uniform rule in Wyoming

1982In 1944, we said in Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417 , 154 P.2d 318 , 348: “ ‘There is no power granted by this act to give advisory opinions in moot cases * * * or pass upon contingent or uncertain situations * * Quoting from Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368 , 144 A. 274, 275 . “ ‘It may now be fairly said to be a uniform rule of construction in these states that proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand.’ ” Quoting from Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210 , 249 N.W. 552,

1982In 1944, we said in Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417 , 154 P.2d 318 , 348: “ ‘There is no power granted by this act to give advisory opinions in moot cases * * * or pass upon contingent or uncertain situations * * Quoting from Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368 , 144 A. 274, 275 . “ ‘It may now be fairly said to be a uniform rule of construction in these states that proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand.’ ” Quoting from Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210 , 249 N.W. 552,

1954Jones, 62 Wyo. 61 , 161 P 2d 135 , cited in the mandate in the instant case, as set forth above) this Court pointed out that: “In State v. Kelley et al., 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 P. 886, 889 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, ‘It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., § 163).’” The other cases called to the attention of the District Court by the mandate aforesaid all make it clear that the constitutional question

1954Jones, 62 Wyo. 61 , 161 P 2d 135 , cited in the mandate in the instant case, as set forth above) this Court pointed out that: “In State v. Kelley et al., 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 P. 886, 889 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, ‘It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., § 163).’” The other cases called to the attention of the District Court by the mandate aforesaid all make it clear that the constitutional question

2006Olson, 652 P.2d at 1368 .

1987Similarly, the uniform rule regarding marketability has been explained in an Oregon decision: “A purchaser is not required to accept title which might reasonably be expected to involve litigation. ‘[I]f there is doubt and uncertainty about the title sufficient to form the basis for litigation, * * * it cannot be thrown upon the purchaser to contest that doubt * * Cameron v. Benson, 57 Or.App. 169 , 643 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 295 Or. 98 , 664 P.2d 412 (1983), quoting from Wollenberg v. Rose, 45 Or. 615 , 78 P. 751 (1904).

1987Similarly, the uniform rule regarding marketability has been explained in an Oregon decision: “A purchaser is not required to accept title which might reasonably be expected to involve litigation. ‘[I]f there is doubt and uncertainty about the title sufficient to form the basis for litigation, * * * it cannot be thrown upon the purchaser to contest that doubt * * Cameron v. Benson, 57 Or.App. 169 , 643 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 295 Or. 98 , 664 P.2d 412 (1983), quoting from Wollenberg v. Rose, 45 Or. 615 , 78 P. 751 (1904).

1987See also Medallion Homes, Inc*, v. Ther-mar Investments, Inc., Texas App., 698 S.W.2d 400 , (1985); and Glaser v. Minnesota Federal Savings and Loan Association, Minn.App., 389 N.W.2d 763 (1986).

1987Similarly, the uniform rule regarding marketability has been explained in an Oregon decision: “A purchaser is not required to accept title which might reasonably be expected to involve litigation. ‘[I]f there is doubt and uncertainty about the title sufficient to form the basis for litigation, * * * it cannot be thrown upon the purchaser to contest that doubt * * Cameron v. Benson, 57 Or.App. 169 , 643 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 295 Or. 98 , 664 P.2d 412 (1983), quoting from Wollenberg v. Rose, 45 Or. 615 , 78 P. 751 (1904).

1987Similarly, the uniform rule regarding marketability has been explained in an Oregon decision: “A purchaser is not required to accept title which might reasonably be expected to involve litigation. ‘[I]f there is doubt and uncertainty about the title sufficient to form the basis for litigation, * * * it cannot be thrown upon the purchaser to contest that doubt * * Cameron v. Benson, 57 Or.App. 169 , 643 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 295 Or. 98 , 664 P.2d 412 (1983), quoting from Wollenberg v. Rose, 45 Or. 615 , 78 P. 751 (1904).

1984Appellant relies upon State v. Brown, Mo., 547 S.W.2d 797 (1977), but with all due respect to our brothers on the Supreme Court of Missouri we decline to follow that rule.

1984Appellant relies upon State v. Brown, Mo., 547 S.W.2d 797 (1977), but with all due respect to our brothers on the Supreme Court of Missouri we decline to follow that rule.

