19 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1883–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Judicial Ditch No. 2, Houston Countygreen2 sentences1985See, e.g., Doyle v. Swanson, 205 Minn. 40, 42 , 284 N.W. 874, 875 (1939) (actual knowledge of filing is no substitute for service of notice of filing); In re Judicial Ditch No. 2, 163 Minn. 383, 385 , 202 N.W. 52, 53 (1925) (“This construction has the merit of doing away with disputes as to whether or not a party had actual notice, and will establish a uniform rule of practice * * *.”); O'Brien v. Wendt, 295 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.1980) (service of written notice of the filing by the clerk of court does not suffice). 1985See, e.g., Doyle v. Swanson, 205 Minn. 40, 42 , 284 N.W. 874, 875 (1939) (actual knowledge of filing is no substitute for service of notice of filing); In re Judicial Ditch No. 2, 163 Minn. 383, 385 , 202 N.W. 52, 53 (1925) (“This construction has the merit of doing away with disputes as to whether or not a party had actual notice, and will establish a uniform rule of practice * * *.”); O'Brien v. Wendt, 295 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.1980) (service of written notice of the filing by the clerk of court does not suffice). | 1 | 3 |
Comes v. Microsoft Corp.green2 sentences2007The desire for harmony between federal and state antitrust law relates more to prohibited conduct than to who can bring a lawsuit. “ ‘The purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is to apply a uniform standard of conduct so that businesses will know what is acceptable conduct,’ ” but “ ‘to achieve this uniformity or predictability, we are not required to define who may sue in our state courts in the same way federal courts have defined who may maintain an action in federal court.’ ” Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 206 Ariz. 9 , 75 P.3d 99, 106 (2003) (quoting Comes v. Microso 2007The desire for harmony between federal and state antitrust law relates more to prohibited conduct than to who can bring a lawsuit. “ ‘The purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is to apply a uniform standard of conduct so that businesses will know what is acceptable conduct,’ ” but “ ‘to achieve this uniformity or predictability, we are not required to define who may sue in our state courts in the same way federal courts have defined who may maintain an action in federal court.’ ” Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 206 Ariz. 9 , 75 P.3d 99, 106 (2003) (quoting Comes v. Microso | 1 | 1 |
Bunker's Glass Co. v. PILKINGTON, PLCgreen2 sentences2007The desire for harmony between federal and state antitrust law relates more to prohibited conduct than to who can bring a lawsuit. “ ‘The purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is to apply a uniform standard of conduct so that businesses will know what is acceptable conduct,’ ” but “ ‘to achieve this uniformity or predictability, we are not required to define who may sue in our state courts in the same way federal courts have defined who may maintain an action in federal court.’ ” Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 206 Ariz. 9 , 75 P.3d 99, 106 (2003) (quoting Comes v. Microso 2007The desire for harmony between federal and state antitrust law relates more to prohibited conduct than to who can bring a lawsuit. “ ‘The purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is to apply a uniform standard of conduct so that businesses will know what is acceptable conduct,’ ” but “ ‘to achieve this uniformity or predictability, we are not required to define who may sue in our state courts in the same way federal courts have defined who may maintain an action in federal court.’ ” Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 206 Ariz. 9 , 75 P.3d 99, 106 (2003) (quoting Comes v. Microso | 1 | 1 |
United States v. A. Guy Crouch, III and Michael J. Fryegreen1 sentence2005United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1523 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 711 (1st Cir.1992); 3 Wayne R. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James W. McCoygreen1 sentence2005United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1523 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 711 (1st Cir.1992); 3 Wayne R. | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. Itasca County Planning Commissiongreen1 sentence2001Id. at 385 , 202 N.W. at 53 ; cf. Graham v. Itasca County Planning Comm’n, 601 N.W.2d 461, 465 (Minn.App.1999) (relying, in part, on Judicial Ditch No. 2 in construing a similar statute). | 1 | 1 |
Goodwin v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Compare, e.g., State v. Eben, 81 Ohio App.3d 341 , 610 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (1992) (no requirement that foundation be laid on cross-examination as would be needed with prior inconsistent statements), with, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856 , 568 S.W.2d 3, 8 (1978) (necessary to give witness opportunity on cross-examination to deny out-of-court statements showing bias). 2001Compare, e.g., State v. Eben, 81 Ohio App.3d 341 , 610 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (1992) (no requirement that foundation be laid on cross-examination as would be needed with prior inconsistent statements), with, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856 , 568 S.W.2d 3, 8 (1978) (necessary to give witness opportunity on cross-examination to deny out-of-court statements showing bias). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ebengreen2 sentences2001Compare, e.g., State v. Eben, 81 Ohio App.3d 341 , 610 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (1992) (no requirement that foundation be laid on cross-examination as would be needed with prior inconsistent statements), with, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856 , 568 S.W.2d 3, 8 (1978) (necessary to give witness opportunity on cross-examination to deny out-of-court statements showing bias). 2001Compare, e.g., State v. Eben, 81 Ohio App.3d 341 , 610 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (1992) (no requirement that foundation be laid on cross-examination as would be needed with prior inconsistent statements), with, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856 , 568 S.W.2d 3, 8 (1978) (necessary to give witness opportunity on cross-examination to deny out-of-court statements showing bias). | 1 | 1 |
Doyle v. Swansongreen2 sentences1985See, e.g., Doyle v. Swanson, 205 Minn. 40, 42 , 284 N.W. 874, 875 (1939) (actual knowledge of filing is no substitute for service of notice of filing); In re Judicial Ditch No. 2, 163 Minn. 383, 385 , 202 N.W. 52, 53 (1925) (“This construction has the merit of doing away with disputes as to whether or not a party had actual notice, and will establish a uniform rule of practice * * *.”); O'Brien v. Wendt, 295 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.1980) (service of written notice of the filing by the clerk of court does not suffice). 1985See, e.g., Doyle v. Swanson, 205 Minn. 40, 42 , 284 N.W. 874, 875 (1939) (actual knowledge of filing is no substitute for service of notice of filing); In re Judicial Ditch No. 2, 163 Minn. 383, 385 , 202 N.W. 52, 53 (1925) (“This construction has the merit of doing away with disputes as to whether or not a party had actual notice, and will establish a uniform rule of practice * * *.”); O'Brien v. Wendt, 295 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.1980) (service of written notice of the filing by the clerk of court does not suffice). | 1 | 1 |
Bowman v. Pamida, Inc.green1 sentence1985The time limits imposed by Rule 59.03 “have been uniformly treated as absolute by decisions of both this court and Federal courts.” Bowman v. Pamida, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Minn.1977) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
O'BRIEN v. Wendtgreen1 sentence1985See, e.g., Doyle v. Swanson, 205 Minn. 40, 42 , 284 N.W. 874, 875 (1939) (actual knowledge of filing is no substitute for service of notice of filing); In re Judicial Ditch No. 2, 163 Minn. 383, 385 , 202 N.W. 52, 53 (1925) (“This construction has the merit of doing away with disputes as to whether or not a party had actual notice, and will establish a uniform rule of practice * * *.”); O'Brien v. Wendt, 295 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.1980) (service of written notice of the filing by the clerk of court does not suffice). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission
green
2 sentences2018The stated purpose of North Carolina law was to avoid consumer confusion by ensuring "a single uniform standard." Id. at 349 , 97 S.Ct. at 2444 . 2018The stated purpose of North Carolina law was to avoid consumer confusion by ensuring "a single uniform standard." Id. at 349 , 97 S.Ct. at 2444 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Nelson v. Sandkamp
green
1 sentence2010Noting that section 645.15 is a codification of a common-law time-computation method, we stated in Nelson that “in making [section] 645.15 expressive of the common-law rule, the legislature intended to provide a certain and uniform rule for the computation of periods of time prescribed or fixed in all statutes, except in those cases where the statutory terms affirmatively indicate the contrary.” 227 Minn, at 181-82, 34 N.W.2d at 643 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bracy v. Gramley
green
2 sentences2005Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 . 2005Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Stoltzmann v. County of Ramsey
green
2 sentences1998At any rate, they constitute the best regulation the law can establish.” Id. at 193 , 251 N.W.2d at 134 (quoting 3 Cooley, Taxation (4 ed.), § 1062, p. 2140). 1998At any rate, they constitute the best regulation the law can establish.” Id. at 193 , 251 N.W.2d at 134 (quoting 3 Cooley, Taxation (4 ed.), § 1062, p. 2140). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Swain v. Alabama
red
2 sentences1985While the court could have allowed the challenge, we do not believe that the court clearly abused its discretion in not doing so and we therefore conclude that defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this ground. 1 The advantages of the uni *312 form rule are discussed as follows in III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 15-2.6 at 15.70 (1980): The Supreme Court observed in Swain v. Alabama [ 380 U.S. 202, 218 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 834 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)] that the approach [used in the uniform rule], as opposed to other types of peremptory challenge, has been praised “as a fairer system 1985While the court could have allowed the challenge, we do not believe that the court clearly abused its discretion in not doing so and we therefore conclude that defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this ground. 1 The advantages of the uni *312 form rule are discussed as follows in III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 15-2.6 at 15.70 (1980): The Supreme Court observed in Swain v. Alabama [ 380 U.S. 202, 218 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 834 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)] that the approach [used in the uniform rule], as opposed to other types of peremptory challenge, has been praised “as a fairer system | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul
green
1 sentence1980Id. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Gray v. Childs
neutral
2 sentences1964Lindsey v. Tollison, 100 S. C. 165, 174, 84 S. E. 819, 821 , the court held: “* * * [I]n determining what was or was not done by the Senate, the Journal must be considered as a whole, as any other record would be.” In Gray v. Childs, 115 Fla. 816 , 156 So. 274 , the court held: “[The] Legislature is empowered while it is in session to make its records speak truth and to record in its journal true history of proceedings, and proceedings as written and approved by Legislature while in session are controlling data as to session’s proceedings.” It is the uniform rule that parliamentary rules, such 1964Lindsey v. Tollison, 100 S. C. 165, 174, 84 S. E. 819, 821 , the court held: “* * * [I]n determining what was or was not done by the Senate, the Journal must be considered as a whole, as any other record would be.” In Gray v. Childs, 115 Fla. 816 , 156 So. 274 , the court held: “[The] Legislature is empowered while it is in session to make its records speak truth and to record in its journal true history of proceedings, and proceedings as written and approved by Legislature while in session are controlling data as to session’s proceedings.” It is the uniform rule that parliamentary rules, such | 1 | 1964–1964 |
State Ex Rel. Lindsey v. Tollison
neutral
2 sentences1964Lindsey v. Tollison, 100 S. C. 165, 174, 84 S. E. 819, 821 , the court held: “* * * [I]n determining what was or was not done by the Senate, the Journal must be considered as a whole, as any other record would be.” In Gray v. Childs, 115 Fla. 816 , 156 So. 274 , the court held: “[The] Legislature is empowered while it is in session to make its records speak truth and to record in its journal true history of proceedings, and proceedings as written and approved by Legislature while in session are controlling data as to session’s proceedings.” It is the uniform rule that parliamentary rules, such 1964Lindsey v. Tollison, 100 S.C. 165, 174 , 84 S.E. 819, 821 , the court held: *168 "* * * [I]n determining what was or was not done by the Senate, the Journal must be considered as a whole, as any other record would be." In Gray v. Childs, 115 Fla. 816 , 156 So. 274 , the court held: "[The] Legislature is empowered while it is in session to make its records speak truth and to record in its journal true history of proceedings, and proceedings as written and approved by Legislature while in session are controlling data as to session's proceedings." It is the uniform rule that parliamentary rules, | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Nicol v. City of St. Paul
neutral
2 sentences1949Section 465.09 (c. 391, § 1), as we have held in the Freeman case ( 219 Minn. 202 , 17 N. W. [2d] 364) and the cases there cited, was intended to prescribe a uniform rule throughout the state, and, like its predecessor (L. 1897, c. 248), operated, under the rule of the Nicol case ( 80 Minn. 415 , 83 N. W. 375 ), to repeal and supersede all charter provisions of the city of St. 1949Section 465.09 (c. 391, § 1), as we have held in the Freeman case ( 219 Minn. 202 , 17 N. W. [2d] 364) and the cases there cited, was intended to prescribe a uniform rule throughout the state, and, like its predecessor (L. 1897, c. 248), operated, under the rule of the Nicol case ( 80 Minn. 415 , 83 N. W. 375 ), to repeal and supersede all charter provisions of the city of St. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Freeman v. City of Minneapolis
