uniform standard in Connecticut

2023Accordingly, we turn our focus to determine whether the defendant’s actual bias claim satisfies the third prong of Golding. ‘‘A claim of judicial bias is a very serious matter.’’ State v. Carlos C., 165 Conn. App. 195, 206 , 138 A.3d 1090 , cert. denied, 322 Conn. 906 , 140 A.3d 977 (2016). ‘‘The United States Supreme Court consistently has held that a judge’s failure to disqualify himself or herself will implicate the due process clause only when the right to disqualification arises from actual bias on the part of that judge. . . . [M]ost questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear

2023Accordingly, we turn our focus to determine whether the defendant’s actual bias claim satisfies the third prong of Golding. ‘‘A claim of judicial bias is a very serious matter.’’ State v. Carlos C., 165 Conn. App. 195, 206 , 138 A.3d 1090 , cert. denied, 322 Conn. 906 , 140 A.3d 977 (2016). ‘‘The United States Supreme Court consistently has held that a judge’s failure to disqualify himself or herself will implicate the due process clause only when the right to disqualification arises from actual bias on the part of that judge. . . . [M]ost questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear

2023Accordingly, we turn our focus to determine whether the defendant’s actual bias claim satisfies the third prong of Golding. ‘‘A claim of judicial bias is a very serious matter.’’ State v. Carlos C., 165 Conn. App. 195, 206 , 138 A.3d 1090 , cert. denied, 322 Conn. 906 , 140 A.3d 977 (2016). ‘‘The United States Supreme Court consistently has held that a judge’s failure to disqualify himself or herself will implicate the due process clause only when the right to disqualification arises from actual bias on the part of that judge. . . . [M]ost questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear

2023Accordingly, we turn our focus to determine whether the defendant’s actual bias claim satisfies the third prong of Golding. ‘‘A claim of judicial bias is a very serious matter.’’ State v. Carlos C., 165 Conn. App. 195, 206 , 138 A.3d 1090 , cert. denied, 322 Conn. 906 , 140 A.3d 977 (2016). ‘‘The United States Supreme Court consistently has held that a judge’s failure to disqualify himself or herself will implicate the due process clause only when the right to disqualification arises from actual bias on the part of that judge. . . . [M]ost questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear

2018Instead, courts seek to determine the uniform meaning of the clause as a matter of law ...." Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP , supra, 738 F.3d at 436-37 ; see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. , 691 F.2d 1039 , 1048 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Boilerplate provisions are thus not the consequence of the relationship of particular borrowers and lenders and do not depend upon particularized intentions of the parties to an indenture.

2016A uniform standard of clear and convincing evi- dence applies to attorney disciplinary proceedings, ‘‘regardless of the nature of the sanction ultimately imposed.’’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162 , 171–72, 575 A.2d 210 (1990).

2016A uniform standard of clear and convincing evi- dence applies to attorney disciplinary proceedings, ‘‘regardless of the nature of the sanction ultimately imposed.’’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162 , 171–72, 575 A.2d 210 (1990).

2008The tension between this reasoning and this court's uniform presumption in favor of joinder has grown appreciably since this court's decision in State v. King, 187 Conn. 292 , 445 A.2d 901 (1982), wherein the court reconciled a conflict between the statute authorizing joinder of offenses of the "same character"; General Statutes § 54-57; and the rule of practice permitting joinder of dissimilar offenses; Practice Book § 41-19 (formerly § 829); in favor of the rule of practice.

2008The tension between this reasoning and this court's uniform presumption in favor of joinder has grown appreciably since this court's decision in State v. King, 187 Conn. 292 , 445 A.2d 901 (1982), wherein the court reconciled a conflict between the statute authorizing joinder of offenses of the "same character"; General Statutes § 54-57; and the rule of practice permitting joinder of dissimilar offenses; Practice Book § 41-19 (formerly § 829); in favor of the rule of practice.

2006Compare, e.g., Schroder v. Fort Thomas, 412 F.3d 724 , 728 (6th Cir. 2005); Kennedy v. Ridgefield, 411 F.3d 1134 , 1142 (9th Cir. 2005); Christiansen v. Tulsa, supra, 332 F.3d 1281 ; Schieber v. Philadelphia, supra, 320 F.3d 416 -17.

