uniform rule in Missouri

1993Regarding the application of statutes the Court stated “the uniform rule is that [statutes] must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.” Lucas, 156 S.W.2d at 690 ; see also Great Southern Sav. and Loan v. Payne, 771 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Mo.App.1989).

1967Municipal Corporations, § 226(16) (b), page 483. ‘In the construction of statutes the uniform rule is that they must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.’ Jamison v. Zausch, 227 Mo. 406 , 126 S.W. 1023, 1027 ; Lucas v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 1078 , 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 .

1986A petition based on published words not defamatory per se may state a cause of action for what is referred to as libel per quod_ However, the petition must allege extrinsic facts which show that although the words published were not libel per se they were in fact defamatory, and it is the uniform rule in Missouri and elsewhere that in such situation special damages must be pleaded in order for the petition to state a cause of action.” 1 (Authorities omitted.) It is not sufficient, to constitute libel, that the writing “tends to provoke [plaintiff] to wrath or expose him to public hatred, conte

1969Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Mo., 370 S.W.2d 341 ; Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, supra, 368 S.W.2d at p. 388 .

1967Municipal Corporations, § 226(16) (b), page 483. ‘In the construction of statutes the uniform rule is that they must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.’ Jamison v. Zausch, 227 Mo. 406 , 126 S.W. 1023, 1027 ; Lucas v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 1078 , 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 .

1967Municipal Corporations, § 226(16) (b), page 483. ‘In the construction of statutes the uniform rule is that they must be held to operate prospectively only, unless the intent is clearly expressed that they shall act retrospectively, or the language of the statute admits of no other construction.’ Jamison v. Zausch, 227 Mo. 406 , 126 S.W. 1023, 1027 ; Lucas v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 1078 , 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 .

1967Among the Missouri authorities cited were Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo.App. 462 , and Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo.App. 267 .

1896Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462 ; Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 ; Martindale on Abstracts of Title, sec. 185; Warvelle on Abstracts [2 Ed.], sec. 29, p. 653; Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 ; Dundee, etc., Co. v. Hughes, 10 Sawyer, 145; Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass’n, 81 Pa. St. 256; Kohl v. Love, 37 N. J.

1967Among the Missouri authorities cited were Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo.App. 462 , and Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo.App. 267 .

1896Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462 ; Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 ; Martindale on Abstracts of Title, sec. 185; Warvelle on Abstracts [2 Ed.], sec. 29, p. 653; Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 ; Dundee, etc., Co. v. Hughes, 10 Sawyer, 145; Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass’n, 81 Pa. St. 256; Kohl v. Love, 37 N. J.

1922All these cases were decided upon principles stated in Elkhart v. Murray, supra, and repeated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the case last cited, as follows: ‘If an ordinance is passed ,by a municipal corporation, which, upon its face, restricts the right of dominion which the individual might otherwise exercise without question, not according to any general or uniform rule, but so as to make the absolute enjoyment of his own depend upon the arbitrary will of the governing authorities of the town or city, it is unconstitutional and void, because it fails to furnish a uniform rule of

1922The reason is well expressed by the Supreme Court of Indiana, in Elkhart v. Murray, 165 Ind. 304 , as follows: ‘If an ordinance upon its face restricts the right of dominion which the owner might otherwise exercise without question, not according to any uniform rule, but so as to make the absolute enjoyment of his own depend upon the arbitrary will of the city authorities, it is invalid, because it fails to furnish a uniform rule of action, and leaves the right of property subject to the will of such authorities, who may exercise it so as to give exclusive profits or privileges to particular p

1914In the case of Wooton v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290 ,'a sale was set aside, because there was an agreement among several persons, that one of the number should bid off the land, and the others should refrain from bidding, and then it should be divided between them. [See also Hook v. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 .]” unclean Hands in Equity.

1883Durfee v. Moran, 57 Mo. 374, 379 ; Wooton v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290 ; Hook v. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 ; Lawnin v. Bradley, 13 Mo. App. 361 ; Swan v. Chorpenning, 20 Cal. 182 ; Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592 ; The People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527 ; Atchison v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 149 .

