explained test in Oregon

2024Id.

2024Id.

2023In State v. Huntley, 302 Or 418 , 730 P2d 1234 (1986), the Supreme Court construed ORS 161.725 (1985).3 As to the requirement that the defendant have a “severe personality disorder,” the court explained that the requirement contem- plates both that the defendant is “mentally abnormal” (as opposed to normal but dangerous) and that the defendant has a propensity toward “dangerous criminal activity” (not just any criminal activity): “The statutory language requiring that the court must find that the defendant is suffering from a severe personality disorder indicating a propensity toward criminal

2023In State v. Huntley, 302 Or 418 , 730 P2d 1234 (1986), the Supreme Court construed ORS 161.725 (1985).3 As to the requirement that the defendant have a “severe personality disorder,” the court explained that the requirement contem- plates both that the defendant is “mentally abnormal” (as opposed to normal but dangerous) and that the defendant has a propensity toward “dangerous criminal activity” (not just any criminal activity): “The statutory language requiring that the court must find that the defendant is suffering from a severe personality disorder indicating a propensity toward criminal

2010In State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 386 , 927 P2d 79 (1996), this court explained that rule as follows: “Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.

2010In State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 386 , 927 P2d 79 (1996), this court explained that rule as follows: “Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.

1993“In State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648 , 705 P2d 694 (1985), this court applied the reasoning of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), to determine ‘what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to shtisfy our state constitutional *430 confrontation clause.’ This court explained that test in State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 62 , 786 P2d 111 (1990): “ ‘The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts established a two-part test to determine whether the admission of the out-of-court sta

1993“In State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648 , 705 P2d 694 (1985), this court applied the reasoning of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), to determine ‘what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to shtisfy our state constitutional *430 confrontation clause.’ This court explained that test in State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 62 , 786 P2d 111 (1990): “ ‘The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts established a two-part test to determine whether the admission of the out-of-court sta

1993“In State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648 , 705 P2d 694 (1985), this court applied the reasoning of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), to determine ‘what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to shtisfy our state constitutional *430 confrontation clause.’ This court explained that test in State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 62 , 786 P2d 111 (1990): “ ‘The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts established a two-part test to determine whether the admission of the out-of-court sta

1993“In State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648 , 705 P2d 694 (1985), this court applied the reasoning of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), to determine ‘what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to shtisfy our state constitutional *430 confrontation clause.’ This court explained that test in State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 62 , 786 P2d 111 (1990): “ ‘The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts established a two-part test to determine whether the admission of the out-of-court sta

1993“In State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648 , 705 P2d 694 (1985), this court applied the reasoning of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), to determine ‘what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to shtisfy our state constitutional *430 confrontation clause.’ This court explained that test in State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 62 , 786 P2d 111 (1990): “ ‘The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts established a two-part test to determine whether the admission of the out-of-court sta

1993“In State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633, 648 , 705 P2d 694 (1985), this court applied the reasoning of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US 56 , 100 S Ct 2531 , 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), to determine ‘what constitutes unavailability of a hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability of hearsay declarations to shtisfy our state constitutional *430 confrontation clause.’ This court explained that test in State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 62 , 786 P2d 111 (1990): “ ‘The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts established a two-part test to determine whether the admission of the out-of-court sta

2023The court explained that the bar on reviewability “applies only when the parties’ agreement is ‘a stipulation as to sentencing of a kind described by ORS 135.407.’ ” Id. at 693 (quoting State v. Kephart, 320 Or 433, 447 , 887 P2d 774 (1994)).

2023The court explained that the bar on reviewability “applies only when the parties’ agreement is ‘a stipulation as to sentencing of a kind described by ORS 135.407.’ ” Id. at 693 (quoting State v. Kephart, 320 Or 433, 447 , 887 P2d 774 (1994)).

2023The court explained that the bar on reviewability “applies only when the parties’ agreement is ‘a stipulation as to sentencing of a kind described by ORS 135.407.’ ” Id. at 693 (quoting State v. Kephart, 320 Or 433, 447 , 887 P2d 774 (1994)).

2022“The first element in time (although it appears in the middle of the provision) is that ‘[t]he ownership or control of the money or property Cite as 322 Or App 809 (2022) 823 was acquired in whole or in part by the other person * * * from the vulnerable person.’ ” Id. at 344 (quoting ORS 124.110(1)(b)(A) (ellipses and brackets in Bates)).7 There need not be any wrongful conduct in the initial acquisition of the money or property.

2022“The first element in time (although it appears in the middle of the provision) is that ‘[t]he ownership or control of the money or property Cite as 322 Or App 809 (2022) 823 was acquired in whole or in part by the other person * * * from the vulnerable person.’ ” Id. at 344 (quoting ORS 124.110(1)(b)(A) (ellipses and brackets in Bates)).7 There need not be any wrongful conduct in the initial acquisition of the money or property.

2022The question of whether a defendant’s conduct “unreasonably created a foreseeable risk to a protected interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff,” Fazzolari, 303 Or at 17 , is a normative one; that is, determi- nation of that question is laden with social values.

2022More recently, the court explained that that framework brings together “two overlapping common-law negligence determinations: (1) whether the defendant’s conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm to a protected interest of the plaintiff such that the defendant may be held liable for that conduct—formerly described in terms of ‘duty’ and ‘breach’ as measures of negligent conduct; and (2) whether, because the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, the defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff for the particular harm that befell the plaintiff—a concept that traditionally was r

2022More recently, the court explained that that framework brings together “two overlapping common-law negligence determinations: (1) whether the defendant’s conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm to a protected interest of the plaintiff such that the defendant may be held liable for that conduct—formerly described in terms of ‘duty’ and ‘breach’ as measures of negligent conduct; and (2) whether, because the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, the defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff for the particular harm that befell the plaintiff—a concept that traditionally was r

2021The court explained its analysis, including, in particular, its use of the questions articulated in State v. Johns, 301 Or 535 , 725 P2d 312 (1986), overruled by State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021),2 in determining relevance, and the balancing process it conducted under OEC 403 to ensure fairness.

