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5 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Bishopgreen2 sentences2003In retrospect, we conclude that a more restrictive test is required to preclude “fishing expedition[s] to see what may turn up,” Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 , 71 S.Ct. 675, 679 , 95 L.Ed. 879 (1951), and “unrestrained foray[s] into confidential records in the hope that the unearthing of some unspecified information would enable [the defendant] to impeach the witness.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169 , 617 N.E.2d 990, 997-98 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). 2003In retrospect, we conclude that a more restrictive test is required to preclude “fishing expedition[s] to see what may turn up,” Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 , 71 S.Ct. 675, 679 , 95 L.Ed. 879 (1951), and “unrestrained foray[s] into confidential records in the hope that the unearthing of some unspecified information would enable [the defendant] to impeach the witness.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169 , 617 N.E.2d 990, 997-98 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Brook Village North Associates v. General Electric Company, Re-Entry and Environmental Systems Divisiongreen2 sentences1994See Brook Village N. Assn., et al. v. General Electric Co., 686 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir.1982): “Rule 36 plainly contemplates a more restrictive standard ... once trial has begun.” Further, the conclusive effect of an admission is neither eliminated nor diminished because “a plaintiff presents evidence which overlaps questions controlled by admissions”; neither “default” nor “waive[r] [of] the right to rely on the matters controlled by the admissions” occurs. 1994See Brook Village N. Assn., et al. v. General Electric Co., 686 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir.1982): "Rule 36 plainly contemplates a more restrictive standard . . . once trial has begun." Further, the conclusive effect of an admission is neither eliminated nor diminished because "a plaintiff presents evidence which overlaps questions controlled by admissions"; neither "default" nor "waive[r] [of] the right to rely on the matters controlled by the admissions" occurs. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elat, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
green
1 sentence2012The reasons that induce the restrictive clause have no existence or application after the risk has ceased.” Id. at 505 (quoting Flint Frozen Foods v. Firemen’s Ins. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Flint Frozen Foods v. Firemen's Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2012Co., 12 N.J.Super. 396 , 79 A.2d 739 (Law.Div.1951)). 6 In summary, the courts that have considered this issue have overwhelmingly concluded that once an insured occurrence has transpired, the insured’s claim then ripens into a chose in action, 7 a type of personal property, which, pursuant to fundamental principles of debtor-creditor relationships, may not, ordinarily, be restrained from alienability. 2012Co., 12 N.J.Super. 396 , 79 A.2d 739 (Law.Div.1951)). 6 In summary, the courts that have considered this issue have overwhelmingly concluded that once an insured occurrence has transpired, the insured’s claim then ripens into a chose in action, 7 a type of personal property, which, pursuant to fundamental principles of debtor-creditor relationships, may not, ordinarily, be restrained from alienability. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Eldred v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2005The Barroso opinion departed from the less restrictive standard set forth in Eldred which only required a showing of "articulable evidence that raises a reasonable inquiry of a witness's mental health history.” Eldred, supra, at 702 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences2003In retrospect, we conclude that a more restrictive test is required to preclude “fishing expedition[s] to see what may turn up,” Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 , 71 S.Ct. 675, 679 , 95 L.Ed. 879 (1951), and “unrestrained foray[s] into confidential records in the hope that the unearthing of some unspecified information would enable [the defendant] to impeach the witness.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169 , 617 N.E.2d 990, 997-98 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). 2003In retrospect, we conclude that a more restrictive test is required to preclude “fishing expedition[s] to see what may turn up,” Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 , 71 S.Ct. 675, 679 , 95 L.Ed. 879 (1951), and “unrestrained foray[s] into confidential records in the hope that the unearthing of some unspecified information would enable [the defendant] to impeach the witness.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169 , 617 N.E.2d 990, 997-98 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Henderson v. Mack
green
1 sentence1912The court saying in the course of the opinion: “Thus if an estate be granted to A. in fee simple, and in the habendum to him for life, and thereafter to his heirs generally, this restrictive clause is inoperative, because it contradicts and defeats the grant, unless it can be gathered from the whole» instrument that the grantor intended that the restrictive clause in the habendum should control the granting clause.” In Henderson v. Mack, 82 Ky., 379 , decided before the Batliff case: “The granting clause was ‘do hereby sell, grant and convey to the party of the second part, his heirs and assig | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Bodine's Adm'rs v. Arthur
neutral
1 sentence1912When the intention does not appear, then the words of grant should govern, if repugnant to the habendum of the deed; but if the intention is apparent, then it should govern. ’ ’ In Bodine’s Admr. v. Arthur, 91 Ky., 53 , the granting clause of the deed construed was “have this day given, bargained, sold and conveyed to Hettie E. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.