1982In 1944, we said in Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417 , 154 P.2d 318 , 348: “ ‘There is no power granted by this act to give advisory opinions in moot cases * * * or pass upon contingent or uncertain situations * * Quoting from Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368 , 144 A. 274, 275 . “ ‘It may now be fairly said to be a uniform rule of construction in these states that proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand.’ ” Quoting from Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210 , 249 N.W. 552,

1982In 1944, we said in Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417 , 154 P.2d 318 , 348: “ ‘There is no power granted by this act to give advisory opinions in moot cases * * * or pass upon contingent or uncertain situations * * Quoting from Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368 , 144 A. 274, 275 . “ ‘It may now be fairly said to be a uniform rule of construction in these states that proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand.’ ” Quoting from Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210 , 249 N.W. 552,

1982See Wyoming Humane Society v. Port, Wyo., 404 P.2d 834 (1965); Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Hallmark Insurance Company, Wyo., 561 P.2d 706 (1977); City of Cheyenne v. Sims, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1347 (1974).

1982See Wyoming Humane Society v. Port, Wyo., 404 P.2d 834 (1965); Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Hallmark Insurance Company, Wyo., 561 P.2d 706 (1977); City of Cheyenne v. Sims, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1347 (1974).

1982In 1944, we said in Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417 , 154 P.2d 318 , 348: “ ‘There is no power granted by this act to give advisory opinions in moot cases * * * or pass upon contingent or uncertain situations * * Quoting from Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368 , 144 A. 274, 275 . “ ‘It may now be fairly said to be a uniform rule of construction in these states that proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand.’ ” Quoting from Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210 , 249 N.W. 552,

1982In 1944, we said in Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417 , 154 P.2d 318 , 348: “ ‘There is no power granted by this act to give advisory opinions in moot cases * * * or pass upon contingent or uncertain situations * * Quoting from Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368 , 144 A. 274, 275 . “ ‘It may now be fairly said to be a uniform rule of construction in these states that proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand.’ ” Quoting from Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210 , 249 N.W. 552,

1972Wyoming, since territorial days, has had statutes that prohibit unauthorized contact with jurors, and recently the district courts of Wyoming adopted a uniform rule to ensure that jurors would not be contacted by counsel even following the rendition of their verdict. [2] An annotation in 9 A.L.R.3d 1275 , 1282, lists Wyoming as one of the several states which follow the view that: "* * * an improper communication between a juror and a witness in a criminal trial is rebuttably presumed prejudicial to defendant and that once shown to have taken place, the burden is on the prosecution to demonstr

1972Wyoming, since territorial days, has had statutes that prohibit unauthorized contact with jurors, and recently the district courts of Wyoming adopted a uniform rule to ensure that jurors would not be contacted by counsel even following the rendition of their verdict. [2] An annotation in 9 A.L.R.3d 1275 , 1282, lists Wyoming as one of the several states which follow the view that: "* * * an improper communication between a juror and a witness in a criminal trial is rebuttably presumed prejudicial to defendant and that once shown to have taken place, the burden is on the prosecution to demonstr

1956Both of these contesting parties having received their respective, titles from a common source, that is to say, from The Mill Iron Cattle Company, the rule to be followed seems best stated in the following excerpt from Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 385, 390 , an action in ejectment, to wit: “But it is an uniform principle of ejectment that if both parties claim title from the same source, it is treated for all the purposes of the case that title resided in that source; each party is estopped from denying it; and so far as respects that source, the controversy is reduced to the inquiry, which party

1956Both of these contesting parties having received their respective, titles from a common source, that is to say, from The Mill Iron Cattle Company, the rule to be followed seems best stated in the following excerpt from Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 385, 390 , an action in ejectment, to wit: “But it is an uniform principle of ejectment that if both parties claim title from the same source, it is treated for all the purposes of the case that title resided in that source; each party is estopped from denying it; and so far as respects that source, the controversy is reduced to the inquiry, which party

1954Jones, 62 Wyo. 61 , 161 P 2d 135 , cited in the mandate in the instant case, as set forth above) this Court pointed out that: “In State v. Kelley et al., 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 P. 886, 889 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, ‘It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., § 163).’” The other cases called to the attention of the District Court by the mandate aforesaid all make it clear that the constitutional question

1954Jones, 62 Wyo. 61 , 161 P 2d 135 , cited in the mandate in the instant case, as set forth above) this Court pointed out that: “In State v. Kelley et al., 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 P. 886, 889 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, ‘It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., § 163).’” The other cases called to the attention of the District Court by the mandate aforesaid all make it clear that the constitutional question

1945In State v. Kelley, et al, 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 Pac. 886 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, “It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., Sec. 163).” Reiterating the same rule in substance the decision in the later case of State v. Smart, 18 Wyo. 536 , 110 Pac. 715 , a cause of like character with that of the Kelley case, supra, so far as procedure is concerned, declared also that: “And it has been uniformly held

