uniform rule in Missouri

1993Regarding the application of statutes the Court stated “the uniform rule is that [statutes] must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.” Lucas, 156 S.W.2d at 690 ; see also Great Southern Sav. and Loan v. Payne, 771 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Mo.App.1989).

1967Municipal Corporations, § 226(16) (b), page 483. ‘In the construction of statutes the uniform rule is that they must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.’ Jamison v. Zausch, 227 Mo. 406 , 126 S.W. 1023, 1027 ; Lucas v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 1078 , 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 .

1986A petition based on published words not defamatory per se may state a cause of action for what is referred to as libel per quod_ However, the petition must allege extrinsic facts which show that although the words published were not libel per se they were in fact defamatory, and it is the uniform rule in Missouri and elsewhere that in such situation special damages must be pleaded in order for the petition to state a cause of action.” 1 (Authorities omitted.) It is not sufficient, to constitute libel, that the writing “tends to provoke [plaintiff] to wrath or expose him to public hatred, conte

1969Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Mo., 370 S.W.2d 341 ; Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, supra, 368 S.W.2d at p. 388 .

1967Municipal Corporations, § 226(16) (b), page 483. ‘In the construction of statutes the uniform rule is that they must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.’ Jamison v. Zausch, 227 Mo. 406 , 126 S.W. 1023, 1027 ; Lucas v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 1078 , 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 .

1967Municipal Corporations, § 226(16) (b), page 483. ‘In the construction of statutes the uniform rule is that they must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.’ Jamison v. Zausch, 227 Mo. 406 , 126 S.W. 1023, 1027 ; Lucas v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 1078 , 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 .

1967Among the Missouri authorities cited were Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo.App. 462 , and Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo.App. 267 .

1896Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462 ; Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 ; Martindale on Abstracts of Title, sec. 185; Warvelle on Abstracts [2 Ed.], sec. 29, p. 653; Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 ; Dundee, etc., Co. v. Hughes, 10 Sawyer, 145; Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass’n, 81 Pa. St. 256; Kohl v. Love, 37 N. J.

1967Among the Missouri authorities cited were Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo.App. 462 , and Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo.App. 267 .

1896Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462 ; Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 ; Martindale on Abstracts of Title, sec. 185; Warvelle on Abstracts [2 Ed.], sec. 29, p. 653; Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 ; Dundee, etc., Co. v. Hughes, 10 Sawyer, 145; Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass’n, 81 Pa. St. 256; Kohl v. Love, 37 N. J.

1910With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute, by a necessary implication, prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 .] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 171 ; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160 .] A passenger i

1903With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and' it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute by necessary implication prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 , and cases cited.] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. loc. cit. 171; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephens v. Smith, 29

1910With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute, by a necessary implication, prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 .] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 171 ; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160 .] A passenger i

1903With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and' it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute by necessary implication prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 , and cases cited.] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. loc. cit. 171; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephens v. Smith, 29

1910With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute, by a necessary implication, prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 .] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 171 ; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160 .] A passenger i

1903With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and' it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute by necessary implication prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 , and cases cited.] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. loc. cit. 171; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephens v. Smith, 29

1904For this reason it is that it has become the uniform rule of this court to defer to the trial court in such matters, and not reverse its action, unless the party assailing that action makes it plainly appear the judicial discretion in that regard has been unsoundly or oppressvely exercised.” [State v. Banks, 118 Mo. 117 , and cases cited.] In view of the extreme improbability of obtaining testimony of the alleged witnesses Warner and Tratell and the still greater improbability of its credibility had it been obtained, we think the trial court committed no error in refusing a continuance on the

1894State v. Banks, 118 Mo. 117 , and eases cited.

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1969Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Mo., 370 S.W.2d 341 ; Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, supra, 368 S.W.2d at p. 388 .

1964However, it has been stated that Supreme Court Rule 27.26 is in substance the same as 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 relating to judgments of federal courts, State v. Thompson, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 133 , and the uniform rule in the federal courts is that the remedy afforded by the federal statute is available *293 “only by an accused who is in custody under a sentence of the court.” 24 C.J.S.

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1963Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric Cooperative, supra; Eby v. Wilson, supra; Furlong v. German-American Press Ass’n, Mo., 189 S.W. 385 ; Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226 , 22 S.W. 358, 724 , 20 L.R.A. 138 ; Curry v. Collins, 37 Mo. 324 ; National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 763 ; McBride v. Crowell-Collier Pub.

1963Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric Cooperative, supra; Eby v. Wilson, supra; Furlong v. German-American Press Ass’n, Mo., 189 S.W. 385 ; Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226 , 22 S.W. 358, 724 , 20 L.R.A. 138 ; Curry v. Collins, 37 Mo. 324 ; National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 763 ; McBride v. Crowell-Collier Pub.

1963Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric Cooperative, supra; Eby v. Wilson, supra; Furlong v. German-American Press Ass’n, Mo., 189 S.W. 385 ; Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226 , 22 S.W. 358, 724 , 20 L.R.A. 138 ; Curry v. Collins, 37 Mo. 324 ; National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 763 ; McBride v. Crowell-Collier Pub.

1963Nordlund v. Consolidated Electric Cooperative, supra; Eby v. Wilson, supra; Furlong v. German-American Press Ass’n, Mo., 189 S.W. 385 ; Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226 , 22 S.W. 358, 724 , 20 L.R.A. 138 ; Curry v. Collins, 37 Mo. 324 ; National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 763 ; McBride v. Crowell-Collier Pub.

1958Co. v. Woermann, 357 Mo. 625 , 210 S.W.2d 26, 31 , wherein this court again approved the quotation from McQuillin on Municipal Corporations quoted in the Caulfield case— "Notwithstanding express power may exist to enact, the ordinance must provide a uniform rule of action; it must contain permanent legal provisions, operating generally and impartially, for its enforcement cannot be left to the will or unregulated discretion of the municipal authorities or any officer of the corporation.” The general rule is also recognized in Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics’ Ins.

1958Co. v. Woermann, 357 Mo. 625 , 210 S.W.2d 26, 31 , wherein this court again approved the quotation from McQuillin on Municipal Corporations quoted in the Caulfield case— "Notwithstanding express power may exist to enact, the ordinance must provide a uniform rule of action; it must contain permanent legal provisions, operating generally and impartially, for its enforcement cannot be left to the will or unregulated discretion of the municipal authorities or any officer of the corporation.” The general rule is also recognized in Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics’ Ins.