uniform rule in Washington

2018The Washington Supreme Court has held in a civil case that "GR 34 provides a uniform standard for determining whether an individual is indigent and further requires the court to waive all fees and costs for individuals who meet this standard." Jafar, 177 Wn.2d at 523 .

2016Mathers cites to Jafar v. Webb, in which the Washington Supreme Court held, “GR 34 provides a uniform standard for determining whether an individual is indigent and further requires the court to waive all fees and costs for individuals who meet this standard.” 177 Wn.2d 520, 523 , 303 P.3d 1042 (2013).

2011We adopted the uniform standard because an examination of other rules connected to CrR 4.2(f) "prevents a court from accepting a plea of guilty until it has ascertained that it was `made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Taylor, 83 Wash.2d at 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (quoting CrR 4.2(d)).

2011We adopted the uniform standard because an examination of other rules connected to CrR 4.2(f) "prevents a court from accepting a plea of guilty until it has ascertained that it was `made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Taylor, 83 Wash.2d at 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (quoting CrR 4.2(d)).

2019Ed. 942 (1955)), “most questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 , 117 S. Ct. 1793 , 138 L.

2019Ed. 942 (1955)), “most questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 , 117 S. Ct. 1793 , 138 L.

2020Id. at 430 .

2020Id. at 430 .

2020App. 239, 243 , 554 P.2d 1084 (1976), that the requirement was satisfied by “a neutral and detached juvenile court judge or commissioner to conduct the proceedings.” Most questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard.

2020App. 239, 243 , 554 P.2d 1084 (1976), that the requirement was satisfied by “a neutral and detached juvenile court judge or commissioner to conduct the proceedings.” Most questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard.

2015Therefore, “although the Coast Guard’s decision not to require propeller guards was undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it does not convey an ‘authoritative’ message of a federal policy against propeller guards.” Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67 . ¶29 Here, in contrast, the Coast Guard has promulgated a uniform standard for exhaust ventilation. 33 C.F.R. § 183.610 establishes a general requirement for ventilation systems, and the Coast Guard has granted personal watercraft an exemption to this requirement due to their unique design.

2015Therefore, "although the Coast Guard's decision not to require propeller guards was undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it does not convey an 'authoritative' message of a federal policy against propeller guards." Sprietsma. 537 U.S. at 67 . -21- No. 73635-3-1/22 Here, in contrast, the Coast Guard has promulgated a uniform standard for exhaust ventilation. 33 C.F.R. § 183.610 establishes a general requirement for ventilation systems, and the Coast Guard has granted personal watercraft an exemption to this requirement due to their unique design.

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor. 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor. 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor. 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor. 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013The motion was addressed to the sound discretion of the court "to be exercised liberally in favor of life and liberty." Following the adoption of CrR 4.2(f), we abandoned the dual standard in favor of a singular, and more stringent, standard of "allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." We adopted the uniform standard because an examination of other rules connected to CrR 4.2(f) "prevents a court from accepting a plea of guilty until it has ascertained 21 State v. McCollum, 88 Wn.

2013The motion was addressed to the sound discretion of the court "to be exercised liberally in favor of life and liberty." Following the adoption of CrR 4.2(f), we abandoned the dual standard in favor of a singular, and more stringent, standard of "allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." We adopted the uniform standard because an examination of other rules connected to CrR 4.2(f) "prevents a court from accepting a plea of guilty until it has ascertained 21 State v. McCollum, 88 Wn.

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

2013App. 977, 981 , 997 P.2d 1235 (1997). 22 State v. Osborne. 102 Wn.2d 87, 97 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984). 23 State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 791 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011); State v. Zhao. 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). 24 State v. Taylor. 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974). 11 No. 68408-6-1/12 that it was 'made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.'" Thus, we felt, there were sufficient safeguards present before a plea was accepted to protect the defendant against involuntary pleas.[25] In State v. Osborne, the c

1950While the fence was probably erected under a mistake of fact as to the true location of the line, we have repeatedly held, although perhaps it is not the uniform rule, that the fact of mistake does not prevent such possession and claim of ownership ripening into title by adverse possession.” (Italics ours.) The court then cited the case of Wissinger v. Reed, 69 Wash. 684 , 125 Pac. 1030 , in which this court, in upholding a claim of title by adverse possession, said: “Respondents’ adverse possession and claim of ownership of all the land up to their fence having continuously existed from April

1950While the fence was probably erected under a mistake of fact as to the true location of the line, we have repeatedly held, although perhaps it is not the uniform rule, that the fact of mistake does not prevent such possession and claim of ownership ripening into title by adverse possession.” (Italics ours.) The court then cited the case of Wissinger v. Reed, 69 Wash. 684 , 125 Pac. 1030 , in which this court, in upholding a claim of title by adverse possession, said: “Respondents’ adverse possession and claim of ownership of all the land up to their fence having continuously existed from April

2016In Russell, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the reasoning in Bennett and exercised its inherent supervisory authority to require a uniform instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that states, in pertinent part, “ ‘A charge is *372 proved beyond a reasonable doubt if, after you have compared and considered all of the evidence, you have in your minds an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is true.’ ” Russell, 23 N.E.3d at 876-78 . 6 WPIC 4.01, at 65 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added) (alterations in original).

