explained standard in North Dakota

2008II [¶7] Patten argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to request a psychiatric evaluation before he pled guilty to the charges. [¶8] In Heckelsmiller v. State , 2004 ND 191, ¶ 5 , 687 N.W.2d 454 , this Court explained the standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction relief proceeding: “Post-conviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.

2008II [¶7] Patten argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to request a psychiatric evaluation before he pled guilty to the charges. [¶8] In Heckelsmiller v. State , 2004 ND 191, ¶ 5 , 687 N.W.2d 454 , this Court explained the standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction relief proceeding: “Post-conviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.

2025Id. [¶17] In Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, this Court explained the requirement that “due regard” be given to the surface owner’s rights “defines, to a certain extent, a consideration in determining if the mineral owner’s [or the lessee’s] use of the surface is reasonably necessary,” and adopted the “accommodation doctrine,” as set forth by the Texas Supreme Court: 6 There may be only one manner of use of the surface whereby the minerals can be produced.

2021Our opinion today addresses only the former, and does not speak to the issue decided in the cases cited by respondents (and by the Florida Supreme Court), which hold that it is for courts to decide whether the alleged obligor ever signed the contract, Chastain v. Robinson–Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (C.A. 11 1992), whether the signor lacked authority to commit the alleged principal, Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (C.A. 3 2000); Sphere Drake Ins.

2021Our opinion today addresses only the former, and does not speak to the issue decided in the cases cited by respondents (and by the Florida Supreme Court), which hold that it is for courts to decide whether the alleged obligor ever signed the contract, Chastain v. Robinson–Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (C.A. 11 1992), whether the signor lacked authority to commit the alleged principal, Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (C.A. 3 2000); Sphere Drake Ins.

2016Northstar Founders, LLC v. Hayden Capital USA, LLC, 2014 ND 200, ¶ 53 , 855 N.W.2d 614 . [¶ 6] In McColl Farms, LLC v. Pflaum, 2013 ND 169, ¶ 18 , 837 N.W.2d 359 (quotations and citations omitted), this Court explained the doctrine of unjust enrichment: Unjust enrichment is a broad, equitable doctrine which rests upon quasi or constructive contracts implied by law to prevent a person from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

2016Northstar Founders, LLC v. Hayden Capital USA, LLC, 2014 ND 200, ¶ 53 , 855 N.W.2d 614 . [¶ 6] In McColl Farms, LLC v. Pflaum, 2013 ND 169, ¶ 18 , 837 N.W.2d 359 (quotations and citations omitted), this Court explained the doctrine of unjust enrichment: Unjust enrichment is a broad, equitable doctrine which rests upon quasi or constructive contracts implied by law to prevent a person from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

2016Northstar Founders, LLC v. Hayden Capital USA, LLC, 2014 ND 200, ¶ 53 , 855 N.W.2d 614 . [¶ 6] In McColl Farms, LLC v. Pflaum, 2013 ND 169, ¶ 18 , 837 N.W.2d 359 (quotations and citations omitted), this Court explained the doctrine of unjust enrichment: Unjust enrichment is a broad, equitable doctrine which rests upon quasi or constructive contracts implied by law to prevent a person from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

2016Northstar Founders, LLC v. Hayden Capital USA, LLC, 2014 ND 200, ¶ 53 , 855 N.W.2d 614 . [¶ 6] In McColl Farms, LLC v. Pflaum, 2013 ND 169, ¶ 18 , 837 N.W.2d 359 (quotations and citations omitted), this Court explained the doctrine of unjust enrichment: Unjust enrichment is a broad, equitable doctrine which rests upon quasi or constructive contracts implied by law to prevent a person from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

2014This Court explained the claim statute was “intended to give finality to probate proceedings and to enable the personal representative of the deceased to close the estate without risk of liability for having overlooked a legitimate debt or claim.” Id. (quoting Estate of Bachand , 307 N.W.2d 140, 144 (S.D. 1981)). [¶14] In Frandson , the surviving spouse was not entitled to property from his deceased wife’s estate as an omitted spouse, and the surviving spouse was not the decedent’s personal representative. 383 N.W.2d at 808 .

2014This Court explained the claim statute was “intended to give finality to probate proceedings and to enable the personal representative of the deceased to close the estate without risk of liability for having overlooked a legitimate debt or claim.” Id. (quoting Estate of Bachand , 307 N.W.2d 140, 144 (S.D. 1981)). [¶14] In Frandson , the surviving spouse was not entitled to property from his deceased wife’s estate as an omitted spouse, and the surviving spouse was not the decedent’s personal representative. 383 N.W.2d at 808 .

2014This Court explained the claim statute was “intended to give finality to probate proceedings and to enable the personal representative of the deceased to close the estate without risk of liability for having overlooked a legitimate debt or claim.” Id. (quoting Estate of Bachand, 307 N.W.2d 140, 144 (S.D.1981)). [¶ 14] In Frandson, the surviving spouse was not entitled to property from his deceased wife’s estate as an omitted spouse, and the surviving spouse was not the decedent’s personal representative. 383 N.W.2d at 808.

2009See Schaan, at ¶ 13; Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235, 242 (N.D.1979); Fowler, 177 N.W.2d at 762 .

2009In Sullwold, 110 N.W.2d at 459 , this Court explained that the requirement that grounds be specified should not be a “technical obstacle” to a moving party seeking justice, but instead is a “procedural safeguard.” We have repeatedly held that “specified grounds” means something more than stating generalities.

2008Id. [¶ 11] In Plott v. Kittelson, 58 N.D. 881, 886-87 , 228 N.W. 217, 218-19 (1929), this Court explained a rule of abatement: “If the court, upon a consideration of the proof adduced, finds that another action is pending between the same parties and for the same cause, its judgment should be that the action abate * * *.

2007Hers comes from her experience and her disability. [¶ 10] In State v. Evans, 1999 ND 70, ¶ 11 , 593 N.W.2d 336 , this Court explained the standard upon which we review an issue of improper argument by a prosecutor: “The control of closing arguments is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse on the ground that a prosecutor exceeded the scope of permissible closing argument unless a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion is shown.” State v. Ash, 526 N.W.2d 473, 481 (N.D.1995).

2007Hers comes from her experience and her disability. [¶ 10] In State v. Evans, 1999 ND 70, ¶ 11 , 593 N.W.2d 336 , this Court explained the standard upon which we review an issue of improper argument by a prosecutor: “The control of closing arguments is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse on the ground that a prosecutor exceeded the scope of permissible closing argument unless a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion is shown.” State v. Ash, 526 N.W.2d 473, 481 (N.D.1995).

1999In Jilek v. Berger Electric, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660, 661-63 (N.D.1989), this Court explained the analysis required to determine whether an occupation was professional under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-18: While the statute itself does not spell out the professions which it covers, the legislative history of NDCC Sec. 28-01-18(3) suggests that the “Legislature envisioned more than one profession in its concept of malpractice.” Johnson [v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 , 539 n. 5 (N.D.1981) ]. [[Image here]] Courts use varying approaches to resolve whether an occupation is a profession for purposes of a malpracti

1994The insuring clause of Hart’s policy provides: “The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of A. bodily injury, or B. property damage To which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedie

1994The insuring clause of Hart's policy provides: "The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of A. bodily injury, or B. property damage To which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedie