restrictive rule in Maryland

2011Indeed, it “has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.” Id. (quoting Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246 , 213 A.2d 549 (1965)).

2011Indeed, it “has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.” Id. (quoting Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246 , 213 A.2d 549 (1965)).

2011As Chief Judge Krauser observed for this Court in Moore v. Myers, 161 Md.App. 349, 363 , 868 A.2d 954 (2005): “Maryland has adopted a very restrictive rule about granting [motions for judgment] in negligence actions.” Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.App. 408, 423 , 475 A.2d 1243 (1984).

2011As Chief Judge Krauser observed for this Court in Moore v. Myers, 161 Md.App. 349, 363 , 868 A.2d 954 (2005): "Maryland has adopted a very restrictive rule about granting [motions for judgment] in negligence actions." Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.

2000Maryland “has adopted a very restrictive rule about taking cases from the jury in negligence actions.” Campbell v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 73 Md.App. 54, 62 , 533 A.2d 9 (1987).

2000Maryland “has adopted a very restrictive rule about taking cases from the jury in negligence actions.” Campbell v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 73 Md.App. 54, 62 , 533 A.2d 9 (1987).

2011As Chief Judge Krauser observed for this Court in Moore v. Myers, 161 Md.App. 349, 363 , 868 A.2d 954 (2005): "Maryland has adopted a very restrictive rule about granting [motions for judgment] in negligence actions." Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.

2011As Chief Judge Krauser observed for this Court in Moore v. Myers, 161 Md.App. 349, 363 , 868 A.2d 954 (2005): "Maryland has adopted a very restrictive rule about granting [motions for judgment] in negligence actions." Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.

2011Even under the narrower view in Ford Motor, however, we opined that the Consumer Protection Division there did not “change existing law ... of widespread application,” but simply applied the statute to the facts in the case. 304 Md. at 756 , 501 A.2d at 61 .

2011Even under the narrower view in Ford Motor, however, we opined that the Consumer Protection Division there did not “change existing law ... of widespread application,” but simply applied the statute to the facts in the case. 304 Md. at 756 , 501 A.2d at 61 .

2011And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”) We mentioned in Consumer Publishing the more restrictive rule explicated in Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 , 103 S.Ct. 358 , 74 L.Ed.2d 394 (1982), that rulemaking should be required when an agency adopts a new, retrospectively applied, ruling -with widespread application.

2011And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”) We mentioned in Consumer Publishing the more restrictive rule explicated in Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 , 103 S.Ct. 358 , 74 L.Ed.2d 394 (1982), that rulemaking should be required when an agency adopts a new, retrospectively applied, ruling -with widespread application.

2010In reversing the Court of Special Appeals and the trial court, the majority relies upon the following inferences, which were drawn in favor of Henderson, the losing party before the Circuit Court, on his motion to suppress: (1) "From the absence of any explanation for how a person's name gets into the `alert' system, it is reasonable to infer that there are persons whose names got into that system on the basis of utterly unreliable hearsay information"; (2) "based upon what was not testified to by the State's witnesses, although we have no idea how Deputy Ruszala `knows' Petitioner, it is reas

2003The Court in Slacum stated ( 153 Md. at 351 , 138 A. at 248 , emphasis added): *40 “ ‘But to entitle the claimant to compensation, it was essential that there be at least some evidence that her husband died of heat stroke or heat prostration and that such injury was occasioned by some unusual and eoctraordinary condition in his employment not naturally and ordinarily incident thereto and there is no such evidence in this case.’ ” The Slacum opinion cited no case, in Maryland or elsewhere, for the above-quoted statement.

2003The Court in Slacum stated ( 153 Md. at 351 , 138 A. at 248 , emphasis added): *40 “ ‘But to entitle the claimant to compensation, it was essential that there be at least some evidence that her husband died of heat stroke or heat prostration and that such injury was occasioned by some unusual and eoctraordinary condition in his employment not naturally and ordinarily incident thereto and there is no such evidence in this case.’ ” The Slacum opinion cited no case, in Maryland or elsewhere, for the above-quoted statement.

2001The court concluded that because of the restrictive clause the defendant could not rely successfully on the First Amendment to support a challenge to its facial validity, id., and it is this limitation that distinguishes the statute from those harassment statutes that have been declared unconstitutionally broad.

2001The court concluded that because of the restrictive clause the defendant could not rely successfully on the First Amendment to support a challenge to its facial validity, id., and it is this limitation that distinguishes the statute from those harassment statutes that have been declared unconstitutionally broad.

2001In reviewing the legislative history, the Supreme Court in Palermo v. U.S., 360 U.S. 343 , 79 S.Ct. 1217 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 , (1959), determined that paragraph two goes beyond mechanical or stenographic statements, but once beyond that point, a very restrictive standard is to be applied.

2001In reviewing the legislative history, the Supreme Court in Palermo v. U.S., 360 U.S. 343 , 79 S.Ct. 1217 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 , (1959), determined that paragraph two goes beyond mechanical or stenographic statements, but once beyond that point, a very restrictive standard is to be applied.

2001The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903 , 913-914 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 , 100 S.Ct. 451 (1979), held that occasional verbatim recitation of phrases used by the person interviewed are not sufficient to satisfy paragraph two.

2001The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903 , 913-914 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 , 100 S.Ct. 451 (1979), held that occasional verbatim recitation of phrases used by the person interviewed are not sufficient to satisfy paragraph two.

2001The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903 , 913-914 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 , 100 S.Ct. 451 (1979), held that occasional verbatim recitation of phrases used by the person interviewed are not sufficient to satisfy paragraph two.

2001Shack, 658 N.E.2d at 711 (citing People v. Klick, 66 Ill.2d 269 , 5 Ill.Dec. 858 , 362 N.E.2d 329 (1977)).

2001Shack, 658 N.E.2d at 711 (citing People v. Klick, 66 Ill.2d 269 , 5 Ill.Dec. 858 , 362 N.E.2d 329 (1977)).

2000Zent, 86 Md.App. at 767-68 , 587 A.2d 1205 (citing Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509 , 264 A.2d 552 (1969)).

2000Zent, 86 Md.App. at 767-68 , 587 A.2d 1205 (citing Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509 , 264 A.2d 552 (1969)).

2000Zent, 86 Md.App. at 767-68 , 587 A.2d 1205 (citing Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509 , 264 A.2d 552 (1969)).

2000Zent, 86 Md.App. at 767-68 , 587 A.2d 1205 (citing Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509 , 264 A.2d 552 (1969)).

1997A common one applied by some of the courts is that the decision will not be disturbed “absent a definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982) (citing Huff, supra).

1997A common one applied by some of the courts is that the decision will not be disturbed "absent a definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982) (citing Huff supra ).

1995The main reason for applying a deferential standard of review to recorded use restrictions is that “each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed.” Basso, supra, 393 So.2d at 639 . 5 Consequently, in upholding the less restrictive standard, courts have compared recorded condominium use restrictions to restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes.

1995The main reason for applying a deferential standard of review to recorded use restrictions is that “each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed.” Basso, supra, 393 So.2d at 639 . 5 Consequently, in upholding the less restrictive standard, courts have compared recorded condominium use restrictions to restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes.