uniform rule in North Carolina

1936As the Court said in Whisnant v. Price, 175 N. C., 611 , the uniform rule is that no action will lie against the personal representative of the deceased person except upon some claim which existed against the deceased in his lifetime and for a claim accruing wholly in the time of. the administration, the administrator is liable only in his personal character.

1936As the Court said in Whisnant v. Price , 175 N.C. 611 , the uniform rule is that no action will lie against the personal representative of the deceased person except upon some claim which existed against the deceased in his lifetime and for a claim accruing wholly in the time of the administration, the administrator is liable only in his personal character.

1936Code, 1935 (Michie), sec. 7911 (13) — “All property, real and personal, within jurisdiction of the State, not especially exempted, shall be subject to taxation.” Sec. 7971 (18)— “Personal property shall include: (10) All other personal property not herein enumerated and not expressly exempted by law.” In Latta v. Jenkins, 200 N. C., 255 (258), it is said: “By virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article Y of the Constitution of North Carolina, all property, real and personal, in this State is subject to taxation, in accordance with a uniform rule, under laws which the General Assembly is r

1933In Latta v. Jenkins, 200 N. C., 255 , 156 S. E., 857 , it is said: “By virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article Y of the Constitution of North Carolina, all property, real and personal, in this State, is subject to taxation, in accordance with a uniform rule, under laws which the General Assembly is required by the Constitution to enact, without regard to its ownership, and without regard to the purposes for which specific property is held, unless exempted by or under the provisions of section 5 of said Article.

1916Kyle v. Comrs., 75 N. C., 445 .

1893Kyle v. Commissioners, 75 N. C., 445 .

1915R., 87 N. C., 255 : ‘The rigid rules of the common law with reference to the liability of common carriers should not be applied to a case involving the violation of a penal statute.’ Such has been the uniform rule of construction from the earliest times.” And in Cox v. R.

1915R. , 87 N.C. 255 : `The rigid rules of the common law with reference to the liability of common carriers should not be applied to a case involving the violation of a penal statute.' Such has been the uniform rule of construction from the earliest times." And in Cox v. R.

2001Plaintiffs note that, "if the standard of care for a given procedure is `the same across the country, an expert witness familiar with that standard may testify despite his lack of familiarity with the defendant's community[.]'" Marley v. Graper, 135 N.C.App. 423, 428 , 521 S.E.2d 129, 134 (1999) (quoting Haney v. Alexander, 71 N.C.App. 731, 736 , 323 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 329 , 327 S.E.2d 889 (1985)), cert. denied, 351 N.C. 358 , 542 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

2001Plaintiffs note that, "if the standard of care for a given procedure is `the same across the country, an expert witness familiar with that standard may testify despite his lack of familiarity with the defendant's community[.]'" Marley v. Graper, 135 N.C.App. 423, 428 , 521 S.E.2d 129, 134 (1999) (quoting Haney v. Alexander, 71 N.C.App. 731, 736 , 323 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 329 , 327 S.E.2d 889 (1985)), cert. denied, 351 N.C. 358 , 542 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

1971V, sec. 3) says that the Legislature shall tax by a uniform rule all moneys, etc., and all property according to its value in money, and that it may also tax trades, etc. Although it is not expressly provided that the tax on trades, etc., shall be uniform, yet a tax not uniform, as properly understood, would .be so inconsistent with natural justice, and with the intent which is apparent in the section of the Constitution above cited, that it may be admitted that the collection of such a tax would be restricted as unconstitutional.” Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119 .

1971V, sec. 3) says that the Legislature shall tax by a uniform rule all moneys, etc., and all property according to its value in money, and that it may also tax trades, etc. Although it is not expressly provided that the tax on trades, etc., shall be uniform, yet a tax not uniform, as properly understood, would be so inconsistent with natural justice, and with the intent which is apparent in the section of the Constitution above cited, that it may be admitted that the collection of such a tax would be restricted as unconstitutional." Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119 . *487 "Uniformity, in its legal

1971It is defined by Mr. Justice MILLER in the [State] Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 , [ 23 L.Ed. 663 ], and the definition accepted as correct by this court in Puitt v. Gaston County Com'rs., 94 N.C. 709 , to consist in putting the same tax upon all of the same class; that is, while the same tax must be imposed upon all innkeepers, upon all railroads, and so throughout, a tax discriminating among persons of the same class, whereby some are required to pay more than others, would lack uniformity." State v. Powell, 100 N.C. 525 , 6 S.E. 424 .

