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16 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd.red2 sentences2023In Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., this Court explained that the rule required a “three-step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) Is the expert’s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert’s testimony relevant?” 358 N.C. 440, 458 (2004) (citations omitted), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020). 2023In Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., this Court explained that the rule required a “three-step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) Is the expert’s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert’s testimony relevant?” 358 N.C. 440, 458 (2004) (citations omitted), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020). | 2 | 2 |
Wray v. City of Greensborogreen2 sentences2023Stein [v. Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560 , 2021-NCSC-163], ¶ 23 (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360 , 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013)); see also Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47 , 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (“Questions of law regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity are reviewed de novo.” (quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611 , 781 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016))). 2023Stein [v. Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560 , 2021-NCSC-163], ¶ 23 (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360 , 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013)); see also Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47 , 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (“Questions of law regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity are reviewed de novo.” (quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611 , 781 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016))). | 1 | 1 |
Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2023Stein [v. Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560 , 2021-NCSC-163], ¶ 23 (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360 , 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013)); see also Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47 , 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (“Questions of law regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity are reviewed de novo.” (quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611 , 781 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016))). 2023Stein [v. Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560 , 2021-NCSC-163], ¶ 23 (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360 , 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013)); see also Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47 , 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (“Questions of law regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity are reviewed de novo.” (quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611 , 781 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016))). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Coxgreen2 sentences2016Gen.Stat. § 5A-22(a) (2011) ; see also Cox, 133 N.C.App. at 226 , 515 S.E.2d at 65 (holding that a contempt order must "clearly specify what the defendant can and cannot do"); [ Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C.App. 382 , 394, 579 S.E.2d 431 , 439 (2003) ] (holding that requirements to purge civil contempt may not be "impermissibly vague"). 2016Gen.Stat. § 5A-22(a) (2011) ; see also Cox, 133 N.C.App. at 226 , 515 S.E.2d at 65 (holding that a contempt order must "clearly specify what the defendant can and cannot do"); [ Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C.App. 382 , 394, 579 S.E.2d 431 , 439 (2003) ] (holding that requirements to purge civil contempt may not be "impermissibly vague"). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Allredgreen2 sentences2002Id. at 12 , 519 S.E.2d at 58 (emphasis added). 2002Id. at 12 , 519 S.E.2d at 58 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1981In State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 24 , 191 S.E.2d 641, 657 (1972), the Court explained the rule for determining the value of property before a taking: In condemnation proceedings the determinative question is: In its condition on the day of the taking, what was the value of the land for the highest and best use to which it would be put by owners possessed of prudence, wisdom, and adequate means? 1981In State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 24 , 191 S.E.2d 641, 657 (1972), the Court explained the rule for determining the value of property before a taking: In condemnation proceedings the determinative question is: In its condition on the day of the taking, what was the value of the land for the highest and best use to which it would be put by owners possessed of prudence, wisdom, and adequate means? | 1 | 1 |
State v. . Caldwellgreen2 sentences1980In State v. Caldwell, 181 N.C. 519, 527 , 106 S.E. 139, 143 (1921), the Court approved of trial court’s refusal to give exhibits to the jury, stating that “unless by consent and in certain restricted instances allowed by statute, the jury must determine the cause on the evidence as it is heard by them, or as presented in open court, and is not allowed to take with them documentary or other evidence for their private inspection [citations omitted].” In Watson v. Davis, 52 N.C. 178, 181 (1859), the Court explained the rule as follows: The jury ought to make up their verdict upon evidence offered 1980In State v. Caldwell, 181 N.C. 519, 527 , 106 S.E. 139, 143 (1921), the Court approved of trial court’s refusal to give exhibits to the jury, stating that “unless by consent and in certain restricted instances allowed by statute, the jury must determine the cause on the evidence as it is heard by them, or as presented in open court, and is not allowed to take with them documentary or other evidence for their private inspection [citations omitted].” In Watson v. Davis, 52 N.C. 178, 181 (1859), the Court explained the rule as follows: The jury ought to make up their verdict upon evidence offered | 1 | 1 |
Watson v. . Davisgreen1 sentence1980In State v. Caldwell, 181 N.C. 519, 527 , 106 S.E. 139, 143 (1921), the Court approved of trial court’s refusal to give exhibits to the jury, stating that “unless by consent and in certain restricted instances allowed by statute, the jury must determine the cause on the evidence as it is heard by them, or as presented in open court, and is not allowed to take with them documentary or other evidence for their private inspection [citations omitted].” In Watson v. Davis, 52 N.C. 178, 181 (1859), the Court explained the rule as follows: The jury ought to make up their verdict upon evidence offered | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae
green
