explained waiver in Indiana

1981The Court further stated: “The requirement of a ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ waiver was articulated in a case involving the validity of a defendant’s decision to forego a right constitutionally guaranteed to protect a fair trial and the reliability of -the truth-determining process.” Id. at 236 , 92 S.Ct. at 2052 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 868 .

1981The Court further stated: "The requirement of a `knowing' and `intelligent' waiver was articulated in a case involving the validity of a defendant's decision to forego a right constitutionally guaranteed to protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process." Id. at 236 , 92 S.Ct. at 2052 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 868 .

2001The court explained that these factors should be considered as they relate to the face of the statute, as opposed to the statute's effect on a single individual, and cautioned that a legislature's apparent attempt to impose a civil sanction should be rejected in favor of a conclusion that the proceeding actually results in a criminal penalty only in the face of " 'the clearest proof"" Id. at 100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ). 3.

2001The court explained that these factors should be considered as they relate to the face of the statute, as opposed to the statute's effect on a single individual, and cautioned that a legislature's apparent attempt to impose a civil sanction should be rejected in favor of a conclusion that the proceeding actually results in a criminal penalty only in the face of " 'the clearest proof"" Id. at 100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ). 3.

2001The court explained that these factors should be considered as they relate to the face of the statute, as opposed to the statute's effect on a single individual, and cautioned that a legislature's apparent attempt to impose a civil sanction should be rejected in favor of a conclusion that the proceeding actually results in a criminal penalty only in the face of " 'the clearest proof"" Id. at 100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ). 3.

1999Exception Four: Probability of Injury Absent Due Precaution As the Court of Appeals majority noted, the due precaution exception 3 makes an employer “liable for the negligence of an independent contractor ‘where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken.’ ” Carie, 694 N.E.2d at 735 (quoting Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586 ). 4 This Court explained the exception in Bagley : The essence of this exception is the foreseeability of the peculiar risk involved in the work and of the need for special precautions.

1999Exception Four: Probability of Injury Absent Due Precaution As the Court of Appeals majority noted, the due precaution exception 3 makes an employer “liable for the negligence of an independent contractor ‘where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken.’ ” Carie, 694 N.E.2d at 735 (quoting Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586 ). 4 This Court explained the exception in Bagley : The essence of this exception is the foreseeability of the peculiar risk involved in the work and of the need for special precautions.

1997The court explained that the rule “was simply a shorthand way of characterizing the duty owed by a landowner to those coming onto the premises under a public duty during emergencies.” Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 503 .

1997The court explained that the rule "was simply a shorthand way of characterizing the duty owed by a landowner to those coming onto the premises under a public duty during emergencies." Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 503 .

1995Rendleman, supra . [17] The court noted prior rejections to Art. 1, § 12 challenges in Sidle, supra (Guest Statute); Dague v. Piper Aircraft (1981) 275 Ind. 520 , 418 N.E.2d 207 , reh. denied (shortening of the statute of limitations in product liability actions); Pennington v. Stewart (1937) 212 Ind. 553 , 10 N.E.2d 619 (legislature's abolishment of a cause of action for alienation of affections); and Beecher v. White (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 622 , trans, denied (change in the statute of limitations for deficiencies in improvements to real property).

1995Rendleman, supra . [17] The court noted prior rejections to Art. 1, § 12 challenges in Sidle, supra (Guest Statute); Dague v. Piper Aircraft (1981) 275 Ind. 520 , 418 N.E.2d 207 , reh. denied (shortening of the statute of limitations in product liability actions); Pennington v. Stewart (1937) 212 Ind. 553 , 10 N.E.2d 619 (legislature's abolishment of a cause of action for alienation of affections); and Beecher v. White (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 622 , trans, denied (change in the statute of limitations for deficiencies in improvements to real property).

1995Rendleman, supra . [17] The court noted prior rejections to Art. 1, § 12 challenges in Sidle, supra (Guest Statute); Dague v. Piper Aircraft (1981) 275 Ind. 520 , 418 N.E.2d 207 , reh. denied (shortening of the statute of limitations in product liability actions); Pennington v. Stewart (1937) 212 Ind. 553 , 10 N.E.2d 619 (legislature's abolishment of a cause of action for alienation of affections); and Beecher v. White (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 622 , trans, denied (change in the statute of limitations for deficiencies in improvements to real property).

1995Rendleman, supra . [17] The court noted prior rejections to Art. 1, § 12 challenges in Sidle, supra (Guest Statute); Dague v. Piper Aircraft (1981) 275 Ind. 520 , 418 N.E.2d 207 , reh. denied (shortening of the statute of limitations in product liability actions); Pennington v. Stewart (1937) 212 Ind. 553 , 10 N.E.2d 619 (legislature's abolishment of a cause of action for alienation of affections); and Beecher v. White (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 622 , trans, denied (change in the statute of limitations for deficiencies in improvements to real property).

