75 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1901–2024 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Mitchell , 1993 OK CR 56 , ¶ 2, 876 P.2d at 686-87 (Lumpkin, P.J., concurring in part/dissenting in part). 2018Mitchell , 1993 OK CR 56 , ¶ 2, 876 P.2d at 686-87 (Lumpkin, P.J., concurring in part/dissenting in part). | 2 | 2 |
JACKSON v. STATEgreen2 sentences2018See also Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5 , ¶ 4, 371 P.3d 1120 , 1121 ; Levering v. State , 2013 OK CR 19 , ¶ 6, 315 P.3d 392 , 395. ¶ 5 In Counts I, II, and III the trial court gave the jury a modified version of the uniform instruction which incorrectly stated that the 85% Rule applied only to life sentences. 2018See also Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5 , ¶ 4, 371 P.3d 1120 , 1121 ; Levering v. State , 2013 OK CR 19 , ¶ 6, 315 P.3d 392 , 395. ¶ 5 In Counts I, II, and III the trial court gave the jury a modified version of the uniform instruction which incorrectly stated that the 85% Rule applied only to life sentences. | 2 | 2 |
Fontenot v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 84 (Okl.Cr.1994) quoting Palmer v. State, 788 P.2d 404, 408 (Okl.Cr.1990), relied upon by Appellant, provides “when a jury must be instructed on a certain subject, the relevant uniform instruction shall be used unless the court determines ‘that it does not accurately state the law’ ”. 881 P.2d at 84 . 1998Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 84 (Okl.Cr.1994) quoting Palmer v. State, 788 P.2d 404, 408 (Okl.Cr.1990), relied upon by Appellant, provides “when a jury must be instructed on a certain subject, the relevant uniform instruction shall be used unless the court determines ‘that it does not accurately state the law’ ”. 881 P.2d at 84 . | 2 | 2 |
Palmer v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 84 (Okl.Cr.1994) quoting Palmer v. State, 788 P.2d 404, 408 (Okl.Cr.1990), relied upon by Appellant, provides “when a jury must be instructed on a certain subject, the relevant uniform instruction shall be used unless the court determines ‘that it does not accurately state the law’ ”. 881 P.2d at 84 . 1994Generally speaking, when a jury must be instructed on a certain subject, the relevant uniform instruction "shall be used unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law." Palmer v. State, 788 P.2d 404, 408 (Okl.Cr. 1990), citing 12 O.S. 1991 , § 577.2 (emphasis in original). | 2 | 2 |
Marquez-Burrola v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Marquez-Burrola v. State, 2007 OK CR 14 , ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 749 , 758. 2018See Marquez-Burrola v. State, 2007 OK CR 14 , ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 749 , 758. | 1 | 2 |
Simpson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Simpson, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶ 12 , 876 P.2d at 695 . ¶ 65 Under the mandate set forth in Cargle , the trial court's failure to administer the uniform instruction on victim impact evidence was error. 2011Simpson, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶ 12 , 876 P.2d at 695 . ¶ 65 Under the mandate set forth in Cargle , the trial court's failure to administer the uniform instruction on victim impact evidence was error. | 1 | 2 |
Powell v. Stategreen2 sentences2011We have previously held that while the uniform instruction on victim impact evidence should be given when such evidence is introduced at trial, "the failure to give the instruction is not automatically fatal." Powell v. State, 2000 OK CR 5, ¶ 121 , 995 P.2d 510, 535 . 2011We have previously held that while the uniform instruction on victim impact evidence should be given when such evidence is introduced at trial, "the failure to give the instruction is not automatically fatal." Powell v. State, 2000 OK CR 5, ¶ 121 , 995 P.2d 510, 535 . | 1 | 2 |
NOLEN v. STATEgreen2 sentences2024Nolen, 2021 OK CR 5, ¶ 124, 485 P.3d at 858-59. 2024Nolen, 2021 OK CR 5, ¶ 124, 485 P.3d at 858-59. | 1 | 1 |
Atkins v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2021Quoting Stedmans Medical Dictionary, the Supreme Court defined mental retardation 3 as "requir[ing] not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. ¶5 However, rather than set out a uniform test for determining the mental status of criminal defendants, the Court, noting both the "serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders" and the fact that "[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded . . . will 2021Quoting Stedmans Medical Dictionary, the Supreme Court defined mental retardation 3 as "requir[ing] not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. ¶5 However, rather than set out a uniform test for determining the mental status of criminal defendants, the Court, noting both the "serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders" and the fact that "[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded . . . will | 1 | 1 |
| Welch v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Huey v. Stephensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mayberrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| The PEOPLE v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanchez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCullough v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gilbert v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bland v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cleary v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Douglas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGregor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brookings v. Singletarygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Rochester Housing Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chambers v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lumpkin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension
green
2 sentences2023City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension and Retirement System , 1963 OK 267, ¶ 8 , 387 P.2d 255, 258 . 2023City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension and Retirement System , 1963 OK 267, ¶ 8 , 387 P.2d 255, 258 . | 4 | 2023–2023 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences2023"We require prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, ¶ 7 , 419 P.3d 271, 277 . " Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 101 , 268 P.3d 86, 116 ); State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17, ¶ 7 , 387 P.3d 918, 921 . 3 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felo 2023"We require prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, ¶ 7 , 419 P.3d 271, 277 . " Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 101 , 268 P.3d 86, 116 ); State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17, ¶ 7 , 387 P.3d 918, 921 . 3 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felo | 3 | 2023–2023 |
DAVIS v. STATE
green
2 sentences2023"We require prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, ¶ 7 , 419 P.3d 271, 277 . " Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 101 , 268 P.3d 86, 116 ); State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17, ¶ 7 , 387 P.3d 918, 921 . 3 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felo 2023"We require prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, ¶ 7 , 419 P.3d 271, 277 . " Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 101 , 268 P.3d 86, 116 ); State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17, ¶ 7 , 387 P.3d 918, 921 . 3 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felo | 3 | 2023–2023 |
STATE v. TUBBY
green
2 sentences2023"We require prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, ¶ 7 , 419 P.3d 271, 277 . " Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 101 , 268 P.3d 86, 116 ); State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17, ¶ 7 , 387 P.3d 918, 921 . 3 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felo 2023"We require prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, ¶ 7 , 419 P.3d 271, 277 . " Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 101 , 268 P.3d 86, 116 ); State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17, ¶ 7 , 387 P.3d 918, 921 . 3 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felo | 3 | 2023–2023 |
Nelson v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2023City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension and Retirement System , 1963 OK 267 387 P.2d 255 Nelson v. Nelson , 1998 OK 10 954 P.2d 1219 ¶30 When applying statutes, our goal is to give effect to legislative intent; if intent is plain from the text, there is nothing for us to do but implement it. 2023City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension and Retirement System , 1963 OK 267 387 P.2d 255 Nelson v. Nelson , 1998 OK 10 954 P.2d 1219 ¶30 When applying statutes, our goal is to give effect to legislative intent; if intent is plain from the text, there is nothing for us to do but implement it. | 3 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases
green
2 sentences2013In In re Amendments to Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 2005 OK 12 ¶ 6 , 116 P.3d 119, 147 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly adopted this uniform instruction. 2013In In re Amendments to Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 2005 OK 12 ¶ 6 , 116 P.3d 119, 147 , the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly adopted this uniform instruction. | 3 | 2006–2013 |
Ex Parte Houghton
green
2 sentences1963It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless ‘the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.’ Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 .” This Court upon examination of the transcript of the preliminary hearing feels that, because of the nature of the offenses charged and because it is evident that the district court and the examining magistrate both felt that the bond was in an a 1963It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless ‘the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.’ Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 .” This Court upon examination of the transcript of the preliminary hearing feels that, because of the nature of the offenses charged and because it is evident that the district court and the examining magistrate both felt that the bond was in an a | 3 | 1925–1963 |
First Nat. Bank of Hobart v. Spink
green
2 sentences1963It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless ‘the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.’ Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 .” This Court upon examination of the transcript of the preliminary hearing feels that, because of the nature of the offenses charged and because it is evident that the district court and the examining magistrate both felt that the bond was in an a 1960It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless “the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.” Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 . | 3 | 1925–1963 |
Ex Parte McClellan
neutral
2 sentences1963It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless ‘the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.’ Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 .” This Court upon examination of the transcript of the preliminary hearing feels that, because of the nature of the offenses charged and because it is evident that the district court and the examining magistrate both felt that the bond was in an a 1960It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless “the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.” Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 . | 3 | 1925–1963 |
BENCH v. STATE
green
2 sentences2023Bench v. State , 2018 OK CR 31 431 P.3d 929 prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7 419 P.3d 271 Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29 268 P.3d 86 State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17 387 P.3d 918 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felony murder. 2023Bench v. State , 2018 OK CR 31 431 P.3d 929 prima facie evidence of the lesser offense to support giving a lesser included instruction." Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7 419 P.3d 271 Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id. (quoting Davis v. State , 2011 OK CR 29 268 P.3d 86 State v. Tubby , 2016 OK CR 17 387 P.3d 918 ¶15 The instruction which Appellant now proposes should have been given is the uniform instruction on second degree felony murder. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Levering v. State
green
2 sentences2018See also Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5 , ¶ 4, 371 P.3d 1120 , 1121 ; Levering v. State , 2013 OK CR 19 , ¶ 6, 315 P.3d 392 , 395. ¶ 5 In Counts I, II, and III the trial court gave the jury a modified version of the uniform instruction which incorrectly stated that the 85% Rule applied only to life sentences. 2018See also Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5 , ¶ 4, 371 P.3d 1120 , 1121 ; Levering v. State , 2013 OK CR 19 , ¶ 6, 315 P.3d 392 , 395. ¶ 5 In Counts I, II, and III the trial court gave the jury a modified version of the uniform instruction which incorrectly stated that the 85% Rule applied only to life sentences. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
REED v. STATE
green
2 sentences2018Appellant has not cited to any authority where a uniform instruction on the Oklahoma Methamphetamine Registry Act has been created or required to be given to the jury. 2 ¶29 The State directs us to Reed v. State , 2016 OK CR 10 , 373 P.3d 118 and argues the reasoning used there to find a jury instruction on the Sex Offender Registration Act is not required is applicable to an instruction on the Oklahoma Methamphetamine Registry Act. 2018Appellant has not cited to any authority where a uniform instruction on the Oklahoma Methamphetamine Registry Act has been created or required to be given to the jury. 2 ¶29 The State directs us to Reed v. State , 2016 OK CR 10 , 373 P.3d 118 and argues the reasoning used there to find a jury instruction on the Sex Offender Registration Act is not required is applicable to an instruction on the Oklahoma Methamphetamine Registry Act. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Harris v. State
green
2 sentences2011We addressed similar concerns in Harris v. State, 2007 OK CR 28 , 164 P.3d 1103 , and concluded that the definition in the current uniform instruction does not prohibit jurors from properly considering mitigating evidence. 2011We addressed similar concerns in Harris v. State, 2007 OK CR 28 , 164 P.3d 1103 , and concluded that the definition in the current uniform instruction does not prohibit jurors from properly considering mitigating evidence. | 2 | 2009–2011 |
Boyde v. California
green
2 sentences2006Relying upon Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990), Myers argues the error constitutes a denial of due process and is reversible where there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in an unconstitutional manner. ¶ 64 Defense counsel did not object to this uniform instruction at trial and our review is for plain error. 2006Relying upon Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990), Myers argues the error constitutes a denial of due process and is reversible where there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in an unconstitutional manner. ¶ 64 Defense counsel did not object to this uniform instruction at trial and our review is for plain error. | 2 | 2001–2006 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2006Rojem challenged the uniform instruction, the same one given in Jackson's case, on the basis that it failed to inform jurors "of the requirement of finding inordinate conscious physical suffering." Rojem argued that the former version of the uniform instruction was inadequate because of the new instruction adopted by the Court in DeRosa and references therein to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). 2006Rojem challenged the uniform instruction, the same one given in Jackson's case, on the basis that it failed to inform jurors "of the requirement of finding inordinate conscious physical suffering." Rojem argued that the former version of the uniform instruction was inadequate because of the new instruction adopted by the Court in DeRosa and references therein to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
DeRosa v. State
green
2 sentences2006He relies, in part, on this Court's decision in DeRosa v. State, 2004 OK CR 19, ¶ 96 , 89 P.3d 1124, 1156 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1063 , 125 S.Ct. 889 , 160 L.Ed.2d 793 (2005), in which we modified and replaced the instruction given in Jackson's case [OUJI-CR(2d) 4-73 (Supp.2005)] with an instruction explicitly requiring the jury to find conscious physical suffering in order to find "serious physical abuse" or torture through "great physical anguish." [13] Jackson's case was tried before DeRosa was handed down. ¶ 37 This Court recently published a case that forecloses Jackson's position. 2006He relies, in part, on this Court's decision in DeRosa v. State, 2004 OK CR 19, ¶ 96 , 89 P.3d 1124, 1156 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1063 , 125 S.Ct. 889 , 160 L.Ed.2d 793 (2005), in which we modified and replaced the instruction given in Jackson's case [OUJI-CR(2d) 4-73 (Supp.2005)] with an instruction explicitly requiring the jury to find conscious physical suffering in order to find "serious physical abuse" or torture through "great physical anguish." [13] Jackson's case was tried before DeRosa was handed down. ¶ 37 This Court recently published a case that forecloses Jackson's position. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Krishnamurthy v. Nimmagadda
