing law, including decisions of the courts, Leonard v. Benjamin, 253 Ga. 718, 719 ( 324 SE2d 185 ) (1985), we must conclude that the Legislature intended to vest more discretion in the trial court by setting forth the standard of “good cause” in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 because it did not utilize phrases such as “excusable neglect” or “providential cause,” see OCGA § 9-11-55 (b), which establishes a more restrictive standard. 1989Since statutes are presumed to be enacted with the Legislature’s full knowledge of existing law, including decisions of the courts, Leonard v. Benjamin, 253 Ga. 718, 719 ( 324 SE2d 185 ) (1985), we must conclude that the Legislature intended to vest more discretion in the trial court by setting forth the standard of “good cause” in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 because it did not utilize phrases such as “excusable neglect” or “providential cause,” see OCGA § 9-11-55 (b), which establishes a more restrictive standard. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Glass v. Gates
green
2 sentences2022In advancing this argument, McBrayer makes an untenable connection between the present appeal and Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga. App. 563 ( 716 SE2d 611 ) (2011). 2022In advancing this argument, McBrayer makes an untenable connection between the present appeal and Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga. App. 563 ( 716 SE2d 611 ) (2011). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kemp v. Neal
green
1 sentence2011See Jones, 443 U.S. at 611 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 . [13] In the majority's response to this dissent, no mention was made as to how evidence of the local church's "affiliation" with the national church fits into the tight construct of the neutral principles of law doctrine and how they can rely on it as a matter of law when it is a fact that is in dispute in this case. [14] The local church denied receiving such benefits and, ironically, when the local church argued that as a result the "trust was breached," the Kemp Court stated: "We know of no neutral principle of law that embodies appellants' posit | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Culpepper v. State
green
2 sentences2011See Jones, 443 U.S. at 611 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 . [13] In the majority's response to this dissent, no mention was made as to how evidence of the local church's "affiliation" with the national church fits into the tight construct of the neutral principles of law doctrine and how they can rely on it as a matter of law when it is a fact that is in dispute in this case. [14] The local church denied receiving such benefits and, ironically, when the local church argued that as a result the "trust was breached," the Kemp Court stated: "We know of no neutral principle of law that embodies appellants' posit 2011See Jones, 443 U.S. at 611 , 99 S.Ct. 3020 . [13] In the majority's response to this dissent, no mention was made as to how evidence of the local church's "affiliation" with the national church fits into the tight construct of the neutral principles of law doctrine and how they can rely on it as a matter of law when it is a fact that is in dispute in this case. [14] The local church denied receiving such benefits and, ironically, when the local church argued that as a result the "trust was breached," the Kemp Court stated: "We know of no neutral principle of law that embodies appellants' posit | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Thomas v. Georgia Board of Dentistry
green
2 sentences1994Appellee argues that appellant seeks an overly broad construction of the statute which will permit judicial review any time an administrative ruling risks duplication of effort or expense by the licensee and suggests a more restrictive standard from Thomas v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry, 197 Ga. App. 589 ( 398 SE2d 730 ) and predicated upon Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404 ( 339 SE2d 226 ). 1994Appellee argues that appellant seeks an overly broad construction of the statute which will permit judicial review any time an administrative ruling risks duplication of effort or expense by the licensee and suggests a more restrictive standard from Thomas v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry, 197 Ga. App. 589 ( 398 SE2d 730 ) and predicated upon Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404 ( 339 SE2d 226 ). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Gray v. Plummer
green
1 sentence1981It is necessary, therefore, that we overrule Porter v. Employers Liability Ins., Co., supra; Gerrell v. Jackson, 85 Ga. App. 707 ( 70 SE2d 105 ); Burnett v. Burnett, 87 Ga. App. 322 ( 73 SE2d 569 ); Continental Cas. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Gerrell v. Jackson
neutral
1 sentence1981It is necessary, therefore, that we overrule Porter v. Employers Liability Ins., Co., supra; Gerrell v. Jackson, 85 Ga. App. 707 ( 70 SE2d 105 ); Burnett v. Burnett, 87 Ga. App. 322 ( 73 SE2d 569 ); Continental Cas. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Rivers v. Cole Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1981It is necessary, therefore, that we overrule Porter v. Employers Liability Ins., Co., supra; Gerrell v. Jackson, 85 Ga. App. 707 ( 70 SE2d 105 ); Burnett v. Burnett, 87 Ga. App. 322 ( 73 SE2d 569 ); Continental Cas. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
The DRAGON CORPORATION v. Syphers
green
1 sentence1981It is necessary, therefore, that we overrule Porter v. Employers Liability Ins., Co., supra; Gerrell v. Jackson, 85 Ga. App. 707 ( 70 SE2d 105 ); Burnett v. Burnett, 87 Ga. App. 322 ( 73 SE2d 569 ); Continental Cas. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Smith v. Standard Oil Company
green
2 sentences1976And while some of the earlier decisions have expressed conflicting views on this subject, the issue was resolved in favor of the more restrictive rule in Smith v. Standard Oil Co., 227 Ga. 268 ( 180 SE2d 691 ). [2] Over the strong dissent of Justice (later Chief Justice) Benning M. 1976And while some of the earlier decisions have expressed conflicting views on this subject, the issue was resolved in favor of the more restrictive rule in Smith v. Standard Oil Co., 227 Ga. 268 ( 180 SE2d 691 ). [2] Over the strong dissent of Justice (later Chief Justice) Benning M. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.