uniform standard in West Virginia

2009We have repeatedly advised that “ ‘[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).’ Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986).” Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the W

2009We have repeatedly advised that "`[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).' Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986)." Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the We

2009We have repeatedly advised that “ ‘[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).’ Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986).” Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the W

2009We have repeatedly advised that "`[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).' Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986)." Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the We

2009We have repeatedly advised that "`[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).' Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986)." Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the We

2009We have repeatedly advised that "`[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).' Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986)." Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the We

2009We have repeatedly advised that "`[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).' Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986)." Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the We

2009We have repeatedly advised that "`[i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate[.] Syl. pt. 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976).' Syllabus Point 2, [in part] Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbotham, 176 W.Va. 186 , 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986)." Syllabus Point 4, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the We

2006For this reason, we have held that [i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate^] Syl. pt. 2, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Committee on Legal Ethics of The West Virginia State Bar v. Cometti, 189 W.Va. 262 , 430 S.E.2d 320 (1993).

2006For this reason, we have held that [i]n disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate^] Syl. pt. 2, in part, Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Committee on Legal Ethics of The West Virginia State Bar v. Cometti, 189 W.Va. 262 , 430 S.E.2d 320 (1993).

2017These circuits apply a uniform standard to all requests for preliminary relief."); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 Vand.L.Rev. 1011, 1014-15 (2012) (discussing split of authority among federal district courts as to proper standard following United States Supreme Court's decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 , 129 S.Ct. 365 , 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).

2017These circuits apply a uniform standard to all requests for preliminary relief."); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 Vand.L.Rev. 1011, 1014-15 (2012) (discussing split of authority among federal district courts as to proper standard following United States Supreme Court's decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 , 129 S.Ct. 365 , 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).

1985Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, supra. See also Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 173 W.Va. 613 , 319 S.E.2d 381 (1984); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, supra. In Mullins, we held, at Syllabus Point 2, in part: “In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate....” See also In Re Hendricks, 155 W.Va. 516 , 185 S.E.2d 336 (1971).

1984We recognized in Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, supra, W.Va., 216 S.E.2d at 241 , that “the repayment of a client’s funds will not prevent disciplinary proceedings against an attorney.” With regard to the severity of the recommended disciplinary action against an attorney, “[t]his Court has refused to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action and has stated that it will consider the facts and circumstances in each particular case in determining whether suspension or disbarment is indicated.” Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647, at 652 , 226 S.E.2d 427 , at 430 (1

1966Pennywitt v. Blue, 73 W.Va. 718 , [ 81 S.E. 399 ]; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 [ 11 S.Ct. 851 , 35 L.Ed. 649 ]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 [ 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ].

1966Pennywitt v. Blue, 73 W.Va. 718 , [ 81 S.E. 399 ]; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 [ 11 S.Ct. 851 , 35 L.Ed. 649 ]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 [ 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ].

2012We believe the two-year suspension, retroactive to January 2, 1992 (the date Mr. White voluntarily placed himself on inactive status with the State Bar), recommended by the Committee, appropriately accounts for both the seriousness of Mr. White’s crimes while he occupied a position of public trust, and the mitigating facts and circumstances of his later behavior. 189 W.Va. at 139 , 428 S.E.2d at 560 . 4 This Court has previously explained that it will consider the facts and circumstances in each individual case involving a determination of disciplinary action, rather than attempting to establi

2012We believe the two-year suspension, retroactive to January 2, 1992 (the date Mr. White voluntarily placed himself on inactive status with the State Bar), recommended by the Committee, appropriately accounts for both the seriousness of Mr. White’s crimes while he occupied a position of public trust, and the mitigating facts and circumstances of his later behavior. 189 W.Va. at 139 , 428 S.E.2d at 560 . 4 This Court has previously explained that it will consider the facts and circumstances in each individual case involving a determination of disciplinary action, rather than attempting to establi

2009We have also stated that "[t]he principle purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to safeguard the public's interest in the administration of justice." Syllabus Point 3, Daily Gazette v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 174 W.Va. 359 , 326 S.E.2d 705 (1984).

2009We have also stated that "[t]he principle purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to safeguard the public's interest in the administration of justice." Syllabus Point 3, Daily Gazette v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 174 W.Va. 359 , 326 S.E.2d 705 (1984).

1989In Syllabus Point 2 of Higinbotham, supra, we spoke to our settled rule that rather than attempt to establish a schedule of punishment, we would make an individualized assessment: "`In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances [in each case], including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate, and when the committee on legal ethics initiates proceedings before this Court, it has a duty to advise this Court of all pertin

1987In syllabus point 2, in part, of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976); we *755 held: “In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate ...” Although we accord respect to the recommendation of the Committee, “[t]his Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprim

1987In syllabus point 2, in part, of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647 , 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976); we *755 held: “In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate ...” Although we accord respect to the recommendation of the Committee, “[t]his Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprim

1986Co., 244 U.S. 499 , 37 S.Ct. 673 , 61 L.Ed. 1280 (1917).

1986Co., 244 U.S. 499 , 37 S.Ct. 673 , 61 L.Ed. 1280 (1917).

