restrictive test in Wisconsin

2016The use of the word "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.356 (9) does not change the proper interpretation of that term in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32 (1bg) and 19.356(2)(a)1. 21 Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶23 . 22 No. 2014AP1853 ¶58 The phrase in Wis. Stat. § 19.356 (9)(a) referring to "a record subject who is an officer or employee of the authority holding a local public office or a state public office" is intended to be read as a restrictive clause modifying the term "record subject."22 Thus, an individual who is not an "employee" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32 (1bg) may still qualify as an "officer or employe

2002The Court declined to apply the more restrictive framework in the Carella concurrence, instead articulating the test for harmless error as "whether it appears `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. at 15 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).

2002The Court declined to apply the more restrictive framework in the Carella concurrence, instead articulating the test for harmless error as "whether it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. at 15 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).

2002The Court declined to apply the more restrictive framework in the Carella concurrence, instead articulating the test for harmless error as "whether it appears `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. at 15 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).

2002The Court declined to apply the more restrictive framework in the Carella concurrence, instead articulating the test for harmless error as "whether it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. at 15 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).

2001It is on this component that a majority of the United States Supreme Court could not agree in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 2 In short, Justice O'Connor, speaking for a plurality of four justices, advocated a more restrictive test, by requiring specific acts by which a defendant purposefully directed its activities toward the forum state, in addition to the defendant's awareness and placement of a product into the stream of commerce.

2001It is on this component that a majority of the United States Supreme Court could not agree in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). [2] In short, Justice O'Connor, speaking for a plurality of four justices, advocated a more restrictive test, by requiring specific acts by which a defendant purposefully directed its activities toward the forum state, in addition to the defendant's awareness and placement of a product into the stream of commerce.

1998Regardless, the court's actual release of certain information in the records reveals that it did not adhere to this restrictive test. 5 Ironically, in State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 386 , 564 N.W.2d 775, 781 (1997), the supreme court cited to State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600 , 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), in support of its standard of review, but only as to the "clearly erroneous" portion of the inquiry. 6 Despite Solberg , we have considered whether we are nonetheless permitted to analyze the issue as one of constitutional law under a de novo approach because decisions of the United S

1998Regardless, the court's actual release of certain information in the records reveals that it did not adhere to this restrictive test. 5 Ironically, in State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 386 , 564 N.W.2d 775, 781 (1997), the supreme court cited to State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600 , 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), in support of its standard of review, but only as to the "clearly erroneous" portion of the inquiry. 6 Despite Solberg , we have considered whether we are nonetheless permitted to analyze the issue as one of constitutional law under a de novo approach because decisions of the United S

1992Saunders, 85 Wis. 2d at 73-74 , 270 N.W.2d at 177 .

1992Saunders, 85 Wis. 2d at 73-74 , 270 N.W.2d at 177 .

1988Id. at 15-16 , 419 N.W.2d at 556 . 3 *9 The injury in the case at bar arose incidental to, and only as a result of, Schachtner’s performance of an integral part of her job as an employee of the Godfrey Company.

1988Id. at 15-16 , 419 N.W.2d at 556 . 3 *9 The injury in the case at bar arose incidental to, and only as a result of, Schachtner’s performance of an integral part of her job as an employee of the Godfrey Company.

1981As stated in Buse v. Smith , 74 Wis.2d 550 , 564 (1976): "[I]t is a fundamental rule that when dealing with the state constitution as contrasted with the federal constitution, the search is not for a grant of power to the legislature, but for a restriction thereon." I find no provision of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibiting the Legislature from paying a claim based upon an employment agreement except as discussed above.

1980In those states, such as Wisconsin, which allow wide-open cross-examination, the federal constitutional question had not been presented prior to the decision of Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), in which it was established that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of freedom from self-incrimination is imposed on the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1979See also City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership Housing, Inc., 73 Cal. App.3d 611 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1977); 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), sec. 3151 [5], and Condemnation Blight and the Abutting Landowner, 73 Mich. Law Rev. 583 (1975). *89 A case closely akin to this case is Kingston East Realty Co. v. State of New Jersey, 133 N.J.

1944Law, 205, 176 Atl. 596 ; . . . 2 Jones on Bonds, etc., sec. 811.” In Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. (8th Cir. 1918) 254 Fed. 560, 569 , the court held that a complaint by a bondholder seeking to foreclose a trust mortgage, in which complaint it was alleged that the trustee had refused to act, that the mortgagor was in default and that the holders of a majority in interest of bonds had conspired to defraud other bondholders and to apply funds properly applicable to bonds to the payment of unsecured indebtedness, stated a cause of action for relief notwithstanding the mortgage provided for fo

1944Law, 205, 176 Atl. 596 ; . . . 2 Jones on Bonds, etc., sec. 811.” In Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. (8th Cir. 1918) 254 Fed. 560, 569 , the court held that a complaint by a bondholder seeking to foreclose a trust mortgage, in which complaint it was alleged that the trustee had refused to act, that the mortgagor was in default and that the holders of a majority in interest of bonds had conspired to defraud other bondholders and to apply funds properly applicable to bonds to the payment of unsecured indebtedness, stated a cause of action for relief notwithstanding the mortgage provided for fo

1936Mueller v. Thompson, supra, employed the words “municipal affairs” instead of “local affairs.” The restrictive clause was that the municipality could not act “in its municipal affairs” in contravention of laws “operative generally throughout the state.” Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the home-rule amendment the legislature adopted an act repealing all special charters and conferring upon cities “all the powers that the legislature could by any possibility confer upon it.” Hack v. Mineral Point (1931), 203 Wis. 215 , 233 N. W. 82 .

1936Mueller v. Thompson, supra, employed the words “municipal affairs” instead of “local affairs.” The restrictive clause was that the municipality could not act “in its municipal affairs” in contravention of laws “operative generally throughout the state.” Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the home-rule amendment the legislature adopted an act repealing all special charters and conferring upon cities “all the powers that the legislature could by any possibility confer upon it.” Hack v. Mineral Point (1931), 203 Wis. 215 , 233 N. W. 82 .