restrictive rule in Oregon

2016As a result, “a” may simply signal that the specified noun is one of a par- ticular class, whether that class is defined by a subsequent restrictive clause or other modifier, id., or is implied more generally by the context in which the phrase appears.

2016As a result, “a” may simply signal that the specified noun is one of a particular class, whether that class is defined by a subsequent restrictive clause or other modifier, id., or is implied more generally by the context in which the phrase appears.

2015See Bryan Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 888-89 (3rd ed 2011) (describing rule on use of commas to indicate restrictive versus nonrestrictive clauses); cf. Blacknall v. Board *394 of Parole, 348 Or 131, 140 , 229 P3d 595 (2010) (reiterating and applying grammatical principle that a phrase set off by commas functions as parenthetical).

2015See Bryan Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 888-89 (3rd ed 2011) (describing rule on use of commas to indicate restrictive versus nonrestrictive clauses); cf. Blacknall v. Board *394 of Parole, 348 Or 131, 140 , 229 P3d 595 (2010) (reiterating and applying grammatical principle that a phrase set off by commas functions as parenthetical).

1992Therefore, he denied the application. 1 This is the first case of which we are aware in which LUBA’s review was governed by the restrictive standard that the Supreme Court recently devised in Clark v. Jackson County, 313 Or 508 , 836 P2d 710 (1992).

1992Therefore, he denied the application. 1 This is the first case of which we are aware in which LUBA’s review was governed by the restrictive standard that the Supreme Court recently devised in Clark v. Jackson County, 313 Or 508 , 836 P2d 710 (1992).

1972We held, relying on Linkletter and Tehan, supra, that Escobedo would apply only to cases which had not been finally disposed of on the date Escobedo *1152 was decided. [6] After the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, adopted a more restrictive rule, in Escobedo cases we continued to apply our own rule. [7] Recently, however, in State v. Evans, 258 Or. 437 , 483 P.2d 1300 (1971), we conformed our rule in Escobedo cases to that applied by the Supreme Court and overruled our earlier cases.

1972We held, relying on Linkletter and Tehan, supra, that Escobedo would apply only to cases which had not been finally disposed of on the date Escobedo *1152 was decided. [6] After the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, adopted a more restrictive rule, in Escobedo cases we continued to apply our own rule. [7] Recently, however, in State v. Evans, 258 Or. 437 , 483 P.2d 1300 (1971), we conformed our rule in Escobedo cases to that applied by the Supreme Court and overruled our earlier cases.

2006Id. at *156 276, 959 P.2d 49 .

2006Id. at 276 .

2005However, we see nothing in the cases that the state cites — Jackson, 228 Or 371 , D’Autremont, 212 Or 344 ; Johnston, 140 Or 100 , and State v. Hedrick, 233 Or 137 , 377 P2d 325 (1962) — that indicates that this court ever applied the rule for which the state contends.

2005However, we see nothing in the cases that the state cites — Jackson, 228 Or 371 , D’Autremont, 212 Or 344 ; Johnston, 140 Or 100 , and State v. Hedrick, 233 Or 137 , 377 P2d 325 (1962) — that indicates that this court ever applied the rule for which the state contends.

2005However, we see nothing in the cases that the state cites — Jackson, 228 Or 371 , D’Autremont, 212 Or 344 ; Johnston, 140 Or 100 , and State v. Hedrick, 233 Or 137 , 377 P2d 325 (1962) — that indicates that this court ever applied the rule for which the state contends.

2005However, we see nothing in the cases that the state cites — Jackson, 228 Or 371 , D’Autremont, 212 Or 344 ; Johnston, 140 Or 100 , and State v. Hedrick, 233 Or 137 , 377 P2d 325 (1962) — that indicates that this court ever applied the rule for which the state contends.

2005However, we see nothing in the cases that the state cites — Jackson, 228 Or 371 , D’Autremont, 212 Or 344 ; Johnston, 140 Or 100 , and State v. Hedrick, 233 Or 137 , 377 P2d 325 (1962) — that indicates that this court ever applied the rule for which the state contends.

2000See Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260 , 980 P2d 178 , rev dismissed 329 Or 553 (1999); Weidner v. Armenakis, 154 Or App 12 , 959 P2d 623 (1998), withdrawn by order July 13, 1998, reasoning reaffirmed and readopted in Merrill v. Johnson, 155 Or App 295 , 964 P2d 284 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998).

2000See Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260 , 980 P2d 178 , rev dismissed 329 Or 553 (1999); Weidner v. Armenakis, 154 Or App 12 , 959 P2d 623 (1998), withdrawn by order July 13, 1998, reasoning reaffirmed and readopted in Merrill v. Johnson, 155 Or App 295 , 964 P2d 284 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998).

2000See Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260 , 980 P2d 178 , rev dismissed 329 Or 553 (1999); Weidner v. Armenakis, 154 Or App 12 , 959 P2d 623 (1998), withdrawn by order July 13, 1998, reasoning reaffirmed and readopted in Merrill v. Johnson, 155 Or App 295 , 964 P2d 284 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998).

