explained doctrine in Ohio

2018"In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself." Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 47} In Goldfuss , the Court explained that the doctrine shall only be applied in extremely unusual circ

2018"In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself." Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 47} In Goldfuss , the Court explained that the doctrine shall only be applied in extremely unusual circ

2010The court stated: {¶ 18} “The strict standard for granting a directed verdict is found in Civ.R. 50(A)(4): ‘When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion {¶ 19} In Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284 , 21 O.O.3d 177 , 423 N.E.2d 467 , the court

2010The court stated: {¶ 18} “The strict standard for granting a directed verdict is found in Civ.R. 50(A)(4): ‘When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion {¶ 19} In Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284 , 21 O.O.3d 177 , 423 N.E.2d 467 , the court

2019Cuyahoga No. 100358, 2014-Ohio-2187 , this court explained the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to seal a record of conviction as follows: Generally, a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to seal records filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.52 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

2019Cuyahoga No. 100358, 2014-Ohio-2187 , this court explained the standard of review for a ruling on a motion to seal a record of conviction under R.C. 2953.52 as follows: Generally, a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to seal records filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.52 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

2023Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan Bd. of Trustees, 577 U.S. 136, 144-145 , 136 S.Ct. 651 , 193 L.Ed.2d 556 (2016).

2023Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan Bd. of Trustees, 577 U.S. 136, 144-145 , 136 S.Ct. 651 , 193 L.Ed.2d 556 (2016).

2017Weight of the Evidence {¶42} Lee maintains that the conclusion that he acted in concert with the principal offenders of the April 15, 2013 shooting is against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶43} In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 , N.E.2d 541 (1997), the court explained a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence as follows: Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.

2013The Court explained that the standard in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), a criminal case, also applied to civil cases.

2003The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction." {¶ 78} The Ohio Supreme Court incorporated this same statement as if it were its own when the Court explained the standard it was using in the 2001 case of State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49 .

2003The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction." {¶ 54} The Ohio Supreme Court incorporated this same statement as if it were its own when the Court explained the standard it was using in the 2001 case of State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49 .

2026State v. Sutton, 2025-Ohio-2487, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.). {¶26} In Sutton, this Court explained the standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel as follows: Regarding the first requirement, “[i]n order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment.” State v. Houston, 2010-Ohio- 6070, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2026State v. Sutton, 2025-Ohio-2487, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.). {¶26} In Sutton, this Court explained the standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel as follows: Regarding the first requirement, “[i]n order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment.” State v. Houston, 2010-Ohio- 6070, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2025The court also explained an error may be structural “if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure,” such as when a defendant is denied the right to select his or her own attorney, and if “the error always results in fundamental unfairness,” such as when a trial “judge fails to give a reasonable-doubt instruction.” Id. at 295-96 .

2025In exercising this discretion, a trial court must “consider the posture of the case and what efforts, if any, preceded the noncompliance and then balance the severity of the violation against the degree of possible sanctions, selecting that sanction which is most appropriate.” Id. {¶10} When it granted the motion to dismiss, the trial court explained its analysis of these factors: When considering the appropriate sanction in this matter, the Court reviewed the entire history of the case.

2023In Hartman, the “state offered the evidence for purposes of rebutting Hartman’s suggestion that even if [the second victim] did not consent to oral sex, he mistakenly thought that she had.” Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2020-Ohio-4440 , 161 N.E.3d 651, at ¶ 54 .

2023In Hartman, the “state offered the evidence for purposes of rebutting Hartman’s suggestion that even if [the second victim] did not consent to oral sex, he mistakenly thought that she had.” Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2020-Ohio-4440 , 161 N.E.3d 651, at ¶ 54 .

2020Id. at 348- 349.

2020(Tr. 13-14.) “[A] probable cause hearing held before a juvenile court’s transfer to adult court is a preliminary, non-adjudicatory proceeding[.]” Matter of B.W., 2017-Ohio-9220 , 103 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18, and State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 7-8 , 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).

2020(Tr. 13-14.) “[A] probable cause hearing held before a juvenile court’s transfer to adult court is a preliminary, non-adjudicatory proceeding[.]” Matter of B.W., 2017-Ohio-9220 , 103 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18, and State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 7-8 , 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).

2020(Tr. 13-14.) “[A] probable cause hearing held before a juvenile court’s transfer to adult court is a preliminary, non-adjudicatory proceeding[.]” Matter of B.W., 2017-Ohio-9220 , 103 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18, and State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 7-8 , 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).

2020(Tr. 13-14.) “[A] probable cause hearing held before a juvenile court’s transfer to adult court is a preliminary, non-adjudicatory proceeding[.]” Matter of B.W., 2017-Ohio-9220 , 103 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18, and State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 7-8 , 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973).

2019Cuyahoga No. 99886, 2013-Ohio-5135 , this court explained the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to seal a record of conviction as follows: In general, a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a request to seal records is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

2017Miami No. 2015-CA-28, 2016-Ohio-5647 , 2016 WL 4591377 , ¶ 9 ; see also R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).

2017Cuyahoga No. 97707, 2012-Ohio-2212 , 2012 WL 1795273 , ¶ 9. {¶ 8} There is a presumption in favor of arbitration where the disputed issue falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, "except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." DeVito v. Autos Direct Online, Inc. , 2015-Ohio-3336 , 37 N.E.3d 194 , ¶ 42 (8th Dist.) ( en banc ); Conte v. Blossom Homes L.L.C. , 2016-Ohio-7480 , 63 N.E.3d 1245 , ¶ 13. {¶ 9} In DeVito , this court explained that presumption as follows: It is well settled that the arbitration process is a favored method to settle d

2017This court explained the doctrine as follows: The collective knowledge doctrine recognizes that "[a] police officer need not always have knowledge of the specific facts justifying a stop and may rely, therefore, upon a police dispatch or flyer." Maumee v. Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d 295 , 297, 1999-Ohio-68 , 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), citing United States v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221 , 231, 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed. 2d 604 (1985). "[T]he admissibility of the evidence uncovered during such a stop does not rest upon whether the officers relying upon a dispatch or flyer 'were themselves aware of the specific

2017This court explained the doctrine as follows: The collective knowledge doctrine recognizes that "[a] police officer need not always have knowledge of the specific facts justifying a stop and may rely, therefore, upon a police dispatch or flyer." Maumee v. Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d 295 , 297, 1999-Ohio-68 , 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), citing United States v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221 , 231, 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed. 2d 604 (1985). "[T]he admissibility of the evidence uncovered during such a stop does not rest upon whether the officers relying upon a dispatch or flyer 'were themselves aware of the specific

2017Cuyahoga No. 97707, 2012-Ohio-2212 , 2012 WL 1795273 , ¶ 9. {¶ 8} There is a presumption in favor of arbitration where the disputed issue falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, "except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." DeVito v. Autos Direct Online, Inc. , 2015-Ohio-3336 , 37 N.E.3d 194 , ¶ 42 (8th Dist.) ( en banc ); Conte v. Blossom Homes L.L.C. , 2016-Ohio-7480 , 63 N.E.3d 1245 , ¶ 13. {¶ 9} In DeVito , this court explained that presumption as follows: It is well settled that the arbitration process is a favored method to settle d

2016Cuyahoga No. 100501, 2014-Ohio-3034 , the court explained the analysis as follows: Prejudice is not presumed solely due to a lengthy delay.

2015Id. at 2162 . {¶ 24} The court explained that the analysis pertaining to factors increasing a minimum sentence is similar to the analysis pertaining to factors increasing a maximum sentence by recognizing that “if a judge were to find a fact that increased the statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range.” Id.

2015Id. at 2162 . {¶ 24} The court explained that the analysis pertaining to factors increasing a minimum sentence is similar to the analysis pertaining to factors increasing a maximum sentence by recognizing that “if a judge were to find a fact that increased the statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range.” Id.

2014Id. at *14-16. {¶17} In contrast, appellant relies on Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312 , 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996), arguing that, regardless of Berry’s conduct, Underwood owed a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring Berry from the point she observed him on the tracks.

2014Id. at *14-16. {¶17} In contrast, appellant relies on Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312 , 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996), arguing that, regardless of Berry’s conduct, Underwood owed a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring Berry from the point she observed him on the tracks.

2013Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , ¶17-23.

2013Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , ¶17-23.

2013No. 98342, 2013-Ohio-30, ¶ 20 . {¶20} In Matthews, supra, this court explained the standard we apply in reviewing a consecutive sentence in light of the statutory requirement set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).