21 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pueblo v. Sandersgreen2 sentences1971See Pueblo v. Sanders, 151 Colo. 216 , 376 P.2d 996 . 1971See Pueblo v. Sanders, 151 Colo. 216 , 376 P.2d 996 . | 2 | 2 |
FD Interests v. Fairways at Buffalo Rungreen1 sentence2025See §§ 38-33.3-101 to -401, C.R.S. 2024. ¶ 27 CCIOA “establishes a uniform framework for the creation and operation of common interest communities.” FD Ints., LLC v. Fairways at Buffalo Run Homeowners Ass’n, 2019 COA 148, ¶ 24 . | 1 | 1 |
McNichols v. City of Denvergreen2 sentences2008Our past cases do not adopt a uniform standard for what constitutes a lawful, public, local, and municipal purpose, perhaps because of the difficulty of capturing the permissible range of local and municipal projects with a static test. [2] Compare, e.g., McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 324 , 74 P.2d 99, 103 (1937) ("The test is whether the power, if exercised, will promote the general objects and purposes of the municipality."), with City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 49 , 329 P.2d 441, 445 (1958) ("Whether a particular business *168 activity is a matter of m 2008Our past cases do not adopt a uniform standard for what constitutes a lawful, public, local, and municipal purpose, perhaps because of the difficulty of capturing the permissible range of local and municipal projects with a static test. [2] Compare, e.g., McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 324 , 74 P.2d 99, 103 (1937) ("The test is whether the power, if exercised, will promote the general objects and purposes of the municipality."), with City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 49 , 329 P.2d 441, 445 (1958) ("Whether a particular business *168 activity is a matter of m | 1 | 1 |
City of Denver v. Board of Commissionersgreen2 sentences2008Turning first to our review of pertinent Colorado law, we place reliance on the time-honored premise that article XX vests in home rule municipalities every power which the legislature "could have conferred." Bd. Of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. at 156 , 156 P.2d at 103 ("If the General Assembly can confer a power upon any [statutory] city . . . a charter city, such as Denver, already possesses the power without legislative action."). 2008Turning first to our review of pertinent Colorado law, we place reliance on the time-honored premise that article XX vests in home rule municipalities every power which the legislature "could have conferred." Bd. Of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. at 156 , 156 P.2d at 103 ("If the General Assembly can confer a power upon any [statutory] city . . . a charter city, such as Denver, already possesses the power without legislative action."). | 1 | 1 |
Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannongreen2 sentences2008In Taco Bell, we looked to whether certain security measures were necessary by virtue of the restaurant's unusually violent immediate history. 744 P.2d at 44 (noting that ten armed robberies had taken place there in the past three years). 2008In Taco Bell, we looked to whether certain security measures were necessary by virtue of the restaurant’s unusually violent immediate history. 744 P.2d at 44 (noting that ten armed robberies had taken place there in the past three years). | 1 | 1 |
City and County of Denver v. Sweetgreen2 sentences2008Our past cases do not adopt a uniform standard for what constitutes a lawful, public, local, and municipal purpose, perhaps because of the difficulty of capturing the permissible range of local and municipal projects with a static test. [2] Compare, e.g., McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 324 , 74 P.2d 99, 103 (1937) ("The test is whether the power, if exercised, will promote the general objects and purposes of the municipality."), with City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 49 , 329 P.2d 441, 445 (1958) ("Whether a particular business *168 activity is a matter of m 2008Our past cases do not adopt a uniform standard for what constitutes a lawful, public, local, and municipal purpose, perhaps because of the difficulty of capturing the permissible range of local and municipal projects with a static test. [2] Compare, e.g., McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 324 , 74 P.2d 99, 103 (1937) ("The test is whether the power, if exercised, will promote the general objects and purposes of the municipality."), with City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 49 , 329 P.2d 441, 445 (1958) ("Whether a particular business *168 activity is a matter of m | 1 | 1 |
Camphill Village, U.S.A., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Boardgreen2 sentences1992See Camphill Village, U.S.A. v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 23 N.Y.2d 202 , 243 N.E.2d 739, 742 , 296 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1968) (persons who lived in and supervised family-type establishments for handicapped persons, and who received no compensation except full subsistence for their households, were not employees for purposes of workers’ compensation, but were volunteers; receipt of wages is the distinguishing factor). 1992See Camphill Village, U.S.A. v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 23 N.Y.2d 202 , 243 N.E.2d 739, 742 , 296 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1968) (persons who lived in and supervised family-type establishments for handicapped persons, and who received no compensation except full subsistence for their households, were not employees for purposes of workers’ compensation, but were volunteers; receipt of wages is the distinguishing factor). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bosse v. Portsmouth
green
2 sentences1997Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523 , 226 A.2d 99 (1967); Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189 , 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950). 1997Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523 , 226 A.2d 99 (1967); Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189 , 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller
green
2 sentences1997Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523 , 226 A.2d 99 (1967); Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189 , 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950). 1997Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523 , 226 A.2d 99 (1967); Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189 , 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Town of Coloma v. Eaves
green
2 sentences1912We cannot conclude that these decisions of the court have intended a departure from .the uniform rule of the supreme court of .the United States, where the question of authority or power was involved, and as stated in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S., 83 , where the court said: “This principle is the essence of the rule declared upon this point, by this court, in the well considered words of Mr. Justice Strong, in Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S., 484 , where he states (p. 491, 582) that it is, ‘Where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality were investe 1912We cannot conclude that these decisions of the court have intended a departure from .the uniform rule of the supreme court of .the United States, where the question of authority or power was involved, and as stated in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S., 83 , where the court said: “This principle is the essence of the rule declared upon this point, by this court, in the well considered words of Mr. Justice Strong, in Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S., 484 , where he states (p. 491, 582) that it is, ‘Where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality were investe | 2 | 1912–1912 |
