restrictive standard in Texas

2025“All doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it.” Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1987) (citation omitted).

1999However, two cases have determined there is no meaningful distinction between the statute and the rule announced in Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.1987) that "[a]ll doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it." See Ashcreek Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 902 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Crispin v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 78 , 81 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

1991However, in Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), the Court, when presented with a similar con *307 tention, held that it would “decline his [appellant’s] invitation to attach to Article I, Section 9 of our Texas Constitution a more restrictive standard of protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 798 .

1991However, in Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), the Court, when presented with a similar con *307 tention, held that it would “decline his [appellant’s] invitation to attach to Article I, Section 9 of our Texas Constitution a more restrictive standard of protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 798 .

2015In Johnson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 708, 717-719 (Tex.App.- Dallas 1993, affirmed), the court held that there was no historical or textual basis for affording a defendant greater rights under art. 1, sec. 9 than under the Fourth Amendment. see also Murray v. State, 864 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, pet. ref’d)(no Texas statute or case requires a more restrictive standard of review for … probable cause under art. 1, sec. 9 than under the Fourth Amendment).

1994I, § 9 than under the Fourth Amendment; see also Murray v. State, 864 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, pet. ref'd) (no Texas statute or case requires a more restrictive standard of review for ... probable cause under art.

1999However, two cases have determined there is no meaningful distinction between the statute and the rule announced in Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.1987) that "[a]ll doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it." See Ashcreek Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 902 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Crispin v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 78 , 81 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

1999However, two cases have determined there is no meaningful distinction between the statute and the rule announced in Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.1987) that “[a]ll doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it.” See Ashcreek Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith, 902 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Crispin v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 78 , 81 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

1996Ibid.

1994After writing that the quoted portion of the rule “is a restrictive rule[;] [i]t regulates the extent of the grounds upon which a defendant can appeal,” Jones v. State, 796 S.W.2d at 186 , and that it “is not a jurisdictional prerequisite,” Lemmons v. State, 818 S.W.2d 58 , 63 n. 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), the Court of Criminal Appeals later clarified its writings by holding that compliance with the rule is jurisdictional.

2008See McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 495-96 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 189-90 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2008See McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 495-96 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 189-90 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2021This phrase consists of a broad clause followed by a restrictive clause that begins with “as determined by.” BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE §§ 1.6(a), 10.20 (2d ed. 2006). “[W]here there is a broad and restrictive clause within a statute, the broad clause is limited or controlled by the restrictive one.” Hammond v. City of Dallas, 712 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. 1986) (citing City of Baytown v. Angel, 469 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. Civ.

1986City of Baytown v. Angel, 469 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.).

2010Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 956 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); see Ashcreek Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Smith, 902 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (explaining that Property Code section 202.003 does not does not conflict with doctrine that restrictive covenants be construed either to favor *252 free and unrestricted use of land or against party seeking enforcement).

2009Co. v. First Interstate Bank , 956 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. App--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); see Ashcreek Homeowner's Ass'n v. Smith , 902 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (explaining that Property Code section 202.003 does not does not conflict with doctrine that restrictive covenants be construed either to favor free and unrestricted use of land or against party seeking enforcement).

2022“All doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it.” Id.

1995See Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.1987) (“All doubts *589 must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it.”); Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex.1981).

2018Sebastian relies on the series-qualifier canon, which provides that "when there *39 is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series." Sullivan v. Abraham , 488 S.W.3d 294 , 297 (Tex. 2016).

2018Sebastian relies on the series-qualifier canon, which provides that “when there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.” Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. 2016).

2008She argues that the trial court followed a more restrictive standard in evaluating her breach of fiduciary duty claims than that announced by this Court in Goffney v. Robson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193-94 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied), and followed in our subsequent decisions.

2008She argues that the trial court followed a more restrictive standard in evaluating her breach of fiduciary duty claims than that announced by this Court in Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193-94 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied), and followed in our subsequent decisions.

