explained doctrine in Pennsylvania

2024While not inventing an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record, including, but not limited, “the child’s need for permanency and the length of time in foster care [. . .]; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at n.28 (emphasis in original).

2024While not inventing an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record, including, but not limited, “the child’s need for permanency and the length of time in foster care [. . .]; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of - 14 - J-S04029-24 love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at n.28 (emphasis i

2023In Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., et al., 878 A.2d 63 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court explained the test used to determine whether a communication has “defamatory character:” In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving ... the defamatory character of the communication.

2022In Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., et al., 878 A.2d 63 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 903 A.2d 539 (Pa. 2006), this Court explained the test used to determine whether a communication has “defamatory character:” In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving ... the defamatory character of the communication.

2010Father’s Brief, at 4. ¶ 10 In Collins v. Collins, 897 A.2d 466 (Pa.Super.2006), this Court explained our standard of review of custody matters as follows: In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type and our standard is abuse of discretion.

2010Father’s Brief, at 4. ¶ 10 In Collins v. Collins, 897 A.2d 466 (Pa.Super.2006), this Court explained our standard of review of custody matters as follows: In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type and our standard is abuse of discretion.

1987In the recent decision of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508 , 522 A.2d 17 (1987), our Supreme Court mandated that a party appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)’s requirement that he set forth a “concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal.” The Court explained that this rule was promulgated to implement 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), which provides that: The defendant or the Commonwealth may file a petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor to the appellate court that

1987In the recent decision of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508 , 522 A.2d 17 (1987), our Supreme Court mandated that a party appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)’s requirement that he set forth a “concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal.” The Court explained that this rule was promulgated to implement 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), which provides that: The defendant or the Commonwealth may file a petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor to the appellate court that

2022In Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., et al., 878 A.2d 63 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 903 A.2d 539 (Pa. 2006), this Court explained the test used to determine whether a communication has “defamatory character:” In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving ... the defamatory character of the communication.

2022In Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., et al., 878 A.2d 63 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 903 A.2d 539 (Pa. 2006), this Court explained the test used to determine whether a communication has “defamatory character:” In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving ... the defamatory character of the communication.

2017We note that in Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court explained the standard for withdrawal of counsel on collateral review.

2016Appellant’s counsel, George N. Dagnir, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).2 * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 2 We note that in Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court explained the standard for withdrawal of counsel on collateral review.

2017Bell v. Twp. of Spring Brook, 30 A.3d 554 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

2017Bell v. Twp. of Spring Brook, 30 A.3d 554 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

2016The court explained that the test a court must employ “to determine continuing disability is whether the support beneficiary has become and is now physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment and whether such employment is available to her at a supporting wage.” Id. (citing Hanson v. Hanson, 425 Pa.Super. 508 , 625 A.2d 1212 (1993)).

2016The court explained that the test a court must employ “to determine continuing disability is whether the support beneficiary has become and is now physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment and whether such employment is available to her at a supporting wage.” Id. (citing Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. 1993)).

2024Further, the trial court explained a standard-range sentence would not be appropriate because “it’s one of the few cases where I have a [d]efendant who is essentially telling me he’s going to re-offend.” Id. at 32 .

2023In regard to claims of innocence, the Court explained that the claim “must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Id.

2022This court did not want to reemphasize any potential prejudice to jury members[.]” Id. (some capitalization omitted).

2021The Court explained that the error “‘affect[ed] the framework within which the trial proceed[ed],’” which the Court distinguished from “a lapse or flaw that is ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’” Id. (citation omitted).

2021It also found that the error involved a right “‘not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,’ such as ‘the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty.’” Id. (citation omitted).

2019Id.

2018This Court explained that this exception was to be narrowly construed and was meant to apply only "where the suspension [imposed long after the fact] loses its public protection rationale and simply becomes an additional punitive measure." Id.

2017J-A03024-17 In Grossman v. Barke, 868 A.2d 561 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court explained our standard and scope of review from the grant of summary judgment as follows: Summary judgment properly is granted after the close of the relevant pleadings “whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2017The Court explained that this privilege is absolute and “provid[es] immunity for communications which are made in the regular course of judicial proceedings and are material to the relief sought,” whether the statements are made “by a party, a witness, an attorney, or a judge.” 121 A.3d at 947 .

2017The privilege therefore “serves an essential function in guaranteeing access to the courts and permitting the free articulation and resolution of legal claims.” Id.

2016“It is only the probability and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity that is a standard of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Monaghan, 295 Pa.Super. 450 , 441 A.2d 1318 (Pa.Super. 1982) (citation omitted); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (holding that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”); Commonwealth v. -6- J.

2016“It is only the probability and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity that is a standard of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Monaghan, 295 Pa.Super. 450 , 441 A.2d 1318 (Pa.Super. 1982) (citation omitted); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (holding that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”); Commonwealth v. -6- J.

2016Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must proceed not under Anders but under Commonwealth v. Turner, [ ] 544 A.2d 927 ([Pa.] 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, [ ] 550 A.2d 213 ([Pa. Super.] 1988).

2016Appellant’s counsel, George N. Dagnir, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).2 * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 2 We note that in Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court explained the standard for withdrawal of counsel on collateral review.