Dixon County v. Field
green
2 sentences1912We cannot conclude that these decisions of the court have intended a departure from .the uniform rule of the supreme court of .the United States, where the question of authority or power was involved, and as stated in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S., 83 , where the court said: “This principle is the essence of the rule declared upon this point, by this court, in the well considered words of Mr. Justice Strong, in Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S., 484 , where he states (p. 491, 582) that it is, ‘Where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality were investe 1912We cannot conclude that these decisions of the court have intended a departure from .the uniform rule of the supreme court of .the United States, where the question of authority or power was involved, and as stated in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S., 83 , where the court said: “This principle is the essence of the rule declared upon this point, by this court, in the well considered words of Mr. Justice Strong, in Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S., 484 , where he states (p. 491, 582) that it is, ‘Where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality were investe | 2 | 1912–1912 |
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
green
2 sentences2025They did so based on "an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision" or because the controversy in question "touche[d] basic interests of federalism." Milwaukee I , 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. ¶86 The interstate nature of the alleged pollution in the above-referenced cases constituted an overriding federal interest necessitating "a uniform rule of 40 decision." See id. (explaining that "the pollution of a body of water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by four States" presents "demands for applying federal law"); Tex. Indus., Inc. , 451 U.S. at 641 (noting that "the 2025They did so based on "an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision" or because the controversy in question "touche[d] basic interests of federalism." Milwaukee I , 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. ¶86 The interstate nature of the alleged pollution in the above-referenced cases constituted an overriding federal interest necessitating "a uniform rule of 40 decision." See id. (explaining that "the pollution of a body of water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by four States" presents "demands for applying federal law"); Tex. Indus., Inc. , 451 U.S. at 641 (noting that "the | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.
green
1 sentence2018But, Telluride did not adopt a uniform rule for what constitutes a lawful public purpose “because of the difficulty of capturing the permissible range of local and municipal projects with a static 9 test.”6 Id. at 167 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Comstock v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co.
neutral
1 sentence2009As we stated in Comstock: [UJsers and consumers of water ... in one district cannot make and apply regulations in the administration of their priorities according to their own interpretation of them, and to meet their needs as they think they should be met; but the waters of a division must be distributed to all consumers under the uniform rule provided by law. 58 Colo. at 202 , 145 P. at 705. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs
green
2 sentences1995However, in United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 373 , 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1406-07 , 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), the Court interpreted a federal statute that imposed a prior restraint to require judicial review to be sought within fourteen days. 1995However, in United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 373 , 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1406-07 , 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), the Court interpreted a federal statute that imposed a prior restraint to require judicial review to be sought within fourteen days. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Salute v. Pitchess
green
2 sentences1994It is the duty of the sheriff to make such an investigation and determination, on an individual basis, on every application under [the statute]. *145 Salute v. Pitchess, 61 Cal.App.3d at 560-61 , 132 Cal.Rptr. at 347 . 1994It is the duty of the sheriff to make such an investigation and determination, on an individual basis, on every application under [the statute]. *145 Salute v. Pitchess, 61 Cal.App.3d at 560-61 , 132 Cal.Rptr. at 347 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Arthur G. Hageman v. City Investing Company and the Home Insurance Company, Defendants
green
1 sentence1991Hageman, 851 F.2d at 71 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board
green
1 sentence1983Although the Supreme Court has described the three-factor formula as “a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas are judged,” Container Corp., 103 S.Ct. at 2943 , it has refused to impose a uniform rule on the states. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Orchard Court Development Co. v. City of Boulder
green
2 sentences1974Orchard Development Company v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361 , 513 P.2d 199 (1973). 1974Orchard Development Company v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361 , 513 P.2d 199 (1973). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Reilly
green
2 sentences1948“But in State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 698 , 110 Atl. 550 , we further said, on page 705, that in such an information ‘two separate issues are presented: first, was the defendant guilty of the crime charged? 1948“But in State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 698 , 110 Atl. 550 , we further said, on page 705, that in such an information ‘two separate issues are presented: first, was the defendant guilty of the crime charged? | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1916The uniform rule in this respect was stated in Home Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 , 53 L. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Garfield v. United States Ex Rel. Allison
green
1 sentence1916The uniform rule in this respect was stated in Home Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 , 53 L. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Golden Canal Co. v. Bright
green
1 sentence1895Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144 ; People ex rel. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.