green
2 sentences1999The Willingham court noted the uniform instruction should be modified to reflect this holding and that the fifth element of the second degree depraved mind murder instruction should provide “the conduct is not done with the intention of taking the life of any particular individual.” Id. 1999The Willingham court noted the uniform instruction should be modified to reflect this holding and that the fifth element of the second degree depraved mind murder instruction should provide "the conduct is not done with the intention of taking the life of any particular individual." Id. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Ex Parte Ruble
neutral
2 sentences1963It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless ‘the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.’ Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 .” This Court upon examination of the transcript of the preliminary hearing feels that, because of the nature of the offenses charged and because it is evident that the district court and the examining magistrate both felt that the bond was in an a 1963It is the uniform rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the actions of the trial court unless ‘the bail demanded be per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved.’ Ex parte McClellan, 1 Okl.Cr. 299 , 97 P. 1019 ; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Okl.Cr. 302 , 97 P. 1021 ; Ex parte Ruble, 18 Okl.Cr. 134 , 193 P. 1009 .” This Court upon examination of the transcript of the preliminary hearing feels that, because of the nature of the offenses charged and because it is evident that the district court and the examining magistrate both felt that the bond was in an a | 2 | 1960–1963 |
Darnell v. State
green
2 sentences2018Although we have held that the word "steal" ordinarily needs no explanation in jury instructions, we have specifically approved of the following definitional explanation of this term: "Where the word 'steal' is used it means to take and carry away the property of another with the felonious intent to deprive the owner thereof, and to appropriate the same to one's own use." Darnell v. State , 1962 OK CR 23 , ¶ 17, 369 P.2d 470 , 473-74. 2018Although we have held that the word "steal" ordinarily needs no explanation in jury instructions, we have specifically approved of the following definitional explanation of this term: "Where the word 'steal' is used it means to take and carry away the property of another with the felonious intent to deprive the owner thereof, and to appropriate the same to one's own use." Darnell v. State , 1962 OK CR 23 , ¶ 17, 369 P.2d 470 , 473-74. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co.
green
2 sentences2012The State disagrees and insists that the trial court was required to alter the instructions to conform to the evidence presented. 123 Our definition of wilful neglect of duty has varied depending on the statutes in question. 25 Nevertheless, we must look at a statute's underlying intent and purpose to define it. 26 For example, recently in Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2008 OK 21 , 184 P.3d 518 , we re-examined the meaning of "wilful" in the context of several acts. 2012The State disagrees and insists that the trial court was required to alter the instructions to conform to the evidence presented. 123 Our definition of wilful neglect of duty has varied depending on the statutes in question. 25 Nevertheless, we must look at a statute's underlying intent and purpose to define it. 26 For example, recently in Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2008 OK 21 , 184 P.3d 518 , we re-examined the meaning of "wilful" in the context of several acts. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Wood v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Romano v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cargle v. State
green
2 sentences2011Cargle v. State, 1995 OK CR 77, ¶ 77 , 909 P.2d 806, 828-29 ; Instruction No. 9-45, OUJI-CR (2d). 2011Cargle v. State, 1995 OK CR 77, ¶ 77 , 909 P.2d 806, 828-29 ; Instruction No. 9-45, OUJI-CR (2d). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Cruse v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Harmon v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Liddell v. Heavner green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Chambers v. Florida green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Dowling v. United States green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Rochin v. California green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ullery v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Battenfield v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Thornburg v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Shrum v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Willingham v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Humphrey v. New York green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Traylor v. South Carolina green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Cady v. Texas green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Manning v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Savarese v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.