2000See Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or App 260 , 980 P2d 178 , rev dismissed 329 Or 553 (1999); Weidner v. Armenakis, 154 Or App 12 , 959 P2d 623 (1998), withdrawn by order July 13, 1998, reasoning reaffirmed and readopted in Merrill v. Johnson, 155 Or App 295 , 964 P2d 284 , rev den 328 Or 40 (1998).

1993The only Oregon case that has considered whether a sale-leaseback transaction is a security is Bergquist v. International Realty, 272 Or 416 , 537 P2d 553 (1975), in which the court held that a package involving an apartment complex was an investment contract rather than an ordinary commercial transaction.

1993The only Oregon case that has considered whether a sale-leaseback transaction is a security is Bergquist v. International Realty, 272 Or 416 , 537 P2d 553 (1975), in which the court held that a package involving an apartment complex was an investment contract rather than an ordinary commercial transaction.

1988Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213 , 103 S Ct 2317 , 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).

1988Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213 , 103 S Ct 2317 , 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).

1985We said that with "respect to a specific performance of contracts for the sale of land we prefer a less restrictive rule than that announced in dicta in Smith v. Vehrs, supra . " 270 Or. at 10 , 526 P.2d 552 .

1985We said that with “respect to a specific performance of contracts for the sale of land we prefer a less restrictive rule than that announced in dicta in Smith v. Vehrs, supra.” 270 Or at 10 .

1983The Supreme Court of Wisconsin directly confronted the threshold policy limitations in gradual stress mental disability cases in School District No. 1 v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 370 , 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).

1983The Supreme Court of Wisconsin directly confronted the threshold policy limitations in gradual stress mental disability cases in School District No. 1 v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 370 , 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).

1972In Bouge v. Reed, 254 Or. 418 , 459 P.2d 869 (1969) we again had to decide the question of the retroactivity of a federally guaranteed right without the guidance of a Supreme Court determination.

1972In Bouge v. Reed, 254 Or. 418 , 459 P.2d 869 (1969) we again had to decide the question of the retroactivity of a federally guaranteed right without the guidance of a Supreme Court determination.

1958Doubt was cast upon this restrictive rule by the opinion in Grover v. Hawthorne, 62 Or 65, 72-75 , 116 P 100 , 121 P 804 ; and in State v. Donahue, 75 Or 409, 416-417 , 144 P 755 , 147 P 548 , 5 ALR 1121 , it was held that the entry of a nunc pro tunc order for the purpose of amending or correcting the record may be sustained if merely based on the court’s memory or on any competent legal evidence foreign to the record.

1958Doubt was cast upon this restrictive rule by the opinion in Grover v. Hawthorne, 62 Or 65, 72-75 , 116 P 100 , 121 P 804 ; and in State v. Donahue, 75 Or 409, 416-417 , 144 P 755 , 147 P 548 , 5 ALR 1121 , it was held that the entry of a nunc pro tunc order for the purpose of amending or correcting the record may be sustained if merely based on the court’s memory or on any competent legal evidence foreign to the record.

1958Doubt was cast upon this restrictive rule by the opinion in Grover v. Hawthorne, 62 Or 65, 72-75 , 116 P 100 , 121 P 804 ; and in State v. Donahue, 75 Or 409, 416-417 , 144 P 755 , 147 P 548 , 5 ALR 1121 , it was held that the entry of a nunc pro tunc order for the purpose of amending or correcting the record may be sustained if merely based on the court’s memory or on any competent legal evidence foreign to the record.

1958Doubt was cast upon this restrictive rule by the opinion in Grover v. Hawthorne, 62 Or 65, 72-75 , 116 P 100 , 121 P 804 ; and in State v. Donahue, 75 Or 409, 416-417 , 144 P 755 , 147 P 548 , 5 ALR 1121 , it was held that the entry of a nunc pro tunc order for the purpose of amending or correcting the record may be sustained if merely based on the court’s memory or on any competent legal evidence foreign to the record.

1958Doubt was cast upon this restrictive rule by the opinion in Grover v. Hawthorne, 62 Or 65, 72-75 , 116 P 100 , 121 P 804 ; and in State v. Donahue, 75 Or 409, 416-417 , 144 P 755 , 147 P 548 , 5 ALR 1121 , it was held that the entry of a nunc pro tunc order for the purpose of amending or correcting the record may be sustained if merely based on the court’s memory or on any competent legal evidence foreign to the record.

1958See, also, Richey v. Robertson, 86 Or 525, 531-532 , 169 P 99 ; Costello v. Costello, 120 Or 439, 440, 442 , 251 P 303 ; State v. Lillie, 172 Or 194, 204 , 139 P2d 576 .

1958See, also, Richey v. Robertson, 86 Or 525, 531-532 , 169 P 99 ; Costello v. Costello, 120 Or 439, 440, 442 , 251 P 303 ; State v. Lillie, 172 Or 194, 204 , 139 P2d 576 .