explained standard in Washington

2018In Graham , the Court explained that a framework that compares "the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime," which is what Fain does, does not advance an analysis of a claim that challenges "a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes." Id. at 61 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 .

2018In Graham , the Court explained that a framework that compares "the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime," which is what Fain does, does not advance an analysis of a claim that challenges "a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes." Id. at 61 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 .

2010Bruss, 324 Ill.Dec. 387 , 895 N.E.2d at 1123 . ¶ 30 In a well-reasoned and detailed analysis of the myriad decisions concerning the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the court explained that the doctrine "fulfills its aim only if subject-matter deference is considered the controlling principle behind the doctrine.

2010Bruss, 895 N.E.2d at 1123 . ¶30 In a well-reasoned and detailed analysis of the myriad decisions concerning the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the court explained that the doctrine “fulfills its aim only if subject-matter deference is considered the controlling principle behind the doctrine.

1999In making this argument, he relies on Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32 Wash.App. 859 , 650 P.2d 256 (1982), in which the court explained that a violation of Washington's public policy might occur if a foreign court were to impose a permanent obligation to pay alimony.

1999In making this argument, he relies on Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32 Wash.App. 859 , 650 P.2d 256 (1982), in which the court explained that a violation of Washington's public policy might occur if a foreign court were to impose a permanent obligation to pay alimony.

2026App. 815 , 41 P.3d 1225 (2002).

2026Rousso cites to State v. Deryke, where the court explained that the rule of lenity requires courts to interpret ambiguous verdicts in favor of the defendant. 110 Wn.

2025Id. at 614 .

2023The Court explained that this presumption applies “only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists.” Id.

2021White, 60 Wn.2d at 586 . 8 No. 80602-5-I/9 “Voluntary intoxication does not excuse the commission of crime.

2018Id . at 594, 537 P.2d 782 . ¶60 Considering the first factor, the court stated, "[T]here is no question but that RCW 19.86.080 and RCW 19.86.110(1) accord to the Attorney General power to investigate possible unfair or deceptive practices." Id . at 594, 537 P.2d 782 .

2018Id . at 594, 537 P.2d 782 . ¶60 Considering the first factor, the court stated, "[T]here is no question but that RCW 19.86.080 and RCW 19.86.110(1) accord to the Attorney General power to investigate possible unfair or deceptive practices." Id . at 594, 537 P.2d 782 .

2018App. at 77 . 11 O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 571 . 12 Aten, 130 Wn. 2d at 662 . 13 106 Wn.2d 569 , 723 P.2d 1135 (1986). -4- No. 76338-5-1/ 5 our Supreme Court consolidated four cases involving three defendants charged with driving while intoxicated and one defendant charged with being in actual physical control of the vehicle while intoxicated.14 The court explained the standard, stating it is not "necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with petitioners not driving a car."15 It held that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow consideration of the defenda

2018App. at 77 . 11 O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 571 . 12 Aten, 130 Wn. 2d at 662 . 13 106 Wn.2d 569 , 723 P.2d 1135 (1986). -4- No. 76338-5-1/ 5 our Supreme Court consolidated four cases involving three defendants charged with driving while intoxicated and one defendant charged with being in actual physical control of the vehicle while intoxicated.14 The court explained the standard, stating it is not "necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with petitioners not driving a car."15 It held that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow consideration of the defenda

2018Again quoting from the Restatement, the court explained that this rule “is not limited to cases where it is determined that the language used [in the contract] is ambiguous.” Berg, 115 Wn.2d at 668 (quoting RESTATEMENT~212 cmt. b).

2018App. at 77 . 11 O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 571 . 12 Aten, 130 Wn. 2d at 662 . 13 106 Wn.2d 569 , 723 P.2d 1135 (1986). -4- No. 76338-5-1/ 5 our Supreme Court consolidated four cases involving three defendants charged with driving while intoxicated and one defendant charged with being in actual physical control of the vehicle while intoxicated.14 The court explained the standard, stating it is not "necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with petitioners not driving a car."15 It held that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow consideration of the defenda

2018App. at 77 . 11 O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 571 . 12 Aten, 130 Wn. 2d at 662 . 13 106 Wn.2d 569 , 723 P.2d 1135 (1986). -4- No. 76338-5-1/ 5 our Supreme Court consolidated four cases involving three defendants charged with driving while intoxicated and one defendant charged with being in actual physical control of the vehicle while intoxicated.14 The court explained the standard, stating it is not "necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with petitioners not driving a car."15 It held that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow consideration of the defenda

2014App. at 750 . 20 509 U.S. 259 , 113 S. Ct. 2606 , 126 L.

2014App. at 750 . 20 509 U.S. 259 , 113 S. Ct. 2606 , 126 L.

2014The Court explained that this inquiry focuses on "'the nature of the 19 Reddv. 102 Wn.

2011App. 542, 544-46 , 564 P.2d 340 (1977) (trial court did not err in denying a Telfaire instruction). ¶17 In Jordan , this court explained that an instruction that might be appropriate in a federal case, where there is no constitutional prohibition from the judge commenting on matters of fact, is not appropriate in Washington, where our constitution contains such a prohibition. 17 Wn.

2011App. 542, 544-46 , 564 P.2d 340 (1977) (trial court did not err in denying a Telfaire instruction). ¶17 In Jordan , this court explained that an instruction that might be appropriate in a federal case, where there is no constitutional prohibition from the judge commenting on matters of fact, is not appropriate in Washington, where our constitution contains such a prohibition. 17 Wn.

2007Id. ¶33 In Davis, this court clearly explained the standard for reasonable investigation by defense counsel: Defense counsel must, “at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling [counsel] to make informed decisions about how best to represent [the] client.” This includes investigating all reasonable lines of defense, especially “the defendant’s most important defense.” Counsel’s “failure to consider alternate defenses constitutes deficient performance when the attorney neither conduces] a reasonable investigation nor ma[kes] a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.” Onc

2007Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d 868, 873 , 16 P.3d 601 (2001); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 , 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002)). ¶34 Elmore argues that counsel’s failure to have him evaluated by mental health experts prior to the guilty plea fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms as part of the duty to investigate.

2007Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d 868, 873 , 16 P.3d 601 (2001); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 , 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002)). ¶34 Elmore argues that counsel’s failure to have him evaluated by mental health experts prior to the guilty plea fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms as part of the duty to investigate.

2007Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d 868, 873 , 16 P.3d 601 (2001); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 , 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002)). ¶34 Elmore argues that counsel’s failure to have him evaluated by mental health experts prior to the guilty plea fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms as part of the duty to investigate.

2007Restraint of Brett, 142 Wn.2d 868, 873 , 16 P.3d 601 (2001); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 , 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002)). ¶34 Elmore argues that counsel’s failure to have him evaluated by mental health experts prior to the guilty plea fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms as part of the duty to investigate.

2003In Corley v. Hertz Corp., 76 Wash.App. 687, 693 , 887 P.2d 401 (1994), review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1007 , 910 P.2d 481 (1996), the court explained that the requirement that an insured reject UIM coverage by an affirmative and conscious act "necessarily implies that the insured is given a choice between rejecting or accepting UIM coverage." Here, the documentary evidence established that Smith knew that CTE was entitled to UIM benefits equal to liability limits but, on the advice of insurance brokers, requested UIM coverage of only $60,000.

2003In Corley v. Hertz Corp., 76 Wash.App. 687, 693 , 887 P.2d 401 (1994), review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1007 , 910 P.2d 481 (1996), the court explained that the requirement that an insured reject UIM coverage by an affirmative and conscious act "necessarily implies that the insured is given a choice between rejecting or accepting UIM coverage." Here, the documentary evidence established that Smith knew that CTE was entitled to UIM benefits equal to liability limits but, on the advice of insurance brokers, requested UIM coverage of only $60,000.

2003In Weir v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 63 Wash.App. 187 , 816 P.2d 1278 (1991), this court addressed a similar issue.

2003In Weir v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 63 Wash.App. 187 , 816 P.2d 1278 (1991), this court addressed a similar issue.

1990Ed. 2d 528 , 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985), the court explained that this requirement is met when the defendant "purposefully availed itself of the forum state's markets, thereby deriving benefits and protections of the forum state's laws, so that it would be unfair to allow the defendant to escape the consequences for its actions in that state." Grange, 110 Wn.2d at 762 .

1990Ed. 2d 528 , 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985), the court explained that this requirement is met when the defendant "purposefully availed itself of the forum state's markets, thereby deriving benefits and protections of the forum state's laws, so that it would be unfair to allow the defendant to escape the consequences for its actions in that state." Grange, 110 Wn.2d at 762 .