uniform rule in Texas

2013Ctr. at Garland, 232 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (“While it is certainly possible an identical standard of care governs different providers, a generalized statement without explanation that a uniform standard applies ‘can reasonably be deemed conclusory’ and deficient.”) (quoting Gray v. CHCA Bayshore, L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855 , 859–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)).

2011Appellants cite Kettle, 232 S.W.3d at 839-40 , for the proposition that a "generalized statement without explanation that a uniform standard applies” can be deemed conclusory and deficient.

2002Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 24.61 (2d ed. 2001); see also Marin v. State , 851 S.W.2d 275 , 281 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (en banc) (describing statutory requirement as prophylactic rule of procedure designed by legislature "to impose a uniform requirement where the fairness of a flexible rule is too uncertain.").

2002The state has a legitimate interest in providing procedures for the fair operation of an indigent defense system, including a uniform procedure for the prompt appointment of counsel "where the fairness of a flexible rule is too uncertain." See Marin , 851 S.W.2d at 281 (describing statutory ten-day preparation requirement as prophylactic rule of procedure designed by legislature "to impose a uniform requirement where the fairness of a flexible rule is too uncertain" among precepts for the fair operation of adjudication system). 4 However, the need for uniformity must necessarily be balanced ag

2003Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.1993) (“the uniform rule is that the state and its essential instrumentalities are immune from the defenses of limitations, laches, ... and estoppel ... ”).

2002Dist , 865 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. 1993) (“the uniform rule is that the state and its essential instrumentalities are immune from the defenses of limitations, laches, . . . and estoppel . . .”).

2002See Louisiana v. Bryant , 324 So.2d 389 , 392-93 (La. 1975) (methods for providing counsel for indigent defendants may vary from one part of state to another without violating equal protection where it is necessary to balance needs of uniformity and workability in state with political subdivisions of widely varying population, geography, and problems).

2002See Louisiana v. Bryant, 324 So.2d 389,392-93 (La. 1975) (methods for providing counsel for indigent defendants may vary from one part of state to another without violating equal protection where it is necessary to balance needs of uniformity and workability in state with political subdivisions of widely varying population, geography, and problems).

1991“Besides extending the recovery of prejudgment interest to personal injury cases, Cavnar established a uniform standard for determining the amount of prejudgment interest in all cases where the amount of interest was not controlled by operation of law.” Acco Constructors v. National Steel Products, 733 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).

1988Acco Constructors, Inc. v. National Steel Products Co., 733 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (see for authorities cited in support of statement).

1987Donald v. Jones, 445 F.2d 601, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).

1983Donald v. Jones, 445 F.2d 601, 606 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 , 92 S.Ct. 537 , 30 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).

2013Ctr. at Garland, 232 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (“While it is certainly possible an identical standard of care governs different providers, a generalized statement without explanation that a uniform standard applies ‘can reasonably be deemed conclusory’ and deficient.”) (quoting Gray v. CHCA Bayshore, L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855 , 859–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)).

2007Gray v. CHCA Bay shore, L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855, 859-60 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)(report failed to notice “who had what responsibility and how that person or persons depart *840 ed from the standard ... in failing to do some specific act required by a person in that position”).

2019Thus, “if all the defendants took part in a similar scheme that was sustained either by a contract or conspiracy, or was mandated by a uniform state rule, it is appropriate to join as defendants even parties with whom the named class representative did not have direct contact.” Payton v. Cty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Fallick v. Nationwide Mut.

2015Co., 88 S.W.3d 370, 373 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). 105 Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2011). 106 Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Tex. 1986). 34 grounded on evidence, the parties involved should be provided fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to present their evidence.”107 The TCPA does not define “good cause,” so its technical or plain- meaning definition applies.108 Good cause is generally defined as “the burden placed on a litigant (usually by court rule or order) to show why a request should be granted or an action excused.”109 Texas courts have

2015Co., 88 S.W.3d 370, 373 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). 105 Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2011). 106 Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Tex. 1986). 34 grounded on evidence, the parties involved should be provided fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to present their evidence.”107 The TCPA does not define “good cause,” so its technical or plain- meaning definition applies.108 Good cause is generally defined as “the burden placed on a litigant (usually by court rule or order) to show why a request should be granted or an action excused.”109 Texas courts have

2015In Bilbrey, the court held that the plaintiff did not meet the standard because he failed to state the purpose for the discovery he sought.110 Conversely, in Charalambopoulos v. Grammer, the court held that the plaintiff met the good-cause standard because he “sought discovery of evidence that is effectively within the exclusive control of [the defendant] and/or her agents, and this evidence may 107United Copper Indus., Inc. v. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d 797, 805 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet dism’d) (emphasis added). 108See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 (“Words and phrases that are not defined by statute a

2015Co., 88 S.W.3d 370, 373 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). 105 Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2011). 106 Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Tex. 1986). 34 grounded on evidence, the parties involved should be provided fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to present their evidence.”107 The TCPA does not define “good cause,” so its technical or plain- meaning definition applies.108 Good cause is generally defined as “the burden placed on a litigant (usually by court rule or order) to show why a request should be granted or an action excused.”109 Texas courts have

2015In Bilbrey, the court held that the plaintiff did not meet the standard because he failed to state the purpose for the discovery he sought.110 Conversely, in Charalambopoulos v. Grammer, the court held that the plaintiff met the good-cause standard because he “sought discovery of evidence that is effectively within the exclusive control of [the defendant] and/or her agents, and this evidence may 107United Copper Indus., Inc. v. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d 797, 805 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet dism’d) (emphasis added). 108See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 (“Words and phrases that are not defined by statute a

2012See Hayes v. Carroll, 314 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tex.App.-Austin 2010, no pet.) ("Because the report affirmatively states that a uniform standard of care applies to each physician and nurse, and identifies what the standard of care is, [the] report is sufficient to provide a fair summary to each physician and nurse of his opinion regarding the standard of care applicable to each.”); Polone v. Shearer, 287 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) ("Because the report does not delineate between the standard of care applicable to a physician's assistant and the standard of care applicable to

2012See Polone, 287 S.W.3d at 234 ("Just as an expert report must provide an explanation of how each defendant specifically breached the standard of care, the expert report must set forth the applicable standard of care for each defendant.”). 4 .

2012To which we now turn: first to the Equal and Uniform challenge; next to Equal Protection; then to Due Process; and finally to the Commerce Clause. 74 Allcat, 356 S.W .3d at 461 n.6 (quoting Love v. Wilcox, 28 S.W .2d 515, 519 (Tex. 1930)). 75 Id. at 463, 470-471 (Tex. 2011). 76 See In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 439 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Jones, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 V A .

2012See Hayes v. Carroll, 314 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tex.App.-Austin 2010, no pet.) ("Because the report affirmatively states that a uniform standard of care applies to each physician and nurse, and identifies what the standard of care is, [the] report is sufficient to provide a fair summary to each physician and nurse of his opinion regarding the standard of care applicable to each.”); Polone v. Shearer, 287 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) ("Because the report does not delineate between the standard of care applicable to a physician's assistant and the standard of care applicable to

2012See Hayes v. Carroll, 314 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tex.App.-Austin 2010, no pet.) ("Because the report affirmatively states that a uniform standard of care applies to each physician and nurse, and identifies what the standard of care is, [the] report is sufficient to provide a fair summary to each physician and nurse of his opinion regarding the standard of care applicable to each.”); Polone v. Shearer, 287 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) ("Because the report does not delineate between the standard of care applicable to a physician's assistant and the standard of care applicable to