uniform standard in Nebraska

1959Bee Building Co. v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714 , 91 N. W. 716 : “The object of the law of uniformity is accomplished if all property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed at a uniform standard of value, as compared with its actual market value, even though there be great disparity between values as assessed for taxes and the value as fixed in the open markets by barter, exchange, or by buying and selling, and other commercial transactions in which values and prices enter as important factors.” Plaintiffs’ contention has no merit.

1959Bee Building Co. v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714 , 91 N. W. 716 : “The object of the law of uniformity is accomplished if all property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed at a uniform standard of value, as compared with its actual market value, even though there be great disparity between values as assessed for taxes and the value as fixed in the open markets by barter, exchange, or by buying and selling, and other commercial transactions in which values and prices enter as important factors.” Plaintiffs’ contention has no merit.

1960Co. v. Beard, 283 F. 313 : “Where a state Constitution provides that all taxable property shall be assessed by a uniform rule at its true value in money, if that rule is not observed, and the basis of valuation is 60 per cent., or any per cent, less than 100, the courts will grant relief to those whose property is rated in excess of the adopted percentage.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 , 43 S. Ct. 190 , 67 L.

1960Co. v. Beard, 283 F. 313 : “Where a state Constitution provides that all taxable property shall be assessed by a uniform rule at its true value in money, if that rule is not observed, and the basis of valuation is 60 per cent., or any per cent, less than 100, the courts will grant relief to those whose property is rated in excess of the adopted percentage.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 , 43 S. Ct. 190 , 67 L.

2022MOSER Cite as 312 Neb. 757 This court has long said that the paramount object of the constitution and the laws relative to taxation is to raise all needful revenues by valuation of the taxable property so that each owner of property taxed will contribute his, her, or its just proportion of the public revenues. 7 The object of the law of uniformity is accomplished if all property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed at a uniform standard of value, as com- pared with its actual market value. 8 “Thus if the property of one citizen is valued for taxation at one-fourth its value, others withi

2022MOSER Cite as 312 Neb. 757 levied uniformly and proportionately upon all taxable property in the county.’” 32 We see no evidence that these constitutional principles were implicated by the County Board’s decision to affirm the valuation of Mary’s Farm. [16] The rule of uniformity applies to both the rate of tax­ ation and the valuation of property. 33 And the object of the uniformity clause is accomplished “‘if all of the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed and taxed at a uni- form standard of value.’” 34 The evidence presented in this case and relied upon by TERC showed that i

1950We said in Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796 , 79 N. W. 721 , that: “The uniform doctrine of the American courts is that a conviction for felony will not be sustained when the only evidence of guilt is the extra-judicial confession of the defendant that a crime has been committed.

1950We said in Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796 , 79 N. W. 721 , that: “The uniform doctrine of the American courts is that a conviction for felony will not be sustained when the only evidence of guilt is the extra-judicial confession of the defendant that a crime has been committed.

1910On that point the court say: “Inasmuch as the certainty of a rule is of more importance than the reason of it, we think the legislature intended by section 68 to put an end to all this confusion and uncertainty, by adopting a uniform rule for the computation of time, alike applicable to matters of mere practice and to the construction of statutes.” In McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427 , we had under consideration section 895 of the code, and- held: “The provision of section 895 of the code of civil procedure, for the exclusion of the first day in computing the time within which an act is to be done

1904This was said in McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427 , “To establish a uniform rule, applicable alike to the construction of statutes and to matters of practice.” These appointments were made on the 31st day of October, and by the above rule of computation were made eight days before the election.

2015In In re Interest of Tayla R.,12 the Court of Appeals deter- mined that an order in one of the consolidated appeals of the case which changed the permanency plan from reunification 7 In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., supra note 2. 8 In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581 , 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012). 9 In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., supra note 5. 10 In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., supra note 2. 11 In re Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52 , 601 N.W.2d 780 (1999). 12 In re Interest of Tayla R., 17 Neb.

2015In In re Interest of Tayla R.,12 the Court of Appeals deter- mined that an order in one of the consolidated appeals of the case which changed the permanency plan from reunification 7 In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., supra note 2. 8 In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581 , 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012). 9 In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., supra note 5. 10 In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., supra note 2. 11 In re Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52 , 601 N.W.2d 780 (1999). 12 In re Interest of Tayla R., 17 Neb.

2015In In re Interest of Tayla R.,12 the Court of Appeals deter- mined that an order in one of the consolidated appeals of the case which changed the permanency plan from reunification 7 In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., supra note 2. 8 In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581 , 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012). 9 In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., supra note 5. 10 In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., supra note 2. 11 In re Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52 , 601 N.W.2d 780 (1999). 12 In re Interest of Tayla R., 17 Neb.

2001The object of the uniformity clause is accomplished “ ‘if all of the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed and taxed at a uniform standard of value.’ ” Id.

2001No difference in the method of determining the valuation or rate of tax to be imposed can be allowed unless “separate classifications rest on some reason of public policy or some substantial difference of situation or circumstance that would naturally suggest justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be classified.” Id. at 874 , 606 N.W.2d at 793 .

1991Gordman Properties Co. v. Board of Equal., 225 Neb. 169 , 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). "[T]he object of the law of uniformity is accomplished if all of the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed at a uniform standard of value. " (Emphasis in original.) Carpenter v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 178 Neb. 611, 619 , 134 N.W.2d 272, 278 (1965).

1991Gordman Properties Co. v. Board of Equal., 225 Neb. 169 , 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). "[T]he object of the law of uniformity is accomplished if all of the property within the taxing jurisdiction is assessed at a uniform standard of value. " (Emphasis in original.) Carpenter v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 178 Neb. 611, 619 , 134 N.W.2d 272, 278 (1965).

