explained rule in California

2016He claimed, however, as does Carter, that in order to be ineligible for recall of sentence under Proposition 36 “there must be an underlying felony to which the firearm possession is ‘tethered’ or to which it has some ‘facilitative nexus.’ He [argued] 3 one cannot be armed with a firearm during the commission of possession of the same firearm.” (Ibid.) The court explained this analysis would be appropriate if the case “were concerned with imposition of an arming enhancement—an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term, for which a defendant cannot be punished until and unless conv

2016He claimed, however, as does Carter, that in order to be ineligible for recall of sentence under Proposition 36 “there must be an underlying felony to which the firearm possession is ‘tethered’ or to which it has some ‘facilitative nexus.’ He [argued] 3 one cannot be armed with a firearm during the commission of possession of the same firearm.” (Ibid.) The court explained this analysis would be appropriate if the case “were concerned with imposition of an arming enhancement—an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term, for which a defendant cannot be punished until and unless conv

2026(Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 446 .) The court explained that this instruction provided an “appropriate framework” for the jury to consider the evidence that “but for the medication, which Guerrero would not take without supervision, Guerrero was presently gravely disabled.” (Id. at p. 447.) A.B. argues that in Walker, Guerrero and other cases upholding conservatorships, there was evidence that the conservatees were symptomatic at the time of trial and denied having a mental illness at or shortly before trial ( Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1575-1577; Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.Ap

2026(Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 446 .) The court explained that this instruction provided an “appropriate framework” for the jury to consider the evidence that “but for the medication, which Guerrero would not take without supervision, Guerrero was presently gravely disabled.” (Id. at p. 447.) A.B. argues that in Walker, Guerrero and other cases upholding conservatorships, there was evidence that the conservatees were symptomatic at the time of trial and denied having a mental illness at or shortly before trial ( Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1575-1577; Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.Ap

2026(Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 446 .) The court explained that this instruction provided an “appropriate framework” for the jury to consider the evidence that “but for the medication, which Guerrero would not take without supervision, Guerrero was presently gravely disabled.” (Id. at p. 447.) A.B. argues that in Walker, Guerrero and other cases upholding conservatorships, there was evidence that the conservatees were symptomatic at the time of trial and denied having a mental illness at or shortly before trial ( Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1575-1577; Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.Ap

2026(Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 446 .) The court explained that this instruction provided an “appropriate framework” for the jury to consider the evidence that “but for the medication, which Guerrero would not take without supervision, Guerrero was presently gravely disabled.” (Id. at p. 447.) A.B. argues that in Walker, Guerrero and other cases upholding conservatorships, there was evidence that the conservatees were symptomatic at the time of trial and denied having a mental illness at or shortly before trial ( Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1575-1577; Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.Ap

2018In fact, such letters and threats are themselves likely to be the result of a prelitigation investigation." ( Id . at pp. 1068-1069, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 .) Finally, with respect to whether the litigation was a sham, the court explained the analysis of this issue arose in the context of the second stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis, i.e., whether or not the attorney had established a probability of prevailing on his claim against the City for unlawful retaliation against him for exercising his constitutional right of petition (brought under 42 United States Code section 1983 ).

2018The court determined the attorney established such a probability unless "evidence presented in the anti-SLAPP motion would preclude such a finding as a matter of law"; the question was "whether the evidence conclusively establishes that the alleged romantic relationship and claimed conflict of interest that [he] purported to investigate were just a sham." ( Tichinin , supra , 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1071-1072, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 .) The court concluded there was no evidence conclusively establishing either that the investigation was "objectively baseless" or that it was "pursued ... for an impro

2016(Id. at p. 382.) “ ‘By allowing close supervision of probationers, probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers.’ (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 .) A condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is, therefore, ‘reasonably related to future criminality.’ ” (Olguin, at pp. 380- 381.) J.B. questioned whether Olguin “justifies a probation condition that facilitates general supervision of a ward’s activities if the condi

2016(Id. at p. 382.) “ ‘By allowing close supervision of probationers, probation search conditions serve to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers.’ (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 .) A condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is, therefore, ‘reasonably related to future criminality.’ ” (Olguin, at pp. 380- 381.) J.B. questioned whether Olguin “justifies a probation condition that facilitates general supervision of a ward’s activities if the condi

2025This includes the power “ ‘to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven . . . .’ ” (Hosanna-Tabor, at p. 186, quoting Kedroff, at p. 116.) As historical support for the ministerial exception, the Supreme Court cited the “background” against which “the First Amendment was adopted.” (Hosanna-Tabor, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 183 .) “Familiar with life under the established Church of England, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a national church. . . .

2025(Id. at pp. 182–184.) Referencing its earlier decisions in Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679 and Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America (1952) 344 U.S. 94 (Kedroff) (Hosanna-Tabor, at pp. 185–187), the court explained that the doctrine recognizes the “ ‘power [of religious organizations] to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters 8 of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine’ ” (id. at p. 186, quoting Kedroff, at p. 116).

2025(Id. at pp. 182–184.) Referencing its earlier decisions in Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679 and Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America (1952) 344 U.S. 94 (Kedroff) (Hosanna-Tabor, at pp. 185–187), the court explained that the doctrine recognizes the “ ‘power [of religious organizations] to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters 8 of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine’ ” (id. at p. 186, quoting Kedroff, at p. 116).

2025Clarity, Ambiguity, and Explicit Intent In Madison v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 589 , the court explained the requirement that a release be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the parties’ intent by stating “the language used ‘must be clear, explicit and comprehensible in each of its essential details.

2025(People v. Gwillim (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1254, 1258, 1265 .) In Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d 822 , our high court held that “in addition to circumscribing multiple punishments, section 654 establishes an independent rule regarding multiple prosecutions.” (People v. Spicer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372 .) The court explained the rule as follows: “When . . . the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited or severance permit

2025(People v. Gwillim (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1254, 1258, 1265 .) In Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d 822 , our high court held that “in addition to circumscribing multiple punishments, section 654 establishes an independent rule regarding multiple prosecutions.” (People v. Spicer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372 .) The court explained the rule as follows: “When . . . the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited or severance permit

2025As the court explained at the hearing, it imposed conditions only to ensure that the third amended complaint included “sufficient information so that we can determine whether [the proposed named plaintiffs] are adequate plaintiffs or not.” The trial court chose reasonable conditions to achieve that end, and it did not abuse its discretion in imposing those terms.6 (Cf. Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 274 , disapproved of on another ground by Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 939, fn.13 [no abuse of 6 As an alternative ground to affirm,

2025(People v. Gwillim (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1254, 1258, 1265 .) In Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d 822 , our high court held that “in addition to circumscribing multiple punishments, section 654 establishes an independent rule regarding multiple prosecutions.” (People v. Spicer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372 .) The court explained the rule as follows: “When . . . the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited or severance permit

2024(People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248 , 306–307.) The instruction permits the jury to consider the effect of that untimely disclosure on the weight and significance of the evidence, but states the failure to timely disclose evidence is not itself evidence the defendant committed a crime. 22 The trial court also denied the prosecution’s motion to exclude the defense’s eviction evidence, but indicated it would allow the People to call a rebuttal witness.

2024That issue is not before this court in this appeal. 2 Further citations to rules refer to the California Rules of Court. 2 facts are in controversy”; “[w]hether live testimony is necessary for the court to assess the credibility of the parties or other witnesses”; and “[w]hether a party offering testimony from a non-party has complied with Family Code section 217[, subdivision] (c).”3 The court found M.H. had not complied with section 217, subdivision (c), which requires that “[a] party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file an

2024(See Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364 .) This argument takes the cited language from Brigham out of context and ignores the common understanding of the word “abiding.” In Brigham, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 290 , footnote 8, the Court considered the continuing viability of an instruction in which (1) the term “abiding” was not used; and (2) the instruction simply told the jury that the requisite proof was “that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.” The Court explained the instruction without the term abiding was not sufficient because, “[t]he lasting, permanent na

2024(See Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364 .) This argument takes the cited language from Brigham out of context and ignores the common understanding of the word “abiding.” In Brigham, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 290 , footnote 8, the Court considered the continuing viability of an instruction in which (1) the term “abiding” was not used; and (2) the instruction simply told the jury that the requisite proof was “that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.” The Court explained the instruction without the term abiding was not sufficient because, “[t]he lasting, permanent na

2024The court explained the requirement “the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent” (see Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pages 410) had not been satisfied.

2023(See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147, 151 [participating in parade without required permit].) The court explained the rule thusly: “ ‘It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.’ (Staub v. [City

2023(See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147, 151 [participating in parade without required permit].) The court explained the rule thusly: “ ‘It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.’ (Staub v. [City

2023This could be done, for instance, by indirectly including the cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract price.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693 .) In Kinsman, the court considered whether the Privette doctrine should extend to a case in which the plaintiff, a former employee of a scaffolding firm, developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos at a Unocal refinery in the 1950’s.

2022In United States v. Allen (9th Cir. 2022) 34 F.4th 789, 797 , the court explained that the test for “determining whether a particular closure order violates a defendant’s public trial right changes depending on whether the courtroom closure is total or partial.