uniform instruction in Oregon

2025We have concluded that “[i]t is plain error to fail to instruct the jury on all material elements of a crime” and “to fail to instruct the jury on the elements of a defense or limita- tions on a defense.” State v. Worsham, 332 Or App 154 , 162- 63, 548 P3d 849 , rev allowed, 372 Or 787 (2024); cf. State v. Moravek, 297 Or App 763, 773 , 444 P3d 521 , rev den, 365 Or 533 (2019) (“We are aware of no cases, and the parties have presented none, in which a trial court erred for failing to sua sponte instruct a jury on either an affirmative defense or a defense that had not been raised by [the] defe

2025We have concluded that “[i]t is plain error to fail to instruct the jury on all material elements of a crime” and “to fail to instruct the jury on the elements of a defense or limita- tions on a defense.” State v. Worsham, 332 Or App 154 , 162- 63, 548 P3d 849 , rev allowed, 372 Or 787 (2024); cf. State v. Moravek, 297 Or App 763, 773 , 444 P3d 521 , rev den, 365 Or 533 (2019) (“We are aware of no cases, and the parties have presented none, in which a trial court erred for failing to sua sponte instruct a jury on either an affirmative defense or a defense that had not been raised by [the] defe

2025Rather, we understand defendant to argue that the trial court plainly erred in failing to give the uniform instruction because the record contained “many, many instances of indirect vouching, even if it wasn’t direct vouching.”2 We have reviewed the record and conclude that any error is not “obvious.” State v. Gaines, 275 Or App 736, 746 , 365 P3d 1103 (2015) (“[F]or us to decide whether instructional error is plain error, our analysis is normally 2 Although defendant’s brief lists 27 pages from the trial transcript as exam- ples of vouching, he identifies only a few specific statements that h

2025Rather, we understand defendant to argue that the trial court plainly erred in failing to give the uniform instruction because the record contained “many, many instances of indirect vouching, even if it wasn’t direct vouching.”2 We have reviewed the record and conclude that any error is not “obvious.” State v. Gaines, 275 Or App 736, 746 , 365 P3d 1103 (2015) (“[F]or us to decide whether instructional error is plain error, our analysis is normally 2 Although defendant’s brief lists 27 pages from the trial transcript as exam- ples of vouching, he identifies only a few specific statements that h

2025Rather, we understand defendant to argue that the trial court plainly erred in failing to give the uniform instruction because the record contained “many, many instances of indirect vouching, even if it wasn’t direct vouching.”2 We have reviewed the record and conclude that any error is not “obvious.” State v. Gaines, 275 Or App 736, 746 , 365 P3d 1103 (2015) (“[F]or us to decide whether instructional error is plain error, our analysis is normally 2 Although defendant’s brief lists 27 pages from the trial transcript as exam- ples of vouching, he identifies only a few specific statements that h

2025Rather, we understand defendant to argue that the trial court plainly erred in failing to give the uniform instruction because the record contained “many, many instances of indirect vouching, even if it wasn’t direct vouching.”2 We have reviewed the record and conclude that any error is not “obvious.” State v. Gaines, 275 Or App 736, 746 , 365 P3d 1103 (2015) (“[F]or us to decide whether instructional error is plain error, our analysis is normally 2 Although defendant’s brief lists 27 pages from the trial transcript as exam- ples of vouching, he identifies only a few specific statements that h

2024State v. Sharinghousen, 279 Or App 593 , 597 n 3, 379 P3d 728 (2016).

2024State v. Sharinghousen, 279 Or App 593 , 597 n 3, 379 P3d 728 (2016).

2024Considering defendant’s argument on its merits, in State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 477-78 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995), we 2 The uniform instruction was revised in 2012 to omit that sentence.

2024Considering defendant’s argument on its merits, in State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 477-78 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995), we 2 The uniform instruction was revised in 2012 to omit that sentence.

2012The court held that in such circumstances the trial court should not give the portion of the uniform instruction that provides that an officer may use a degree of physical force that the officer reasonably believes is necessary to effectuate an arrest, explaining that that portion of the instruction “insert[s] an irrelevant issue — the arresting officers’ actual state of mind — into the jury’s deliberations concerning [the defendant’s] claim of self defense,” id., and “impermissi-bly shifts the focus of the jury’s deliberations on a defendant’s self-defense claim from what the defendant reason

2012The court held that in such circumstances the trial court should not give the portion of the uniform instruction that provides that an officer may use a degree of physical force that the officer reasonably believes is necessary to effectuate an arrest, explaining that that portion of the instruction “insert[s] an irrelevant issue — the arresting officers’ actual state of mind — into the jury’s deliberations concerning [the defendant’s] claim of self defense,” id., and “impermissi-bly shifts the focus of the jury’s deliberations on a defendant’s self-defense claim from what the defendant reason

2007Resisting a conclusion of the requirement of rulemaking, the department cites Swenson v. Dept. of Rev. , 6 OTR 234 , 238-39 (1975), aff'd 276 Or 1 , 553 P2d 351 (1976), for the proposition that an administrative rule is not required for application of valuation methods under ORS 308.205 .

2007Resisting a conclusion of the requirement of rulemaking, the department cites Swenson v. Dept. of Rev. , 6 OTR 234 , 238-39 (1975), aff'd 276 Or 1 , 553 P2d 351 (1976), for the proposition that an administrative rule is not required for application of valuation methods under ORS 308.205 .