2013Otherwise, the WSBA argues, the cases cited by Wickersham do not involve similar misconduct. 6 ¶45 “Proportionate sanctions are those which are ‘ “roughly proportionate to sanctions imposed in similar situations or for analogous levels of culpability.” ’ ” Dynan, 152 Wn.2d at 623 (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell, 141 Wn.2d 593, 615 , 9 P.3d 193 (2000) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gillingham, 126 Wn.2d 454, 469 , 896 P.2d 656 (1995))).

2013Otherwise, the WSBA argues, the cases cited by Wickersham do not involve similar misconduct. 6 ¶45 “Proportionate sanctions are those which are ‘ “roughly proportionate to sanctions imposed in similar situations or for analogous levels of culpability.” ’ ” Dynan, 152 Wn.2d at 623 (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell, 141 Wn.2d 593, 615 , 9 P.3d 193 (2000) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gillingham, 126 Wn.2d 454, 469 , 896 P.2d 656 (1995))).

2013Otherwise, the WSBA argues, the cases cited by Wickersham do not involve similar misconduct. 6 ¶45 “Proportionate sanctions are those which are ‘ “roughly proportionate to sanctions imposed in similar situations or for analogous levels of culpability.” ’ ” Dynan, 152 Wn.2d at 623 (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell, 141 Wn.2d 593, 615 , 9 P.3d 193 (2000) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gillingham, 126 Wn.2d 454, 469 , 896 P.2d 656 (1995))).

2013Otherwise, the WSBA argues, the cases cited by Wickersham do not involve similar misconduct. 6 ¶45 “Proportionate sanctions are those which are ‘ “roughly proportionate to sanctions imposed in similar situations or for analogous levels of culpability.” ’ ” Dynan, 152 Wn.2d at 623 (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell, 141 Wn.2d 593, 615 , 9 P.3d 193 (2000) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gillingham, 126 Wn.2d 454, 469 , 896 P.2d 656 (1995))).

2013Otherwise, the WSBA argues, the cases cited by Wickersham do not involve similar misconduct. 6 ¶45 “Proportionate sanctions are those which are ‘ “roughly proportionate to sanctions imposed in similar situations or for analogous levels of culpability.” ’ ” Dynan, 152 Wn.2d at 623 (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Anschell, 141 Wn.2d 593, 615 , 9 P.3d 193 (2000) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gillingham, 126 Wn.2d 454, 469 , 896 P.2d 656 (1995))).

2001Dredging, 510 U.S. at 447 , 114 S.Ct. 981 ; Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 628 (1st Cir.1994); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wash.2d 64, 84 , 866 P.2d 15 (1993); see also Aubry, 918 F.2d at 1421. [43] Interstate relies solely upon American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir.1995), in which the Second Circuit purported to recognize such a uniform rule.

2001Dredging, 510 U.S. at 447 , 114 S.Ct. 981 ; Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 628 (1st Cir.1994); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wash.2d 64, 84 , 866 P.2d 15 (1993); see also Aubry, 918 F.2d at 1421. [43] Interstate relies solely upon American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir.1995), in which the Second Circuit purported to recognize such a uniform rule.

2001Dredging, 510 U.S. at 447 , 114 S.Ct. 981 ; Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 628 (1st Cir.1994); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wash.2d 64, 84 , 866 P.2d 15 (1993); see also Aubry, 918 F.2d at 1421. [43] Interstate relies solely upon American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir.1995), in which the Second Circuit purported to recognize such a uniform rule.

1988Spokane v. Portch, 92 Wn.2d 342, 348 , 596 P.2d 1044 (1979) (need for a single standard defining obscenity was a factor indicating preemption by implication in the area).

1988Spokane v. Portch, 92 Wn.2d 342, 348 , 596 P.2d 1044 (1979) (need for a single standard defining obscenity was a factor indicating preemption by implication in the area).

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.Ed.2d 387 , 95 S.Ct. 1108 (1975), Jones v. Jones, 270 Ore. 869 , 530 P.2d 34 (1974); Flores v. King, 13 Md.

1978Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115 , 524 P.2d 801 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 , 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 , 43 L.