explained standard in Alabama

2014II. ■ Marshall contends that juror M.J., juror T.C., and juror W.P. failed to truthfully answer questions propounded to them during voir dire and, further, argues that juror M.J. introduced “extraneous information” during the jury-deliberation process. 10 A. Juror Misconduct — Voir Dire This' Court has articulated the following in reviewing juror-misconduct claims arising from a juror’s failure to truthfully answer questions during voir dire: “Tn [Ex parte] Dobyne, [ 805 So.2d 763 (Ala.2001),] this Court explained the standard for granting a new trial based on a juror’s failure to answer quest

2011(McWhorter’s brief, p. 38.) This Court has articulated the following in reviewing juror-misconduct claims: “ ‘In [Ex parte ] Dobyne, [ 805 So.2d 763 (Ala.2001),] this Court explained the standard for granting a new trial based on a juror’s failure to answer questions on voir dire truthfully: “ ‘ “The proper standard for determining whether juror misconduct warrants a new trial, as set out by this Court’s precedent, is whether the misconduct might have prejudiced, not whether it actually did prejudice, the defendant.

2025Nobis v. State, 401 So. 2d 191 (Ala. Crim.

2024Nobis v. State, 401 So. 2d 191 (Ala. Crim.

2012Musgrove alleges that newly discovered evidence “demonstrates that [he] was denied a fair trial and is innocent.” (Mus-grove’s brief, p. 13.) “In Boyd v. State, 746 So.2d 364 (Ala. Crim.App.1999), this Court explained the standard applicable to claims of newly discovered evidence: “‘Under Rule 32.1, Ala. R.Crim.

2011In Boyd v. State, 746 So.2d 364 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), this Court explained the standard applicable to claims of newly discovered evidence: “Under Rule 32.1, Ala. R.Crim.

2010Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997).

2007Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997).

2010“In Jones v. ARD Contracting, Inc., 910 So.2d 132 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), this court explained the requirement of notice under § 25-5-78 and how that requirement may be satisfied by oral notice instead of the written notice contemplated by the statute. “ ‘ “Section 25-5-78, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that ‘no *307 compensation shall be payable [to an injured employee] unless written notice is given within 90 days after the occurrence of the accident....’ ‘An employee is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits if [he] fails to provide notice.’ ” “ ‘Premdor Corp. v. Jones, 88

2009Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no compensation shall be payable unless written notice is given within 90 days after the occurrence of the accident or, if death results, within 90 days after the death.” In Jones v. ARD Contracting, Inc., 910 So.2d 132 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), this court explained the requirement of notice under § 25-5-78 and how that requirement may be satisfied by oral notice instead of the written notice contemplated by the statute. “‘Section 25-5-78, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that “no compensation shall be payable [to an injured employee] u

2010“The purpose of this section is to enable an employer to make a speedy examination, afford proper treatment and protect himself against simulated or exaggerated claims.” Gold Kist, Inc. v. Dumas, 442 So.2d 115, 116 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (citing Ex parte Stith Coal Co., 213 Ala. 399 , 104 So. 756 (1925)). “ ‘....

2009Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no compensation shall be payable unless written notice is given within 90 days after the occurrence of the accident or, if death results, within 90 days after the death.” In Jones v. ARD Contracting, Inc., 910 So.2d 132 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), this court explained the requirement of notice under § 25-5-78 and how that requirement may be satisfied by oral notice instead of the written notice contemplated by the statute. “‘Section 25-5-78, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that “no compensation shall be payable [to an injured employee] u

2010“The purpose of this section is to enable an employer to make a speedy examination, afford proper treatment and protect himself against simulated or exaggerated claims.” Gold Kist, Inc. v. Dumas, 442 So.2d 115, 116 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (citing Ex parte Stith Coal Co., 213 Ala. 399 , 104 So. 756 (1925)). “ ‘....

2009Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no compensation shall be payable unless written notice is given within 90 days after the occurrence of the accident or, if death results, within 90 days after the death.” In Jones v. ARD Contracting, Inc., 910 So.2d 132 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), this court explained the requirement of notice under § 25-5-78 and how that requirement may be satisfied by oral notice instead of the written notice contemplated by the statute. “‘Section 25-5-78, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that “no compensation shall be payable [to an injured employee] u

2026In Brizendine, this court explained that the test for permanent total disability is applied conjunctively so that the trial court must determine that an employee meets all the statutory criteria to be found permanently and totally disabled. 575 So. 2d at 574 .

2017In Perdue v. Green , 127 So.3d 343 , 356 (Ala. 2012), this Court explained the standard of review applicable in appeals such as these where objectors seek appellate review of a trial court's judgment approving the settlement of a class action: " '[T]he standard of review applicable to a trial court's approval of a proposed settlement of a class action is as follows: " ' "There can be no settlement [of a class action] without the trial court's approval.