2021The court explained its analysis, including, in particular, its use of the questions articulated in State v. Johns, 301 Or 535 , 725 P2d 312 (1986), overruled by State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 , 479 P3d 254 (2021),2 in determining relevance, and the balancing process it conducted under OEC 403 to ensure fairness.

2021In Marbet, 277 Or at 456 , the court explained that the doctrine “most obviously” applies in the case of a party seeking judicial review whose license or individual rights, duties, or privileges “are the occasion of the contested case,” but “is less obviously applicable” when the agency’s action is challenged as based on an unconstitutional statute or a rule that was invalid under the constitution, exceeded agency authority, or was adopted without compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures, “for these are legal flaws which the agency could not remedy in the contested case.” (Emphasis add

2021In Marbet, 277 Or at 456 , the court explained that the doctrine “most obviously” applies in the case of a party seeking judicial review whose license or individual rights, duties, or privileges “are the occasion of the contested case,” but “is less obviously applicable” when the agency’s action is challenged as based on an unconstitutional statute or a rule that was invalid under the constitution, exceeded agency authority, or was adopted without compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures, “for these are legal flaws which the agency could not remedy in the contested case.” (Emphasis add

2021The court explained that the rule “allows an officer com- ing upon the scene of a recently committed crime to ‘freeze’ the situation and obtain identifications and an account of the circumstances from the persons present.” Fair, 353 Or at 606 n 9 (quoting American Law Institute, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure at 9-10 (1975) (Model Code).

2021Moreover, the court explained that “it would be ‘irrational’ not to authorize officers responding to ‘confused, emergency 244 State v. Lira situations’ to ‘freeze the situation for a short time, so that [they] may make inquiry and arrive at a considered judg- ment about further action to be taken.’ ” Fair, 353 Or at 607 (quoting Model Code § 110.2 at 272) (brackets in Fair).

2020We observed: “[I]n Prima Paint, the Court explained that the rule derives from the text of 9 USC section 4 : ‘Under § 4, * * * the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that “the making of the agreement for arbitration * * * is not in issue.” ’ ” Id. at 565 (quoting Buckeye, 546 US at 403 ) (emphasis in Vasquez-Lopez); see also Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 US 63, 72 , 130 S Ct 2772 , 177 L Ed 2d 403 (2010) (unless the plaintiff “challenged the [arbitration] provision specifi- cally, we must treat it as valid under [section] 2, and must en

2020However, in State v. Williams, 366 Or 495 , 466 P3d 55 (2020), the court explained that this rule may be waived for “good cause” under ORAP 1.20(5), and it concluded that the significant change in the law announced by the Court in Ramos consti- tuted good cause for waiver of that rule.

2020However, in State v. Williams, 366 Or 495 , 466 P3d 55 (2020), the court explained that this rule may be waived for “good cause” under ORAP 1.20(5), and it concluded that the significant change in the law announced by the Court in Ramos consti- tuted good cause for waiver of that rule.

2020Cite as 366 Or 588 (2020) 601 The confusion about what Ireland requires a trial court to do when a party requests the witness-false-in-part instruction stems from contradictory statements in the opinion about a trial court’s “discretion” to decide whether to give the instruction.

2020In Douglas, the court explained that the principle rests on a failure to establish prejudice rather than waiver. 310 Or at 441-42 .

2020And in State v. Goff, 71 Or 352, 365 , 142 P 564 (1914), this court explained that, when a witness had 600 State v. Payne “knowingly testified falsely as to a material point in a case,” the instruction “requir[ed] the jury to distrust other parts of his evidence[.]” (Emphasis added.) The court in Goff required what Ireland recognized as a factor in other cases: that the false testimony relate to a material issue.

2020And in State v. Goff, 71 Or 352, 365 , 142 P 564 (1914), this court explained that, when a witness had 600 State v. Payne “knowingly testified falsely as to a material point in a case,” the instruction “requir[ed] the jury to distrust other parts of his evidence[.]” (Emphasis added.) The court in Goff required what Ireland recognized as a factor in other cases: that the false testimony relate to a material issue.

2019Rather, the test is whether the expert's testimony, if believed, will be of help or assistance to the jury.' " Id. at 435 , 657 P.2d 1215 (quoting State v. Stringer , 292 Or. 388 , 391, 639 P.2d 1264 (1982) ).

2019Rather, the test is whether the expert's testimony, if believed, will be of help or assistance to the jury.' " Id. at 435 , 657 P.2d 1215 (quoting State v. Stringer , 292 Or. 388 , 391, 639 P.2d 1264 (1982) ).

2019Rather, the test is whether the expert's testimony, if believed, will be of help or assistance to the jury.' " Id. at 435 , 657 P.2d 1215 (quoting State v. Stringer , 292 Or. 388 , 391, 639 P.2d 1264 (1982) ).

2019Rather, the test is whether the expert's testimony, if believed, will be of help or assistance to the jury.' " Id. at 435 , 657 P.2d 1215 (quoting State v. Stringer , 292 Or. 388 , 391, 639 P.2d 1264 (1982) ).

2018Id. at 74 , 689 P.2d 955 .

2018Id. at 74 , 689 P.2d 955 .

2018Id. at 747 , 390 P.3d 1054 .

2018Id. at 747 , 390 P.3d 1054 .

2016Wilson, 282 Or at 68 n 3; Phillips, 269 Or at 501 .