8 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sutton v. Monongahela Power Co.green2 sentences1992In Sutton v. Monongahela Power Co., 151 W.Va. 961, 971 , 158 S.E.2d 98, 104 (1967), we acknowledged that we do not recognize the doctrine of attractive nuisance, [11] but we do have a similar rule for children: "Although the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is not recognized in this State, this Court has adopted a rule quite similar to that Doctrine and has held that where a dangerous instrumentality or condition exists at a place frequented by children who thereby suffer injury, the parties responsible for such dangerous condition may be held liable for such injury if they knew, or should have kn 1992In Sutton v. Monongahela Power Co., 151 W.Va. 961, 971 , 158 S.E.2d 98, 104 (1967), we acknowledged that we do not recognize the doctrine of attractive nuisance, [11] but we do have a similar rule for children: "Although the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is not recognized in this State, this Court has adopted a rule quite similar to that Doctrine and has held that where a dangerous instrumentality or condition exists at a place frequented by children who thereby suffer injury, the parties responsible for such dangerous condition may be held liable for such injury if they knew, or should have kn | 1 | 1 |
Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp.green2 sentences1991In Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp., 506 Pa. 104, 106-107 , 484 A.2d 374, 376 (1984), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the following rule, first stated in its earlier plurality opinion of McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 501 Pa. 93, 101 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983): “ ‘Where there are multiple causes of death and the immediate cause was non-compensable, the requirements of [the workers’ compensation statute] may be met by a showing with unequivocal medical evidence that the deceased suffered from an occupational disease and that it was a substantial, contributing factor 1991In Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp., 506 Pa. 104, 106-107 , 484 A.2d 374, 376 (1984), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the following rule, first stated in its earlier plurality opinion of McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 501 Pa. 93, 101 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983): “ ‘Where there are multiple causes of death and the immediate cause was non-compensable, the requirements of [the workers’ compensation statute] may be met by a showing with unequivocal medical evidence that the deceased suffered from an occupational disease and that it was a substantial, contributing factor | 1 | 1 |
McCloskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences1991In Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp., 506 Pa. 104, 106-107 , 484 A.2d 374, 376 (1984), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the following rule, first stated in its earlier plurality opinion of McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 501 Pa. 93, 101 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983): “ ‘Where there are multiple causes of death and the immediate cause was non-compensable, the requirements of [the workers’ compensation statute] may be met by a showing with unequivocal medical evidence that the deceased suffered from an occupational disease and that it was a substantial, contributing factor 1991In Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp., 506 Pa. 104, 106-107 , 484 A.2d 374, 376 (1984), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the following rule, first stated in its earlier plurality opinion of McCloskey v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 501 Pa. 93, 101 , 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983): “ ‘Where there are multiple causes of death and the immediate cause was non-compensable, the requirements of [the workers’ compensation statute] may be met by a showing with unequivocal medical evidence that the deceased suffered from an occupational disease and that it was a substantial, contributing factor | 1 | 1 |
Hodge v. Sands Manufacturing Companygreen2 sentences1990Co., 151 W.Va. 133, 141 , 150 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1966). 1990Co., 151 W.Va. 133, 141 , 150 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brent v. Board of Trustees of David & Elkins College
green
2 sentences1999To the extent that Brent v. Board of Trustees, 163 W.Va. 390 , 266 S.E.2d 432 (1979), implies a more restrictive standard, it is overruled. 1990To the extent that Brent v. Board of Trustees, 163 W.Va. 390 , 256 S.E.2d 432 (1979), implies a more restrictive standard, it is overruled. 3 In determining the “sufficiency of a corporation’s minimum contacts in a county” (Id.) to demonstrate that it is doing business, we recognized that “the maintenance of an action in the forum ... [should] not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Hodge v. Sands Mfg. | 2 | 1990–1999 |
Morgan v. City of Wheeling
green
1 sentence2022These considerations, however, are not relevant to the constitutional inquiry called for in this case. 16 Morgan v. City of Wheeling, 205 W. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Eastern Marketing Corp. v. Texas Meridian Production Co.
green
1 sentence1999In Eastern Marketing Corporation v. Texas Meridian Production Company, Ltd., 798 F.Supp. 363 (S.D.W.Va.1992), the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia recognized that the minimum contacts test of West Virginia’s jurisdiction statute, and inferentially, of West Virginia’s venue statute, would comport with federal due process requirements where the minimum contacts showed that the defendant had purposely directed its activities at residents of the forum state and that litigation had arisen out of or related to those activities. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gibson v. West Virginia Department of Highways
green
2 sentences1997Dept. of Highways, 185 W.Va. 214 , 406 S.E.2d 440 (1991), we applied a less restrictive test when the vagueness doctrine is raised concerning economic matters. 1997Dept. of Highways, 185 W.Va. 214 , 406 S.E.2d 440 (1991), we applied a less restrictive test when the vagueness doctrine is raised concerning economic matters. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Brent v. BD. OF TRUSTEES, ETC.
green
1 sentence1990To the extent that Brent v. Board of Trustees, 163 W.Va. 390 , 256 S.E.2d 432 (1979), implies a more restrictive standard, it is overruled. 3 In determining the “sufficiency of a corporation’s minimum contacts in a county” (Id.) to demonstrate that it is doing business, we recognized that “the maintenance of an action in the forum ... [should] not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Hodge v. Sands Mfg. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co.
green
2 sentences1990In Hartsock-Flesher, we held: “It is appropriate under the Due Process Clause vagueness doctrine to apply a less restrictive test to statutes or ordinances involving economic matters in which criminal penalties are not at issue.” Id., syl. pt. 3. 1990In Hartsock-Flesher, we held: "It is appropriate under the Due Process Clause vagueness doctrine to apply a less restrictive test to statutes or ordinances involving economic matters in which criminal penalties are not at issue." Id., syl. pt. 3. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.
green
2 sentences1984Furthermore, in a criminal prosecution under the Robinson-Patman Act, where the standard in Section 3 making it unlawful to sell goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying *547 competition or eliminating a competitor” was challenged, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 , reh’g denied, 372 U.S. 961 , 83 S.Ct. 1011 , 10 L.Ed.2d 13 (1963), declined to hold that this language was void for vagueness. 1984Furthermore, in a criminal prosecution under the Robinson-Patman Act, where the standard in Section 3 making it unlawful to sell goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying *547 competition or eliminating a competitor” was challenged, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 , reh’g denied, 372 U.S. 961 , 83 S.Ct. 1011 , 10 L.Ed.2d 13 (1963), declined to hold that this language was void for vagueness. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino
green
1 sentence1984Furthermore, in a criminal prosecution under the Robinson-Patman Act, where the standard in Section 3 making it unlawful to sell goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying *547 competition or eliminating a competitor” was challenged, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 , reh’g denied, 372 U.S. 961 , 83 S.Ct. 1011 , 10 L.Ed.2d 13 (1963), declined to hold that this language was void for vagueness. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
American States Insurance v. Crane Supply Co.
green
1 sentence1984Furthermore, in a criminal prosecution under the Robinson-Patman Act, where the standard in Section 3 making it unlawful to sell goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying *547 competition or eliminating a competitor” was challenged, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 , reh’g denied, 372 U.S. 961 , 83 S.Ct. 1011 , 10 L.Ed.2d 13 (1963), declined to hold that this language was void for vagueness. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.