2015Compass Bank v. Snow, 823 So.2d 667 (Ala.2001).

2015The court explained that that rule specifically retains the requirement of Rule 14.4(a) that the court must “personally address the defendant.” See also Bozeman v. State, 686 So.2d 556 , 558 n. 1 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (noting that if a trial court uses forms to comply with Rule 14.4, it must “ ‘specifically question[ ] the. defendant on the record as to each item in the form.

2013In Johnson , the Court explained that the rule holding that properties on opposite sides of a public road are contiguous for annexation purposes comports with common sense because both properties would have equal access to existing city services “such as police and fire protection, school bus routes, utility services, and similar functions of city government.” 551 So.2d at 944-45 .

2012However, in AALAR, this Court explained that the test this Court had been applying with regard to claims for emotional-distress damages, including the test applied in Taylor , was “consistent with the ‘zone of danger’ test discussed in [Consolidated Rail Corp. v.] Gottshall, [ 512 U.S. 532 (1994) ].” 716 So.2d at 1147 .

2012However, in AALAR, this Court explained that the test this Court had been applying with regard to claims for emotional-distress damages, including the test applied in Taylor , was “consistent with the ‘zone of danger’ test discussed in [Consolidated Rail Corp. v.] Gottshall, [ 512 U.S. 532 (1994) ].” 716 So.2d at 1147 .

2012In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994), the United States Supreme Court stated that “the zone of danger test limits recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.” 512 U.S. at 547-48 .

2012The Court explained that its analysis did not create a “‘rigid, per se” rule that requires defense counsel to do a complete review of the file on any prior conviction introduced.’ Id. at 389 , 125 S.Ct. 2456 .

2012The Court explained that its analysis did not create a “‘rigid, per se” rule that requires defense counsel to do a complete review of the file on any prior conviction introduced.’ Id. at 389 , 125 S.Ct. 2456 .

2012This Court explained the standard of review applicable to Schramm’s appeal in Ex parte City of Fairhope, 739 So.2d 35 (Ala.1999), in which we considered the City of Fairhope’s argument that the Court of Civil Appeals had improperly reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the City of Fairhope’s issuance of a permit authorizing a second-floor addition to a grandfathered nonconforming garage that did not meet the side-yard setback requirement.

2011We consider this particular provision of § 34-24-367 as being intended to address where judicial review is to be commenced and maintained, not how it is to be commenced or maintained, particularly in light of the fact that this provision was in place at the time the Court of Civil Appeals decided Eitzen v. Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama, 709 So.2d 1239 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) [ (dismissing an appeal from an order of the Commission when the appellant failed to file a notice of appeal with the Commission) ]....” Eley, 904 So.2d at 274 n. 2.

2011We consider this particular provision of § 34-24-367 as being intended to address where judicial review is to be commenced and maintained, not how it is to be commenced or maintained, particularly in light of the fact that this provision was in place at the time the Court of Civil Appeals decided Eitzen v. Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama, 709 So.2d 1239 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) [(dismissing an appeal from an order of the Commission when the appellant failed to file a notice of appeal with the Commission) ]...." Eley, 904 So.2d at 274 n. 2.

2011We consider this particular provision of § 34-24-367 as being intended to address where judicial review is to be commenced and maintained, not how it is to be commenced or maintained, particularly in light of the fact that this provision was in place at the time the Court of Civil Appeals decided Eitzen v. Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama, 709 So.2d 1239 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) [ (dismissing an appeal from an order of the Commission when the appellant failed to file a notice of appeal with the Commission) ]....” Eley, 904 So.2d at 274 n. 2.

2011We consider this particular provision of § 34-24-367 as being intended to address where judicial review is to be commenced and maintained, not how it is to be commenced or maintained, particularly in light of the fact that this provision was in place at the time the Court of Civil Appeals decided Eitzen v. Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama, 709 So.2d 1239 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) [(dismissing an appeal from an order of the Commission when the appellant failed to file a notice of appeal with the Commission) ]...." Eley, 904 So.2d at 274 n. 2.

2011When reviewing a juror-misconduct claim, this Court applies the standard articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Dixon, 55 So.3d 1257 (Ala.2010): “In [Ex parte ] Dobyne, [ 805 So.2d 763 (Ala.2001),] this Court explained the standard for granting a new trial based on a juror’s failure to answer questions on voir dire truthfully: “ ‘The proper standard for determining whether juror misconduct warrants a new trial, as set out by this Court’s precedent, is whether the misconduct might have prejudiced, not whether it actually did prejudice, the defendant.

2010The Court explained that the requirement that the police have a warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances “is imposed to protect the home, and anything incriminating the police gathered from arresting [a defendant] in his home, rather than elsewhere.... ” Harris, 495 U.S. at 20 ..