uniform standard in Illinois

1986(In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426, 433 .) However, “predictability and fairness require a degree of consistency in the selection of sanctions for similar types of misconduct.” (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 275 .) As such, “where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11 .

1986(In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426, 433 .) However, “where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11 .

1983While a determination of the proper sanction involves analysis of the facts and circumstances of the particular case, “where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11 ; In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293, 302 ; In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276, 283 .

1982“Nevertheless, where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11 , citing In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276, 283 .

1941Bank v. Holmes, supra, it was said: “A court of equity can not intervene in behalf of a taxpayer on the ground that the property of others has been valued too low.” Other cases to the same effect are Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Frary, 22 Ill. 34 ; People v. Lots in Ashley, 122 id. 297; Dunham v. City of Chicago, 55 id. 357; DuPage County v. Jenks, 65 id. 275; People v. Cesar, 349 id. 372.

1932(Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Frary, 22 Ill. 34 ; Schofield v. Watkins, id. 66 ; Merritt v. Farris, id. 303; Munson v. Minor, id. 595; Metz v. Anderson, 23 id. 410; Dunham v. City of Chicago, 55 id. 357; DuPage County v. Jenks, 65 id. 275; Spencer & Gardner v. People, 68 id. 510; People v. Lots in Ashley, 122 id. 297; FirstNat.

2020However, depending on the circumstances, the uniform requirement may be met by showing that the officer wore something other than a “traditional police uniform.” Cavitt, 2019 IL App (2d) 170149, ¶ 181 .

2020Although the Cavitt court noted that the purpose of the uniform requirement was that it ensured that a defendant was fleeing or eluding an actual police officer (Cavitt, 2019 IL App (2d) 170149, ¶ 181 , appeal pending, (Jan. 1, 2020)), the issue of whether a conviction for aggravated fleeing or eluding a peace officer could be upheld with no evidence that the peace officer was wearing a police uniform was not before the Cavitt court.

2018“By complying with the statute, the State demonstrates that reasonably protective measures have been taken to ensure that the blood taken from [the] defendant and tested in the hospital lab was not changed or substituted.” Id. ¶ 85 Initially, defendant argues that, under section 11-501.4(a), a chemical test is inadmissible unless the State shows that it was ordered in accordance “with an established medical rule.” He maintains “the statutory phrase ‘the regular course of providing emergency medical treatment’ - 16 - relates to a uniform standard applicable to emergency medical providers throug

2017"By complying with the statute, the State demonstrates that reasonably protective measures have been taken to ensure that the blood taken from [the] defendant and tested in the hospital lab was not changed or substituted." Id. *1105 ¶ 85 Initially, defendant argues that, under section 11-501.4(a), a chemical test is inadmissible unless the State shows that it was ordered in accordance "with an established medical rule." He maintains "the statutory phrase 'the regular course of providing emergency medical treatment' relates to a uniform standard applicable to emergency medical providers through

2016Indeed, the only uniformity among these states’ tests is that each of them draws on their own state’s pre-existing test for defining bad faith. [Citation.]” Id. at 336 . ¶ 95 I am persuaded by the analysis of Krafft and conclude that the term “bad faith” in section 5 of the Act should be given the preexisting definition of “bad faith” of this state. ¶ 96 Though no Illinois court has previously been asked to interpret “bad faith” within section 5 of the Act, our supreme court in Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541 (2006), had the opportunity to announce a test for determining bad faith in th

2016Indeed, the only uniformity among these states’ tests is that each of them draws on their own state’s pre-existing test for defining bad faith. [Citation.]” Id. at 336 . ¶ 95 I am persuaded by the analysis of Krafft and conclude that the term “bad faith” in section 5 of the Act should be given the preexisting definition of “bad faith” of this state. ¶ 96 Though no Illinois court has previously been asked to interpret “bad faith” within section 5 of the Act, our supreme court in Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541 (2006), had the opportunity to announce a test for determining bad faith in th

2016Indeed, the only uniformity among these states’ tests is that each of them draws on their own state’s pre-existing test for defining bad faith. [Citation.]” Id. at 336 . ¶ 95 I am persuaded by the analysis of Krafft and conclude that the term “bad faith” in section 5 of the Act should be given the preexisting definition of “bad faith” of this state. ¶ 96 Though no Illinois court has previously been asked to interpret “bad faith” within section 5 of the Act, our supreme court in Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541 (2006), had the opportunity to announce a test for determining bad faith in th

2016Indeed, the only uniformity among these states’ tests is that each of them draws on their own state’s pre-existing test for defining bad faith. [Citation.]” Id. at 336 . ¶ 95 I am persuaded by the analysis of Krafft and conclude that the term “bad faith” in section 5 of the Act should be given the preexisting definition of “bad faith” of this state. ¶ 96 Though no Illinois court has previously been asked to interpret “bad faith” within section 5 of the Act, our supreme court in Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541 (2006), had the opportunity to announce a test for determining bad faith in th

2000Any suggested changes or departures from these uniform procedures are subject to final approval from the corporation's princi- pal headquarters in Peoria." Catepillar Tractor Co. , 84 Ill. 2d at 117 .

