14 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1949–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ray v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2004“The uniform rule is that an offer to make a bilateral contract must be accepted precisely according to the terms of the offer.” Id.; see, Ray v. Thomas, 232 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. 1950). 5 Purchasers possessed only the right to accept seller’s offer and had no authority to negotiate or modify its terms. -5- of the Trial Court, and the decision will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless the record reveals a manifest and palpable abuse of discretion. 1953Ray v. Thomas, 191 Tenn. 195, 202, 203 , 232 S. W. (2d) 32 ; Petway *661 v. Loew’s etc. Corp., 22 Tenn. App. 59, 70 , 117 S. W. (2d) 975 . | 2 | 2 |
Bracy v. Gramleygreen2 sentences2019App. 2013). “[M]ost questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). 2019Rather, these questions are “answered by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bensongreen1 sentence2011In State v. Benson, 973 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tenn.1998), we observed that there is “a due process right under the federal constitution to a fair trial before an impartial judge,” and stated that [M]ost questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard. | 1 | 1 |
Adoption of Bowling v. Bowlinggreen1 sentence2005In re Adoption of Bowling, 631 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tenn. 1982). -77- In 1995, this Court noted in O’Daniel that Tennessee lacked a uniform standard for ascertaining whether a biological parent had abandoned his or her child. | 1 | 1 |
Spencer Ex Rel. Spencer v. A-1 Crane Service, Inc.green1 sentence2004Spencer v. A-1 Crane Service, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 938, 944 (Tenn.1994); Otis v. Cambridge Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Arcadian Phosphates, Inc., Judas Azuelos, and Eli Sivan v. Arcadian Corporationgreen1 sentence2004Some courts require that the promise be “definite and unequivocal,” while other courts will allow (continued...) -22- express contract between the parties.” Engenius Entertainment, 971 S.W.2d at 19 (citing Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1989)); United Magazine Co. v. Prudential Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Parsonsgreen1 sentence1997See In Re Adoption of Parsons, 766 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Adoption of Dearinggreen1 sentence1997In Re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). 6 At the time this case came to trial, Tennessee lacked a uniform standard for determining whether a parent has abandoned his or her child.1 We should note that, according to its express provisions, the definition of “abandoned child,” in the version of T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A) applicable at the time of this case, relates to cases where there is an “action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child.” At the time of this case, this had not been extended by amendment or construction to apply when the issue of a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stanley Walker v. Bradley County Government
green
1 sentence2015Whether, the Court would err by declining to apply the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Walker v. Bradley County Government, 2014 WL 1493193 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Associates
green
1 sentence2013We, therefore, hold that the standard to be applied in informed consent cases is whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would have consented to the procedure or treatment in question if adequately informed of all significant perils. [Ashe, 9 S.W.3d at 123-24 ]. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
O'DANIEL v. Messier
green
1 sentence2005O’Daniel, 905 S.W.2d at 186 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Engenius Entertainment, Inc. v. Herenton
green
1 sentence2004Some courts require that the promise be “definite and unequivocal,” while other courts will allow (continued...) -22- express contract between the parties.” Engenius Entertainment, 971 S.W.2d at 19 (citing Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1989)); United Magazine Co. v. Prudential Ins. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Harvey Ex Rel. Harvey v. Mid-Coast Hospital
green
2 sentences2004Harvey, 36 F.Supp.2d at 38 . 2004Harvey, 36 F.Supp.2d at 38 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Amacher v. Brown-Forman Corp.
green
1 sentence2004Amacher, 826 S.W.2d at 482 .12 However, a “claim of promissory estoppel is not dependent upon the existence of an 12 Courts have not reached a uniform standard to determine if the promisor’s words and actions justify the promisee’s reliance. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Comes v. Microsoft Corp.
green
1 sentence2001Similarly, in Comes v. Microsoft, 646 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002), the court determined that Iowa’s harmonization provision did not require Iowa courts to interpret its state antitrust statute the same way as federal courts interpreted federal antitrust statutes, particularly since that provision stated such harmonization “shall not be made in such a way as to constitute a delegation of state authority to the federal government.” The court found the purpose of the provision was to apply a uniform standard of conduct, not to require the state to define who may sue in state courts the same way federa | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Holodook v. Spencer
green
1 sentence1994The court stated that to apply the reasonable parent standard “would be to circumscribe the wide range of discretion a parent ought to have in permitting his child to undertake responsibility and gain independence.” Id. at 871, 324 N.E.2d at 346 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
In re Troutman
neutral
2 sentences1964Matter of Troutman, 24 N.J.Law, 634 ; Taintor v. Taylor, 36 Conn. 242 , 4 Am. 1964Matter of Troutman, 24 N.J.Law, 634 ; Taintor v. Taylor, 36 Conn. 242 , 4 Am. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Raine v. State
green
1 sentence1964In holding that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the circumstances, the Court, at Page 183 of 143 Tenn., at page 194 of 226 S.W., stated: “It is finally, however, insisted by counsel for the defendant that the state, had it attempted so to do, could have secured the defendant from the federal prison and put him to trial in Tennessee on the ground that the comity existing between different sovereignties would have warranted and sanctioned this course. ¥e have been cited to no authority which even by analogy so holds, but the uniform rule with referen | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Taintor v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1964Matter of Troutman, 24 N.J.Law, 634 ; Taintor v. Taylor, 36 Conn. 242 , 4 Am. 1964Matter of Troutman, 24 N.J.Law, 634 ; Taintor v. Taylor, 36 Conn. 242 , 4 Am. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Petway v. Loew's Nashville Knoxville Corporation
green
2 sentences1953Ray v. Thomas, 191 Tenn. 195, 202, 203 , 232 S. W. (2d) 32 ; Petway *661 v. Loew’s etc. Corp., 22 Tenn. App. 59, 70 , 117 S. W. (2d) 975 . 1953Ray v. Thomas, 191 Tenn. 195, 202, 203 , 232 S. W. (2d) 32 ; Petway *661 v. Loew’s etc. Corp., 22 Tenn. App. 59, 70 , 117 S. W. (2d) 975 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Nashville Tobacco Works v. City of Nashville
neutral
1 sentence1949Sealed Power Corporation v. Stokes, 174 Tenn. 493 , 127 S. W. (2d) 114 ; Nashville Tobacco Works v. City of Nashville, 149 Tenn. 551 , 260 S. W. 449 ; Knoxville and Ohio R. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Sealed Power Corp. v. Stokes
green
2 sentences1949Sealed Power Corporation v. Stokes, 174 Tenn. 493 , 127 S. W. (2d) 114 ; Nashville Tobacco Works v. City of Nashville, 149 Tenn. 551 , 260 S. W. 449 ; Knoxville and Ohio R. 1949Sealed Power Corporation v. Stokes, 174 Tenn. 493 , 127 S. W. (2d) 114 ; Nashville Tobacco Works v. City of Nashville, 149 Tenn. 551 , 260 S. W. 449 ; Knoxville and Ohio R. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.