2000I COGNIZABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM We first consider the defendant’s claim that the jury’s verdict should be set aside and judgment rendered for it because, by permitting the adjudication of the plaintiffs claim, the trial court improperly recognized a tort of negligent resident education, which, according to the defendant: (1) previously has been rejected bythis court in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 591-92 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996); and (2) does not satisfy the uniform test that this court articulated in Zamstein v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549, 558 , 692 A.2d 781 (1997)

2000I COGNIZABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM We first consider the defendant’s claim that the jury’s verdict should be set aside and judgment rendered for it because, by permitting the adjudication of the plaintiffs claim, the trial court improperly recognized a tort of negligent resident education, which, according to the defendant: (1) previously has been rejected bythis court in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 591-92 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996); and (2) does not satisfy the uniform test that this court articulated in Zamstein v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549, 558 , 692 A.2d 781 (1997)

2000I COGNIZABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM We first consider the defendant’s claim that the jury’s verdict should be set aside and judgment rendered for it because, by permitting the adjudication of the plaintiffs claim, the trial court improperly recognized a tort of negligent resident education, which, according to the defendant: (1) previously has been rejected bythis court in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 591-92 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996); and (2) does not satisfy the uniform test that this court articulated in Zamstein v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549, 558 , 692 A.2d 781 (1997)

2000I COGNIZABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM We first consider the defendant’s claim that the jury’s verdict should be set aside and judgment rendered for it because, by permitting the adjudication of the plaintiffs claim, the trial court improperly recognized a tort of negligent resident education, which, according to the defendant: (1) previously has been rejected bythis court in Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 591-92 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996); and (2) does not satisfy the uniform test that this court articulated in Zamstein v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549, 558 , 692 A.2d 781 (1997)

1978Indeed, the evidentiary restriction relied upon in Stevens’ Appeal was reiterated in Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, 165 Conn. 478, 486 , 338 A.2d 497 , a case involving an appeal from a probate decree ordering the sale of certain real property.

1978Indeed, the evidentiary restriction relied upon in Stevens’ Appeal was reiterated in Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, 165 Conn. 478, 486 , 338 A.2d 497 , a case involving an appeal from a probate decree ordering the sale of certain real property.

1963If a uniform rule is now to be established, it must be done by that power whose regulations are usually merely prospective.” Even in Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Gilman, supra, 84 , cited by defendant in support of his position, the court recognized in passing that “ ‘diversity of computation’ ” might be justified “ ‘in some few instances, in which long usage may have been different.’ ” This court takes judicial notice of 20 Connecticut Law Journal, No. 8 (Dec. 25, 1962), containing under the heading “Court Calendar,” near the top of page 1, the notation “Wednesday, December 26 —Last day to file w

1957It is, accordingly, a uniform rule that such additional allegations relating to the penalty alone should be incorporated in the information.” Similar language has been used by the court in State v. Delmonto, 110 Conn. 298 , 300: “Since, however, the maximum sentence in the case of an accused who has been twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned is absolutely fixed by the statute and exceeds the maximum for a first offense, fairness requires that the accused should be informed if the State intends to claim the additional penalty because of the prior convictions.

1923Gorelick v. Superior Court, 75 Wash. 239 , 134 Pac. 916 , and prin *443 cipally upon the ground that the State court was exercising a function of the Federal government and as such was a Federal agency, and upon the further' ground that to permit the appeal in the State court while denying it in the Federal court would destroy the uniform rule of naturalization which the Constitution establishes.

1923Gorelick v. Superior Court, 75 Wash. 239 , 134 Pac. 916 , and prin *443 cipally upon the ground that the State court was exercising a function of the Federal government and as such was a Federal agency, and upon the further' ground that to permit the appeal in the State court while denying it in the Federal court would destroy the uniform rule of naturalization which the Constitution establishes.

1921But in State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 698 , 110 Atl. 550 , we further said, on page 705, that in such an information “two separate issues are presented: first, was the de *173 fendant guilty of. the crime charged?

1921But in State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 698 , 110 Atl. 550 , we further said, on page 705, that in such an information “two separate issues are presented: first, was the de *173 fendant guilty of. the crime charged?

1894Allen v. Ranney, 1 Conn., 569 ; Brown v. Green, 7 Conn., 586 ; Fisher v. Towner, 14 Conn., 30 ; Bridgeport v. Eisenman, 47 Conn., 37 . “ In general, arbitrators have full power" to decide upon questions of law and fact, which directly or incidentally arise in considering and deciding the questions embraced in the submission.

1857This principle was fully recognized in Thompson et al. v. Rose, 16 Conn., 71 , and in Gardner v. Preston, 2 Day, 205 ; and it is the uniform doctrine of the books.

1857This principle was fully recognized in Thompson et al. v. Rose, 16 Conn., 71 , and in Gardner v. Preston, 2 Day, 205 ; and it is the uniform doctrine of the books.