1985Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, supra. See also Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 173 W.Va. 613 , 319 S.E.2d 381 (1984); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, supra. In Mullins, we held, at Syllabus Point 2, in part: “In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate....” See also In Re Hendricks, 155 W.Va. 516 , 185 S.E.2d 336 (1971).

1985Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, supra. See also Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 173 W.Va. 613 , 319 S.E.2d 381 (1984); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, supra. In Mullins, we held, at Syllabus Point 2, in part: “In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate....” See also In Re Hendricks, 155 W.Va. 516 , 185 S.E.2d 336 (1971).

1985Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, supra. See also Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 173 W.Va. 613 , 319 S.E.2d 381 (1984); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, supra. In Mullins, we held, at Syllabus Point 2, in part: “In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate....” See also In Re Hendricks, 155 W.Va. 516 , 185 S.E.2d 336 (1971).

1985Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, supra. See also Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 173 W.Va. 613 , 319 S.E.2d 381 (1984); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, supra. In Mullins, we held, at Syllabus Point 2, in part: “In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate....” See also In Re Hendricks, 155 W.Va. 516 , 185 S.E.2d 336 (1971).

1966Pennywitt v. Blue, 73 W.Va. 718 , [ 81 S.E. 399 ]; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 [ 11 S.Ct. 851 , 35 L.Ed. 649 ]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 [ 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ].

1966Pennywitt v. Blue, 73 W.Va. 718 , [ 81 S.E. 399 ]; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 [ 11 S.Ct. 851 , 35 L.Ed. 649 ]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 [ 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ].

1966Pennywitt v. Blue, 73 W.Va. 718 , [ 81 S.E. 399 ]; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 [ 11 S.Ct. 851 , 35 L.Ed. 649 ]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 [ 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ].

1966Pennywitt v. Blue, 73 W.Va. 718 , [ 81 S.E. 399 ]; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 [ 11 S.Ct. 851 , 35 L.Ed. 649 ]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 [ 7 S.Ct. 592 , 30 L.Ed. 694 ].

1966Despite the scant consideration given the holding in the Pennywitt case in the opinion *699 of the majority, the holding of this Court in that case was approved by this Court in the later case of Eureka Pipe Line Company v. Hallanan, 87 W.Va. 396 , 105 S.E. 506 , 257 U.S. 265 , 42 S.Ct. 101 , 66 L.Ed. 227 , in which this Court said in the opinion: "That a state cannot levy any tax upon interstate commerce, or charge any license for the privilege of engaging in such commerce within the state, is the uniform doctrine of this Court, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States.

1966Despite the scant consideration given the holding in the Pennywitt case in the opinion *699 of the majority, the holding of this Court in that case was approved by this Court in the later case of Eureka Pipe Line Company v. Hallanan, 87 W.Va. 396 , 105 S.E. 506 , 257 U.S. 265 , 42 S.Ct. 101 , 66 L.Ed. 227 , in which this Court said in the opinion: "That a state cannot levy any tax upon interstate commerce, or charge any license for the privilege of engaging in such commerce within the state, is the uniform doctrine of this Court, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States.

1966Despite the scant consideration given the holding in the Pennywitt case in the opinion *699 of the majority, the holding of this Court in that case was approved by this Court in the later case of Eureka Pipe Line Company v. Hallanan, 87 W.Va. 396 , 105 S.E. 506 , 257 U.S. 265 , 42 S.Ct. 101 , 66 L.Ed. 227 , in which this Court said in the opinion: "That a state cannot levy any tax upon interstate commerce, or charge any license for the privilege of engaging in such commerce within the state, is the uniform doctrine of this Court, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States.

1966Despite the scant consideration given the holding in the Pennywitt case in the opinion *699 of the majority, the holding of this Court in that case was approved by this Court in the later case of Eureka Pipe Line Company v. Hallanan, 87 W.Va. 396 , 105 S.E. 506 , 257 U.S. 265 , 42 S.Ct. 101 , 66 L.Ed. 227 , in which this Court said in the opinion: "That a state cannot levy any tax upon interstate commerce, or charge any license for the privilege of engaging in such commerce within the state, is the uniform doctrine of this Court, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States.

1935The Supreme Court remarked the dissimilarity of objects to be accomplished, and the degree and elements of proof required, etc., in criminal and civil actions, and sustained the civil action against Stone, saying: “ It is no defense against such action that the defendant was indicted criminally for cutting such timber and was acquitted.” While the rule followed in the Stone case is not a uniform rule, as we indicated in Dry Goods Store v. Williamson, 91 W.

1935Va. 156, 159-160 , 112 S. E. 301 , it is beyond question the majority rule, and is supported by ' ‘ a decided preponderance of authority. ’ ’ Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.), sec. 653.

1900But the uniform doctrine of courts of equity is that it is improper to order an account merely to afford a party an opportunity to establish by testimony the allegations of his bill,” — the last sentence of which is the syllabus of the case; and Lee County Justices v. Fulkerson, 21 Grat. 182, is cited with approval; and Livey v. Winton, 30 W.

1900Va. 554 , ( 4 S. E. 451 ), (Syl., point 7), is to the same effect: “It is improper to order an account merely to establish by testimony the allegations of the bill.” See, also, 3 Pom.