1991In Xerox Corp. v. Karnes , 217 Neb. 728 , 350 N.W.2d 566 (1984) [" Xerox "], the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a legislative enactment establishing that valuations of real and personal property for assessment and taxation were to be based on valuations determined "as of January 1 at 12:01 a.m. of 1981 and every odd-numbered year thereafter. . . ." Xerox, which was obligated to pay the applicable personal property taxes on certain equipment, challenged the constitutionality of this biennial assessment on the ground that it violated Article VIII, § 1, in that the stat

1991In Xerox Corp. v. Karnes , 217 Neb. 728 , 350 N.W.2d 566 (1984) [" Xerox "], the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a legislative enactment establishing that valuations of real and personal property for assessment and taxation were to be based on valuations determined "as of January 1 at 12:01 a.m. of 1981 and every odd-numbered year thereafter. . . ." Xerox, which was obligated to pay the applicable personal property taxes on certain equipment, challenged the constitutionality of this biennial assessment on the ground that it violated Article VIII, § 1, in that the stat

1964See, In re National Telephone Co., (1914) 1 Ch.D. 755; Scottish Insurance Corp. v. Wilsons, (1949) 1 All E.L.R. 1068; Mohawk Carpet Mills v. Delaware Rayon Co., 35 Del.Ch. 51 , 110 A.2d 305 ; Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 , 42 S.Ct. 540 , 66 L.Ed. 871 .

1964See, In re National Telephone Co., (1914) 1 Ch.D. 755; Scottish Insurance Corp. v. Wilsons, (1949) 1 All E.L.R. 1068; Mohawk Carpet Mills v. Delaware Rayon Co., 35 Del.Ch. 51 , 110 A.2d 305 ; Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 , 42 S.Ct. 540 , 66 L.Ed. 871 .

1964See, In re National Telephone Co., (1914) 1 Ch.D. 755; Scottish Insurance Corp. v. Wilsons, (1949) 1 All E.L.R. 1068; Mohawk Carpet Mills v. Delaware Rayon Co., 35 Del.Ch. 51 , 110 A.2d 305 ; Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 , 42 S.Ct. 540 , 66 L.Ed. 871 .

1964See, In re National Telephone Co., (1914) 1 Ch.D. 755; Scottish Insurance Corp. v. Wilsons, (1949) 1 All E.L.R. 1068; Mohawk Carpet Mills v. Delaware Rayon Co., 35 Del.Ch. 51 , 110 A.2d 305 ; Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 , 42 S.Ct. 540 , 66 L.Ed. 871 .

1960Co. v. Beard, 283 F. 313 : “Where a state Constitution provides that all taxable property shall be assessed by a uniform rule at its true value in money, if that rule is not observed, and the basis of valuation is 60 per cent., or any per cent, less than 100, the courts will grant relief to those whose property is rated in excess of the adopted percentage.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 , 43 S. Ct. 190 , 67 L.

1955Such, variously expressed, is the uniform doctrine laid down by all authorities.’ ” Such Nebraska case is cited with approval in Rich v. Dugan, 135 Neb. 63 , 280 N. W. 225 , along with other authorities from this and other jurisdictions.

1955Such, variously expressed, is the uniform doctrine laid down by all authorities.’ ” Such Nebraska case is cited with approval in Rich v. Dugan, 135 Neb. 63 , 280 N. W. 225 , along with other authorities from this and other jurisdictions.

1933Kariher’s Petition, 284 Pa. St. 455; Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa. St. 263; Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. St. 368; Taylor v. Haverford Township, 299 Pa. St. 402; Sterrett’s Estate, 300 Pa. St. 116; Appeal of Kimmell, 96 Pa. Super.

1930Davis v. Londgreen, 8 Neb. 43 ; Fremont, E. & M.

1919In- Burnham-Munger Root Dry Goods Co. v. Strahl, 102 Neb. 142 , in discussing this point, it is said: “ This is not a uniform rule and has been departed from for good reasons by this court on several occasions.” As pointed out in oral argument and in briefs of counsel, the construction of the Oregon statute was based on the former practice in that state, and was not, strictly speaking, an independent construction of the statutory language.

1915In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 , it ivas held that .congress by the Carmack amendment intended to adopt a uniform rule as to the liability imposed upon interstate carriers by state regulations of bills of lading, and to relieve such contracts from the diverse regulation to which the various states had made them subject, and that this legislation supersedes all regulations and policies of the state upon the same subject matter.

1910Co., 86 Neb. 165 , we held that the legislature intended by the enactment of section 895, supra, to establish a uniform rule with respect to legal procedure.

1899(People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 113 ; Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181 ; State v. Jones, 106 Mo. 302 ; People v. Simonsen, 107 Cal. 345 ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. [Va.] 796.) The uniform doctrine of the American courts is that a conviction for felony will not be sus tained when the only evidence of guilt is the extra-judicial confession of the defendant that a crime has been committed.

1899(People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 113 ; Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181 ; State v. Jones, 106 Mo. 302 ; People v. Simonsen, 107 Cal. 345 ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. [Va.] 796.) The uniform doctrine of the American courts is that a conviction for felony will not be sus tained when the only evidence of guilt is the extra-judicial confession of the defendant that a crime has been committed.

1899(People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 113 ; Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181 ; State v. Jones, 106 Mo. 302 ; People v. Simonsen, 107 Cal. 345 ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. [Va.] 796.) The uniform doctrine of the American courts is that a conviction for felony will not be sus tained when the only evidence of guilt is the extra-judicial confession of the defendant that a crime has been committed.

1876Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio State, 589.