29 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.green2 sentences2026In Mount v. Board of Trustees, PFRS, 233 N.J. 402, 427 (2018), the Court explained the analysis requires "the Board and a reviewing court [to] carefully consider not only the member's job responsibilities and training, but all aspects of the event itself. 2024In Mount v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 233 N.J. 402, 427 (2018), the Court explained the analysis requires "the Board and a reviewing court [to] carefully consider not only the member's job A-3332-21 8 responsibilities and training, but all aspects of the event itself. | 2 | 2 |
Hawkins v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2024Relying upon Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995), the court explained the privilege "applies to both invasion of privacy and negligence A-0273-21 24 claims" and protects "any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." It concluded the disclosure of medical information in the Passaic County action was covered by the privilege because it was "(1) made in a judicial context[,] (2) by a party to | 1 | 1 |
Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc.green1 sentence2024As to negligence, the court noted "a tort remedy does not arise from a contractual relationship unless the breaching party owes an independent duty imposed by law" under Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 170 N.J. 297, 316 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Kovalcik v. Somerset County Prosecutor's Officegreen2 sentences2022In its review of the third exception in section 10, the Court explained the exception “narrow[s] the mandate of disclosure” to “a specific, or particular, educational qualification that is a prerequisite” for a government position “and only if the record demonstrates compliance with that specific requirement is it subject to being disclosed pursuant to OPRA.” Id. at 593 (emphasis added). 2022Under the statute’s plain language, the Court observed, a “document in dispute can only be found to be within the exception to the exemption if it discloses, and only to the extent that it discloses, that [a detective] had completed specific training or education that was required for her employment . . . with the Prosecutor’s Office.” Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc.green1 sentence2021In Lehmann, the Court explained the doctrine as providing vicarious liability for an employer because the creation of a hostile work environment by a supervisor depends on whether he or she "was aided in accomplishing that tort by the power delegated . . . to control the day-to-day working environment." 132 N.J. at 620 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Tmgreen2 sentences2020A-3376-18T2 13 In Campfield, the Court explained the inquiry of a defendant during the plea hearing need not follow a "prescribed or artificial ritual." 213 N.J. at 231 (quoting State ex rel T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 326 (2001)). "[D]ifferent criminal charges and different defendants require courts to act flexibly to achieve constitutional ends." Ibid. (quoting T.M., 166 N.J. at 327 ) (alteration in original). 2020A-3376-18T2 13 In Campfield, the Court explained the inquiry of a defendant during the plea hearing need not follow a "prescribed or artificial ritual." 213 N.J. at 231 (quoting State ex rel T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 326 (2001)). "[D]ifferent criminal charges and different defendants require courts to act flexibly to achieve constitutional ends." Ibid. (quoting T.M., 166 N.J. at 327 ) (alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
Tanner v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Ed. at 1302 ; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 , 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747 , 97 L. 2017Ed. at 1302 ; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 , 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747 , 97 L. | 1 | 1 |
Manson v. Brathwaitegreen2 sentences2008The Court framed the issue presented as follows: "[W]hether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary. " Id. at 99 , 97 S.Ct. at 2245 , 53 L.Ed. 2d at 144 (emphasis added). [5] In Manson , as in Stovall, the Court explained that the standard is "fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 113 , 97 S.Ct. at 2252 , 53 L.Ed. 2d at 153 . 2008The Court framed the issue presented as follows: "[W]hether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary. " Id. at 99 , 97 S.Ct. at 2245 , 53 L.Ed. 2d at 144 (emphasis added). [5] In Manson , as in Stovall, the Court explained that the standard is "fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 113 , 97 S.Ct. at 2252 , 53 L.Ed. 2d at 153 . | 1 | 1 |
Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmarygreen2 sentences2008Principally, the Court explained that the doctrine was merely a judicially-created one, see Collopy, supra, 27 N.J. at 31, 141 A.2d 276 ; that it had been eroded over time through court-sanctioned exceptions, id. at 31-32 , 141 A.2d 276 ; that it had little historical basis as compared to other common law tort duties, id. at 32 , 141 A.2d 276 ; that it had been increasingly criticized by courts of other states for its “lack of current utility or justification,” id. at 33 , 141 A.2d 276 ; and that it had engendered “overwhelming[ ]” opposition in the “[pjrofessorial and student writings,” id. a 2008Principally, the Court explained that the doctrine was merely a judicially-created one, see Collopy, supra, 27 N.J. at 31, 141 A.2d 276 ; that it had been eroded over time through court-sanctioned exceptions, id. at 31-32 , 141 A.2d 276 ; that it had little historical basis as compared to other common law tort duties, id. at 32 , 141 A.2d 276 ; that it had been increasingly criticized by courts of other states for its “lack of current utility or justification,” id. at 33 , 141 A.2d 276 ; and that it had engendered “overwhelming[ ]” opposition in the “[pjrofessorial and student writings,” id. a | 1 | 1 |
| Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Mellk v. Sarahsongreen2 sentences1995E.g., Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 514-15 [ 263 A. 2d 129 ] (1970); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 228-29 [ 229 A. 2d 625 ] (1967). 1995E.g., Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 514-15 [ 263 A. 2d 129 ] (1970); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 228-29 [ 229 A. 2d 625 ] (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Campbell Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
green
2 sentences2025Further, the Court explained the standard is couched "in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances." Id. at 69 . 2016Further, the Court explained the standard is couched "in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances." Id. at 69 , 126 S. Ct. at 2415 , 165 L. | 2 | 2016–2025 |
Kelly v. Gwinnell
green
2 sentences2011In Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544 , 476 A.2d 1219 (1984), the Court explained this analysis: In most cases the justice of imposing such a duty is so clear that the cause of action in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor’s creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury. 2011In Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544 , 476 A.2d 1219 (1984), the Court explained this analysis: In most cases the justice of imposing such a duty is so clear that the cause of action in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor’s creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury. | 2 | 1992–2011 |
D'Atria v. D'Atria
green
1 sentence2021In denying defendant's motion, the court explained the standard for reconsideration under D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp.
green
1 sentence2021"Judicial review of [a] hospital board action 'should properly focus on the reasonableness of the action taken in A-0380-19 35 relation to the several interests of the public, the [physician], and the hospital.'" Zoneraich, 212 N.J. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Campfield
green
1 sentence2020A-3376-18T2 13 In Campfield, the Court explained the inquiry of a defendant during the plea hearing need not follow a "prescribed or artificial ritual." 213 N.J. at 231 (quoting State ex rel T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 326 (2001)). "[D]ifferent criminal charges and different defendants require courts to act flexibly to achieve constitutional ends." Ibid. (quoting T.M., 166 N.J. at 327 ) (alteration in original). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.
green
1 sentence2020The Court explained that the waiver rule "is simply a procedural rule of litigation necessary to avoid unfairness to the other party and waste of adjudicatory resources." Id. at 197 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Slater
green
2 sentences2019In State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), the Court explained the factors trial courts must balance in exercising their discretion to grant defendants' motions to withdraw guilty pleas. 2019Id. at 157-58 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
McDonald v. Pless
green
2 sentences2017Rep. 1612, 1613-14 (1839)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 A-3491-15T2 The Court explained the rule, which is now almost universally applied, against receiving such evidence from jurors is ultimately "based upon controlling considerations of a public policy which in these cases chooses the lesser of two evils." Id. at 267 , 35 S. Ct. at 784 , 59 L. 2017Rep. 1612, 1613-14 (1839)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 A-3491-15T2 The Court explained the rule, which is now almost universally applied, against receiving such evidence from jurors is ultimately "based upon controlling considerations of a public policy which in these cases chooses the lesser of two evils." Id. at 267 , 35 S. Ct. at 784 , 59 L. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lessee of Cluggage v. Swain
green
1 sentence2017Rep. 1612, 1613-14 (1839)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 A-3491-15T2 The Court explained the rule, which is now almost universally applied, against receiving such evidence from jurors is ultimately "based upon controlling considerations of a public policy which in these cases chooses the lesser of two evils." Id. at 267 , 35 S. Ct. at 784 , 59 L. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Moran
green
1 sentence2014Ibid. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Potente v. County of Hudson
green
2 sentences2013Likewise, in Potente v. County of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 114 , 900 A.2d 787 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court rejected as “simply wrong” the analysis of some prior cases that “prejudgment interest will not be awarded against a public entity except where provided by statute.” The Court explained that [w]hat the [pre-judgment interest] rule actually says is that pre-judgment interest shall be awarded against all defendants unless it is prohibited by applicable law. 2013Likewise, in Potente v. County of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 114 , 900 A.2d 787 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court rejected as “simply wrong” the analysis of some prior cases that “prejudgment interest will not be awarded against a public entity except where provided by statute.” The Court explained that [w]hat the [pre-judgment interest] rule actually says is that pre-judgment interest shall be awarded against all defendants unless it is prohibited by applicable law. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Levine v. Busick