2007Resisting a conclusion of the requirement of rulemaking, the department cites Swenson v. Dept. of Rev. , 6 OTR 234 , 238-39 (1975), aff'd 276 Or 1 , 553 P2d 351 (1976), for the proposition that an administrative rule is not required for application of valuation methods under ORS 308.205 .

2007Resisting a conclusion of the requirement of rule-making, the department cites Swenson v. Dept. of Rev. , 6 OTR 234 , 238-39 (1975), aff'd , 276 Or 1 , 7 , 553 P2d 351 (1976), for the proposition that an administrative rule is not required for application of valuation methods under ORS 308.205 .

1982We have chosen to reject the view that exertion or stress can never be a causative factor in these cases.’ 253 Or at 402 .

1982We have chosen to reject the view that exertion or stress can never be a causative factor in these cases.” 253 Or at 402 .

2026Id. at 119 .

2025The uniform instruction comports with the text of ORS 163.135(1) and with Supreme Court’s discussion in Counts of the third element of the EED defense, which the court characterized as a largely objective inquiry and only a “narrowed * * * subjective scope of inquiry.” 311 Or at 625 - 27.

2025The uniform instruction comports with the text of ORS 163.135(1) and with Supreme Court’s discussion in Counts of the third element of the EED defense, which the court characterized as a largely objective inquiry and only a “narrowed * * * subjective scope of inquiry.” 311 Or at 625 - 27.

2024In the end, what the court needed to convey to the jury was that the “initial aggressor” is the person who first engages in an overt act of hostility, and that “mere words” do not make a person the “initial aggressor” unless accompanied by an overt act of hostility.5 In sum, we agree with defendant that, on this record, it is obvious that the court needed to instruct the 5 There is currently no uniform jury instruction on the meaning of “initial aggressor,” although the comment to the uniform instruction on the initial- aggressor limitation notes that “ ‘provocation by mere words’ does not cau

2023See, e.g., State v. Lopez-Minjarez, 350 Or 576, 583, n 4 , 260 P3d 439 (2011); State v. Vanornum, 273 Or App 263 , 356 P3d 1161 (2015) (holding that a trial court’s use of a uniform instruction constituted plain error and exercising discretion to correct that error); see also UCrJI § 1.4 (“The uniform instructions are only a framework for building a set of instructions.

2023See, e.g., State v. Lopez-Minjarez, 350 Or 576, 583, n 4 , 260 P3d 439 (2011); State v. Vanornum, 273 Or App 263 , 356 P3d 1161 (2015) (holding that a trial court’s use of a uniform instruction constituted plain error and exercising discretion to correct that error); see also UCrJI § 1.4 (“The uniform instructions are only a framework for building a set of instructions.

2022State v. Eumana-Moranchel, 352 Or 1, 7-8 , 277 P3d 549 (2012) (“[T]he state can prove that the person was ‘under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or an inhalant,’ that is, that the defendant was adversely affected by intoxicants to a per- ceptible degree, ORS 813.010(1)(b), (c).” (Emphasis added.)).

2022State v. Eumana-Moranchel, 352 Or 1, 7-8 , 277 P3d 549 (2012) (“[T]he state can prove that the person was ‘under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or an inhalant,’ that is, that the defendant was adversely affected by intoxicants to a per- ceptible degree, ORS 813.010(1)(b), (c).” (Emphasis added.)).

2021The whole premise of the uniform instruction is that the jury has to conclude that the defendant is subject to the ELL.” 7 In fact, the court did instruct the jury on Polygon’s “sole fault of another party” defense, which was similarly phrased: “Defendant next contends that because Wood Mechanix has already agreed to comply with basic OSHA rules, * * * the [ELL] and any other applicable governmental safety regulations, those contractual duties remained the sole responsibility of Wood Mechanix, regardless of what other measures Tanasbourne or Polygon might request in other parts of the subcontr

2021Joshi at least sometimes discusses the appli- cability of the substantial-factor instruction in cases in which there are multiple causes of the plaintiff’s injury; its analysis is not limited to cases in which there are multi- ple tortfeasors. 342 Or at 161-62 .

2020Cler, 349 Or at 492 .

2020Thus, although the Supreme Court did not issue a decision holding that the uniform instruction was legally incorrect until after the Wade petitioner’s trial, when it did so, “the court did not have to confront any appellate decision that had held that [that instruction] was good law.” Id. (emphasis in orig- inal); see also Walraven v. Premo, 277 Or App 264, 287 , 372 P3d 1 (2016) (reversing post-conviction court’s denial of relief, based on trial counsel’s failure to object to same instruction). at the petitioner’s October 2000 trial on sexual abuse charges, where that testi- mony was admissib

2018State v. Lawson , 352 Or. 724 , 291 P.3d 673 (2012)." In response to defendant's proposed instruction, the state argued not that defendant's proposed instruction was incomplete or biased but, instead, that no special instruction on eyewitness identification was appropriate at all, and that the uniform instruction sufficed on the issue.

2018State v. Lawson , 352 Or. 724 , 291 P.3d 673 (2012)." In response to defendant's proposed instruction, the state argued not that defendant's proposed instruction was incomplete or biased but, instead, that no special instruction on eyewitness identification was appropriate at all, and that the uniform instruction sufficed on the issue.

2016Although Anlauf did not explicitly render the instruction obsolete (an issue we were not called upon to decide), we did establish that the erroneous accomplice liability theory—that a defendant who participates in one crime is necessarily responsible as an accomplice for other crimes that were the natural and probable consequences of the intended predicate crime—was not supported by statutes or case law. 164 Or App at 678 .