1914In the case of Wooton v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290 ,'a sale was set aside, because there was an agreement among several persons, that one of the number should bid off the land, and the others should refrain from bidding, and then it should be divided between them. [See also Hook v. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 .]” unclean Hands in Equity.

1883Durfee v. Moran, 57 Mo. 374, 379 ; Wooton v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290 ; Hook v. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 ; Lawnin v. Bradley, 13 Mo. App. 361 ; Swan v. Chorpenning, 20 Cal. 182 ; Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592 ; The People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527 ; Atchison v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 149 .

1914Co. v. Brown, 43 Mo. 294 .] Where property is palpably sacrificed, and a valuable estate is acquired for a mere pittance, all the attending circumstances will be closely scrutinized. [Parker v. Railroad, 44 Mo. 415 .] It is now the uniform doctrine that any combination at public or private sale, having the effect of preventing competition in bidding, is against the policy of the law and void.

1874Co., 44 Mo., 415 .) It is now the uniform doctrine that any combination at public or private sale, having the effect of preventing competition in bidding, is against the policy of the law and void.

1910With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute, by a necessary implication, prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 .] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 171 ; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160 .] A passenger i

1903With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and' it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute by necessary implication prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 , and cases cited.] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. loc. cit. 171; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephens v. Smith, 29

1910With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute, by a necessary implication, prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 .] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 171 ; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160 .] A passenger i

1903With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and' it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute by necessary implication prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 , and cases cited.] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. loc. cit. 171; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephens v. Smith, 29

1910With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute, by a necessary implication, prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 .] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 171 ; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160 .] A passenger i

1903With reference to these provisions, our statute is a literal copy of the one in force in the State of Wisconsin, and' it has been uniformly held in that State that such a statute by necessary implication prohibits the forcible ejection of a passenger for refusal to pay his fare, except at the places and in conformity with the other conditions specified in the statute. [Boehm v. Railroad, 65 N. W. 506 , and cases cited.] And such is the uniform doctrine in other States having similar statutes. [Railroad v. Latimer, 128 Ill. loc. cit. 171; Railroad v. Branch, 45 Ark. 524 ; Stephens v. Smith, 29

1904For this reason it is that it has become the uniform rule of this court to defer to the trial court in such matters, and not reverse its action, unless the party assailing that action makes it plainly appear the judicial discretion in that regard has been unsoundly or oppressvely exercised.” [State v. Banks, 118 Mo. 117 , and cases cited.] In view of the extreme improbability of obtaining testimony of the alleged witnesses Warner and Tratell and the still greater improbability of its credibility had it been obtained, we think the trial court committed no error in refusing a continuance on the

1894State v. Banks, 118 Mo. 117 , and eases cited.

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1974To like effect, see also Wooten v. State Compensation Commissioner, 142 W.Va. 501 , 95 S.E.2d 643 [3] (1957); Brembry v. Armour & Company, 250 Iowa 630 , 95 N.W.2d 449 [1] (1959); Associated Transport v. Pusey, 10 Terry, Del., 413, 118 A.2d 362 [1] (Del. 1955); Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436 , 81 A.2d 741 [9] (1951); Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash.2d 71 , 337 P.2d 1062 [1] (1959), and Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J.Super. 225 , 164 A.2d 357 [3] (1960).

1969Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Mo., 370 S.W.2d 341 ; Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, supra, 368 S.W.2d at p. 388 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964However, it has been stated that Supreme Court Rule 27.26 is in substance the same as 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 relating to judgments of federal courts, State v. Thompson, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 133 , and the uniform rule in the federal courts is that the remedy afforded by the federal statute is available *293 “only by an accused who is in custody under a sentence of the court.” 24 C.J.S.

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .

1964Criminal Law § 1606(6), p. 687; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 909 , 4 L.Ed.2d 963 ; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38 , certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 938 , 80 S.Ct. 379 , 4 L.Ed.2d 357 .