restrictive analysis in Colorado

2021The division, in turn, issued an opinion remanding the case to the trial court with instructions that that court consider (and make findings regarding) (1) whether allowing the People to present new evidence and arguments on remand would unfairly prejudice Tallent, (2) whether the People were at fault for having failed to preserve their new arguments at the initial suppression hearing, and (3) "any other factor [the court ] deems relevant." Tallent III , ¶¶ 18 , 25, 490 P.3d at 562–63 . ¶43 Although this remand order did no more than seek findings on the very factors that we identified in More

2013Id. at 420 .

2000See also Colwell v. Mentzer Investments, Inc., 973 P.2d 631 (Colo.App.1998) (applying the *850 rules of evidence to expert testimony regarding the effect of stress on multiple selerosis); People v. Fears, 962 P2d 272 (Colo.App.1997) (shoe print examination and identification); People v. Perryman, supra (same).

2000On the other hand, Colorado courts have refused to apply Frye, and instead have analyzed admissibility under the less restrictive test of CRE 702, in those cireumstances such as experience-based knowledge of canine scent tracking, Brooks v. People, supra; testimony regarding the reliability of eye-witness identifications, People v. Campbell, 785 P.2d 158 (Colo.App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo.1991); and rape trauma syndrome testimony, People v. Hampton, supra (applying CRE 702 when the expert testimony was not used to establish that a crime had been committed).

1995Id. at 798 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 2757 -58 n. 6 ("[T]he same degree of tailoring is not required of these [contentneutral] regulations, and least-restrictive-alternative analysis is wholly out of place.").

1995Id. at 798 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 2757 -58 n. 6 ("[T]he same degree of tailoring is not required of these [contentneutral] regulations, and least-restrictive-alternative analysis is wholly out of place.").

1992In People v. Sporleder, supra, our supreme court held that the installation of a pen register on defendant’s telephone violated Colo. Const, art.

1992While a state court may not go below this floor and infringe upon federally guaranteed rights by a more restrictive analysis of its state constitution, a state court has always been free to find in its state constitution great *886 er protections against governmental intrusions than granted by the federal constitution.” See also State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182 , 576 A.2d 793 (1990).

1992While a state court may not go below this floor and infringe upon federally guaranteed rights by a more restrictive analysis of its state constitution, a state court has always been free to find in its state constitution great *886 er protections against governmental intrusions than granted by the federal constitution.” See also State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182 , 576 A.2d 793 (1990).

1990A state court, therefore, “as a matter of its own law,” may impose “greater restrictions on police activity” than the restrictions imposed by the United States Supreme Court under “federal constitutional standards.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. 707 (1983); Sager, Forward: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional L

1990A state court, therefore, “as a matter of its own law,” may impose “greater restrictions on police activity” than the restrictions imposed by the United States Supreme Court under “federal constitutional standards.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 , 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. 707 (1983); Sager, Forward: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional L

1985Beeman v. People, 193 Colo. 337 , 565 P.2d 1340 (1977).

1985Beeman v. People, 193 Colo. 337 , 565 P.2d 1340 (1977).

1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule.

1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule.

1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule.

1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule.

1980United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), provides the analytic framework for determining the scope of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation proceedings.

1980United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), provides the analytic framework for determining the scope of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation proceedings.

1975See City of Colorado Springs v. District Court, Colo., 519 P.2d 325 ; Dillon Companies, Inc. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 515 P.2d 627 ; C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).

1893This rule was recognized in Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 355 , 30 N. E. 741 , and is laid down as an established rule of equity by various text writers.

1893This rule was recognized in Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 355 , 30 N. E. 741 , and is laid down as an established rule of equity by various text writers.