2008See McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 495-96 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 189-90 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2008See McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 495-96 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 189-90 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

1997Although Texas courts are not bound by Fourth Amendment precedent when interpreting Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), we find no authority requiring a more restrictive standard for reviewing investigative stops, arrests, or probable cause under Article I, § 9 than that required under the Fourth Amendment.

1993Subsequent to Heitman, supra, where the Court of Criminal Appeals drew the distinction between review of Article 1, § 9 and the Fourth Amendment, the court reviewed the standards for investigative stops under Article 1, § 9 by applying the standards of Terry v. Ohio, supra, as adopted by the courts of this *116 state, without an independent review under state law.

1991In Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 , 109 S.Ct. 127 , 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988), “Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of this State, and the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution are, in all material aspects, the same.” The Court again refused to hold that section 9 imposed a more restrictive standard than did the Fourth Amendment.

1991In Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 , 109 S.Ct. 127 , 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988), “Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of this State, and the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution are, in all material aspects, the same.” The Court again refused to hold that section 9 imposed a more restrictive standard than did the Fourth Amendment.

1991In Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 , 109 S.Ct. 127 , 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988), “Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of this State, and the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution are, in all material aspects, the same.” The Court again refused to hold that section 9 imposed a more restrictive standard than did the Fourth Amendment.

1991In Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 , 109 S.Ct. 127 , 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988), “Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of this State, and the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution are, in all material aspects, the same.” The Court again refused to hold that section 9 imposed a more restrictive standard than did the Fourth Amendment.

2021See Phillips, 288 S.W.3d at 880 .

2021This phrase consists of a broad clause followed by a restrictive clause that begins with “as determined by.” BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE §§ 1.6(a), 10.20 (2d ed. 2006). “[W]here there is a broad and restrictive clause within a statute, the broad clause is limited or controlled by the restrictive one.” Hammond v. City of Dallas, 712 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. 1986) (citing City of Baytown v. Angel, 469 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. Civ.

2021App.—Houston [14th Dist.] –9– 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.), and City of West Lake Hills v. Westwood Legal Defense Fund, 598 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. Civ.

2019See Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. Crim.

2016Gannon v. Payne is the foundational case in Texas, drawing from both Laker Airways and Seattle Totems to 6 impose a restrictive standard. 06 Robert Payne and Fred Gannon were partners in an oil and gas venture in Alberta Province.- 7 When Gannon unilaterally reduced Payne's profit share by five percent, Payne sued Gannon in Canada and obtained a judgment that became final6.60 Payne then sued Gannon again in Dallas County, and Gannon filed a parallel claim in Canada seeking a declaration that some of the issues in the Texas suit had been decided in the prior Canadian action."160 Next, Payne ask

2015In Johnson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 708, 717-719 (Tex.App.- Dallas 1993, affirmed), the court held that there was no historical or textual basis for affording a defendant greater rights under art. 1, sec. 9 than under the Fourth Amendment. see also Murray v. State, 864 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, pet. ref’d)(no Texas statute or case requires a more restrictive standard of review for … probable cause under art. 1, sec. 9 than under the Fourth Amendment).

2011See Coker v. Coker , 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) [3] ; s ee also Wheeler v. White , 314 S.W.3d 225 , 229–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding that under certain very limited circumstances [not at issue in this case], a portion of a document could be interpreted even when the remainder of the document was not in evidence); see also Wheeler , 314 S.W.3d at 232–39 (Frost, J., dissenting) (arguing for an even more restrictive rule).

2011See Coker v. Coker , 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) [3] ; s ee also Wheeler v. White , 314 S.W.3d 225 , 229–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding that under certain very limited circumstances [not at issue in this case], a portion of a document could be interpreted even when the remainder of the document was not in evidence); see also Wheeler , 314 S.W.3d at 232–39 (Frost, J., dissenting) (arguing for an even more restrictive rule).