green
1 sentence2013Levine v. Busick, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (involving the validity of Rule 4:42-11(b), which authorizes] prejudgment interest in tort actions), where the Court explained the rule’s interaction with the Act: After the adoption of the prejudgment interest rule ..., the Legislature enacted the [Act,] which provides in N.J.S.A 59:9-2a that “[n]o interest shall accrue prior to the entry of judgment against a public entity or public employee.” We have approved an amendment to our rule of Court which will except that situation. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Turner v. Egan
green
1 sentence2013Levine v. Busick, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (involving the validity of Rule 4:42-11(b), which authorizes] prejudgment interest in tort actions), where the Court explained the rule’s interaction with the Act: After the adoption of the prejudgment interest rule ..., the Legislature enacted the [Act,] which provides in N.J.S.A 59:9-2a that “[n]o interest shall accrue prior to the entry of judgment against a public entity or public employee.” We have approved an amendment to our rule of Court which will except that situation. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Outpost Development Corp. v. United States
green
1 sentence2013Levine v. Busick, 414 U.S. 1106 , 94 S.Ct. 831 , 38 L.Ed.2d 733 (1973) (involving the validity of Rule 4:42-11(b), which authorizes] prejudgment interest in tort actions), where the Court explained the rule’s interaction with the Act: After the adoption of the prejudgment interest rule ..., the Legislature enacted the [Act,] which provides in N.J.S.A 59:9-2a that “[n]o interest shall accrue prior to the entry of judgment against a public entity or public employee.” We have approved an amendment to our rule of Court which will except that situation. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Dupree v. City of Clifton
green
2 sentences2011In Dupree v. City of Clifton, 351 N.J.Super. 237, 245 , 798 A. 2d 105 (2002), the court explained the analysis courts should use when determining whether a religious organization owes a duty to a plaintiff who suffers an injury on a negligently maintained abutting sidewalk. 2011In Dupree v. City of Clifton, 351 N.J.Super. 237, 245 , 798 A. 2d 105 (2002), the court explained the analysis courts should use when determining whether a religious organization owes a duty to a plaintiff who suffers an injury on a negligently maintained abutting sidewalk. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 273 , 225 A. 2d 130 . 2009Id. at 273 , 225 A. 2d 130 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Job Haines Home for the Aged v. Township of Bloomfield
green
1 sentence2007The court explained that the exception carved out in Paper Mill Playhouse was for property that had been “previously exempt, but, for one reason or another, discontinue[d] actual use of the property during a discrete reconstruction period.” Ibid. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Paper Mill Playhouse v. Township of Millburn
green
1 sentence2007In Paper Mill Playhouse , the building had been destroyed by fire and was under reconstruction during the tax year- in issue, and the court determined that a continued exempt character exception to the actual use standard should be applied. 7 N.J.Tax at 86 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder
green
1 sentence2006The court explained that the immunity “is grounded upon critical social considerations, for, if an attorney must work in constant fear of civil liability, it is the rights of the public that will suffer.” Ibid. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
green
2 sentences2006In Dewey, supra, 121 N.J. at 94 , 577 A. 2d 1239 , our Supreme Court considered whether the PLA, which "provides a defense to manufacturers and sellers for harms caused by products whose dangerous propensities are known to the ordinary user, can retroactively insulate these defendants from liability for design defects inherent in their cigarettes." The Court explained that the defense in N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a(2), regarding design defect, "combines the `consumer expectations' doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis [in Ca 2006In Dewey, supra, 121 N.J. at 94 , 577 A. 2d 1239 , our Supreme Court considered whether the PLA, which "provides a defense to manufacturers and sellers for harms caused by products whose dangerous propensities are known to the ordinary user, can retroactively insulate these defendants from liability for design defects inherent in their cigarettes." The Court explained that the defense in N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a(2), regarding design defect, "combines the `consumer expectations' doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis [in Ca | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of City of Newark green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Cook v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Crater v. County of Somerset green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| In Re Huyler green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Salorio v. Glaser green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Salorio v. Glaser green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Payne v. Texas green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Jerokovitch v. Ricciuti green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.