1945In State v. Kelley, et al, 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 Pac. 886 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, “It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., Sec. 163).” Reiterating the same rule in substance the decision in the later case of State v. Smart, 18 Wyo. 536 , 110 Pac. 715 , a cause of like character with that of the Kelley case, supra, so far as procedure is concerned, declared also that: “And it has been uniformly held

1945In State v. Kelley, et al, 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 Pac. 886 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, “It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., Sec. 163).” Reiterating the same rule in substance the decision in the later case of State v. Smart, 18 Wyo. 536 , 110 Pac. 715 , a cause of like character with that of the Kelley case, supra, so far as procedure is concerned, declared also that: “And it has been uniformly held

1945In State v. Kelley, et al, 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 Pac. 886 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, “It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., Sec. 163).” Reiterating the same rule in substance the decision in the later case of State v. Smart, 18 Wyo. 536 , 110 Pac. 715 , a cause of like character with that of the Kelley case, supra, so far as procedure is concerned, declared also that: “And it has been uniformly held

1945In State v. Kelley, et al, 17 Wyo. 335 , 98 Pac. 886 , a case involving procedure under the statutes above referred to, this court pointed out that, “It is a uniform rule that courts do not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the necessity therefor in the case pending clearly appears (Cooley Const. Lim., Sec. 163).” Reiterating the same rule in substance the decision in the later case of State v. Smart, 18 Wyo. 536 , 110 Pac. 715 , a cause of like character with that of the Kelley case, supra, so far as procedure is concerned, declared also that: “And it has been uniformly held

1945Lee, Attorney General v. Continental Oil Co., 48 Wyo. 152 , 43 Pac. *65 2d 686; and Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, 52 Wyo. 89 , 68 Pac. 2d 891 .

1945Lee, Attorney General v. Continental Oil Co., 48 Wyo. 152 , 43 Pac. *65 2d 686; and Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, 52 Wyo. 89 , 68 Pac. 2d 891 .

1945Lee, Attorney General v. Continental Oil Co., 48 Wyo. 152 , 43 Pac. *65 2d 686; and Roberts v. City of Rock Springs, 52 Wyo. 89 , 68 Pac. 2d 891 .

1929Co., 116 Iowa 681, 686 , 88 N. W. 1082 . ‘ ‘ This seems to be the uniform rule not only in this state, but elsewhere.” The leading case of Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns.

1923In order to do this, it follows as a natural consequence that the legislature is empowered to create the necessary agencies to carry into effect the duty thus imposed.” ' In the case of Van De Griff v. Haynie, 28 Ark. 270 , the Court, holding the act creating the State Board of Equaliza.tion constitutional, said: ‘ ‘ In reference to. taxation, the' constitution :is •not- so much ; to be regarded a grant of-power as a restriction, or limitation of • power.

1923That restriction which: requires; that, all .property ■- shall be taxed by. a ‘ Uniform rule ’ :is So jmapi-fegtly just-, that •it-commends itself to uniyersap-assCnt.- >-t\\•*.- ■■•■The;4u.ty of ascertaining taxable values, and of assessing and collecting taxes thereon, necessarily rests in the discretion of the legislature, and it may perform that duty by its own legislative acts, or through the agency of such officers or tribunals, as it may appoint for that purpose.” And again in Board of Equalization cases, 49 Ark. 518 , the court,' after referring to the constitutional provision similar

1923On the contrary, it becomes the duty of the legislature to afford the means of making the approximate estimate of values conform as nearly as practicable to the constitutional design of equality and uniformity. * * * When the power to create the board is once established, it would seem to be the duty of the legislature to empower it to equalize the burden of taxation by adjusting the assessments of all property subject to taxation to the common standard of actual values. ’ ’ In Sav. & Loan Society v. Austin, 46 Cal. 415, 475 , the court, holding the act creating the State Board of Equalization

1916It is impossible to review questions which involve a consideration of the evidence as in the case here without bringing up all the evidence bearing on the question sought to be raised., It is so held in criminal cases, notably in Downing v. State, supra, and in Koppala v. State, 15 Wyo. 398 , 89 Pac. 576 , and we think we should follow the uniform rule in vogue in this jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. 2.

1916It is impossible to review questions which involve a consideration of the evidence as in the case here without bringing up all the evidence bearing on the question sought to be raised., It is so held in criminal cases, notably in Downing v. State, supra, and in Koppala v. State, 15 Wyo. 398 , 89 Pac. 576 , and we think we should follow the uniform rule in vogue in this jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. 2.