restrictive standard in California

2019(State Farm, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1106–1107.) C.

2019For example, an insurer cannot bring a subrogation action against its own insured. .... [¶] The most restrictive principle is the doctrine of superior equities, which prevents an insurer from recovering against a party whose equities are equal or superior to those of the insurer. ( State Farm , supra , 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1106-1107, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 785 .) *985 C.

2013Typically, “[ljawyer advertising is commercial speech and is accorded an intermediate measure of First Amendment protection.” (Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court (10th Cir. 1997) 106 F.3d 929 , 932; see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (1995) 515 U.S. 618 , 623 *1488 [ 132 L.Ed.2d 541 , 115 S.Ct. 2371 ] (Florida Bar).) Petitioners acknowledge Farrise’s Web site advertises her legal services and thus contains elements of commercial speech.

2013Typically, "[l]awyer advertising is commercial speech and is accorded an intermediate measure of First Amendment protection." (Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court (10th Cir. 1997) 106 F.3d 929 , 932; Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (1995) 515 U.S. 618, 623 (Florida Bar).) Petitioners acknowledge Farrise's website advertises her legal services and thus contains elements of commercial speech.

2007As Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 and other decisions make plain, adhesive contracts of employment present very different policy considerations from the adhesive consumer contract for a service such as a cell phone.

2007As Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 and other decisions make plain, adhesive contracts of employment present very different policy considerations from the adhesive consumer contract for a service such as a cell phone.

1998The court noted the intermediate court had rejected the argument “observing that ‘[tjhose cases all involved claims only for damages resulting from economic loss as opposed to damages based on physical injury. . . . [Cjases involving only economic loss are subject to a more restrictive rule. [Citation.]’ ” (Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1085 .) We find Randi W. does not excuse the plaintiffs in this case from showing actual reliance.

1998The court noted the intermediate court had rejected the argument "observing that `[t]hose cases all involved claims only for damages resulting from economic loss as opposed to damages based on physical injury.... [C]ases involving only economic loss are subject to a more restrictive rule. [Citations.]'" ( Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1085 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 929 P.2d 582 .) We find Randi W. does not excuse the plaintiffs in this case from showing actual reliance.

2025Direct examination on any aspect of an event or transaction ‘opens the door’ to cross-examination on ‘[a]ll relevant and material matters preceding, concurring with, or following’ that testified to on direct. [Citations.]” (Fairbank, supra, ¶ 10:35, italics omitted.) “ ‘Scope of the direct’ includes both the matters the witness actually testified to as well as reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom: ‘He can be cross- examined with respect to facts or denials which are necessarily implied from the testimony in chief, as well as with respect to facts which he expressly states.’ ” (Id.

2022Co., supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1265 .) Several aspects of the policy at issue here suggest that in the policy’s coverage provision, the restrictive clause “that violates a person’s right of privacy” modifies only the word “material,” meaning that, for there to be coverage, the material itself — that is, its informational content — must give rise to the privacy violation.

2022Insured’s Reasonable Expectations and Other Considerations Where, as here, the standard rules of contract interpretation do not resolve an ambiguity in the operative language of an insurance policy, “we interpret [that language] to protect ‘ “the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured.” ’ ” (Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 501 .) As noted above, “[o]nly if these rules do not resolve a claimed ambiguity do we resort to the rule that ambiguities are to be resolved against the insurer.” (Ibid.; see Minkler v. Safeco Ins.

2022Co., supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1265 .) Several aspects of the policy at issue here suggest that in the policy’s coverage provision, the restrictive clause “that violates a person’s right of privacy” modifies only the word “material,” meaning that, for there to be coverage, the material itself — that is, its informational content — must give rise to the privacy violation.

2022Co. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 409, 420 .) Reading the restrictive clause “that violates a person’s right of privacy” as modifying the entire phrase “[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material,” and thus as creating liability coverage for right-of- seclusion violations, might be seen as somewhat unnatural because it is a reading that arguably makes the word “material” superfluous.

2022Co., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 475 .) Yet other aspects of Yahoo!’s policy suggest that in the policy’s coverage provision, the restrictive clause “that violates a person’s right of privacy” modifies the entire phrase “[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material,” thus creating coverage for any publication-based right-of-privacy violation, including right-of-seclusion violations.

2019Subrogation Action for Fire Loss Caused by Negligence of Lessee "In California, courts have held a lessee is not responsible for negligently caused fire damages where the lessor and lessee intended the lessor's fire policy to be for their mutual benefit." ( Hammond , supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 317 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 596 .) The import of this rule is that an *559 insurer may not seek subrogation against an insured's lessee in such cases for a fire he or she negligently causes, even when the elements necessary for subrogation have otherwise been met.

2019Subrogation Action for Fire Loss Caused by Negligence of Lessee "In California, courts have held a lessee is not responsible for negligently caused fire damages where the lessor and lessee intended the lessor's fire policy to be for their mutual benefit." ( Hammond , supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 317 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 596 .) The import of this rule is that an *559 insurer may not seek subrogation against an insured's lessee in such cases for a fire he or she negligently causes, even when the elements necessary for subrogation have otherwise been met.

2012Rep., supra, at p. 1271.) In summary, section 15401 was written specifically to change the restrictive rule adopted in Rosenauer v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at page 304 .

2007Appellant's contention that the court erroneously thought it was ruling on a motion to strike a prior felony conviction under Penal Code section 1385 ( People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 ), which is subject to a more restrictive test than a motion to strike an enhancement under section 667.5, is untenable.

2006Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy Gardner, Inc. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 593 , 602 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] ( Continental ).) The doctrine of superior equities was adopted in California in 1938, in Meyers, supra , 11 Cal.2d 92 , which held a surety on a fidelity bond 6 could not recover from a bank the amount paid to an employer as reimbursement for forged checks written by a bonded employee, where the bank had not participated in the wrongdoing. ( Meyers, supra , at pp. 102-103.) In so holding, the court reasoned: "[T]he right to maintain an action of this kind and to a recovery thereunder involves a

2006Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy Gardner, Inc. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 593 , 602 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] ( Continental ).) The doctrine of superior equities was adopted in California in 1938, in Meyers, supra , 11 Cal.2d 92 , which held a surety on a fidelity bond 6 could not recover from a bank the amount paid to an employer as reimbursement for forged checks written by a bonded employee, where the bank had not participated in the wrongdoing. ( Meyers, supra , at pp. 102-103.) In so holding, the court reasoned: "[T]he right to maintain an action of this kind and to a recovery thereunder involves a

2004There is support for this view of exigency. ( People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 29 , 76 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 453 P.2d 353 ; see also People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 878 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 .) I believe, however, that in the context of drug enforcement cases this restrictive standard has been broadened and proof of exigency lowered by the reasonable suspicion standard of Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 .) California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (d) (Prop.8) requires we use Richards's standard.

2004There is support for this view of exigency. ( People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 29 , 76 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 453 P.2d 353 ; see also People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 878 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 .) I believe, however, that in the context of drug enforcement cases this restrictive standard has been broadened and proof of exigency lowered by the reasonable suspicion standard of Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 .) California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (d) (Prop.8) requires we use Richards's standard.

2003Co. (Tenn. 2002) 71 S.W.3d 691 , 701-702 & fn. 5; see also Note, supra, 46 Hastings L.J. at pp. 629, 632-637; but see Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors, Inc. (Or. 1983) 296 Ore. 208 [675 *1200 P.2d 172, 178-179], mod. on other grounds, 296 Ore. 713 [ 679 P.2d 866 ] [adopting mixed motive test].) In reviewing the record in this case under the predominant motive test, it appears that Husband might well have been able to establish that his conduct here was privileged, even under this more restrictive test.

1998Relations Com’n. (1983) 115 Wis.2d 623 [ 340 N.W.2d 571 ] [an award of attorney fees would be improper absent bad faith after the conclusion of a collective bargaining arbitration]; Sergeant Bluff-Luton v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton (Iowa 1979) 282 N.W.2d 144, 150-151 [applying both the federal attorney’s fee standard and a more restrictive state standard].) Similarly, in Paddack v. Furtick (1986) 78 Or.App. 49 [ 714 P.2d 1068, 1070 ], the Oregon Court of Appeals held, citing Waggoner v. Northwest Excavating, Inc., supra, 642 F.2d at pages 338-339, that the state’s reciprocal attorney’s fee statute

1998Relations Com’n. (1983) 115 Wis.2d 623 [ 340 N.W.2d 571 ] [an award of attorney fees would be improper absent bad faith after the conclusion of a collective bargaining arbitration]; Sergeant Bluff-Luton v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton (Iowa 1979) 282 N.W.2d 144, 150-151 [applying both the federal attorney’s fee standard and a more restrictive state standard].) Similarly, in Paddack v. Furtick (1986) 78 Or.App. 49 [ 714 P.2d 1068, 1070 ], the Oregon Court of Appeals held, citing Waggoner v. Northwest Excavating, Inc., supra, 642 F.2d at pages 338-339, that the state’s reciprocal attorney’s fee statute

1998The Schad majority reasoned that this guarantee is fulfilled so long as the capital jury is given a single noncapital third option, even if the jury was not instructed on other lesser included noncapital offenses also supported by the evidence. ( Id. at pp. 646-648, 111 S.Ct. 2491 .) We have never adopted such a restrictive analysis for purposes of California law. [9] Several of the People's arguments—that the sua sponte rule allows the defendant to "gamble" by remaining silent on instructions, that instructions inconsistent with the defendant's trial theory should not be given, and that couns