Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Files v. Bernalgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 9, ¶ 3 (App. 2004) (“Generally, a court abuses its discretion where the record fails to provide substantial support for its decision[.]”) (quoting Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64, 65, ¶ 2 (App. 2001)). ¶12 Furthermore, as the State points out on appeal, the cases on which Campbell relies to argue that the State was bound to the stipulation (Higgins, Pulliam, Gangadean, and Industrial Park) are distinguishable because none involved a party’s request to withdraw from a stipulation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cowlesgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 9, ¶ 3 (App. 2004) (“Generally, a court abuses its discretion where the record fails to provide substantial support for its decision[.]”) (quoting Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64, 65, ¶ 2 (App. 2001)). ¶12 Furthermore, as the State points out on appeal, the cases on which Campbell relies to argue that the State was bound to the stipulation (Higgins, Pulliam, Gangadean, and Industrial Park) are distinguishable because none involved a party’s request to withdraw from a stipulation. | 1 | 1 |
General Refractories Company Grefco, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company Gilberg & Kiernan Andrew Butz General Refractories Companygreen1 sentence2004The range of feeling in the initiating attorney evoked by that awareness might well vary from instances of actual indifference to instances of intense satisfaction____Liability should result only when the sense of awareness progresses to a sense of purpose, and, in addition the utilization of the procedure for the purposes for which it was designed becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate function as a reasonably justifiable litigation procedure. 133 Ariz. at 354 , 651 P.2d at 882 (emphasis added); see also General Refractories, 337 F.3d at 308 . | 1 | 1 |
Nienstedt v. Wetzelgreen2 sentences2004The range of feeling in the initiating attorney evoked by that awareness might well vary from instances of actual indifference to instances of intense satisfaction____Liability should result only when the sense of awareness progresses to a sense of purpose, and, in addition the utilization of the procedure for the purposes for which it was designed becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate function as a reasonably justifiable litigation procedure. 133 Ariz. at 354 , 651 P.2d at 882 (emphasis added); see also General Refractories, 337 F.3d at 308 . 2004The range of feeling in the initiating attorney evoked by that awareness might well vary from instances of actual indifference to instances of intense satisfaction____Liability should result only when the sense of awareness progresses to a sense of purpose, and, in addition the utilization of the procedure for the purposes for which it was designed becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate function as a reasonably justifiable litigation procedure. 133 Ariz. at 354 , 651 P.2d at 882 (emphasis added); see also General Refractories, 337 F.3d at 308 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 192 ¶ 32, 971 P.2d at 1053 ; accord Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. 2018Id. at 192 ¶ 32, 971 P.2d at 1053 ; accord Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Taylor v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2007In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), the Court explained this requirement guards against the exercise of arbitrary power, insuring that the “commonsense judgment of the community” will act as a “hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,” preserving “public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,” and implementing the belief that “sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.” Id. at 530-31 , 95 S.Ct. 692 . ¶ 13 Stewart never explains how allowing prospective jurors 75 or older to opt out of ju 2007In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), the Court explained this requirement guards against the exercise of arbitrary power, insuring that the “commonsense judgment of the community” will act as a “hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,” preserving “public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,” and implementing the belief that “sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.” Id. at 530-31 , 95 S.Ct. 692 . ¶ 13 Stewart never explains how allowing prospective jurors 75 or older to opt out of ju | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2006The court further explained, “[wjhere force has been exerted from an unidentified vehicle through an intermediate object and where this fact may be verified in such a way to provide safeguards against fraud, we find that the physical contact requirement of the policy has been satisfied.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 11 The court’s explanations and findings in Anderson are consistent with a finding that the physical contact requirement is satisfied where an intermediate object, here the tire tread, is projected into the claimant by another motor vehicle. 2006In reaching its conclusion, the court explained that the requirement of physical contact was designed to prevent fraudulent claims, and that the “trend is to construe ‘physical contact’ broadly in order to effectuate the purposes of uninsured motorist protection.” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Green Acres Trust v. London
green
2 sentences1999According to Green Acres, “to fall within the privilege, the defamatory publication must relate to, bear on or be connected with the proceeding.” Further, “[t]he defamatory content of the communication need not be ‘strictly relevant,’ but need only have ‘some reference to the subject matter of the proposed or pending litigation____’” Id. at 613 , 688 P.2d at 621 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586, comment c). 1999According to Green Acres, “to fall within the privilege, the defamatory publication must relate to, bear on or be connected with the proceeding.” Further, “[t]he defamatory content of the communication need not be ‘strictly relevant,’ but need only have ‘some reference to the subject matter of the proposed or pending litigation____’” Id. at 613 , 688 P.2d at 621 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586, comment c). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Employers Casualty Co. v. Moore
green
2 sentences1997In Employers Casualty, the court explained the rule against assignment of personal injury claims as an application of the survivability standard; personal injury claims were not assignable because they were “strictly personal” and could not survive the death of the injured party. 60 Ariz. at 548 , 142 P.2d at 415 . 1997In Employers Casualty, the court explained the rule against assignment of personal injury claims as an application of the survivability standard; personal injury claims were not assignable because they were “strictly personal” and could not survive the death of the injured party. 60 Ariz. at 548 , 142 P.2d at 415 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Cheatham v. Vanderwey
green
2 sentences1988However, in Cheatham v. Vanderwey, 18 Ariz.App. 35 , 499 P.2d 986 (1972), the court explained that the rule in Santos is “equally applicable to adverse possession claimed through a tenant or several tenants.” 18 Ariz.App. at 37 , 499 P.2d at 988 . 1988However, in Cheatham v. Vanderwey, 18 Ariz.App. 35 , 499 P.2d 986 (1972), the court explained that the rule in Santos is “equally applicable to adverse possession claimed through a tenant or several tenants.” 18 Ariz.App. at 37 , 499 P.2d at 988 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.