explained standard in West Virginia

2015This Court explained the standard of review in such appeals in syllabus point one of Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588 , 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996), in which we said that [o]n appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in [West Virginia] Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

2015This Court explained the standard of review in such appeals in syllabus point one of Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588 , 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996), in which we said that [o]n appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in [West Virginia] Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

2009In State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294 , 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996), this Court explained the standard of review for a Rule 404(b) issue as follows: The standard of review for a trial court's admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) involves a three-step analysis.

2009In State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294 , 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996), this Court explained the standard of review for a Rule 404(b) issue as follows: The standard of review for a trial court's admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) involves a three-step analysis.

2021In syllabus point one of State v. Wilson, 237 W.Va. 288 , 787 S.E.2d 559 (2016), this Court explained the standard of review for matters involving an alleged breach of a plea agreement: “‘Cases involving plea agreements allegedly breached by either the prosecution or the circuit court present two separate issues for appellate consideration: one factual and the other legal.

2021In syllabus point one of State v. Wilson, 237 W.Va. 288 , 787 S.E.2d 559 (2016), this Court explained the standard of review for matters involving an alleged breach of a plea agreement: “‘Cases involving plea agreements allegedly breached by either the prosecution or the circuit court present two separate issues for appellate consideration: one factual and the other legal.

2012Standard of Review In syllabus point three of State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994), this Court explained the standard of review applicable to suppression determinations, as follows: “On appeal, legal conclusions made with regard to suppression determinations are reviewed de novo.

2012Standard of Review In syllabus point three of State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994), this Court explained the standard of review applicable to suppression determinations, as follows: “On appeal, legal conclusions made with regard to suppression determinations are reviewed de novo.

2012Appalachian Power Company v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740 , 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965), in which this Court explained the standard for reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, as follows: In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the judicial, legislative and executive branches.

2012Appalachian Power Company v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740 , 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965), in which this Court explained the standard for reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, as follows: In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the judicial, legislative and executive branches.

2011In Syllabus Point 2 of Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584 , 301 S.E.2d 216 , this Court explained that the doctrine of collateral estoppel will prevent litigation of issues which previously have been litigated: Collateral estoppel is designed to foreclose relitigation of issues in a second suit which have actually been litigated in the earlier suit even though there may be a difference in the cause of action between the parties of the first and second suit.

2011In Syllabus Point 2 of Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584 , 301 S.E.2d 216 , this Court explained that the doctrine of collateral estoppel will prevent litigation of issues which previously have been litigated: Collateral estoppel is designed to foreclose relitigation of issues in a second suit which have actually been litigated in the earlier suit even though there may be a difference in the cause of action between the parties of the first and second suit.

2008In State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977), this Court examined the rule and explained its premise as follows: The basis for the rule prohibiting the use of the defendant's silence against him is that it runs counter to the presumption of innocence that follows the defendant throughout the trial.

2008In State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234 , 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977), this Court examined the rule and explained its premise as follows: The basis for the rule prohibiting the use of the defendant's silence against him is that it runs counter to the presumption of innocence that follows the defendant throughout the trial.

2008In State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228 , 50 S.E. 247 (1905), for instance, this Court explained that the rule has its origin in the principle that "the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will, did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him." 57 W.Va. at 235 , 50 S.E. at 249 .

2008In State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228 , 50 S.E. 247 (1905), for instance, this Court explained that the rule has its origin in the principle that "the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will, did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him." 57 W.Va. at 235 , 50 S.E. at 249 .

2007Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314 , 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977), as follows: "[a] writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court.

2007Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314 , 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977), as follows: "[a] writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court.

2005Syllabus point five of Sugg elucidated that not every improper prosecutorial statement will result in the reversal of a defendant’s conviction: “A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.” In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463 , 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), this Court also addressed the principles utilized in evaluating prosecutorial comments and stated as follows: In reviewing allegedly improper comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument, we are

2005Syllabus point five of Sugg elucidated that not every improper prosecutorial statement will result in the reversal of a defendant’s conviction: “A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.” In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463 , 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), this Court also addressed the principles utilized in evaluating prosecutorial comments and stated as follows: In reviewing allegedly improper comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument, we are

2005Syllabus point five of Sugg elucidated that not every improper prosecutorial statement will result in the reversal of a defendant’s conviction: “A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.” In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463 , 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), this Court also addressed the principles utilized in evaluating prosecutorial comments and stated as follows: In reviewing allegedly improper comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument, we are

2005The State further maintains that prosecutorial statements, even if in error, will not be sufficient to reverse a conviction unless they clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice. *196 In syllabus point six of State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388 , 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995) this Court explained the factors used in analyzing an allegedly improper prosecutorial remark, as follows: Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecuto-rial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have a tendency to mislead the j

2005The State further maintains that prosecutorial statements, even if in error, will not be sufficient to reverse a conviction unless they clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice. *196 In syllabus point six of State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388 , 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995) this Court explained the factors used in analyzing an allegedly improper prosecutorial remark, as follows: Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecuto-rial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have a tendency to mislead the j

2005Syllabus point five of Sugg elucidated that not every improper prosecutorial statement will result in the reversal of a defendant’s conviction: “A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.” In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463 , 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), this Court also addressed the principles utilized in evaluating prosecutorial comments and stated as follows: In reviewing allegedly improper comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument, we are

2003In syllabus point one of Mountain Lodge Association v. Crum & Forster Indemnity Co., 210 W.Va. 536 , 558 S.E.2d 336 (2001), this Court explained the standard of review applicable to summary judgment orders as follows: “ ‘A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.’ Syl.

2003In syllabus point one of Mountain Lodge Association v. Crum & Forster Indemnity Co., 210 W.Va. 536 , 558 S.E.2d 336 (2001), this Court explained the standard of review applicable to summary judgment orders as follows: “ ‘A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.’ Syl.

2003Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189 , 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).” We consequently apply a de novo standard of review to the matter presently under evaluation.

2003Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189 , 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).” We consequently apply a de novo standard of review to the matter presently under evaluation.

2002In syllabus point one of State v. Jones, 174 W.Va. 700 , 329 S.E.2d 65 (1985), this Court explained the standard for determining whether a lesser included offense instruction should be provided, as follows: The question of whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense involves a two-part inquiry.

2002In syllabus point one of State v. Jones, 174 W.Va. 700 , 329 S.E.2d 65 (1985), this Court explained the standard for determining whether a lesser included offense instruction should be provided, as follows: The question of whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense involves a two-part inquiry.

2001Standard of Review The Appellants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. 5 In syllabus point two of Alkire v. First National Bank of Parsons, 197 W.Va. 122 , 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996), this Court explained the standard of review for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 6 as follows: *633 In reviewing a trial court’s granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is not the task of the appellate court reviewing facts to determine how it would have ruled on the evidence presented.

2001Standard of Review The Appellants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. 5 In syllabus point two of Alkire v. First National Bank of Parsons, 197 W.Va. 122 , 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996), this Court explained the standard of review for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 6 as follows: *633 In reviewing a trial court’s granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is not the task of the appellate court reviewing facts to determine how it would have ruled on the evidence presented.

1991It assures base of ascertaining ownership and prevents the vesting of title upon abandonment of a right of way in the heirs of long since deceased grantors or predecessors in title.” Id.