1995Rendleman, supra . [17] The court noted prior rejections to Art. 1, § 12 challenges in Sidle, supra (Guest Statute); Dague v. Piper Aircraft (1981) 275 Ind. 520 , 418 N.E.2d 207 , reh. denied (shortening of the statute of limitations in product liability actions); Pennington v. Stewart (1937) 212 Ind. 553 , 10 N.E.2d 619 (legislature's abolishment of a cause of action for alienation of affections); and Beecher v. White (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 622 , trans, denied (change in the statute of limitations for deficiencies in improvements to real property).

1995Rendleman, supra . [17] The court noted prior rejections to Art. 1, § 12 challenges in Sidle, supra (Guest Statute); Dague v. Piper Aircraft (1981) 275 Ind. 520 , 418 N.E.2d 207 , reh. denied (shortening of the statute of limitations in product liability actions); Pennington v. Stewart (1937) 212 Ind. 553 , 10 N.E.2d 619 (legislature's abolishment of a cause of action for alienation of affections); and Beecher v. White (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 622 , trans, denied (change in the statute of limitations for deficiencies in improvements to real property).

1985In Dortch v. Lugar (1971), 255 Ind. 545, 572 , 266 N.E.2d 25, 42 , the Court explained this exception: "[The Legislature may create such special taxing districts for local public improvements and provide for the levy of special ad valorem taxes throughout the district based upon the benefit accruing to the property holders therein situated; the Legislature may determine the boundaries of such districts or delegate to an agency the power to so determine them, conforming or not to the political or governmental subdivision there located; the Legislature may designate the agency to perform the adm

1985In Dortch v. Lugar (1971), 255 Ind. 545, 572 , 266 N.E.2d 25, 42 , the Court explained this exception: "[The Legislature may create such special taxing districts for local public improvements and provide for the levy of special ad valorem taxes throughout the district based upon the benefit accruing to the property holders therein situated; the Legislature may determine the boundaries of such districts or delegate to an agency the power to so determine them, conforming or not to the political or governmental subdivision there located; the Legislature may designate the agency to perform the adm

1982In Dimmick v. Follis, (1953) 123 Ind.App. 701 , 111 N.E.2d 486 , this court explained the requirement that the actor perceive a perilous situation. “[A]t no time was the appellee conscious of peril and no conduct on her part was prompted by a sudden realization of danger.

1982In Dimmick v. Follis, (1953) 123 Ind.App. 701 , 111 N.E.2d 486 , this court explained the requirement that the actor perceive a perilous situation. “[A]t no time was the appellee conscious of peril and no conduct on her part was prompted by a sudden realization of danger.

1981The Court explained that the error stemmed from the instruction’s invasion of the jury’s exclusive province to determine both the law and the facts in criminal cases and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused from a consideration of all the facts and circumstances in the case: “[A]ny instruction by the court which in any manner takes from the jury this exclusive duty, or which attaches weight to certain evidence, or which would in any manner place the burden upon the defendant to prove his innocence or introduce evidence to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, is err

1981In Goodpaster v. State, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 1239 , this Court explained the analysis to be used in determining whether an offense is an included offense of the charged crime.

1981In Goodpaster v. State, (1980) Ind., 402 N.E.2d 1239 , this Court explained the analysis to be used in determining whether an offense is an included offense of the charged crime.

1981In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, the accused argued that a “consent” to a search under the Fourth Amendment should be evaluated by the same standards used to determine a “waiver” for Sixth Amendment purposes, under the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. In disposing of this argument, the Court explained that the waiver standards of Johnson v. Zerbst, “ * * * were enunciated ... in the context of a fair criminal trial.” 412 U.S. at 235 , 93 S.Ct. at 2052 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 867 .

1981In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, the accused argued that a “consent” to a search under the Fourth Amendment should be evaluated by the same standards used to determine a “waiver” for Sixth Amendment purposes, under the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. In disposing of this argument, the Court explained that the waiver standards of Johnson v. Zerbst, “ * * * were enunciated ... in the context of a fair criminal trial.” 412 U.S. at 235 , 93 S.Ct. at 2052 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 867 .

1972Less than a year after Wade and Gilbert were decided the Court explained the rule of those decisions as follows: ‘The rationale of those cases was that an accused is entitled to counsel at any ‘critical stage of the prosecution,’ and that a post-indictment lineup is such a ‘critical stage.’ ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-383 .