2 sentences2023In Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., this Court explained that the rule required a “three-step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) Is the expert’s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert’s testimony relevant?” 358 N.C. 440, 458 (2004) (citations omitted), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020). 2023In Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., this Court explained that the rule required a “three-step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) Is the expert’s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert’s testimony relevant?” 358 N.C. 440, 458 (2004) (citations omitted), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409 (2020). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Cortes-Serrano
green
2 sentences2022State v. Cortes-Serrano, 195 N.C. App. 644 , 654-55, 673 S.E.2d 756 , 762-63 (2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). ¶ 20 In State v. Martin, citing Cortes-Serrano, this Court explained the factors for consideration as to the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession: The determination of whether a defendant’s statements are voluntary and admissible is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal. 2022State v. Cortes-Serrano, 195 N.C. App. 644 , 654-55, 673 S.E.2d 756 , 762-63 (2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). ¶ 20 In State v. Martin, citing Cortes-Serrano, this Court explained the factors for consideration as to the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession: The determination of whether a defendant’s statements are voluntary and admissible is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Tumey v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2022This principle was recognized nearly one hundred years ago by the United States Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), where the Court explained that the test for impartiality is not whether judges “of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry . . . on [the proceeding] without danger of injustice,” id. at 532 . 2022This principle was recognized nearly one hundred years ago by the United States Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), where the Court explained that the test for impartiality is not whether judges “of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry . . . on [the proceeding] without danger of injustice,” id. at 532 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences2021Whether this error constitutes plain error depends on the nature of the evidence introduced at trial.” Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 43 In Bell, this Court explained this error is highly fact sensitive and based on which theory is misrepresented and what the facts tend to show. 2021Whether this error constitutes plain error depends on the nature of the evidence introduced at trial.” Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 43 In Bell, this Court explained this error is highly fact sensitive and based on which theory is misrepresented and what the facts tend to show. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
White v. Trew, 366 NC 360
green
2 sentences2023Stein [v. Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560 , 2021-NCSC-163], ¶ 23 (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360 , 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013)); see also Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47 , 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (“Questions of law regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity are reviewed de novo.” (quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611 , 781 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016))). 2023Stein [v. Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560 , 2021-NCSC-163], ¶ 23 (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360 , 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013)); see also Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47 , 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (“Questions of law regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity are reviewed de novo.” (quoting Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611 , 781 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016))). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Caromont Health, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Health
green
1 sentence2017The Court explained that the claim of harm arose "solely out of the fact that competition would be increased by virtue of the authorization of two additional GI endoscopy rooms located in Gaston County" so "patients and doctors in Gaston County would now have a choice between CaroMont's facilities and another separate facility also located in Gaston County." Id . at 9, 751 S.E.2d at 250 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Scott v. Scott
green
2 sentences2016Gen.Stat. § 5A-22(a) (2011) ; see also Cox, 133 N.C.App. at 226 , 515 S.E.2d at 65 (holding that a contempt order must "clearly specify what the defendant can and cannot do"); [ Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C.App. 382 , 394, 579 S.E.2d 431 , 439 (2003) ] (holding that requirements to purge civil contempt may not be "impermissibly vague"). 2016Gen.Stat. § 5A-22(a) (2011) ; see also Cox, 133 N.C.App. at 226 , 515 S.E.2d at 65 (holding that a contempt order must "clearly specify what the defendant can and cannot do"); [ Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C.App. 382 , 394, 579 S.E.2d 431 , 439 (2003) ] (holding that requirements to purge civil contempt may not be "impermissibly vague"). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Exum v. Boyles
green
2 sentences2013In Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567 , 158 S.E.2d 845 (1968), the Court explained the doctrine of last clear chance in the following way: [I]t is well established in this State that where the defendant does owe the plaintiff the duty of maintaining a lookout and, had he done so, could have discovered the plaintiffs helpless peril in time to avoid injuring him by then exercising reasonable care, the doctrine of the last clear chance does impose liability if the defendant failed to take such action to avoid the injury. 2013In Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567 , 158 S.E.2d 845 (1968), the Court explained the doctrine of last clear chance in the following way: [I]t is well established in this State that where the defendant does owe the plaintiff the duty of maintaining a lookout and, had he done so, could have discovered the plaintiffs helpless peril in time to avoid injuring him by then exercising reasonable care, the doctrine of the last clear chance does impose liability if the defendant failed to take such action to avoid the injury. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company
green
2 sentences2004Likewise, in Brown , the Court explained that a claim against a UM carrier “is actually one for the tort allegedly committed by the uninsured motorist.” Brown, 285 N.C. at 319 , 204 S.E.2d at 834 . 2004Likewise, in Brown , the Court explained that a claim against a UM carrier “is actually one for the tort allegedly committed by the uninsured motorist.” Brown, 285 N.C. at 319 , 204 S.E.2d at 834 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.