1912In this respect tbe Constitution “shows no favor and allows no discretion.” Wiley v. Commissioners, 111 N. C., 397 ; Puitt v. Commissioners, 94 N. C., 709 ; Vaughan v. Murfreesboro, 96 N. C., 319 .

1954Guano Co. v. Biddle, 158 N.C. 212 , 73 S.E. 996 .

1934Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Biddle, 158 N. C., 212 .

1937S., 535 is as follows: “In the construction of a pleading for the purpose of determining its effect its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” In Blackmore v. Winders, 144 N. C., 212 (215-16), speaking to the subject we find: “The uniform rule prevailing under our present system is that, for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning and determining the effect of a pleading, its allegations shall be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.

1937S., 535 is as follows: "In the construction of a pleading for the purpose of determining its effect its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties." In Blackmore v. Winders , 144 N.C. 212 (215-16), speaking to the subject we find: "The uniform rule prevailing under our present system is that, for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning and determining the effect of a pleading, its allegations shall be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.

1936Snipes v. Monds, ante, 190.” Hall v. Trust Co., 200 N. C., 734, 739 .

1936Snipes v. Monds, ante , 190." Hall v. Trust Co. , 200 N.C. 734 , 739 .

1930The uniform rule adopted by this Court is to the general effect that such questions will not be considered.” “The appeal therefore raises a question which is abstract or academic.” Board of Education v. Commissioners of Johnston, 198 N. C., 430 .

1930The uniform rule adopted by this Court is to the general effect that such questions will not be considered." "The appeal therefore raises a question which is abstract or academic." Board of Education v. Commissioners of Johnston , 198 N.C. 430 .

1926In S. v. Tenant, 110 N. C., p. 609, "Mission Hospital case’’ tbe ordinance was as follows: “That no person, firm or corporation shall build or erect within the limits of the city any house or building of any kind or character, or otherwise add to, build upon or generally improve or change any house or building, without having -first applied to the aldermen and obtained a permission for such purpose.” The Court said: “If an ordinance is passed by a municipal corporation, which, upon its face, restricts the right of dominion which the individual might otherwise exercise without question, not acc

1926In S. v. Tenant , 110 N.C. p. 609 , " Mission Hospital case ," the ordinance was as follows: "That no person, firm, or corporation shall build or erect within the limits of the city and house or building of any kind or character, or otherwise add to, build upon or generally improve or change any house or building, without having first applied to the aldermen and obtained a permission for such purpose." The Court said: "If an ordinance is passed by a municipal corporation, which, upon its face, restrict the right of dominion which the individual might otherwise exercise without question, not ac

1926R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. O., 36); and further: If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an *371 express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1917R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. C., 36 ) ; and further: “If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1926R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. O., 36); and further: If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an *371 express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1917R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. C., 36 ) ; and further: “If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1926R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. O., 36); and further: If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an *371 express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1917R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. C., 36 ) ; and further: “If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1926R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. O., 36); and further: If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an *371 express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1917R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. C., 36 ) ; and further: “If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1926R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. O., 36); and further: If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an *371 express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1917R., 118 N. C., 1096 , approved in White v. Ely, 145 N. C., 36 ) ; and further: “If the complaint is so worded that under the liberal procedure of The Code it could have been construed to be either an action on an express or implied contract (Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C., 394 ; Fulps v. Mock, 108 N. C., 601 ; Holden v. Warren, 118 N. C., 326 ) or either in tort or contract (Brittain v. Payne, 118 N. C., 989 , Schulhofer v. R.

1915R., 148 N. C., 459, 460 , the Court said, in discussing the same subject: “It is a well-established principle of law, applicable to corporations and individuals alike, that penal statutes are strictly construed, and that he who sues to recover a penalty awarded by the law must bring his case clearly within the language and meaning of the law.

1915R. , 148 N.C. 459 , 460 , the Court said, in discussing the same subject: "It is a well-established principle of law, applicable to corporations and individuals alike, that penal statutes are strictly construed, and that he who sues to recover a penalty awarded by the law must bring his case clearly within the language and meaning of the law.