2000Any suggested changes or departures from these uniform procedures are subject to final approval from the corporation’s principal headquarters in Peoria.” Caterpillar Tractor Co., 84 Ill. 2d at 117 .

2000Kilpatrick , 216 Ill.

2000Kilpatrick, 216 Ill.

1995In Snowden v. Hughes, the United States Supreme Court used as a "familiar example” of the denial of equal protection "the failure of state taxing officials to assess property for taxation on a uniform standard of valuation as required by the assessment laws.” (Snowden, 321 U.S. at 9 , 88 L.

1995In Snowden v. Hughes, the United States Supreme Court used as a "familiar example” of the denial of equal protection "the failure of state taxing officials to assess property for taxation on a uniform standard of valuation as required by the assessment laws.” (Snowden, 321 U.S. at 9 , 88 L.

1986See also In re Enstrom (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 410, 416 ; In re Woldman (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 248, 257-58 .

1986See also In re Enstrom (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 410, 416 ; In re Woldman (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 248, 257-58 .

1986(In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426, 433 .) However, “predictability and fairness require a degree of consistency in the selection of sanctions for similar types of misconduct.” (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 275 .) As such, “where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11 .

1986(In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426, 433 .) However, “where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11 .

1973Cf. People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 , 293 P.2d 57 ; Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 , 116 S.W.2d 1009 ; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 , 97 N.W.2d 16 ; See: Einhorn, The Exclusionary Rule in Operation, 50 J.

1973Cf. People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 , 293 P.2d 57 ; Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 , 116 S.W.2d 1009 ; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 , 97 N.W.2d 16 ; See: Einhorn, The Exclusionary Rule in Operation, 50 J.

1973Cf. People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 , 293 P.2d 57 ; Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 , 116 S.W.2d 1009 ; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 , 97 N.W.2d 16 ; See: Einhorn, The Exclusionary Rule in Operation, 50 J.

1973Cf. People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 , 293 P.2d 57 ; Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 , 116 S.W.2d 1009 ; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 , 97 N.W.2d 16 ; See: Einhorn, The Exclusionary Rule in Operation, 50 J.

1973Cf. People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 , 293 P.2d 57 ; Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 , 116 S.W.2d 1009 ; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 , 97 N.W.2d 16 ; See: Einhorn, The Exclusionary Rule in Operation, 50 J.

1973Cf. People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114 , 293 P.2d 57 ; Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 , 116 S.W.2d 1009 ; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 , 97 N.W.2d 16 ; See: Einhorn, The Exclusionary Rule in Operation, 50 J.

1900The defendants severally answered, denying all the mar terial allegations of the bill as to everything upon which the bill could stand, and without any replication being filed by the complainant the cause was by agreement set down for hearing on the merits, upon bill and answers and upon affidavits in support of the motion to dissolve the injunction. “ When a trial is had upon bill and answer, and no replication is filed, according to the uniform rule of practice in a court of equity, the answer must be considered as true.” Mason v. McGirr, 28 Ill. 322 ; DeWolf v. Long, 2 Gilm. 679 ; Kitchell

1862De Wolf v. Long, 2 Gilm. 682 ; Kitchell v. Burgwin, 21 Ill. 40 .

2022Peterson felt like she 1 The police report provides there were reasonable grounds to believe that Peterson was driving under the influence due to improper lane usage, glossy eyes, odor of an alcoholic beverage, admitting to consuming alcohol, and a portable (preliminary) breath test of 0.121 BAC. 2 For a Breathalyzer test result to be admissible in court, the State must show “(1) the Breathalyzer test was performed according to the uniform standard adopted by the Department of State Police; (2) the operator administering the test was certified by the Department of State Police; (3) the machine

2013Aryainejad, 278 Ill.

2007Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 340 ; Larsen, 323 Ill.

1994(Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 163 .) In order to present results of breath tests for alcohol, the State’s foundation must include: "(1) evidence that the tests were performed according to the uniform standard adopted by the Illinois Department of Public Health, (2) evidence that the operator administering the tests was certified by the Department of Public Health, (3) evidence that the model used was a machine approved by the Department of Health, was tested regularly for accuracy, and was working properly, (4) evidence that the motorist was observed for the requisite 20 minutes prior to the test an

1994People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill.