explained rule in Illinois

2001In Flores-Ortega, the Court explained that defense counsel’s “alleged deficient performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding itself.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 , 145 L.

2001In Flores-Ortega, the Court explained that defense counsel’s “alleged deficient performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding itself.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 , 145 L.

2009Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 339-42 .

2008Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 339-42 .

2024The court explained that this test involves the following inquiry: “ ‘[W]here a plaintiff attempts to allege a violation of the [Consumer Fraud] Act in a case which appears on its face to involve only a breach of contract, the relevant inquiry is “whether the alleged conduct [involves trade practices addressed to the market generally or otherwise] implicates consumer protection concerns.” ’ ” Id. at 159 (quoting Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville, Inc. v. Advance Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 275 Ill.

2024The court explained that this test involves the following inquiry: “ ‘[W]here a plaintiff attempts to allege a violation of the [Consumer Fraud] Act in a case which appears on its face to involve only a breach of contract, the relevant inquiry is “whether the alleged conduct [involves trade practices addressed to the market generally or otherwise] implicates consumer protection concerns.” ’ ” Id. at 159 (quoting Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville, Inc. v. Advance Mechanical -8- Contractors, Inc., 275 Ill.

2018Morton, 286 Ill.

2017Morton , 286 Ill.

2014If so, the other elements being present, it is forgery.” Id. at 569 .

2013If so, the other elements being present, it is forgery.” Id. at 569 .

2012The court noted that “[t]o permit the State to concede provocation, and then instruct the jury that second degree murder involves serious provocation in a case where the defendant denies that he committed the offense, posed a legitimate risk that the jury might surmise there was unpresented evidence which showed the defendant had an altercation with [the victim].” Id.

2012The court noted that "[t]o permit the State to concede provocation, and then instruct the jury that second degree murder involves serious provocation in a case where the defendant denies that he committed the offense, posed a legitimate risk that the jury might surmise there was unpresented evidence which showed the defendant had an altercation with [the victim]." Id.

2010The court explained that its rule, which would disregard a general statute of limitations where a more specific limitations period is embedded within the statute itself, was based on the idea that "compliance with fixed limitations within the statute is indispensable to the maintenance of a right thereunder" because the time element of the statute "is such an integral part of the enactment *** that it necessarily is a condition of the liability itself and not on the remedy alone." King, 18 Ill.

2010The court explained that its rule, which would disregard a general statute of limitations where a more specific limitations period is embedded within the statute itself, was based on the idea that “compliance with fixed limitations within the statute is indispensable to the maintenance of a right thereunder” because the time element of the statute “is such an integral part of the enactment *** that it necessarily is a condition of the liability itself and not on the remedy alone.” King, 18 Ill.

2001In discussing the allegation in Flores-Ortega that counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal, the Edwards court noted: “In Flores-Ortega, the Court explained that defense counsel’s ‘alleged deficient performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding itself.’ [Citation.] *** [T]he ‘deficiency deprived [defendant] of the appellate proceeding altogether.’ [Citation.] This, the Court held, ‘demands a presumption of prejudice.’ ” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 251-52 , quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 , 145 L.

2001In discussing the allegation in Flores-Ortega that counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal, the Edwards court noted : “In Flores-Ortega , the Court explained that defense counsel’s ‘alleged deficient performance arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture of a proceeding itself.’ [Citation.] *** [T]he ‘deficiency deprived [defendant] of the appellate proceeding altogether.’ [Citation.] This, the Court held, ‘demands a presumption of prejudice.’ ” Edwards , 197 Ill. 2d at 251-52 , quoting Flores-Ortega , 528 U.S. at 483 , 145 L.

1998Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 , 10 L.

1998Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 , 10 L.

1998The court explained that this rule was based on the theory that when an administrative agency is given authority to decide matters which are "not judicially cognizable," and a statute "vest[s] in courts a supervisory power which is not limited *354 to a review of the administrative action but extends to a redetermination of factual issues, [the effect of the statute] is to grant, unlawfully, a power to exercise executive functions." West End, 16 Ill.2d at 525 , 158 N.E.2d 608 .

1998The court explained that this rule was based on the theory that when an administrative agency is given authority to decide matters which are “not judicially cognizable,” and a statute “vestís] in courts a supervisory power which is not limited to a review of the administrative action but extends to a re-determination of factual issues, [the effect of the statute] is to grant, unlawfully, a power to exercise executive functions.” West End, 16 Ill. 2d at 525 .

1996In Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill. 2d 266 (1986), this court explained that the test for whether an amended complaint relates back under section 2 — 616(b) to the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes does not depend on whether the amended complaint asserts the "same cause of action” pleaded in the original complaint.

1996This conclusion was in error. *1224 In Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill.2d 266 , 95 Ill.Dec. 478 , 489 N.E.2d 1342 (1986), this court explained that the test for whether an amended complaint relates back under section 2-616(b) to the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes does not depend on whether the amended complaint asserts the "same cause of action" pleaded in the original complaint.

1996In Boeing, the Court explained the doctrine thus: "[A] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” 444 U.S. at 478 , 62 L.

1996In Boeing, the Court explained the doctrine thus: "[A] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” 444 U.S. at 478 , 62 L.

1985In Terry, the court explained that the exception to the probable cause requirement would arise in cases where police conduct could be deemed reasonable because the governmental interest justifying the seizure outweighed the intrusion on the individual’s fourth amendment interests. ( 392 U.S. 1, 20-23 , 20 L.

1985In Terry, the court explained that the exception to the probable cause requirement would arise in cases where police conduct could be deemed reasonable because the governmental interest justifying the seizure outweighed the intrusion on the individual’s fourth amendment interests. ( 392 U.S. 1, 20-23 , 20 L.

2025With respect to the first exception to the presumption, the legislature likely intended a consequence to be mandatory when “a statute expressly prescribes a consequence for failure to obey its command or it uses negative language such as ‘no such ordinance shall take effect until,’ importing that the command shall not be executed in any other manner or time.” Id.

2025The court explained that the presumption is overcome and a provision is mandatory only if “ ‘(1) negative language in the statute or rule prohibits further action in the case of noncompliance or (2) the right the statute or rule is designed to protect would generally be injured under a directory reading.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 18 ).

2024The court explained that the privilege rested on the idea that “conduct that otherwise would be actionable escapes liability because the defendant acted to further some interest of social importance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 45 Here, in contrast to the defendant in Gardner, defendant made her statements to further an interest of social importance—a judicial proceeding—and to report a crime.

2023“The complaint must be read as a whole to assess its true nature.” Owners Insurance Co. v. Don McCue Chevrolet, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210634, ¶ 19 . ¶ 50 In Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Danner, 2012 IL App (4th) 110461, ¶ 37 , 967 N.E.2d 836 , this court explained the inquiry and wrote the following: “[I]n determining whether an insurance company has a duty to defend, courts are not required ‘ “to consider each count in isolation and ignore facts pleaded in other counts,” ’ where the plaintiff has pleaded separate counts against various defendants but not pleaded in the alternative.

2023“The complaint must be read as a whole to assess its true nature.” Owners Insurance Co. v. Don McCue Chevrolet, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210634, ¶ 19 . ¶ 50 In Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Danner, 2012 IL App (4th) 110461, ¶ 37 , 967 N.E.2d 836 , this court explained the inquiry and wrote the following: “[I]n determining whether an insurance company has a duty to defend, courts are not required ‘ “to consider each count in isolation and ignore facts pleaded in other counts,” ’ where the plaintiff has pleaded separate counts against various defendants but not pleaded in the alternative.

2023“The complaint must be read as a whole to assess its true nature.” Owners Insurance Co. v. Don McCue Chevrolet, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210634, ¶ 19 . ¶ 50 In Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Danner, 2012 IL App (4th) 110461, ¶ 37 , 967 N.E.2d 836 , this court explained the inquiry and wrote the following: “[I]n determining whether an insurance company has a duty to defend, courts are not required ‘ “to consider each count in isolation and ignore facts pleaded in other counts,” ’ where the plaintiff has pleaded separate counts against various defendants but not pleaded in the alternative.

2023SCR Medical Transportation Services, Inc. v. Browne, 335 Ill.

2022The court explained that the rule is necessary because 8 prejudice results for a criminal defendant when “more than one offense is carved from the same physical act.” Id. at 566 .

2022The court further explained that in cases involving multiple acts, even acts that are closely related, prejudice only results from multiple convictions if any are for offenses that “are, by definition, lesser included offenses.” Id.

2021The court explained this standard constitutes a “comprehensive approach where the court must determine whether the new evidence places the evidence presented in the underlying proceedings in a different light and ‘undercuts the court’s confidence in the factual correctness’ of the - 14 - conviction.” Id. (quoting Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97 ). ¶ 36 In his concurring opinion in Reed II, Justice Michael J.

2019Id. at 448 . ¶ 23 In its analysis, the court explained the doctrine of incompatibility as follows: “ ‘Incompatibility *** is present when the written law of a state specifically prohibits the occupant of either one of the offices in question from holding the other and, also, where the duties of either office are such that the holder of the office cannot in every instance, properly and fully, faithfully perform all the duties of the other office.

2017Id. at 402 , 102 Ill.Dec. 810 , 500 N.E.2d 703 .

2017Id. at 402 , 102 Ill.Dec. 810 , 500 N.E.2d 703 .