restrictive clause in Vermont

2009The decision to grant relief requested by a motion to amend or reconsider is “committed to the court’s sound discretion.” Rubin v. Sterling Enters., 164 Vt. 582, 588 (1996).

2008A motion to reconsider allows the court to modify a decision in order to relieve a party from “the unjust operation of the record resulting from the mistake or inadvertence of the court and not the fault or neglect of a party.” Rubin v. Sterling Enters., 164 Vt. 582, 588 (1996).

2023Police “reasonably believed [defendant] to be armed.” Id. (recognizing that “[d]elay in arrest of an armed felon may well increase danger to the community meanwhile, or to the officers at time of arrest”).

2023Looking to the Dorman factors as a guide, the case involves “a grave offense” and “one that is a crime of violence.” 435 F.2d at 392 (recognizing that “the restrictive requirement for a warrant is more likely to be retained, and the need for proceeding without a warrant found lacking, when the offense is what has been sometimes referred to as one of the ‘complacent’ crimes, like gambling”).

2011See In re Scheiber, 168 Vt. 534, 539 , 724 A.2d 475, 478 (1998) (affirming that private shooting range was not a zoneable structure even when regulations were silent on the subject and zoning ordinance contained a restrictive clause); see also Town of Salem v. Durrett, 480 A.2d 9, 10 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing “the impossibility of providing expressly by zoning ordinance for every possible lawful use”); Tanis v. Twp. of Hampton, 704 A.2d 62, 68 (N.J.

2011See In re Scheiber, 168 Vt. 534, 539 , 724 A.2d 475, 478 (1998) (affirming that private shooting range was not a zoneable structure even when regulations were silent on the subject and zoning ordinance contained a restrictive clause); see also Town of Salem v. Durrett, 480 A.2d 9, 10 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing “the impossibility of providing expressly by zoning ordinance for every possible lawful use”); Tanis v. Twp. of Hampton, 704 A.2d 62, 68 (N.J.

2011See In re Scheiber, 168 Vt. 534, 539 , 724 A.2d 475, 478 (1998) (affirming that private shooting range was not a zoneable structure even when regulations were silent on the subject and zoning ordinance contained a restrictive clause); see also Town of Salem v. Durrett, 480 A.2d 9, 10 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing “the impossibility of providing expressly by zoning ordinance for every possible lawful use”); Tanis v. Twp. of Hampton, 704 A.2d 62, 68 (N.J.

2011See In re Scheiber, 168 Vt. 534, 539 , 724 A.2d 475, 478 (1998) (affirming that private shooting range was not a zoneable structure even when regulations were silent on the subject and zoning ordinance contained a restrictive clause); see also Town of Salem v. Durrett, 480 A.2d 9, 10 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing “the impossibility of providing expressly by zoning ordinance for every possible lawful use”); Tanis v. Twp. of Hampton, 704 A.2d 62, 68 (N.J.

2011See In re Scheiber, 168 Vt. 534, 539 , 724 A.2d 475, 478 (1998) (affirming that private shooting range was not a zoneable structure even when regulations were silent on the subject and zoning ordinance contained a restrictive clause); see also Town of Salem v. Durrett, 480 A.2d 9, 10 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing “the impossibility of providing expressly by zoning ordinance for every possible lawful use”); Tanis v. Twp. of Hampton, 704 A.2d 62, 68 (N.J.

2011See In re Scheiber, 168 Vt. 534, 539 , 724 A.2d 475, 478 (1998) (affirming that private shooting range was not a zoneable structure even when regulations were silent on the subject and zoning ordinance contained a restrictive clause); see also Town of Salem v. Durrett, 480 A.2d 9, 10 (N.H. 1984) (recognizing “the impossibility of providing expressly by zoning ordinance for every possible lawful use”); Tanis v. Twp. of Hampton, 704 A.2d 62, 68 (N.J.