green
2 sentences1949Freeman v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 202 , 17 N. W. (2d) 364 . 1949Section 465.09 (c. 391, § 1), as we have held in the Freeman case ( 219 Minn. 202 , 17 N. W. [2d] 364) and the cases there cited, was intended to prescribe a uniform rule throughout the state, and, like its predecessor (L. 1897, c. 248), operated, under the rule of the Nicol case ( 80 Minn. 415 , 83 N. W. 375 ), to repeal and supersede all charter provisions of the city of St. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Johnson v. City of Duluth
neutral
2 sentences1945We have held in several cases that the legislative act in respect to the method and procedure of presenting claims against municipalities was “intended to establish a uniform rule which should apply to all municipalities, thus avoiding the confusion arising out of the many dissimilar provisions contained in their various charters.” Johnson v. City of Duluth, 133 Minn. 405, 408 , 158 N. W. 616, 617 . 1945We have held in several cases that the legislative act in respect to the method and procedure of presenting claims against municipalities was “intended to establish a uniform rule which should apply to all municipalities, thus avoiding the confusion arising out of the many dissimilar provisions contained in their various charters.” Johnson v. City of Duluth, 133 Minn. 405, 408 , 158 N. W. 616, 617 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Mulcrevy, & Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. City & County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence1926After prescribing the fees in naturalization proceedings, the act, in the fourth paragraph of section 13, provides that the clerk collecting such fees “is hereby authorized to retain one-half * * *; the remaining one-half * * * shall be accounted for in their quarterly accounts, which they are hereby required to render the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.” On the point here involved, that law did not receive construction at the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States until 1913, when it was dealt with in Mulcrevy v. City and County of San Francisco, 231 U. S. 669 , 34 Sup. Ct. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Loan Assn. v. Topeka
green
1 sentence1904Loan Assn. v. Topeka, supra; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487 , 1 Sup. Ct. 442; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 6 ; Allen v. Inhabitants, 60 Me. 124 ; Weismer v. Village, 64 N. Y. 91 ; In re Eureka B. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Parkersburg v. Brown
green
1 sentence1904Loan Assn. v. Topeka, supra; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487 , 1 Sup. Ct. 442; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 6 ; Allen v. Inhabitants, 60 Me. 124 ; Weismer v. Village, 64 N. Y. 91 ; In re Eureka B. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| De Gogorza v. . Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Weismer v. . Village of Douglas
green
1 sentence1904Loan Assn. v. Topeka, supra; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487 , 1 Sup. Ct. 442; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 6 ; Allen v. Inhabitants, 60 Me. 124 ; Weismer v. Village, 64 N. Y. 91 ; In re Eureka B. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Billings v. Accident Insurance Co. of North America
green
1 sentence1904Scarth v. Security, 75 Iowa, 348 , 39 N. W. 658 ; Pierce v. Travelers, 34 Wis. 389 ; Billings v. Accident, 64 Vt. 78 , 24 Atl. 656; De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker, 65 N. Y. 232 ; Riley v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Pierce v. Travelers' Life Insurance Co.
neutral
1 sentence1904Scarth v. Security, 75 Iowa, 348 , 39 N. W. 658 ; Pierce v. Travelers, 34 Wis. 389 ; Billings v. Accident, 64 Vt. 78 , 24 Atl. 656; De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker, 65 N. Y. 232 ; Riley v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay
green
1 sentence1904Loan Assn. v. Topeka, supra; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487 , 1 Sup. Ct. 442; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 6 ; Allen v. Inhabitants, 60 Me. 124 ; Weismer v. Village, 64 N. Y. 91 ; In re Eureka B. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Scarth v. Security Mutual Life Society
neutral
1 sentence1904Scarth v. Security, 75 Iowa, 348 , 39 N. W. 658 ; Pierce v. Travelers, 34 Wis. 389 ; Billings v. Accident, 64 Vt. 78 , 24 Atl. 656; De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker, 65 N. Y. 232 ; Riley v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Curry v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. green | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.